MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Status and Tasks of Military Science at the Present Stage of the Development of the Armed Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article summarizes Soviet military science work in the period 1960 to 1965, noting achievements and shortcomings and recommending tasks for the further development of military theory. The author briefly reviews some of the questions treated in the major works generated on military strategy, operational art, tactics and military history during the period, specifying the problems yet to be worked out. He also assesses the contribution of military journals, collections and other periodical publications to the development of military theory, as well as the quality of the military literature being published. Among the problems still confronting military art are questions of nuclear strategy, combat readiness and effectiveness, tactics of highly mobile combat actions under nuclear conditions, and the need to improve historical research. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned [Redacted].

William E. Nelsen
Deputy Director for Operations

Page 1 of 23 Pages
TOP SECRET
Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov. The article summarizes Soviet military science work in the period 1960 to 1965, noting achievements and shortcomings and recommending tasks for the further development of military theory. The author briefly reviews some of the questions treated in the major works generated on military strategy, operational art, tactics and military history during the period, specifying the problems yet to be worked out. He also assesses the contribution of military journals, collections and other periodical publications to the development of military theory, as well as the quality of the military literature being published. Among the problems still confronting military art are questions of nuclear strategy, combat readiness and effectiveness, tactics of highly mobile combat actions under nuclear conditions, and the need to improve historical research.

End of Summary

Comment:

Marshal of the Soviet Union Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov was Chief of the General Staff in 1971. He died 31 January 1972. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
The Status and Tasks of Military Science at the Present Stage of the Development of the Armed Forces

by

Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov

The present stage in the development of the Armed Forces is characterized by a radical qualitative change in the means of waging war, a change which began in the first half of the 1950's with the adoption of nuclear weapons into service.

Since that time only a little more than ten years have passed but, thanks to the constant attention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in building up the defensive strength of our country, truly revolutionary transformations have taken place in military affairs.

Based on outstanding achievements in the field of science and technology and on the country's steadily growing economy, in a short amount of time the mass production of nuclear weapons was organized, and the design and production of different types of missiles, that is, principally of new means of delivering these nuclear weapons to the targets to be destroyed, were developed on a wide scale. At the same time, new models of different kinds of weapons and combat equipment were being improved and developed. In the army and the navy radioelectronics, automation, and telemechanics began to be widely introduced.

In this manner, in a short time a powerful military technical foundation was created which permitted a new branch of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, to be organized in the beginning of 1960. It also permitted the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces of the Country, the Air Forces, and the Navy to be equipped with new kinds of weapons and combat equipment. The Armed Forces as a whole became qualitatively different.

The mass introduction of nuclear weapons of unprecedented destructive power into all branches of the armed forces, and the capability to quickly destroy targets located anywhere on the globe have changed the role and significance of time and space and their effect on the methods of conducting armed combat. Completely new possibilities for achieving the
strategic objectives of a war have developed, and this in turn has radically changed the established connections and relationship among strategy, operational art, and tactics.

If in the past war strategic objectives were achieved only by means of battles and operations, now strategy has at its disposal means of destruction capable themselves of ensuring the accomplishment of the most important strategic tasks and of creating the conditions necessary for successful actions by the other branches of the armed forces.

In this connection, our established theoretical views on many questions of military affairs have needed substantial revision and further development.

Large and crucial tasks have arisen for Soviet military science. First of all, along with further development of the military theory heritage of V. I. Lenin, taking into consideration the development of military ideas in the decisions of the congresses and in the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it was necessary to discover in depth the essence of the processes and principles of this revolution in military affairs, to research the most important problems of a modern war conducted with the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, to revise views about the nature of a future war, to work out methods and forms of conducting it, and to determine the ways of building the armed forces.

It was necessary to thoroughly research problems of military philosophy such as, for instance, the role of morale-psychological and sociopolitical factors in attaining victory in a modern war. Much attention had to be devoted to questions of the methodology of Soviet military science and to the application of Marxist dialectic to military affairs.

Military science was also confronted with an important task in the area of researching problems of military economics. Problems requiring further working out included those of economic support for a war, preservation of the viability of the country's economy, economical expenditure of means on defense, making optimal decisions in the area of building the military establishment, and problems of the development of armament systems. Besides this, it became necessary to revise many of the principles of operational art and tactics, the requirements for the training and education of personnel, and the requirements for the combat readiness of the troops.
All this has sharply increased the role and significance of military theory and has lent vitally important significance to the work of military science in preparing the Armed Forces for a modern missile/nuclear war.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government require that the leadership of the defense of the country and the Armed Forces of the USSR always be genuinely scientific and qualified. This is ensured primarily by good Marxist-Leninist training of cadres and by strict observance of the Leninist style of leadership, which combines organizational and ideological work with constant monitoring and careful checking of performance, profound understanding of affairs, and sober evaluation of the situation.

Scientific leadership of the building of the military establishment is also ensured by an uncompromising attitude toward everything obsolescent and outdated, and toward conservatism and bureaucratism; it entails revolutionary passion in the struggle for victory of the new, the advanced, born of life and experience.

The new tasks confronting military science necessitated substantial restructuring of the organizational principles and methods of leadership of the work of military science in the Armed Forces.

In the first place, we were faced with determining the direction of the main efforts in the area of military science work and specific tasks in solving the problems of military art. At the same time, it was necessary to centralize planning of the development of the most important military theory and military history works, as well as to centralize the organization of military science conferences on the most pressing problems of the armed forces as a whole and of each of the branches individually. It was necessary to precisely establish the forms and methods of military science work and the means of leadership of it.

The solution to all these problems has been defined in orders of the Minister of Defense on military science work, which have been published periodically every three years, beginning in 1960. The Statute on Military Science Work in the Armed Forces was approved as the first of them.

In the past year, the time limit for implementing Order of the Minister of Defense, No. 016, 1963, expired. In this connection, it is advisable to briefly sum up military science work in recent years, note our achievements in this area, expose shortcomings, and point out the tasks for the further development of military theory, taking into consideration the present status of our Armed Forces and the general direction of their
development.

The experience of past years has shown that the system for the leadership and planning of military science work adopted by us has justified itself and produced positive results. In the course of the first three years alone (1960-1963), 130 major works of military theory and military history, including 12 on problem questions of military strategy, were developed and published. This is especially important inasmuch as no theoretical works in the area of strategy had been developed by us for a long time.

Of most important significance for the development of the theory of military strategy were such general theoretical works as "Modern War" (published in 1960), and "Military Strategy" (1962 and 1963). 

With these works, in essence, began the serious research of the problems of modern strategy. In them were set forth views on the nature of a missile/nuclear war and its initial period, and the role and place of the branches of the armed forces in armed combat were shown.

Much attention was devoted to ways of conducting a war, to preparing the country to repel aggression, and to exposing the aggressive nature of the military strategy of imperialism.

At the same time, both in the work "Modern War" and in the book "Military Strategy", the ways of conducting a future war are not researched in sufficient depth, precise recommendations on the conduct on military actions in land theaters are lacking, and the role and significance of conventional means of destruction in war are underrated. On the whole, though, these works were of undoubted benefit to the development of the theory of modern strategy.

The large command-staff exercises conducted in 1961-1963 played a significant role in solving a number of pressing problems of military art.

Such exercises as DUNAY (DANUBE), TAYFUN (TYPHOON), and others permitted us to test and evaluate many of our new views on problems of the conduct of military actions in the initial period of a war. In addition, exercise critique materials were an important basis for the further development of strategic theory concerning questions of researching the possible ways for an aggressor to unleash a war, the strategic deployment of the armed forces, the movement of large groupings of troops from the depth to the front line, the employment of the branches of the armed forces
in strategic operations, and the control of troops.

In spite of the fact that during the years 1960-1963 much attention was devoted to strategy, many important problems in this area of military theory were not solved because of their extreme complexity.

Questions of the nature of a future war remained incompletely researched. There existed many unclear and controversial theses on questions of the ways of conducting missile/nuclear war and on the forms of the strategic use of the branches of the armed forces. This applied chiefly to the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, and the Air Defense Forces of the Country. The nature of modern local wars and ways of conducting them, as well as the possibilities of these wars growing into a world war, were not researched to the proper extent.

In this connection, the Military Science Conference of the Armed Forces conducted in February 1963 had great significance for the further development of the theory of military art, and of strategy above all.

Widely discussed at the conference were questions of the nature of a future war and the role in it of the initial period, questions concerning a strategic operation in a theater of military operations, and other very important problems of modern military art. The materials of the conference, published in 1963, were a good foundation for the further development of many questions of military theory.

After the Military Science Conference, the scope of research, including research in the area of strategy, broadened considerably, and military science organs became even more active. A number of works on military theory were developed and published. In the pages of the theoretical journal "Military Thought" and especially its Special Collection, articles on pressing problems of military strategy were published.

Among major works, the work "The Strategy of Nuclear War," published in 1964 under the editorship of Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, played an important role in the development of the theory of military strategy. Based on a study of theoretical materials accumulated in the Soviet Armed Forces, and research and generalization of the experience of large exercises of strategic scale, the basic theoretical tenets of contemporary missile/nuclear war are summarized in this work. In it methods for the strategic employment of the branches of the armed forces in war are set forth and their future development is examined; the essence
and the means of carrying out the first missile/nuclear strike and a strategic operation in a theater of military operations in the initial period of a war are determined. Also examined are problems of the command of the Armed Forces. On the whole, the work was a step forward on the path of the further development of the theory of Soviet military strategy.

Unfortunately, nothing is said in the work on the question of the rear in a modern war. A more extensive and scientifically based definition should also have been given to certain contemporary phenomena and concepts.

Besides the solution of a number of general theoretical problems of strategy, many problems of the employment of the branches of the armed forces in war have been worked out.

For example, in the military science work of the Strategic Rocket Forces, much attention was devoted to problems of researching methods to raise the level of constant combat readiness. In the Air Defense Forces of the Country, views on many problem questions of theory and practice in air defense were summarized, and possible directions for the development of our country's air defense were researched. In the Air Forces, much attention was devoted to methods of combating enemy aviation groupings in theaters of military operations in the initial period of a war, and also to the organization and conduct of aerial reconnaissance in a modern war and operations. Very important problems were also worked out in the Navy, in particular such ones as combating missile-carrying submarines and carrier strike large units of the enemy and developing a system of antisubmarine defense. Problems of employing the different kinds of naval forces in modern warfare were researched.

At the present time we can state with complete justification that in the last five years much useful work has been done in the area of strategy. We have developed a scientific theory on the possible nature of a missile/nuclear war and on the role and significance of its initial period. Problems of the strategic employment of the branches of the armed forces in war have been worked out; concepts about the basic forms of military actions have taken shape. In particular, the theoretical bases for the first strategic nuclear strike and for strategic operations in theaters of military operations -- those new phenomena, and for strategic categories of nuclear war, have been worked out. Many problems of the strategic employment of the Air Forces, Navy, and Air Defense Forces of the Country have been researched. It can be said that we have developed unified views on the basic questions of military strategy.
However, we still have many unsolved problems in the area of military strategy. Problems of preparing the country and the Armed Forces for nuclear war, which are extremely varied and complex, have not yet been thoroughly researched. Still awaiting solution are problems of thwarting an enemy nuclear attack and of organizing and maintaining cooperation among formations of different branches of the armed forces during military actions and especially during the delivery of the first nuclear strike. Also not fully resolved are problems of determining the results of strategic nuclear strikes. We have no theoretical works on the conduct of a coalition war.

Such are the basic achievements and shortcomings of military science work in the area of strategy.

Our attention in the area of operational art has been concentrated mainly on finding and developing the most effective methods of preparing and conducting operations and combat actions with formations of branches of the armed forces, and methods of employing the forces and means of different branch arms in a nuclear war, above all in its initial period. Research has been carried out on the conduct of operations using only conventional means of destruction when there is a constant threat of the employment of nuclear weapons.

