MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Reduction of Troop Assembly Time During Alerts

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses the implementation of measures to reduce the time needed to assemble troops during a combat alert. Among the measures mentioned are improving the system for warning the troops through better training of officers and improving technical means of warning, the organization of precise control of the troops and reduction of the time needed to bring weapons and equipment to combat readiness. The mechanization of loading operations to move out materiel is noted as being of special importance. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor Ye. Touzakov. This article discusses the implementation of measures to reduce the time needed to assemble troops during a combat alert. Among the measures mentioned are improving the system for warning the troops through better training of officers and improving technical means of warning, the organization of precise control of the troops and reduction of the time needed to bring weapons and equipment to combat readiness. The mechanization of loading operations to move out materiel is noted as being of special importance.

Comment:
General-Lt. Ye. Touzakov has been identified as Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Military District. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Troop Experience:

Shortening the Time for Assembling Troops During a Combat Alert

by

General-Mayor Ye. Touzakov

Shortening the time for assembling troops during a combat alert is achieved, as is known, by having an entire series of most important measures implemented by the troops. These measures, in particular, include improving the system of warning the troops, organizing precise control of them, reducing the time for bringing weapons and equipment to combat readiness, mechanizing the loading operations to move out materiel, and training commanders, staffs, and troops for actions during combat alert.

In the troops of our army, considerable work has been done toward shortening the time for warning the officers, staffs, and troops. Owing to the technical improvement of the warning signal system, only a few minutes are spent at the army-regiment level on announcing the receipt of the signals. But this is not the end. We are taking steps to accomplish the warning in a more rigid time period. The time required to warn the troops during combat alert may be further reduced by improving the training of the officers assigned to 24-hour duty, and by improving the technical means of warning. Whereas the first problem can be successfully resolved right in the troops, the second requires help from the military scientific-research institutions. The troops at present are in need of an automated warning system which would be manufactured centrally by the military industrial base and not by a semiprimitive method, as often happens. Such a system is especially necessary now for warning officers at the regiment level, since they directly head the implementation of specific measures during combat alert.
The significance of the continuity of troop control increases sharply during the period of bringing the troops to full combat readiness. When assembling the troops of an army during combat alert, control is initially exercised from the command post set up in the staff. The main tasks of this control post in this period are: to warn the troops, to clarify or assign new tasks, to monitor their fulfillment, to collect information about the situation, to warn the troops about the air enemy and the radiation and chemical situation, to maintain stable communications, to report to the district troop commander about the status of the army troops, and to establish and maintain closer coordination with the oblast military commissariats and the civil defense staff.

While the command post is moving forward to its designated area, the troops are controlled through the auxiliary control post which, during combat alert, is set up in the army staff at the same time as the command post. The staff is made up of all deputy chiefs of the arms of troops and services, and is headed by the first deputy army commander. The main tasks of the auxiliary post at this time are: to maintain stable communications with the large units and units of the army and with the district staff; to estimate the situation and clarify the tasks to the troops; to warn the troops of the air enemy and of the radiation and chemical situation; and to obtain information from the military commissariats which are manning and equipping the units about the measures being implemented to accelerate the supply of mobilization resources, and to work with the civil defense staff in accordance with the coordination plan. Communications between the auxiliary post and the troops and the army commander are carried out through the inter-garrison communications center, using some of the radio means of the communications company of the forward command post.

Having arrived in an area prepared by an operations group, where the means of the first position of the communications center are already deployed, the army commander listens to the first deputy on the telephone about the situation and the work done. He then gives the order to move the auxiliary post forward into its assigned area,
where it will function as the reserve command post, based at
the second position of the communications center. At the
same time as the deployment of the command post in the
assigned area takes place, the rear services control post of
the army is deployed, and is headed by the deputy army
commander for rear services. The rear operations group,
headed by the chief of the rear services staff, is sent out
from the rear services control post to the command post.
After the departure of the auxiliary post, a group of
officers of the organization-mobilization department and of
other services remains behind in the permanent location area
of the army staff to monitor the implementation of measures
for complete mobilization and for moving out the materiel
and equipment not taken along on the march.

While assembling the troops during a combat alert,
control in large units and units is also exercised from
command posts which are set up in the staffs. For the
period in which the command posts of the large units and
units at reduced strength are moving forward to assigned
areas, it is planned to have auxiliary posts headed by
chiefs of staff in the staffs at the permanent location points.
Officers of the rear services and technical units
make up the complement of these auxiliary posts for the most
part. At this time, the chiefs of the services are located
at the depots and ensure that the materiel is loaded. After
receiving the signal that the command post has been deployed
in an assigned area, the chiefs of staff depart to join
their commanders. After this, the auxiliary posts are
headed by the deputy commanders for the rear services until
all the equipment is finally removed and the materiel
completely moved out.

Command posts of large units and units in areas of
permanent location are prepared in advance and are kept in
constant readiness for control. At those command posts, a
control panel is prepared for use; into this panel are tied
selective circuit, telephone and inter-garrison radio
communications with the equipment parks, depots, concentra-
tion areas, higher staffs, and the military commissariats
manning and equipping the units. Having a similar kind of
control panel, the commander of a large unit (unit) may
personally collect data on the status of the large unit.
(unit) in a limited amount of time, may actively influence trop actions, and makes a timely report to the senior chief on the progress of assembling the troops during alert.

At present, a great deal of work is being done among the troops of the army to shorten the time for bringing the equipment to combat readiness. All armored vehicles are sheltered, and the storage batteries are left in the vehicles year round and are recharged by low electrical currents. All of this shortens the time for bringing the tanks to combat readiness and assures the reliable start of motors in low temperatures. Experience shows that a trained mechanic-driver can take a combat vehicle out of the vehicle park, even in low temperatures, within an hour. The storage of artillery prime movers and also the recharging of their batteries are handled in a similar way.

Dispensers are set up in communications units and subunits to supply electrolytes so storage batteries can be brought to operating condition. Putting this equipment to use to dispense electrolytes makes it possible to considerably reduce the time spent on this work. However, in such a situation, an intolerably large amount of time (from 10 to 17 hours) is expended in preparing the storage batteries for operation and in mounting them. It is quite impossible to accept this situation. The problem must be solved and solved in a centralized way, enlisting the services of the scientific research institutes for this purpose.

Of all the questions being dealt with in the troops regarding shortening the time for bringing the troops to combat readiness, the problem of moving out materiel supplies occupies a special position. Troop experience shows that whereas warning, assembling and moving out the troops during combat alert require not more than one hour, moving out materiel by the forces of the loading teams without mechanized means takes up to an hour and a half and sometimes even more. As to large units and units of reduced strength, they often cannot manage the tasks of moving out materiel with their own forces in the specified time; even for the immediate measures to prepare to receive mobilization resources. Hence, the tendency to use loading teams to
load materiel in large units (units) which are in constant readiness, and even more so in large units and units of reduced strength, does not now meet modern requirements.

It is precisely for this reason that in the troops of the army attention now is being turned to a comprehensive introduction of low-level mechanization for moving out materiel supplies. This will make it possible to considerably reduce the number of loading teams at all depots, to expedite the loading of vehicles by a factor of 3 to 4, and to ensure the materiel is moved out at the same time the troops move out during combat alert. Large units and units of reduced strength will acquire a capability to quickly move materiel out according to quotas in the specified time period, prior to the arrival of the bulk of those called up.

We will cite several specific examples in which low-level mechanization has been introduced. To begin with, all materiel depots in the units and large units of the army are equipped with movable pallets, each with a one-truck capacity. The equipment is kept on them in packages (kits in containers). Along with its pallet the equipment is delivered via guiding lines, which are made from rails or angle iron, to the doors (hatches) of the warehouses for loading onto the vehicles. Loading is carried out by the drivers of the vehicles designated for moving out the equipment, and by the storekeepers. To load one vehicle takes no longer than 2 to 3 minutes. Steps are being taken to expand the loading frontage at the depots based on their layout and the amount of equipment stored.

In ammunition and small arms depots, where equipment is stored in two tiers, low-level mechanization is used for both tiers. In such a case, the lower tier serves as a support for the guiding lines of the equipment in the second tier. In front of the doors (hatches) of the depot, depressions are made in the ground, permitting the vehicles to be put on the level of the lower tier of equipment. To load the equipment of the second tier, wooden or metal platforms are placed in these depressions to allow the vehicles to be lifted to the level of the second tier. As soon as the equipment is loaded from the second tier, the platforms are
taken away and the vehicles are returned to the level of the first tier.

Adaptations have been made for loading the heaviest and bulkiest stock, for example, fuel and lubricants. Where barrels of POL are stored in closed dumps, sloping platforms are inclined to the doors. At the bases of the sloping platforms, barriers are erected to stop the barrels before loading them into each vehicle. When the barrier is lifted, the barrel is rolled into the body of the vehicle. If the POL is stored in open dumps, then special sloping lanes are prepared on the ground, like, the sloping platforms. In this case, depressions in the ground are prepared from the input sides, allowing vehicles to be put on the level of the inclined lanes. These seemingly insignificant improvements make it possible to reduce the number and size of the loading teams to a fraction of their former size, and most important, to reduce the time spent in moving out the materiel.

Of great importance to shortening the time for bringing the troops to full combat readiness is the practicability of the plans formulated and of the calculations regarding the use of personnel and motor vehicle transport equipment, as is the training of the commanders, staffs, and the troops for actions during combat alert.

In the troops of the army, the bringing of the troops to full combat readiness is planned according to the level of combat readiness. In so doing, at each level of combat readiness, specific measures are defined in terms of time and the responsible executors are designated. All the chiefs of the arms of troops and services formulate individual plans which are a sort of component part of the overall plan, in accordance with the decision of the commander on bringing the troops to full combat readiness. The individual plans also are worked out according to levels of combat readiness, and in content they embrace not only the work of the chief of arms of troops or service, as occurred when so-called personal plans were developed, but the whole range of measures to be implemented by the given service. In these plans the specific job of each officer of the departments and services is specified.
The plans for combat readiness are regularly clarified in the troops of the army, under the direct supervision of the chiefs of staff. Every month time is set aside for all officer personnel to study their responsibilities in the unit to which they belong. Furthermore, all command-staff exercises, war games, staff exercises, and troop exercises and drills, begin with working out the problems of actions by levels of combat readiness. Studies of their duties and activities during combat alert are separately planned and conducted for NCOs, the storekeepers, and the drivers of tanks, and motor vehicle transports. This is necessary, since during a combat alert the bulk of the work to prepare for moving the troops out must be completed before the arrival of the officers at their subunits and units. These are a few of the ways of shortening the time for bringing the troops to full combat readiness, based on the work experience of the commanders, staffs, and troops of the army.