MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: From the Exercise Sphere--1970 Exercises

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article reviews the results of seven exercises held by Warsaw Pact forces in 1970 to work out various operational-tactical and command-staff problems. These exercises were the following: the DVINA combined-arms maneuvers involving five military districts of the USSR; the FRAKIYA-70 operational-tactical exercise in Bulgaria; the TARAN army exercise in Czechoslovakia; a multilevel command-staff exercise in communications in Poland; a combined army command-staff exercise in Bulgaria; the SIGETVAR command-staff exercise in Hungary; and, an allied naval staff exercise in the Black Sea. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 1, which was published in 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the

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The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article reviews the results of seven exercises held by Warsaw Pact forces in 1970 to work out various operational-tactical and command-staff problems. These exercises were the following: the DVINA combined-arms maneuvers involving five military districts of the USSR; the FPAKIYA-70 operational-tactical exercise in Bulgaria; the TARAN army exercise in Czechoslovakia; a multilevel command-staff exercise in communications in Poland; a combined army command-staff exercise in Bulgaria; the TGETVAR command-staff exercise in Hungary; and, an allied naval staff exercise in the Black Sea. This article appeared in Issue No. 1, which was published in 1970.
The Combined Armed Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact are undergoing intensive combat training. Personnel are actively absorbing military knowledge, mastering the use of equipment, and perfecting their combat skills.

We present below reports on certain exercises held among fraternal armies.

The DVINA Maneuvers

In the first half of March 1970, under the direction of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade A. A. Grechko, combined-arms maneuvers were held on the territory of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic under the code name DVINA.

In terms of area covered and the large number of ground, air, and airborne landing forces involved, these maneuvers were the largest measure undertaken by the Armed Forces of the USSR in recent years.

Taking part in the maneuvers were troops from the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus, Belorussian, and Baltic Military Districts, large units and units of airborne landing forces, and Long-Range and Military Transport Aviation.

At the maneuvers the combat and mobilization readiness of ground forces and aviation were tested, problems involving the regrouping of forces over a large distance, using all types of transport in their deployment, were worked out, and the field training and preparation of large units and units for the conduct of highly mobile combat operations were improved.
During the maneuvers motorized rifle and tank divisions, operating under adverse conditions resembling as closely as possible those of actual combat, negotiated deep snow and impassable roads and successfully carried out various combat tasks: they successfully broke through border and intermediate lines, negotiated large water barriers through the ice, organized bridge crossings for heavy combat equipment under winter conditions, deployed and delivered quick strikes against the "enemy", waged an offensive both by day and by night, and quickly executed a maneuver on the battlefield. Units and large units prepared lines of defense in a short time, carried out high-speed counterattacks with regimental and divisional reserves, and also delivered powerful counterstrikes. The troops performed decisively and boldly in a meeting engagement, during which nearly 1000 tanks and a great deal of other combat equipment were operating in certain extremely active sectors.

Front aviation participating in the maneuvers delivered strikes against moving ground targets from low and extremely low altitudes. The crews' actions were marked by boldness and decisiveness.

Military Transport Aviation operated successfully in the maneuvers, performing an airdrop of an operational airborne landing force, consisting of an airborne landing division, into the assigned area. Within a space of 28 minutes, more than 8000 landing troops, equipped with light armament, antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, self-propelled guns and the ammunition for them, were dropped into the "enemy" rear area.

Considerable art and boldness were demonstrated by a group of landing forces who executed a jump from an altitude of less than 100 meters. This opens the way for airborne landing forces to conduct landings from low altitudes. Immediately after the landing, personnel of subunits of airborne divisions, in strict accordance with the operations plan, initiated combat to seize and expand the bridgehead.
Also well-executed was the transport by air of the personnel and armament of certain units of ground troops, including tanks and missile launchers, with a landing on dirt airfields.

Rear services support to the troops at the maneuvers was organized and carried out in an efficient military manner.

During the maneuvers the formation commanders, commanders, staffs, and troops improved their practical skills in fulfilling combat tasks under adverse conditions with and without the use of nuclear weapons. The maneuvers were well-organized and instructive, and served to confirm the high level of combat capabilities of ground, air, and airborne landing forces and their ability to perform well in modern warfare.

The Operational-Tactical Exercise FRALIYA-70

Between 14 and 28 August in the Bulgarian People's Army under the direction of the Minister of National Defense, a two-sided troop operational-tactical exercise was held bearing the code name FRALIYA-70. Its goals were the improvement of the field training of troops and staffs and the practical working out of problems of coordination when organizing and conducting an operation (battle) at the outset of a war, under conditions in which conventional weapons are used at first and nuclear weapons are subsequently introduced.

The exercise was held over a large area and involved the participation of large units and units at full strength. (A total of three motorized rifle divisions, two tank brigades, one army rocket brigade, one air defense division, and seven aviation regiments were assigned to the exercise.)

In order to work out the problems of breaking through fortified areas in the defensive zone of a division, a special sector with fortifications was created, in imitation of the defensive zones "Metaxas" (Greece) and "Gallipoli"
Worked out in full scale for the first time were such important problems as delivering the first strike by aviation and repelling an enemy air attack, waging combat to negotiate a forward security zone, breaking through a fortified zone, and forcing water barriers from the march.

The exercise included a great number of field firings and a considerable amount of bombing. There were two field launchings of tactical missiles. The field firings, bombings, and missile launchings were carried out not on the firing ranges, as is the usual practice, but in unfamiliar sectors of the terrain. Taking part in the operations of the troops were two parachute and four helicopter tactical landing forces, with incendiary material also being used. Special attention at the exercise was devoted to the releasing of aviation to field and alternate airfields and to conducting combat operations from them for the purpose of supporting and covering ground forces; to bombing, and to the firing of on-board weapons from helicopters.

Fire support of an attack by infantry and tanks was carried out by artillery using the method of dual concentration of fire (simultaneously along two lines echeloned in depth). Armored personnel carriers and helicopters were used in laying minefields.

The great instructive value and high degree of organization of the exercise carried out were achieved through advance and careful preparation and the fact that it was held under conditions approximating those of actual combat as closely as possible.

The Army Exercise of Czechoslovak and Soviet Troops TARN

This exercise was devoted to the problems of organizing and conducting an army offensive operation and battle by combined-arms large units and units under conditions in which conventional weapons are used at first and nuclear
weapons are subsequently introduced at the beginning of a war.

This exercise was held with a view toward improving the control of an army and the staffs of large units, as well as testing the readiness of the troops to wage a modern battle. In addition much attention was devoted at the exercise to working out problems of coordination between large units of allied armies when fulfilling common combat tasks.

The TAPAN exercise was notable for the large area that it covered, and the fact that a considerable number of troops and a large amount of combat equipment were involved. The exercise covered five provinces of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The overall scope of the operations of the troops and staffs covered a 100-kilometer front which was 350 kilometers deep.

Up to 40,000 men, 600 tanks and self-propelled guns, 500 armored personnel carriers, 151 aircraft, 99 helicopters, and over 7,000 motor vehicles were assigned to the exercise. This was the first exercise of such scope ever held by the Czechoslovak People’s Army.

Commanders and staffs at all levels on the whole showed ability in gathering and drawing conclusions from data on the situation within a short time, in making timely and sound decisions, and in assigning tasks to subordinate troops. In planning and conducting an operation the most important problems were those of controlling troops when breaking through a prepared enemy defense using conventional means of destruction, repulsing counterstrikes by large operational reserves with a simultaneous transition to the use of nuclear weapons, and breaking through an intermediate line of the enemy defense.

A positive factor in the work of the army staff and the staffs of large units was the use of various means of limited mechanization, and especially the use of standardized documents.
A characteristic feature of the TARAN army exercise was the very large number of tactical exercises on a divisional and regimental scale that were held with field firing and bombing.

Against the background of an army offensive operation, the troops, operating over extremely broken terrain, under adverse weather conditions, and in a situation approximating actual combat as closely as possible, worked out various methods of operation, carrying out combat tasks with powerful strikes by troops, fire from small arms, tanks, and artillery, and by bombing.

During the offensive the troops forced the Labe (Elbe) River, carried out an airborne landing, and negotiated zones of radioactive contamination and nuclear minefields.

Participating in the field firings were eight motorized rifle and seven tank battalions, five tank companies, 23 artillery (mortar) battalions (individual batteries), and six aviation regiments.

In all the tactical exercises Czechoslovak and Soviet large units and units performed efficiently and boldly, successfully carrying out tactical and fire tasks. All firings and bombing tasks were fulfilled with marks of "good" and "excellent".

The firing by antitank guided missile crews of Czechoslovak and Soviet divisions was especially effective. The exercise included such complex types of field firings, from the organizational point of view, as firings by second echelons of divisions and night firing by a tank regiment.

The operations of fighter aircraft and fighter-bombers were marked by good teamwork among pairs and flights and the ability to carry out fire tasks from altitudes of 70 to 100 meters. Flight personnel, operating under adverse weather conditions, performed boldly and decisively, arranging their battle formations on the basis of the meteorological conditions and the nature of the targets.
A tactical airborne landing force consisting of a parachute landing battalion was landed to support the forced crossing of the Labe River.

The infantry crossed the river in armored personnel carriers, while the tanks crossed on the bottom of the river (simultaneously, along three underwater routes), on tracked self-propelled ferries, and over a bridge that had been erected. A 120-meter floating bridge from a pontoon bridge park was erected in ten minutes. The total time required for the motorized rifle regiment to make a forced crossing of a water barrier 120 to 150 meters wide was one hour and ten minutes.

To work out problems of controlling troops of different national composition, mutual re-subordination of individual units was practiced during the exercise. To ensure control in these cases, operations groups with communications means were sent out. This facilitated the timely conveying of orders and instructions to the subordinate commanders, made for a clear understanding of the contents of combat documents, and on the whole ensured the control of troops of different national composition.

At the combined exercise, motorized rifle, tank, artillery, and aviation units and large units of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Central Group of Forces operated in close and continuous coordination.

The TARNAV combined exercise was both well-organized and instructive, thus making it possible to accomplish all the training goals assigned. It also contributed to a further strengthening of the harmony between the fraternal armies and a deeper mutual understanding and unity of views among commanders and staffs on the conduct of combined combat operations while fulfilling common tasks.
A Command-Staff Exercise Under the Direction of the Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic

A one-sided multilevel command-staff exercise held in 1970, using communications means in the field, was of great significance in the training of the operations staffs of the Polish Armed Forces.

During the exercise problems were worked out concerning the planning of the work of the chief directorates of the Ministry of National Defense, and of commanders and staffs of operational formations, during a period of threat as well as when conducting a front offensive operation in the non-nuclear and nuclear periods of a war.

Certain features of this exercise merit attention.

Deployment of the armed forces and the dispatching of staffs to field control posts were carried out on the basis of a specially prepared training operations plan (as opposed to a task).

All the playing groups were concentrated in one place near the staff of the director of the exercise. This ensured:

-- centralized direction of the playing out of the course of combat operations;
-- more effective use of means of communication.

In order to utilize the communications means economically, the staffs were actually relocated concentrically around the staff of the director, in short moves, bearing in mind the time required to relieve the control posts of the playing staffs.

This method of relocating the control posts was also used to achieve operational camouflage of the exercise.

Departments for automation of control were set up in the front staff and in the staffs of the armies. They made extensive use of high-speed field equipment for transmitting information in a secure form, which involved electronic
computer centers. Using this system some 400 separate problems were successfully solved during the course of the exercise.

For increased mobility during the exercise, the staffs were organized according to a new table of organization, designed to reduce personnel and motor transport by an average of 18 to 20 percent. The exercise showed that such a reduction was fully justified.

For the first time in recent years problems of replacing staff personnel were worked out at the exercise in a practical manner. The replacement was accomplished by:

-- replacing individual generals and officers;
-- replacing whole departments and directorates in playing staffs;
-- removing staffs from action entirely.

Those generals and officers removed from action were grouped in battalions and companies of an officer reserve, from which they were sent to other staffs as replacements. In addition, certain individuals and groups of officers were sent to replace playing staffs from the interior of the country (from central directorates, military academies, training schools, etc.). The staff of one combined-arms army, removed from action during the exercise, was replaced by the staff of a tank division that was called up on alert and arrived in its place.

During the exercise the foreign language ability of the officers of the playing staffs was put to the test. For this purpose one day of the exercise was designated "Russian Day". On that day all documents and communications were carried out in Russian. On the second day certain documents and telegrams were transmitted to the participating staffs in German.

During the exercise much attention was devoted to overcoming a strong enemy air defense system. It was considered the second most important task (after combat against nuclear means of attack) of all arms of troops.
A Combined Army Command-Staff Exercise

In June 1970 a combined army command-staff exercise using communications means was held on the territory of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the theme "Preparation for the conduct of an army offensive operation on a maritime axis with and without the use of nuclear weapons at the outset of war". The exercise was directed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army.

Taking part in the exercise were operations groups and staffs of the Bulgarian People's Army, the Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the Armed Forces of the USSR (Odessa Military District).

Preliminary coordination of the concept and combined work during the preparation and conduct of the exercise with operations groups of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the staff of the Odessa Military District, proved to be an effective form of timely preparation and successful conduct of the combined exercise.

The exercise was held in a complex and instructive situation.

During the exercise the first attempts were made to use network graphs in solving problems on electronic computers.

Experience was gained in resubordinating and receiving allied troops from one national army into another, and in organizing combat and implementing coordination and control of allied troops.

The control of the staffs of large units of the allied armies was organized by exchanging operations groups between an army staff and the large units of the allied troops, and also by having an army establish radio communications between them.
The exercise contributed to an increase in knowledge and improved the practical skills of commanders and staffs in preparing and carrying out a combined operation by allied troops.

The SIGETVAR Command-Staff Exercise

In May 1970 a combined, two-level command-staff exercise, SIGETVAR, was held with the participation of staffs of the 5th Army of the Hungarian People's Army and the Southern Group of Forces of the Soviet Army.

During the exercise the main attention was devoted to working out problems of planning and organizing coordination between allied large units when breaking through an enemy defense, repulsing counterstrikes during the conduct of an operation, making forced crossings of water barriers, and conducting combat operations at night.

Commanders and staffs gained practical experience in organizing and conducting combined combat operations and considerably enhanced their theoretical training.

Worth noting here is the method of maintaining continuous coordination between national staffs, which was accomplished by the assigned officers with the necessary means of communications.

The exercise provided specific, positive experience in deploying and relocating control posts, as well as in organizing the work and rest of the personnel in them.

During the exercise the commanders and staffs of both the Hungarian and Soviet divisions employed a parallel method of work when developing and making a decision. This greatly reduced the amount of time needed to assign tasks to subordinate staffs. Extensive use was made of tape recorders to record instructions that had been issued, as well as extremely simple devices for making copies of the maps of the decision.

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During the exercise there was a smooth flow of internal information in the field headquarters of the army and in the command posts of divisions of the Hungarian People's Army. This was accomplished by means of continuously operating selective circuit communications.

On the whole the exercise showed that the staffs know their tasks and are able to perform them successfully.

A Staff Exercise by Allied Navies in the Black Sea

In order to work out communications when coordinating allied navies, a staff exercise was held in the Black Sea in May 1970, involving operations groups of naval staffs, their communications centers, and representational ship forces.

At the exercises, problems were worked out concerning the control of ship forces of allied navies during combined operations in coordination with aviation, and of mutual warning and communications between naval staffs and between forces taking part in the exercise. Particular attention in this connection was devoted to ensuring control and coordination by radio under conditions of intensive "enemy" radio countermeasures.

It should be noted that the load on communications means for the flow of information increased somewhat at this exercise as compared to previous, similar exercises, and also that the effectiveness of radio jamming increased.

On the average the length of one item of information (radiogram) at the exercise was 50 groups, and the time required to transmit it was one hour and 30 minutes, which is somewhat greater than the established norms.

On the whole, the communications set up at the exercise ensured the accomplishment of the tasks of coordinating the navies. This was helped by monthly training of the communications centers.
During the exercise the staffs of the three allied navies obtained practice in organizing and implementing coordination during combined combat operations to destroy ship groupings of the "enemy" at sea and to assist coastal groupings of ground forces in improving their system of communications, and in coordinating allied navies when they are carrying out combined tasks under conditions of intensive "enemy" radio countermeasures.

NOTE: