CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Cooperation of Troops of a Military District and Civil Defense

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article outlines the measures taken in the Turkestan Military District to ensure the cooperation of civil defense forces with the military district forces, border guard troops and military commissariats, in operational and planning matters. The author notes the shortcomings uncovered in joint civil defense exercises in his military district, and recommends that a senior military commander take charge of all units allocated to civil defense work. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

WILLIAM W. WELLS

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SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Cooperation of Troops of a Military District and Civil Defense

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Summary: The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor of Artillery F. Narkhodzhayev. This article outlines the measures taken in the Turkestan Military District to ensure the cooperation of civil defense forces with military district forces, border guard troops and military commissariats in operational and planning matters. The cooperation plan for the civil defense and military forces must include warning and reporting procedures, joint measures for dispersal and evacuation of the population and materiel to non-urban areas, and joint rescue and restoration operations. Continuous communications are necessary for warning and for reporting on the situation. The author notes the shortcomings uncovered in joint civil defense exercises in his military district, and recommends that a senior military commander take charge of all units allocated to civil defense work.

Comment: The author, now retired, formerly was Deputy Chief of Civil Defense of the Turkestan Military District.
The Cooperation of Troops of a Military District and Civil Defense

(Based on the experience of exercises conducted in the Turkestan Military District)

by

General-Mayor of Artillery F. Narkhodzhayev

The cooperation of the troops of a military district (and at the start of combat actions, the troops of a front) and the civil defense organs is a very significant problem under present-day conditions. Its foundation is the decision of the military district troop commander and the appropriate civil defense chief. In the interests of thorough organization and precise fulfillment of such cooperation, a special plan is worked out in detail. The chiefs or representatives of directorates and departments of the military district staff, and chiefs of the branch arms and services, must take an active part in drawing up the plan. To be specific, the operations department determines the composition of forces and means to be allocated by the military district to carry out civil defense measures, areas of the terrain which can be used for civil defense purposes, operational camouflage measures, and the procedure for exchanging information on the situation.

The directorate of communications troops of the military district sets up communications between the control posts of the civil defense and the military garrisons at their permanent deployment areas; plans the organization of cooperation communications for the period of the movement of large units and units to the concentration areas, and for the movement of the civil defense staffs to non-urban control posts; and establishes the procedure for warning, via technical communications means, the staffs of civil defense and the military garrisons regarding the operational situation and the threat of aggressive enemy actions. The chief of the chemical troops works out the procedure for exchanging information to be used when determining the radiation situation and when organizing and conducting radiation and chemical reconnaissance.

The engineer troops of the military district and the civil defense contingents will assume the responsibility for a large volume of highly important work. The directorate of the chief of the engineer troops coordinates the action of the forces and means allocated to carry out such tasks as restoring destroyed roads and bridges and building new ones, laying and maintaining crossings, clearing mountain passes and passages,
setting up defensive lines, constructing obstacles, preparing dummy areas, camouflaging industrial and defense enterprises, hydraulic engineering works, airfields and other installations. It will be necessary to coordinate work pertaining to the construction and equipping of protective structures for control posts, the personnel of the contingents, local residents, workers and important operating installations, and also to the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes and the implementation of specific engineer measures.

Thus, in order to minimize the results of destruction of hydraulic engineering works, it is important in peacetime for the civil defense organs to coordinate their actions with the engineer troops of the military district regarding the organization of mutual warning of the troops and the civil defense contingents situated in the probable zones of flooding. It also is necessary to provide for rescuing the population and moving out valuable materiel, laying crossings for the troops and freight from the national economy, carrying out restoration operations on the roads and railroads, and providing cover for the areas in which troops, valuable materiel and freight are concentrated. In the plans for cooperation it also is desirable to indicate the forces and means which can be allocated directly to operations to eliminate the results of flooding.

The other important and specific question, particularly for our Red Banner Turkestan Military District, is the organization of cooperation in providing troops, civil defense contingents and the population with water. To do this it will be necessary to construct and maintain a large number of water supply points. The district troops have acquired a certain amount of experience in purifying water contaminated by radioactive and toxic substances. However, the forces and means available for this are quite inadequate to satisfy all or even the basic needs of the troops and civil defense. The problem lies in the means of special purification of necessary quantities of water, the training of specialists in the course of combat training of civil defense contingents, the construction of enclosed water resources in the areas in which it is planned to disperse the population and along the transportation lines of possible troop movement.

The directorate of the rear of the district draws up plans for the mutual use of the medical system and rear-area hospitals; as to the deployment of depots and bases, the directorate designates areas of the terrain on which civil defense measures should not be carried out. The civil defense department of the military district staff has to summarize the matters of cooperation which have been worked out, refine them once and for all with the directorates and departments of the district staff, with
the chiefs of the branch arms, and with the civil defense staffs of the oblasts or Union republics on whose territory the troops of the military district are stationed, and to formulate the developed cooperation plan as a whole.

Reflected in this plan must be the following basic matters: the disposition of troop and civil defense control posts; the procedure for mutual warning and reporting on the threat of enemy attack, especially in the process of eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear attack; the volume of, and the time required to carry out, joint measures to disperse and evacuate the population as well as valuable materiel from cities; the allocation of areas in non-urban zones for the accommodation of forces for the civil defense of workers and employees, the population being evacuated, organizations and institutions, and valuable materiel; the procedure for carrying out joint rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations; and the strength of the forces to be allocated from the military district in support of the civil defense and from civil defense in support of the district.

The practicability of a cooperation plan developed in this manner should be verified in command-staff exercises and war games conducted jointly with the civil defense staffs. With the same purpose in mind, the chiefs of garrisons with operations groups, military commissars and officers from their organizations, and the commanders of units allocated for participation in the measures stipulated by the given plan, should participate in civil defense command-staff exercises.

The experience of the exercises carried out in our military district shows that the cooperation plans do provide for the performance of the tasks confronting the district troops and the civil defense. However, the same exercises have exposed a number of important problems requiring further, thorough working out. Thus, it is necessary, first of all, that the chiefs of garrisons and unit commanders have sufficiently comprehensive knowledge of civil defense matters, and that they have a clear understanding of the qualitative changes which have taken place in preparing the population for the defense measures. This will make it possible for the cooperation plans to more thoroughly take into account the place and time aspects of the measures, for example, to allocate the roads among the troops and the population being evacuated without jeopardizing their movement.

It is required that the overall command of the units, subunits, educational institutions and medical facilities allocated by the
cooperation plan to provide assistance in carrying out the civil defense measures, be exercised in peacetime not by the senior military commander (garrison chief) but by another assigned person. The fact is that chiefs of garrisons usually are commanders of large units garrisoned in the city or oblast, who will leave their posts at the beginning of a war because of their operational assignment. Taking this into consideration, it is advisable, when developing a plan for cooperation at the garrison-oblast level, to assign a senior military commander who will remain in his place of service in wartime, and to make him responsible for the overall command of the units and subunits allocated to assist the civil defense.

In a modern war, many different situations can develop. Along some axes the troops will be engaged in aggressive, offensive combat actions, while along another -- in an operation with limited objectives. In the latter case, to provide assistance to the civil defense it will be possible to allocate considerably larger forces than provided for in the cooperation plans. But it will not be possible to use these forces effectively to carry out rescue work in the centers of nuclear destruction if they do not have the necessary skills, and if the control organs have not been trained to command them.

It is advisable, for the purpose of training the control organs of units and large units to carry out civil defense measures, to have them participate in joint civil defense command-staff exercises, which is the practice in our military district. Thus, for instance, the commanders of units, large units and institutions of the Dushanbe, Frunze and Ashkhabad garrisons have participated in such exercises. Joint exercises promote a more thorough working out of the matters handled by the civil defense, the organization and maintenance of a stable system of control and cooperation communications, an exchange of information on the results of reconnaissance of contaminated terrain, and mutual use of the civil defense and the military district means of communications as well as the road network, especially near large cities. In addition, other matters peculiar to a given theater of military operations such as, for example, the procedure for reporting on the sanitary-epidemiological state of the operating areas of the military district troops and civil defense contingents, can also be coordinated at these exercises.

The successful bringing of the military district troops to full combat readiness and the dispersal and evacuation of the population from the cities depend to a large extent on timely resolution of all these and other matters, especially since both coincide in respect to time.
In our opinion, cooperation of the border guard troops deployed on the territory of a border military district with the civil defense forces also requires a very careful examination. This cooperation must be worked out in peacetime in regard to the matters set forth for the troops of the military district and garrisons, taking into account the special features of the service performed by border guard outposts and komendaturas, and must also be coordinated among the border guard detachments and districts and, correspondingly, the civil defense staffs of oblasts and Union republics.

Cooperation between the border guard troops and the civil defense organs and contingents may also be organized for the purpose of strengthening the protection of the state border and combating sabotage-reconnaissance groups and airborne landing forces in the rear of the military district (front) troops. In our opinion it is advisable to establish militarized civil defense contingents similar to the detachments of the people's volunteer corps of the Great Patriotic War period.

Cooperation between military commissariats and civil defense organs also must be worked out. As a result of the dispersal of workers and employees of enterprises, organizations and institutions, and the evacuation of city dwellers, there will be a substantial redistribution of them among the raions and inhabited localities. This will create serious difficulties in using human resources for replacements in the armed forces. All those who are subject to the military law will have to be registered at other military commissariats which will require a considerable amount of time and a great deal of work on the part of the raion military commissariats.

Such cooperation may be implemented most fully through the representatives of military commissariats who make up the evacuation commissions, where the basic data on the accommodation of the dispersed and evacuated population are collected. The cooperation plans must stipulate that the civil defense staffs continuously report data on evacuation and dispersal of the population, and that the military commissariats inform these staffs on the induction of conscripts into the army and the removal of materiel and technical resources from the national economy (from the civil defense means) to satisfy the needs of the army.

At the beginning of military operations it is advisable to brief the civil defense chiefs of the oblasts and republics on the situation within the military district (front), notify them of possible targets and the assumed time of delivery of enemy nuclear strikes against them, make brief
recommendations on the implementation of basic civil defense measures in the zone of troop operations and refine the cooperation plan. Other matters to be decided include the procedure for using the civil defense forces in support of the troops, the organization of communications between points, and the warning of the threat of enemy air attack and of radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination.

After the delivery of enemy nuclear strikes against the troops and the main installations in the operational rear area, it is necessary, in order to make a timely assessment of the radiation situation and report it to the troops who are regrouping, to obtain additional information from the civil defense organs and in turn inform them of the situation in the area immediately to the rear of the front.

In our opinion, the exchange of information on the radiation situation should be carried out not only between the staff of the front (military district) and the civil defense staffs of the Union republics but also between the staffs of the large units and the civil defense staffs of the oblasts and cities. This will provide for a more efficient handling of matters connected with organizing the protection of the troops and civilian population from radiation damage.

In order to maintain continuous cooperation, it is advisable, based on the experience of our district, to establish a radio net using the radio sets of the assistant commander of the district for civil defense and the civil defense staffs of the Union republics, which would ensure the transmission and reception of information and the coordination of matters of cooperation.

In order to improve the warning of the danger of enemy air attack, all republic and oblast cities in the territory of our military district are warned by personnel of the air defense forces. Wire and radio communications have been set up for this purpose between the command posts of the formations and large units of the air defense forces and the civil defense command posts of the republics, oblasts and cities, and a constant alert is maintained at the command posts. The system of warning and communications is checked regularly during exercises, in radio training practices, and in the course of civil defense exercises.

In conclusion I would like to mention that in our district considerable attention is being given to the training of reserve officers attached to the civil defense units. By agreement with the local Party and Soviet organs, they are called to participate in training courses so that
they can also take part in civil defense exercises. For example, in 1968 reserve officers attended such training courses in the cities of Frunze and Ashkhabad. Officers of the civil defense department of the military district staff led them in group studies in which they worked out matters of mobilization expansion and the operation of units in eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear attack. The reserve officers studied their operational axes, acquired experience in controlling units and subunits, worked out matters of cooperation with the chiefs of the services of the operational axes and with the chiefs of the civil defense of installations.

We feel that it would be beneficial for the officers of the military district (especially the garrison chiefs), military commissariats and the border guard troops to share their views on these matters in order to work out a common viewpoint for the military command and the civil defense organs.

The cooperation of the troops of the military district and the civil defense calls for further and more thorough study. In our opinion, it is necessary to begin its theoretical development in military academies, and include the study of civil defense matters in academic programs. We also consider it advisable to establish groups at the academies to train qualified operators to work in the troops and civil defense staffs, and also to establish at the Military Academy of the General Staff a group to train senior command personnel in civil defense to work in the staffs of military districts, the civil defense organs of Union republics and operational zones, and in the Civil Defense Staff of the USSR.

It has become necessary to summarize the experience of organizing the cooperation of troops and civil defense and to outline ways of improving it further. A guidance document by the General Staff and the Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR obviously is needed.

NOTE: