MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Organization and Conduct of an Antilanding Defense by an Army Corps in Cooperation with Naval Forces (Based on the Experience of Corps Exercises)

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article proceeds from a brief description of the four conditions for going over to an antilanding defense on a seacoast in presenting a general overview of tactics and the composition, weapons and equipment of the forces involved. The authors pay particular attention to the problems of troop control, communications and cooperation experienced by the ground, naval and air forces conducting the defense, citing the use of communications helicopters as retransmitting points. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Organization and Conduct of an Antilanding Defense by an Army Corps in Cooperation with Naval Forces (Based on the Experience of Corps Exercises)

SOURCE: Documentary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are General-Mayor of Tank Troops A. Zvartsev and Colonel N. Nemozhenko. This article proceeds from a brief description of the four conditions for going over to an antilanding defense on a seacoast in presenting a general overview of tactics and the composition, weapons and equipment of the forces involved. The authors pay particular attention to the problems of troop control, communications and cooperation experienced by the ground, naval and air forces conducting the defense, citing the use of communications helicopters as retransmitting points.

End of Summary

Comment:

[Comments and elaboration upon certain aspects of it were presented in "The Problem of Antilanding Defense" by Colonel A. Lukash. A General-Leytenant Aleksandr M. Zvartsev was identified as the Chief of Staff of the Turkestan Military District in 1970, and as Deputy Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate in 1973. There is no information in available reference materials which can be firmly associated with Colonel Nemozhenko. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.]

TOP SECRET
Organization and Conduct of an Antilanding Defense
by an Army Corps in Cooperation with Naval Forces
(Based on the Experience of Corps Exercises)
by
General-Mayor of Tank Troops A. Zvartsev
and
Colonel N. Nemozhenko

The conditions for corps troops going over to an antilanding defense will be varied. We shall single out only the four most characteristic of the Northwestern Strategic Axis.

First, large units of an army corps can go over to an antilanding defense in a period of threat. Having a certain amount of time before the beginning of military operations, the troops will be able to make a timely move into the designated areas and make engineer preparation of the terrain, which will facilitate the organization of the defense.

Second, the corps can go over to an antilanding defense when the enemy unleashes war by surprise. In this case, the defense is organized in a short time and under a complex situation. Irrespective of the conditions of going over to the defense, it has to be organized on a broad front. Thus, in the joint staff training of a corps headquarters and division staffs, motorized rifle divisions have gone over to an antilanding defense on a front anywhere from 200 to 1,000 kilometers. Each division concentrated its main efforts on holding the most important area.

Third, in the course of an offensive operation of a front, a corps may with part of its forces go over to an antilanding defense for the purpose of covering its main grouping against strikes from the sea. In this case, the organization of the defense will be carried out under very complex physical-geographical conditions of the theater for short periods and under the influence of a rapidly changing combat situation. The main forces and means of the corps will be continuing the offensive.

Fourth, the army corps may go over to coastal antilanding defense in a very extensive sector in the concluding stage of an offensive operation, when separated from the main forces of the front which are operating along an adjacent or a new axis.
The width of the defense zone of an army corps, according to the experience of command-staff exercises and war games, has reached 1,000-1,500 kilometers, and that of a division 200 kilometers and more. Such wide defense zones are explained by the enormous length of the seacoast and the large number of terrain sectors almost inaccessible to a landing. Relative to the overall length of the seacoast, the sectors accessible to landing usually comprise only an insignificant part.

The task of the first echelon of an army corps or division in a number of cases may consist not of holding the coast in the entire zone of defense, but of repelling the landing of an amphibious landing force and covering the maneuver of the second echelons and reserves of defending forces into the areas of landing or to the axes of operations of large-scale landing forces. Therefore, the first echelon can occupy several battalion areas or company strong points prepared in advance or hastily on the most threatened axes, and for holding important installations.

In view of the fact that the most intense stage of antilanding defense is that on the shore, the activities of the commanders of all levels, and the forces and means subordinate to them, must be concentrated on destruction of the enemy while still in the water so as not to permit the landing of the landing force on the shore. In this connection, we believe it is advisable to have in the antilanding defense, as a rule, not a second echelon, but a combined-arms reserve in readiness to maneuver on various axes. Most often it will consist of motorized rifle and tank units and subunits, reinforced without fail with engineer forces and means.

Thus, in one corps command-staff exercise, the coast in the zone of a motorized rifle division was defended essentially by only two motorized rifle battalions supported by the division artillery. A tank regiment and a motorized rifle battalion were held in the division's reserve, and a motorized rifle regiment in the corps commander's reserve. One more regiment of this division defended an important remote sector of the coast independently. Here the battalions of the first echelon were deployed in places that did not appear likely targets of an enemy nuclear attack. They occupied positions prepared directly on the coast if the landing axes of the landing forces had been reliably determined.

The problem of engineer preparation of the positions and areas of troop deployment remains complex and is not fully resolved. Engineer preparation of the terrain on the seacoast will not be uniform. Strong points, artillery firing positions, as well as launching areas of missile
units, should be developed only in those sectors and on those axes where the landing of an amphibious landing force is accomplished by its rapid advance into our territory.

One of the most important features of engineer preparation of the terrain is the increase by two or three times, on the average, in the difficulty of constructing earthworks in rocky soils as compared to ordinary conditions. In this regard, the need arises to carry out certain basic measures in the preparation of troop positions beforehand, even in peacetime. To reduce the volume of engineer works and to complete them in short periods of time, it is necessary to skillfully employ the camouflaging and protective features of the terrain: the numerous crevices, caves, heaps of rocks and boulders, as well as the soft soils in river channels.

Pneumatic tools and explosives should find wide application. This now obliges us in peacetime to instruct subunits of all branch arms to carry out blasting in rocky and hard soils. Calculations show that a motorized rifle division is capable of carrying out with its own forces the immediate operations in the engineer preparation of positions in periods varying from three to ten days, depending on the condition of the ground. It goes without saying that these periods are still too long, and further search for ways to reduce them is necessary.

For antilanding defense there is set up a system of antilanding obstacles in the coastal zone, obstacles in the depth of the defense and on the flanks. Installation of antilanding obstacles on the coast under conditions of high and low tides has a number of special features and calls for a great expenditure of forces and means. Thus, a combat engineer company lays up to 2,400 conventional antitank mines (three kilometers of minefields) in ten hours; under the conditions being considered, it lays only 300 to 350 antilanding mines for one kilometer in the same time. And for the construction of non-explosive antilanding obstacles, significantly more forces, means, and time are required. Consequently, non-explosive obstacles, in our opinion, can be readied and erected mainly during advance organization of an antilanding defense of a seacoast or in case of a protracted period between the occupation of positions by troops and the landing of the enemy landing force.

The engineer troops of the navy and, in particular, of naval bases take upon themselves the large tasks of installing special sea antilanding obstacles at depths over ten meters as well as conventional obstacles in the coastal sectors, on the approaches to fixed artillery positions, and in other places.
Organization of control and communications. According to the experience of exercises, control of troops was carried out from a command post, an alternate command post, and a rear control post. At the probable departure line of the second wave of the corps reserves, forward command posts were prepared. Such a system of deployment of control posts ensures troop command.

Based on the conditions of the terrain, the possible axes of enemy operations, and the grouping of forces and means, it is advisable to locate the command post in the center of the battle formation of the corps, near the routes of maneuver from which reliable control of all units of the corps and the reserves would be ensured, and stable cooperation with a fleet, units of the air defense of the country, and adjacent units would be maintained.

For troop control on an axis most in danger of a landing or on one of the remote flanks in the depth of the battle formation of the first-echelon units, it is advisable to have an alternate command post. The rear control post, in our view, should be located 20 to 25 kilometers from the command post. It must be in readiness to take over control of troops in case the command post and the alternate command post go out of action.

We believe that under the conditions being considered, the transfer of control of the troops of the corps to the command post of one of the divisions may have no less importance. The division commander can successfully accomplish this task if he is briefed in advance on the details of the concept of the conduct of the antilanding defense by the troops of the corps, and if there are in his staff the necessary corps documents and representatives from the cooperating forces with means of communications.

Reliable communications in the corps have paramount significance for control of troops. In a two-level command-staff exercise, division control posts were located at a distance of up to 600 kilometers from the corps command post. Radio communications with them were maintained by the radio nets and radio links of the corps commander and staff mainly using radio sets of medium power; they were maintained with the corps reserves by the radio nets of the corps reserves. Radio communications with units and subunits organizing the defense in important independent sectors of the coast were provided through a separate link using radio sets of medium power. Provision also was made for using the radio communications centers of the naval bases and of an army of the air defense of the country.
Wire telegraph and telephone communications, both secure and plain text, were provided mainly by overhead and cable communications lines. Communications with the first-echelon divisions and the regiments comprising the corps commander's reserve were maintained by not less than two independent links, which ensured their reliability.

Helicopters were widely used to deliver combat documents and in the capacity of radio retransmitting points. We have great hopes for communications helicopters as mobile retransmitting points that permit us to increase significantly the communications range over ultra-shortwave radio channels and the channels of radio-relay stations. Thus, rising to an altitude of 60 meters, a helicopter provides two-way communications by ultra-shortwave radio sets up to 250 kilometers. But such helicopters require special fitting out beforehand.

Cooperation communications were organized in the following manner. The corps commander and staff maintained communications with the commander of the naval base by radio link through representatives of the base located at the corps command post with their own means of communications, and also by links by wire and radio-relay means of communications. Communications of the chief of the rocket troops and artillery of the corps with the flag specialist for artillery of the supporting large unit or group of ships were maintained by radio through a representative of the fleet present at the corps command post with radio means of communications, and -- in the period of naval ship fire support of the counterattacks against the landing force that had landed -- through spotter officers of the fleet located on shore in the battle formations with their own radio sets. Communications of the corps command post with supporting aviation and the air defense forces of the country were maintained accordingly through representatives of the aviation and an operations group of the army of the air defense of the country. For receiving the signal which warned of the appearance of enemy ships, all staffs of the large units of the corps had receivers on the information radio net of the fleet, the air defense, and aviation.

A few words about the problem of stability of operation of the means of communications under conditions of enemy delivery of nuclear strikes. In one of the exercises, 21 nuclear strikes were delivered in the course of two hours against the troops of an army corps and important installations in its zone of defense. As a result, all the main communications centers were put out of action and wire communications with the troops of the corps were broken. For control there remained the means of radio communications and helicopters. In this situation commanders and staffs of large units and independently operating units must take all necessary steps toward
rapid restoration of disrupted control.

Organization of cooperation between the ground forces, naval forces, aviation, and units of the air defense of the country in support of successfully repelling the landing of amphibious landing forces and destroying airborne landing forces and unifying the operations taking place over a large area simultaneously on land, sea, and in the air, is a crucial factor, and it must be carried out with utmost precision.

Cooperation must be organized by tasks and to the full depth of defense on the main axes where there is danger of landings. Destroying the enemy during passage by sea, repelling the landing of the landing force, and destroying the troops who have landed on the shore should be considered the most typical tasks.

During destruction of the enemy in passage by sea, cooperation will be carried out mainly between the missile units, aviation, and the naval ships. In repelling the landing of a landing force, when all forces and means are going consecutively into combat, cooperation is maintained among all elements of the battle formation of the corps, and with aviation, and the coastal missile and artillery units and the ships of the navy, and -- during the destruction of the landing force that has landed on the shore -- with the reserves of the higher commander as well.

In the course of combat with enemy amphibious landing forces, the organization of cooperation of the corps with large units and units of the navy is distinguished by the greatest number of specific features. Coordinated actions can be accomplished directly only on the approach of the landing force to the minefields and in the effective fire zone of missile units and ground artillery. Zones for conduct of fire or targets for destruction are allocated among the fire means; provisions are made for recognition signals of our own ships, exchange of reconnaissance data, and use of the reconnaissance means of the naval coastal missile and artillery units in support of the corps and division rocket troops and artillery, and for other actions.

For purposes of maintaining clear-cut cooperation of the fire means of various branch arms it is necessary, in our view, to have a representative of the naval forces command with means of communications at the command posts of the corps and division commander, and at the fleet reconnaissance posts (combat information post) to have a representative of the artillery staff of a division with means of communications and signalling and code tables.
On the basis of the corps commander's decision and instructions concerning the organization of cooperation, the staffs of the corps and divisions develop a planning timetable or cooperation diagram, enlisting the services of representatives of the cooperating units and large units of the navy, aviation, and the air defense of the country.

Combat with the landing force of the enemy begins long before his approach to the coast. Strategic missiles, naval forces, and front aviation will deliver strikes against ports of embarkation of the landing force and during its passage by sea.

The main task of large units and units of the corps in this period consists of preventing the enemy's conduct of reconnaissance, concealing the true disposition of the defense, preventing both the clearing of antilanding obstacles by sabotage-reconnaissance groups and also preventing their neutralization and destruction of the most important installations of the defense. In this respect, a timely and secretly conducted antinuclear maneuver of forces and means is exceptionally important.

With the appearance of the landing force in the outer anchorage or maneuvering area for transports and landing ships (at a distance of 18 to 30 kilometers from the coast), large units of the corps using their own means inflict damage on the enemy. For destroying the transports, landing craft, and warships concentrated in a limited area in the period when the landing force is debarking from transports, all types of weapons should be used, especially nuclear weapons.

It seems to us that battalions of tactical missiles should deliver nuclear strikes against the landing force in the outer anchorage or maneuvering area of the ships and especially against the areas where the landing force forms up into waves (rendezvous).

As the landing force waves approach the shore, all fire means go into action, and on the arrival of the enemy at a distance of 300 to 400 meters, fire reaches its maximum intensity; the mixed minefields are brought into action.

In the case of an enemy dropping (landing) an airborne landing force, as well as large sabotage-reconnaissance groups, they are destroyed by forces and means designated beforehand or taken from secondary sectors. If there are not enough of these forces, the airborne landing force is at first isolated and, after repulse of the amphibious landing force, destroyed. We also see some sense in employing border guard troops and
If the enemy succeeds in landing an amphibious landing force on the coast, the actions of our troops will not in principle differ from actions under ordinary conditions.

In conclusion, let us express some practical desires directed at raising the combat capabilities of the army corps in antilanding defense. Since the corps can occupy the defense on a front of 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers, its weak area will be the low capabilities for maneuvering troops into the landing areas of the landing forces because of the absence of prepared road axes. Rapid maneuvering can be accomplished only by units and subunits equipped with amphibious tanks and heavy tracked carriers.

Motorized rifle divisions of the northern type are capable, as the experience of exercises has shown, of moving from 20 up to 40 to 50 kilometers a day over wooded-swampy or boulder-strewn terrain. To increase the maneuverability of such divisions under roadless conditions, it is necessary, in our view, to have in a tank regiment not less than one battalion of amphibious tanks in constant combat readiness, and to work out in the process of combat training with this battalion the tasks of moving along the shortest wooded-swampy axes to those areas suitable for landing.

Besides this, it is also necessary to have amphibious tanks in the tank companies of motorized rifle regiments. All of the motorized infantry should be put in heavy tracked carriers. It is advisable to equip staffs with vehicles with a cross-country capability. Under almost completely roadless conditions it is also advisable to accommodate all the supply reserves of the division in tracked carriers.

It should be mentioned that on some axes suitable for landing, the maneuver of reserves can be accomplished only with the aid of helicopters or transport aviation. This circumstance permits us to state that it is necessary to attach not less than a regiment of helicopters to an army corps fulfilling the task of an antilanding defense of the seacoast.

In order to decisively influence combat operations to destroy the landing force at its bases and during its passage by sea, we consider it advisable to strengthen the corps with a missile brigade of operational-tactical missiles with a range of operation up to 300 to 500 kilometers. It is useful at the time of fulfilling the antilanding task to resubordinate part of the fleet large units and aviation large units to the corps commander. For the purposes of combat with enemy nuclear means as
well as for destroying the landing forces while they are landing, it is necessary to have in the divisions artillery systems with a range of fire of 18 to 30 kilometers.