At the present time, definite views have already taken shape concerning the nature and methods of conducting different operations and combat actions with formations of the branches of the armed forces. Very important theoretical tenets and practical recommendations have been worked out on the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction in operations, and on problems of comprehensive support for troops and troop control.

Changes in the nature and methods of conducting combat actions have imposed new requirements upon troop control and have sharply increased the role of staffs. In connection with this, the need has arisen to develop and publish a new Field Service Manual for Staffs.

In recent years, the regulations documents in the different branches of the armed forces have undergone revision; for the Strategic Rocket Forces new regulations and manuals concerning their combat activity have been developed.

Besides this, on different problems of operational art, a significant number of works of a theoretical and applied nature have been worked out.
and published. For instance, in 1964 alone more than 20 works were published, including such ones as "Control of the Strategic Rocket Forces with the Employment of Means of Automation and Mechanization", "Control of Troops in Front and Army Operations", and others.

More than ten scientific works were published in 1964 by the Military Academy of the General Staff. Among them were "The Course of Operational Art" and a collection of materials from a research game on the problems of preparing and conducting a modern front offensive operation carried out in cooperation with the Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces of the Country, Long Range Aviation, and the Navy.

The other military academies are also making no small contribution to the development of the theory of operational art.

For example, the work of the Military Academy in M. V. Frunze, "Combat Actions of Troops Without the Employment of Means of Mass Destruction", and the works of the Military Academy of Armored Troops, "Tank Troops and Their Employment in Modern Operations", "The Movement Forward of a Tank Army over a Great Distance", and a number of other significant works on the employment of a tank army, all deserve attention.

Extremely interesting and useful is the work of Chief Marshal of Armored Troops P. A. Rotmistrov, "The Combined-Arms Army in Modern Operations".

We cannot fail to note the great work of generals, admirals, and officers of the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, flotillas, and the districts and armies of the Air Defense of the Country. Many materials coming from the troops are of significant interest and are used in developing theoretical works on different questions of operational art.

Thus, in recent years much has been done to develop the theory of operational art. However, in this area, too, there are still many problems requiring further research. Among them must be included primarily such problems as: the conduct of a deep offensive operation in land theaters of military operations for the purpose of completing the destruction of enemy groupings; the organization and maintenance of cooperation among the different forces and means in operations; the timely exploitation by advancing troops of the results of nuclear strikes inflicted by the Strategic Rocket Forces; the conduct of an offensive along separate axes with a limited strength in forces and means; and also the thwarting of an enemy offensive under the conditions of the beginning of a war with the employment of only conventional means of destruction.
Still not adequately researched are problems of the conduct of combat actions by the Air Defense Forces of the Country under conditions of the widespread use by each side of means of warfare against radioelectronic systems, and problems of covering naval forces at sea when conducting naval operations.

Far from being fully worked out are: the search for and destruction by aviation of mobile and small-size enemy targets on land and at sea, and above all, the search for and destruction of his submarines; the negotiation of the enemy air defense by aviation; and also the integrated automation of control over aviation forces and means.

The development of means of warfare has sharply increased the requirements for combat readiness in large units and units and has caused changes in the methods of conducting a combined-arms battle. In connection with this, one of the most important tasks of tactics has been to find ways and methods of increasing the combat readiness of large units and units and of shortening the times needed to bring them up to increased and full combat readiness. Another of these tasks has been to study the problems of moving troops out of permanent deployment points for immediate entry into battle from the march, and conducting a decisive offensive at high speed and to a great depth.

The organization and conduct of a meeting engagement have received further development. We have conducted research to find methods of combating enemy means of nuclear attack, methods of protecting troops from means of mass destruction, and methods of troop actions under conditions of various kinds of contamination and destruction. Serious attention has been devoted to the conduct of combat actions by troops without the employment of nuclear weapons.

All these achievements in research and the practice of the troops in the area of the development of tactics were concentrated into the Field Service Regulations published in 1963 and into the corresponding regulations and manuals of the branches and branch arms.

In addition, the development of the theory of general tactics and tactics of the branch arms has been treated in a number of works, textbooks, handbooks, and in candidate and doctoral dissertations.
Here, too, much useful work has been done by the Academy i/n M. V. Frunze and the Armored Troops Academy. The more significant works are "General Tactics", "The Combined-Arms Battle in a Nuclear War", "Tank Troop Tactics" (Parts I and II), "The Work of Combined-Arms Staffs", "Combating Enemy Means of Nuclear Attack", and others.

Of definite significance for the development of tactics were such works as "Ways and Methods of Achieving High Rates of Advance for Tank Divisions and Motorized Rifle Divisions", "The March and Meeting Engagement of a Motorized Rifle (Tank) Division", "Combat Readiness of a Division", and "Tactics of Higher-Level Large Units of the Air Defense Forces of the Country", developed on the basis of the generalization of the practice of the troops.

However, it must be said that we still have many unsolved problems. The constant introduction of new weapons and combat equipment into the troops continuously entails further changes in tactical theory. Therefore, it is not surprising that some of our established tenets are in need of refinement and development.

The Military Political Academy i/n V. I. Lenin is making a major contribution to the development of military theory and practice concerning the training and education of Armed Forces personnel. A number of important scientific works have been worked out by authors from this academy.

The scientific work "Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army" received a positive evaluation in the army, the navy, the higher military educational institutions, and the press. On the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, this work describes the essence, nature, and types of wars of the modern era, and analyzes the principles determining the course and outcome of military actions and the basic principles of building the Soviet Armed Forces.

The works "Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy", "Party Political Work in Units and Large Units of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Initial Period of a Modern War", and others also have great practical value.

Military science work carried on in the military districts is an important means of developing military theory and of working out practical recommendations on the various problems of a modern battle. The tasks accomplished by the districts according to the plan for military science work are characterized for the most part by the concreteness, completeness,
and sufficiently high quality of the material on the problems researched.

The successful solution of a whole series of problems concerning modern military theory and the practical tasks of building the Armed Forces would be impossible without thorough research and analysis of the military past of our country, above all of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War.

In researching past military experience, our science of military history has made incontrovertible achievements. Most important is the creation of military historical literature which helps to further develop military theory, expand the horizons of generals and officers, and educate personnel in the spirit of the revolutionary traditions of the Soviet people and the fighting traditions of our army and navy.

In the period from 1960 to 1965 alone over 200 military history works were published, not counting an enormous number of articles of a research and propaganda nature.

Among the incontrovertible achievements of the science of Soviet military history is research on the basic problems of strategy development in the Great Patriotic War. This found reflection in the works "Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945", and "Soviet Military Art in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945", which received deserved recognition among troops, military educational institutions, and command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The matters of combat employment of the branches of the armed forces and branch arms, the work of the rear of the Soviet Army, and the activities of the Communist Party in training and educating Soviet military cadres in the Great Patriotic War have been researched fully enough. Military historians, with the active participation of the leadership of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense have prepared and published important monographs: "The Battle for Leningrad", "Rout of the German Fascist Troops near Moscow", "The Great Victory on the Volga", "The Liberation of Czechoslovakia", and the books: "The Belgrade Operation", "Iasi-Kishinev Cannae", "Budapest - Vienna - Prague".

Operational art and tactics in the most important operations of the last war have been researched; and the study and summarization of the development of military art in the postwar period has begun. Significant work has been done on the selection and publication of Soviet and captured German documents for the period of the Great Patriotic War, and on the
statistical collation of the results of the last war.

In the course of the last four to five years, many military history conferences, field trips, lectures and reports on military history topics have been conducted among the troops. This work took on an especially enormous scope in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the victory over Fascist Germany.

However, with all this, we have still not written a sufficient number of analytical works on military history. In a number of works there are subjective evaluations of combat actions, harsh reality is embellished, and oversimplified conclusions are drawn. Books on the history of units and large units are often based on secondary materials without the use of the original documents. The subject of military history has not yet occupied its due place in the system of training commanders. The command, staffs, and political organs of formations, large units, and units make little use of the experience gained from military history in combat training and military and patriotic propaganda.

A well-known role in the development of military science and in the search for the solution of new problems of military art belongs to the military periodical press.

An analysis of the contents of military journals, collections of works, information bulletins, and collections for the exchange of combat training experience makes it possible to draw the conclusion that they correctly orient readers toward a thorough study of everything new in military affairs, offer great help to officers and generals in broadening their knowledge of military theory, and aid in the dissemination of advanced experience in the training and education of troops.

In the pages of the journal "Military Thought", the military science activity of generals, admirals and officers in working out pressing problems of military theory, especially in the area of operational art and strategy is treated; new problems are posed, and ways of solving them are explored. Also aiding the accomplishment of many practical tasks of training troops and staffs are the journals "Military Herald", "Military Historical Journal", "Communist of the Armed Forces", "Equipment and Armament", and a number of others.

Also making a definite contribution to the development of contemporary military theory are the military journals published by the branches of the armed forces, which, along with the development of military theory, render
necessary assistance to troops in mastering the new models of military equipment coming into service.

A common shortcoming of the military journals is that they still publish few articles on problem questions, and little material is encountered that refreshes thinking and forces one to think and reflect.

In the Collections of works of the military academies, the level of the scientific materials is not always high. Some articles are more like textbooks and do not contain fresh theoretical ideas, generalizations, and profound analysis.

In recent years, the quality of service periodical publications has improved; and their recommendations have provided much that is useful. However, there are shortcomings in these publications, too.

In the information collections of the branch arms, for instance, materials are often published that simply restate tenets of the regulations or duplicate the requirements of orders and the corresponding instructions. The collections for the exchange of combat training experience which are published in the military districts (groups of forces) contain many valuable recommendations about further improving methods of troop combat actions. However, materials are also published in them that offer little to the reader.

As we can see, the volume of literature is very great. Suffice it to say that about 1,000 titles were published in commissioned military literature by the Directorate of Military Publishing alone in 1964. Many works of military theory, political, historical, memoir, and artistic literature met with positive response among readers and critics. On the whole, definite successes have been achieved in publishing activity of late. The quality of books and brochures has improved, and so have the economic indices of publishing house work.

At the same time, here too there are still many shortcomings. Often in the literature which is being published, the most important problems of modern life and the development of the Armed Forces are not sufficiently reflected. The trend of the subject matter of publications is not always thoroughly thought out; few fundamental works on problems of military theory and few books of an applied nature, especially on tactics and on methods of combat training for subunits of all the branch arms, are published.
The quality of the literature being published needs improvement. Individual books and brochures come out that are written on a low scientific level and contain mistakes, inaccurate wording, subjectivism in evaluating events, and recommendations and tenets that contradict regulations and manuals. Often books and instructional wall posters are published that duplicate one another. The printing of military literature also lags behind the level of world standards.

The instructions concerning the more efficient publication of books and brochures are being carried out slowly. As previously, some of them are two or three years and more in editing and production.

It is necessary to get rid of all these shortcomings in publishing activity as quickly as possible.

So, the main efforts of military science in recent years have been concentrated on working out problems of modern military theory and of building our Armed Forces in order to ensure a further increase in their might and their constant combat readiness.

Now our Armed Forces are capable of successfully accomplishing any tasks which may be assigned to them by the party and the government in case of the unleashing of nuclear war by the imperialists.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, having rearmed the army and navy in a timely manner with new types of weapons and combat equipment, will in the future maintain the defensive might of the Soviet state and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level guaranteeing decisive and total defeat of any enemy. Therefore, all types of weapons and military equipment will be further developed by us; this is aided to a large degree by the decisions of the September (1965) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The decisions of the Plenum establish the preconditions for the still faster development of industry. It is also necessary to keep in mind that new methods of managing industry will promote the quickest translation into reality of the achievements of science in the national economy and the Armed Forces.

Considering the general trend in the development of science and technology, one can assume that nuclear weapons will develop in the direction of producing warheads more varied in yield, and of simplifying their production, storage, and servicing. In the development of missiles,
the primary means of delivering nuclear weapons, much attention will be
devoted to further simplifying the design of all types of missiles, to
shortening the time needed to prepare them for launch, and also to
increasing the length of time that missiles are in readiness for launch at
any moment.

In addition to the further improvement of missile/nuclear weapons, the
possibility that fundamentally new means of destruction will appear must
not be excluded. It is known that both in the Soviet Union and abroad work
is being carried on in the area of obtaining new sources of energy. Ways
are being sought to use quantum generators for destroying missiles and
other airborne platforms, as well as for other purposes. All other means
of armed combat and all types of military equipment continue to be improved
and developed in order for the Soviet Armed Forces to constantly have
superiority over the armies of the imperialist states.

Thus, life does not stand still. New weapons are improved and are
replaced by newer ones. Successes gained already cannot satisfy us.

Military science must not only meet the requirements of the present
day, but also look forward boldly and determine directions for the further
development of methods of conducting military actions, taking into
consideration the improvement of existing means of armed combat and the
appearance of new means.

The principal efforts of military science work in the immediate future
must be directed toward the further development of military science. Under
modern conditions, science is being converted into a productive force.
Military science must foster the utmost increase of the combat readiness of
the armed forces and the strengthening of the defense of our country and
the whole socialist camp.

It is necessary to more thoroughly study the principles of modern
warfare, and to thoroughly research the problems of sociopolitical,
economic, and morale factors in their totality, their interaction, and
their decisive influence on military affairs as a whole.

Important problems also confront military art.

In the area of the theory of military strategy, in view of the
continuous quantitative and qualitative development of strategic means of
armed combat, it is necessary to continue to research questions dealing
with the nature of a future war and particularly its initial period, as
well as problems of thwarting an enemy nuclear attack. It is advisable to continue to research methods of delivering the first and subsequent nuclear strikes and methods of conducting military operations with all branches of the armed forces in order to swiftly and completely destroy the enemy. In need of comprehensive and thorough research are methods of organizing and conducting strategic operations in different theaters of military operations.

More attention should be devoted to the scientific basis of the trends in the development of the branches of the armed forces, and to the development of more efficient and effective methods of using the newest technical means of combat.

An important task of strategy is research of problems of using outer space for conducting armed combat, as well as research in the area of organizing a system to monitor outer space.

More attention should be devoted to working out the problems of coalition warfare.

It is necessary to continue to develop scientific bases for the control of the armed forces in war, taking into consideration the long-range development of means of armed combat and military equipment, and to study and research the problems of military economy and its role and significance in nuclear warfare. Problems of modern mobilization and control of it, as well as problems of civil defense, require further working out.

In the area of the theory of operational art, as formerly the most important task is to find ways to further increase and maintain the constant combat readiness of formations and large units of all branches of the armed forces, to deploy them quickly for immediate actions, and also to preserve their combat effectiveness under conditions of massed enemy nuclear strikes.

We must continue working out the problems of conducting deep offensive operations in different theaters of military operations.

A most important task remains research into the most effective methods of repelling massed strikes by enemy aviation and missiles under adverse weather conditions and strong jamming. Also needing further research are problems of combating missile-carrying submarines and carrier groupings of the enemy.
We must also not reduce the attention given to the working out of such problems as the organization and conduct of meeting engagements and defensive actions during offensive operations, the movement of formations over great distances, and the conduct of operations and combat actions by operational formations of the branches of the armed forces employing conventional means of destruction.

Remaining a most important task of military researchers are the search for ways to increase the reliability and effectiveness of troop control, the maintenance of its stability under conditions of aggressive enemy action, and the improvement of methods of cooperation among forces and means in operations (combat actions) and of all-round support for them. It is also necessary to further work out scientifically based requirements for the organizational structure and armament systems of operational formations of the branches of the armed forces.

In the area of the theory of tactics, the most important tasks are to continue to search for effective methods of organizing and conducting the highly mobile combat actions of combined-arms large units and units under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons, infantry combat vehicles, new tanks and antitank means, and to improve the more effective ways and methods of protecting troops against weapons of mass destruction in different kinds of battle.

Very important tasks are also: the further development of methods of moving troops from permanent deployment areas and of committing them to battle from the march; the improvement of the operating methods of tank large units in extensive zones of contamination and destruction; and the improvement of methods of organizing and conducting defensive actions with limited forces.

Problems of employing subunits and units of ground forces as tactical airborne landing forces, and of improving the air defense of large units require further research.

In the area of military history, it is necessary to extend the research on historical experience and to completely eliminate the situation in which some men have been unjustifiably glorified and others ignored, as has happened in the recent past. It is also necessary to more extensively publicize the enormous work that has been done by our party and government, the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, the staffs of the branches of the armed forces and branch arms, and the command and staffs of formations and large units.
It is necessary to more thoroughly research the development of Soviet military art and the military art of the armies of the capitalist countries during the Second World War and the postwar period, to resolutely reveal and unmask the reactionary nature of imperialist policy and strategy, and to carry out the assault against bourgeois ideology on a broad front.

It is necessary to raise the level of the military history work that is conducted in formations, large units, and units; and to finish working out a high-quality history of formations, large units, units (ships), military educational institutions and establishments.

Such are the basic tasks in the area of further development of the theory of military art and military history.

In developing the theory of military art we must be guided by Marxist-Leninist methodology and must rely on the military theory heritage of V. I. Lenin. Without doing this, it is impossible not only to move our military theory forward but also to thoroughly and scientifically comprehend all the new developments in military affairs.

Scientific research of questions of military art at the present stage of development of the armed forces requires broad generalizations and improved methods of analyzing new phenomena and facts. It is necessary to make wider use of the experience of troop exercises and maneuvers, command-staff exercises, and the materials of military science conferences.

A characteristic feature of present-day scientific knowledge is the wide use of mathematical methods to analyze different processes. Mastery and extensive utilization of these methods in researching problems of military theory is one of the most urgent tasks of our military science and command cadres.

Under modern conditions it is impossible to develop military science successfully without having adequate understanding of other sciences. Now as never before, military cadres must be able to evaluate correctly the effect of the achievements of all the sciences on military affairs as a whole.

And we must not forget the wealth of experience of the Great Patriotic War, especially the principles of military science which have not lost their significance even under present-day conditions.
In researching questions of military affairs it is necessary to take into consideration the status and long-range development of the armed forces of the capitalist states, primarily the US, the main stronghold of the aggressive forces of imperialism. It is necessary to attentively follow the appearance of new means of armed combat in the enemy arsenal, the changes in the enemy's theoretical views on methods and forms of conducting military actions, his experience in training and educating troops, and the enemy's ways and methods of conducting modern local wars.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government manifest constant concern for scientific cadres, and create favorable conditions and every kind of stimulation for the creative work of scientists. In particular, the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 26 March 1965 establishing a prize in the name of the outstanding Soviet military leader and government figure M. V. Frunze, to be awarded for achievements in the area of military science work, can testify to this.

This decree, announced in the Order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR No. 177 of 2 June 1965, has undoubtedly served the further development of Soviet military theory. Very good works have already been nominated for this prize.

All our work in the area of the development of military theory must be permeated with the spirit of the decisions of the September Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and must be distinguished by purposefulness and a creative approach to the accomplishment of the tasks that confront us.

It is necessary to be more enterprising in finding new forms and methods of scientific research. It is also necessary to improve the coordination of military science and research work in the system of the armed forces, and to improve the long-range and yearly planning of military science work at all levels.

We should more extensively develop the creative initiative of generals, admirals, and officers in the area of military science work, and carefully raise young prospective cadres capable of solving the complex problems of modern military science.

The task of party organizations is to give daily attention to the needs of scientific workers, to provide all possible assistance to them in a timely manner, and to remove the different obstacles hindering the successful development of military science.
In scientific research it is necessary to put a final end to subjectivism, dogmatism, and preconceived opinions. The struggle with these shortcomings creates favorable conditions for eradicating cliches in the area of military theory, which are particularly unacceptable under modern conditions. It is necessary to publish original works more daringly and often, and to hold scientific discussions on the fundamental problem questions of military theory on a broader scale. All this will aid in elevating military science to the level of present-day demands and will have a positive effect on further raising the level of the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces.