MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article by the former Chief of Civil Defense proceeds from the assumption that victory in a nuclear war is dependent upon cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces. The author especially emphasizes the need for state-wide, unified systems for warning and communications and for radiation observation and monitoring. He identifies the tasks the armed forces can best perform, and offers the opinion that a unified cooperation plan is needed to tie together the activities of civil defense and military forces and facilities. Joint exercises should be developed and conducted, and civil defense departments established in military educational institutions. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William W. Wells

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov. This article proceeds from the assumption that victory in a nuclear war is dependent upon cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces. The author especially emphasizes the need for state-wide unified systems for warning and communications and for radiation observation and monitoring. He identifies the tasks of the armed forces as providing communications and warning, maintaining civil order, assisting the victims of nuclear attack, and, in conjunction with the civil defense forces, conducting emergency restoration operations. It is his opinion that a unified cooperation plan is needed to tie together the activities of civil defense and military forces and facilities. Joint exercises should be developed and conducted, and civil defense departments established in military educational institutions.

Comment:
Of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov was Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR from 1961 to 1972. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
A number of articles on civil defense were published in 1965 in the journals Military Thought and Civil Defense of the USSR. They analyzed the changes in the means of conducting a modern war and the nature of this war and, in connection with this, both the role and place of civil defense in the overall system of the defensive measures of the state, its main tasks, and methods for accomplishing them. These articles unquestionably helped the leaders and all workers in civil defense, as well as the generals and officers of the armed forces, to more fully picture the vast range of problems to be solved in protecting the population and economy of the country.

Among the large number of diverse and complex problems, which are of interest both to civil defense and the armed forces, a special place is afforded to cooperation between them in a nuclear war.

Sufficient attention was not devoted to researching this problem in previous articles. However, the achievement of victory in a nuclear war will depend largely on the proper solution of this problem.

We will mention right away that the problem of organizing cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces is a new one, and, perhaps for this reason, some of our military workers underestimate its importance. The fact that not everyone has formed a clear idea of the purpose of civil defense, its nature, main tasks, and the methods of fulfilling those tasks in a nuclear war, also undoubtedly has an effect. There are even frequent instances where modern civil defense is regarded as being the same as the local air defense which existed earlier. This, of course, is not the case.
In speaking about cooperation, it is necessary to state some theses which form the basis for its organization. Thus, we are firmly convinced that it is impossible to separate the training and employment of the armed forces in a modern war from the remaining defensive measures of the state, including civil defense, since the active protection of the country (actions by the armed forces) is inseparably linked with so-called passive protection (civil defense). After all, the victorious side will be the one that will be able not only to deliver nuclear strikes and aggressively conduct large-scale offensive actions at the front, but also to protect its economic potential and, most important, its population, from nuclear strikes and other means of destruction. And, it is impossible to accomplish the task of ensuring the survival of the state in a nuclear war without very close cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense. This is why all the defensive measures of the country must comprise a unified system and be directed from a single center.

Other military researchers object to allocating the armed forces to help civil defense, believing that this will divert them from fulfilling their own basic tasks and, as a result, will be detrimental to the accomplishment of the main tasks of the armed forces.

We cannot share such a view. In examining this question, we must assume that, in a nuclear war, each warring side will persistently strive to destroy the military-economic potential of the enemy. First, enemies will attempt to destroy the industry which produces nuclear weapons and other highly improved means of armed combat. And, inasmuch as enterprises of virtually all branches of the national economy take part in this production to some extent, it is inevitable that high-yield nuclear strikes will be delivered against the most important industrial, political and administrative centers where a large part of the country's population lives. A considerable part of the conscripted manpower pool, equipment and supplies enter the armed forces from these centers; numerous military units, staffs, military educational institutions and various facilities of the armed forces are located in them. Therefore, protection of the major industrial centers is inseparably linked with protection of the entire population, and, consequently, is important for ensuring the survival of the state during a nuclear war.
How can the protection of armed forces personnel against bacteriological weapons be carried out separately from the protection of the entire population of the country? We would like especially to consider this question. The spontaneous outbreak of cholera, which occurred in Iran and Afghanistan in the summer of 1965 and was comparatively limited in scale, illustrated how difficult it is to combat an epidemic even in a quiet, peaceful situation.

Consequently, protection against bacterial means must be carried out with close cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR determined the basic principle of protecting the population against nuclear strikes to be the dispersal of the population beforehand. When this measure is carried out, as calculations show, losses of population from nuclear strikes of the same yield can be decreased 35 to 40 times.

Naturally, this principle of dispersal also extends to military units and facilities located in cities.

It is fitting to pose the question: what will military units and facilities located in garrisons do in the event the aggressor delivers a nuclear strike, or employs other means of mass destruction against the political, administrative and economic centers of the country? Will they participate in rescue and emergency restoration work? Of course, we do take into account that troops, based on their function, will fulfill the tasks assigned to them. However, even in this case, in our opinion, some of these troops should be allocated to do rescue and emergency restoration work. This pertains especially to those troops who are not directly conducting combat actions (academies, military schools, construction units, etc.).

For troops moving to the front from interior military districts, an exceptionally serious problem can arise in connection with the destruction of transportation centers. Until movement through these centers is restored, or bypasses are built, the troops will not be able to advance. Therefore, in order to resume movement, they will also have to take part in a
number of restoration operations.

In this way, troops must help the stricken population, take part in restoring the industry of cities and the transportation lines, and thus assist civil defense which, in turn, will also greatly help the armed forces to fulfill their tasks by eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes and the employment of other types of weapons. This is what cooperation consists of.

What, then, are the tasks which the armed forces will have to fulfill in support of civil defense during the special and initial periods of a war?

Among the tasks which the armed forces will fulfill in order to protect the population, warning the population about the threat of an enemy attack occupies a special place. It is necessary to take into account that civil defense does not and cannot have its own system of long-range reconnaissance and observation. Therefore, it will receive data about the threat of an enemy attack most quickly only from staffs and the Air Defense Forces of the Country. Further transmission of information can be done either via the independent civil defense warning and communications net, or via the net of the Air Defense Forces of the Country. In our opinion, it is advisable to have a unified warning and communications system in the country. This will ensure more rapid transmission of signals to installations of the national economy and the entire population, and it is more advantageous for economic reasons.

The exercise conducted in the Ukrainian SSR in 1965 was instructive in this regard. For the first time during this exercise the "Air Alert" signal was transmitted not from the civil defense command post, but from the command posts of an army of the Air Defense Forces of the Country and its units. The results were good. The very first warning signal reached the oblast civil defense command posts within two minutes. This means that, after conducting the necessary training for personnel, the speed at which oblasts are warned can be reduced to one minute. This result is achieved without any additional expense, but only with proper organization and the maintenance of continuous cooperation. Precisely this method is used in many foreign countries. As is stated in the annual report of the US
Civil Defense Headquarters for the 1964 fiscal year, which was presented to President Johnson, the Joint North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) supports civil defense warning centers and provides them with necessary information, and a joint armed forces communications agency controls the civil defense communications systems and the national warning system.

One of the most important tasks of the armed forces, when cooperating with civil defense and militia organs during a nuclear war, should be considered to be ensuring good organization and order in economic and administrative centers, on transportation lines, etc. This should surprise no one: the last war showed conclusively that a high degree of discipline within the population as a whole is very important. Since then the importance of this has increased many times over.

In case of an immediate threat of the employment of weapons of great destructive power by the enemy and, moreover, if they have already been employed, individual persons can cause serious panic.

Let us take an incident which occurred in the Chinese city of Chung-hsien at the beginning of 1941. During one of the air raids by Japanese aviation, approximately 12,000 people were in a large bomb shelter, which was well protected against the very largest bombs. During the bombing of the city, someone in the shelter shouted: "Gas!". Chaos resulted: everyone pushed toward the exit, the strong ones knocked down and trampled the weak and then fell along with the others; they blocked the exits, shutting off the air supply. The majority of the people in the shelter died as a result of a panic which began with one word, said possibly by accident or as a joke.

According to the plan of the civil defense leadership, there will be large-scale movements of people from residences and industrial enterprises to shelters or a non-urban zone during the "special period". At this time nothing can guarantee against the appearance of panic-causing rumors and panicky conduct on the part of not only isolated individuals but whole groups, especially since the enemy also will be actively trying to cause such panic through its agents. The rise of general confusion is not ruled out. Troops, especially cadets of military schools and units from local garrisons, are best able to instil confidence in
the people and establish a calmer atmosphere.

By no means are we skeptical of the ability of the militia to bring about and maintain order, but the forces of the militia will obviously be insufficient when masses of the population consisting of many millions of people are moved. Besides this, organized, highly disciplined troops instil calmness and confidence in masses of people by their very presence and fearless conduct.

The next task, which will require the allocation of troops along with civil defense organs for its fulfilment, is that of assisting the population which has been subjected to weapons of mass destruction. Troops (mechanized, artillery, engineer or special units) possess high mobility and are equipped with everything necessary for rescue work. They can accurately determine the coordinates of centers of destruction, the scales of areas of destruction resulting from the shock wave, the results of the effect of thermal radiation and the aftereffects of radiation contamination; they can quickly arrive at centers of destruction and immediately begin the rescue and prompt evacuation of people to uncontaminated areas and medical facilities.

And, finally, there is one more task, which civil defense forces and military units must fulfil jointly -- carrying out emergency restoration work. This work must be performed in the interests of both the entire country and the troops in action. It is completely obvious that restoration operations will be large in scope, diverse and urgent. It will be necessary to restore control and communications, bridges, roads and other lines of transportation, industrial enterprises, the power supply, agricultural production, etc.

It is even difficult to foresee what kinds of destruction are possible and how many forces and means will be necessary for carrying out the restoration work. However, it can be correctly stated that there will be no one, and no technical means, that will not be needed in this work. Therefore, there is no doubt that military units and facilities must take a very active part in emergency restoration operations.
These, then, are only the most basic tasks which could be fulfilled by the armed forces in cooperation with civil defense organs. The limited scope of this article, unfortunately, does not allow us to dwell at length on other less vital, though nevertheless very important, tasks. Among these we should include: rendering assistance in the area of scientific research work, providing means of radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance, rendering medical assistance, etc.

It is very important that firm bases for cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense be laid in peacetime so that this cooperation is reinforced with actual means, and developed and refined in the course of joint command-staff and troop exercises.

Naturally, for the organization and implementation of cooperation, corresponding organizational forms are also necessary.

For the protection of our population against weapons of mass destruction, it is advisable to have a unified plan for cooperation between all civil defense forces and means and the units, military educational institutions and facilities of the armed forces allocated for this purpose.

At present civil defense has its own special staffs and units being made ready to organize, direct and actually carry out rescue operations in centers of destruction. In the "special period" and with the beginning of war, there will be more of such staffs and units. They will be reinforced with personnel, special equipment, transport, etc.

We are convinced that, besides civil defense staffs and units which, with the onset of war, are assigned to set up direction of rescue operations, it is highly essential to allocate some of the armed forces staffs and units which are garrisoned in cities and industrial centers. After all, in major cities, especially those such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, there are many military academies, institutes, schools, and various units and facilities which will not be sent to the front. Will the Academy i/n M. V. Frunze, the Academy of Armored Troops, the Military Engineer Academy, or the School i/n Supreme Soviet with their control organs, having highly qualified officers and
generals at their disposal, really not be able to head the organization and conduct of rescue and emergency restoration operations, or to render substantial assistance in evacuating and dispersing the population on the most crucial operational axes of the City of Moscow and of Moscow Oblast? Especially, since in and around Moscow, together they have a sufficiently powerful materiel-technical base.

Regarding this, until the 1960's, when there was still local air defense, these educational institutions were assigned to actively participate in protecting the population. They worked out plans and organized cooperation in the sectors of Moscow assigned to them. According to plans for cooperation which were drawn up and put into practice, the Moscow Military District, for example, allocated 65,000 men and 4,000 vehicles, including 41,000 men and 1,800 vehicles for Moscow alone, to help civil defense. This same situation existed in other military districts also.

The necessary organizational work and the training of control organs, command cadres and all personnel were done on the basis of plans for cooperation.

But this system, which had been of unquestionable benefit, was subsequently disrupted. At first, aid to civil defense from military districts was sharply curtailed; for example, the Moscow Military District began to allocate a very insignificant number of forces to help Moscow, and then ceased even this assistance.

In our opinion, such a situation will not promote the strengthening of the country's defensive capability to the necessary degree.

Also, much must be done in the area of developing methods for joint exercises of the armed forces and civil defense, since it is impossible to count on good cooperation during wartime if it has not been practically studied and worked out in peacetime.

In the past, many operational front command-staff exercises, for example in the Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Leningrad, Baltic and other military districts, were conducted together with the civil defense exercises of the corresponding republics, krais, and oblasts. In these exercises a situation was created which as
closely as possible resembled that which could arise at the beginning of a war. Experience has shown that joint exercises of the staffs of the armed forces and civil defense were very interesting, instructive and helpful from the standpoint of the development of cooperation and the actual accomplishment of common tasks.

Other joint tasks should be fulfilled on the basis of cooperation. Let us take as an example research and development work. In this area the sensible coordination of efforts and the mutual exchange of information are also exceptionally important. Therefore, the great economic and practical effect which can result from close creative contact between scientific research institutions and the educational institutions conducting scientific research work on matters which are of mutual interest to the armed forces and civil defense, is fully obvious.

As is known, the successful fulfilment of any task depends primarily on the availability of well-trained cadres. Therefore, it is impossible to speak about cooperation without having touched upon the problems of training cadres.

Unfortunately, we must admit that there are quite a few workers who have little idea of the nature of civil defense tasks and the methods for carrying them out. One reason for such a situation is that our military educational institutions do not provide even elementary knowledge about civil defense matters. In our opinion, military cadres should also be trained in how to protect the population, industry and agriculture against weapons of mass destruction. For this, there should be special departments for civil defense in military educational institutions, and especially in the leading academies.

The most fundamental questions of cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense in a missile/nuclear war have been examined in this article. It should be emphasized that a number of them require resolution on a state-wide basis. We have already dwelt on the urgent need to have a unified state system of warning and communications. It is also necessary to have a unified state-wide system for radiation observation and laboratory monitoring. In order to protect the population it is very important to detect radiation, chemical and bacteriological contamination early, to accurately determine the boundaries of
centers of contamination, and to forecast possible future spreading of them. After all, we know that radiation contamination can be spread along the paths of the movement of radioactive clouds over a very large area. Bacteriological contamination can also be spread very quickly. Therefore, it is impossible to fulfil such a task with the uncoordinated efforts of the forces and means of various agencies. A unified state-wide system is needed for the observation and laboratory monitoring of radiation, chemical and bacteriological contamination in the atmosphere, in water, and on land. Such a system should be established during peacetime. Organs of the Ministry of Defense should also participate in this system.

There is now a department for the local defense of installations of the armed forces. It could head up this work also, as well as solve all other problems connected with organizing and implementing the civil defense of these installations. Apparently, it is generally more suitable to call this the department for the civil defense of installations of the armed forces.

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The article "Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War"* has already discussed the need for centralized control over the accomplishment of all defensive measures (of the economy, armed forces and civil defense). An examination of specific problems of cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense reaffirms this conclusion.

Unified control will ensure more effective cooperation of all the forces and means of the country's defense, both at the center and locally. The separation of the defense of the state into several independent systems greatly complicates cooperation, and could lead to very serious consequences.

NOTE:

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 2 (75), 1965