MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Defense Against Amphibious Landings

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article by the Commander of the Baltic Military District discusses possible NATO plans for making amphibious landings on the Baltic coast and ways of defending against them. The subject is treated comprehensively, from examining the coast for the most probable landing areas to forming reserve antitank and engineer elements to support defensive forces. Emphasis is placed on coordination of forces and maintaining firm control of troops under complex combat conditions. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Anti-Landing Defense During a Front Offensive Operation (Based on experience in Baltic Military District Exercises)

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General of the Army G. Khetagurov. This article by the Commander of the Baltic Military District discusses possible NATO plans for making amphibious landings on the Baltic coast and ways of defending against them. The subject is treated comprehensively, from examining the coast for the most probable landing areas to forming reserve antitank and engineer elements to support defensive forces. Emphasis is placed on coordination of forces and maintaining firm control of troops under complex combat conditions.

Comment:
General of the Army Georgiy Ivanovich Khetagurov was Commander of the Northern Group of Forces from 1958 until 1963, when he became Commander of the Baltic Military District. Previous articles by him appeared in Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 11, 1973, Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 10, 1969; Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 4, 1961 and No. 2, 1960. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
Anti-Landing Defense During a Front Offensive Operation
(based on experience in Baltic Military District Exercises)
by
General of the Army G. Khetagurov

The presence of maritime axes of operational-strategic significance, coupled with the continuing intensified development by our probable enemies of landing forces, attests to the fact that in future war it will become necessary to wage war on maritime axes against amphibious landings by the enemy. It is therefore entirely natural that during operational training of troops and in our military press, particularly in the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", serious attention should be given to analyzing the problems of conducting anti-landing defense.

In this article we shall examine certain questions of organization in conducting anti-landing defense during a front offensive operation as applied to the Western Theater of Military Operations.

The possibility of an amphibious landing operation by the enemy on a maritime axis in this theater is borne out first of all by the fact that NATO already has considerable military and naval transport means capable of transporting over water three or four divisions at one time. Moreover, it is well known that in their preparations for war the US and the NATO commands plan to increase these capabilities by enlisting the services of the merchant marine and by transporting troops and combat equipment by sea and air from other continents. All these forces and landing means can be concentrated in advance, by our enemies in numerous well-equipped bases on the continent, utilizing for this purpose primarily the territory of Norway, Great Britain, Spain, and also the coast of northwest Africa and offshore islands.

Analyzing the possible methods that our enemies might use to conduct landing operations, we reach the conclusion that in a nuclear war they will be counting primarily on nuclear weapons in the conduct of amphibious landings. The
massive use of these weapons should, in their view, ensure nuclear superiority at all stages of the landing operation and lead to the creation of "zones of total destruction" directly on shore and in the landing sectors, and of areas with high radiation levels in the path of our reserves advancing from the interior to axes under threat from landing attacks.

In addition to landing troops, the enemy will at the same time make nuclear strikes against naval bases, ports, airfields, road junctions, bridges, and crossings over large water barriers, so that at a given time he may paralyze the operations of troops in the coastal area. At the same time that he makes an operational-tactical amphibious landing, the enemy can go over to active operations on land with the aim of reestablishing his lost position on the maritime axis.

In a non-nuclear war, our attacking forces and our aviation and navy have comparatively limited capabilities for inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy amphibious landing either in the ports of embarkation or during transit at sea. Therefore, not only can he concentrate forces and landing means in the British Isles, but he will also have time to move large forces through the Baltic Straits and keep them in readiness along the coast of the Scandinavian countries. In the latter case, the comparatively short distance between the departure area for the landing forces and the designated amphibious landing sectors will enable the enemy to use the "shore-to-shore" method of landing, figuring that even massive strikes by our aviation and naval forces with conventional weapons of destruction could hardly cause significant damage in a short time.

An appraisal of the enemy capability for amphibious landings and a study of the special characteristics of the maritime axis of the Western Theater of Operations leads to the conclusion that at various stages of a front offensive operation the requirements for conducting anti-landing defense will vary. For example, in a nuclear war one would hardly expect a large operational-strategic landing by the enemy in the closed part of the Baltic Sea basin, since his landing forces, concentrated at landing and loading points along the coast of the Baltic and North Seas, would immediately be subjected to missile/nuclear strikes by both
strategic nuclear forces and operational-tactical missiles. This, of course, does not exclude operational-tactical and numerous diversionary-reconnaissance amphibious and airborne landings.

Consequently, in organizing anti-landing defense in this part of the sea basin during an offensive operation the front will have to provide for the allocation of a small number of forces needed mainly for the consolidation of the captured coastline on the axes in the greatest danger of a landing attack and for the defense of important objectives (naval bases, ports, islands, etc.).

As the troops of the maritime front continue to advance westward and emerge on the coast of the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Straits of Dover, opportunities arise for the enemy to utilize his sizable navy more broadly to carry out a landing operation on an operational and operational-strategic scale.

The organization of anti-landing defense in a front offensive operation in a nuclear war. One of the characteristic features of anti-landing defense in the conditions under discussion is that it is organized sequentially by means of its uninterrupted buildup.

In preparing the operation, the defense on the seacoast will be set up within the departure area with the allocation of the necessary forces. Its organization should cause no special difficulty, since the defensive measures can be taken well in advance, in peacetime, and be completed on the eve of the offensive.

With the beginning of the offensive operation, as the front forces advance along the seacoast, the coastal flank will gradually be extended, and new areas will be opened up that are accessible to a landing attack. This will require uninterrupted buildup of the defense by the allocation of additional forces and means.

Depending on the circumstances, the buildup of the defense on the seacoast can in one case be achieved by gradually drawing upon units advancing directly along the coast and using them to hold sectors of the coast that have been captured. In another case the defense of newly opened
axes which are accessible to landing attacks can be achieved by utilizing reserve large units. It is also possible that the buildup of the defense will have to be accomplished by regrouping forces and means from those sectors of the coast previously considered threatened by landing attacks, but which have lost their significance as the troops continued to move forward.

As experience in exercises has shown, the use of combined-arms large units is not the only way of building up an anti-landing defense. The navy will also participate directly by sequentially redeploying part of its forces to axes which have become susceptible to landing attacks and securing the sea space behind it.

Along with the combined-arms large units and naval forces, rocket troops and aviation will be redeployed to the axes of the anticipated amphibious landing. Rocket troops first of all prepare the move by trajectories from the launch positions occupied on the axis of operations by the main grouping of the front forces. At the same time, temporary positions are prepared on distant axes threatened by landings, and separate rocket units (subunits) are moved to them when necessary. Front aviation can use forward airfields located preferably near the coast.

The sequential buildup of anti-landing defense predetermines the entire procedure for the organization of the defense of the seacoast during an offensive. This fact affects the plan of the formation commander, the planning of anti-landing defense during the offensive operation, the preparation for it, and the methods used in carrying it out.

A feature of the plan for anti-landing defense is that it is part of the overall plan for the offensive operation and, since the situation is not yet clear, it is initially prepared in rough outline. During the operation, as information is received concerning enemy intentions, the plan for the defense of the coastline is gradually refined and supplemented; and it assumes its final form just as an enemy landing becomes a real threat.

It is in this context that the planning of anti-landing defense is carried out. The front works out a unified plan of the offensive operation that reflects all measures.
involved in organizing anti-landing defense. Subsequently, as the threat of an amphibious landing by the enemy becomes more imminent, and as the front troop commander refines his plan for anti-landing defense during the operation, the staff works out its plan for anti-landing defense of the seacoast on a map with explanatory notes. In individual cases, when a large amphibious landing by the enemy is expected at the very beginning of the operation, the front troop commander can adopt a plan in advance for the defense of the coast and immediately begin setting up the necessary grouping of forces and means. In this situation, parallel to the planning of the front offensive operation, the front staff works out a plan for the anti-landing defense.

The makeup of anti-landing defense, as is known, is accomplished in accordance with the plan of the front troop commander, and usually includes the creation of appropriate groupings of forces and means on the axes threatened by landing attacks, the organization of a fire plan for all types of weapons, and the engineer preparation of the terrain. The grouping of ground forces will be made up from the combat strength of the front, coastal rocket-artillery units of the navy, and border troops operating in the maritime zone. The number of combined-arms large units needed to defend the seacoast will depend in each specific case on the length and nature of the coast, the number of axes accessible to landing attacks and their size and significance, the combat capabilities of the large units brought into the battle against the amphibious landings, and also the makeup of the expected enemy landing force and the actuality of a threat of a landing.

A study of the military-geographic conditions of the theater of military operations shows that the length of the coastal flank of the front during an operation can be 600 kilometers or more. If our goal were to securely cover the entire coast, the defense of this kind of front would require up to ten divisions. It is quite obvious that, in conducting an offensive operation, the front is in no position, either simultaneously or in sequence, to commit that quantity of forces to anti-landing defense. Therefore, in determining the number of combined-arms large units for the organization of anti-landing defense during an operation, it is necessary in each case to take strict account of enemy capabilities and to determine which axes
are most threatened by landing attacks. If we approach from this position the problem of determining the number of large units needed, then we may assume that the number will be less. Thus, for example, within the Soviet Baltic there are only three axes suitable for landing attacks; along the coast of Poland and East Germany there are only 5 or 6 such sectors, each 15 to 20 kilometers long; and west of the Jutland Peninsula to Cherbourg there are 6 or 7 sectors with an overall length of about 200 kilometers. During an offensive operation, at the most 3 or 4 of these axes (sectors) could be opened up. Thus, only 3 or 4 divisions would need to be allocated for their defense. And even these need not be committed at once, but rather in succession.

In view of the great length of the coastal flank, and the presence of considerable gaps between axes threatened by landing attacks, often up to 80 to 200 kilometers, the width of a division defensive zone along the seacoast, based on experience gained in exercises and war games, could reach 100 to 120 kilometers. But where individual small sectors accessible to landing attacks are widely separated, and in coastal areas not particularly suitable for amphibious landings by the enemy, the defensive front of individual large units could be 200 kilometers and more.

Therefore, defense by a large unit must be based on a broad maneuver, ensuring the rapid concentration of the greatest possible number of forces and means in the sectors of the enemy landings. Each division prepares, in addition to the maneuver within its defended zone, a maneuver in the zone of adjacent large units. The final grouping of forces and means on one axis or another will usually take place at the beginning of the enemy landing attack, when it becomes possible to ascertain his intentions.

The broad front of combat with enemy landings, and the principle of sequential organization of an anti-landing defense with the allocation to it of limited forces, all affect the operational disposition of those forces of the front which go over to the defense of the seacoast. A grouping of ground forces, as a rule, is formed into one echelon with a strong combined-arms reserve (not less than a division). In addition to the combined-arms reserve, antitank reserves, mobile obstacle detachments, and reserves
of special troops are also formed, all especially intended for anti-landing defense.

In the disposition of forces for defense it is essential to take into account the nature of the terrain, the presence in the immediate coastal area and in the coastal zone of important tactical and operational installations (naval bases, ports, naval control posts, etc.), as well as the possible methods of landing by the enemy. Thus, some divisions may deploy their main forces in the coastal interior, ready to occupy the areas that have been prepared or to execute a maneuver into the zones of other large units. Other divisions, in whose zones directly on the coast there are the aforementioned important operational installations, will have to commit significant forces to the defense.

The defense of naval bases, ports, and coastal cities is set up as an all-around defense, designed to prevent their capture from either sea or land. In those divisions covering sectors and axes which are difficult of access, only separate strongpoints for security and reconnaissance subunits need be set up; while the main forces at full strength can be deployed by echelon in the coastal interior in several areas and dispersed, for example, by regiment. And they must always be ready to move into the axes where the enemy is most likely to land his main forces and also be ready to destroy his airborne landing forces.

It is advisable to deploy the combined-arms reserve of the front in the coastal interior, in one or in several areas, on important axes which are accessible to landing attacks. The reserve is supposed to deliver a counter-strike, destroy the enemy airborne landing force, take up the defense on the defensive lines prepared in the interior, or replace units of the first echelon that have lost their combat effectiveness as a result of enemy nuclear strikes. The combined-arms reserve should be located in an area which provides protection for the troops from weapons of mass destruction, which has a well-developed road network, and which has prepared routes for moves within the area and for advancing to the deployment lines for a counterstrike. From experience gained in the Baltic Military District, we figure that the distance between the areas where the combined-arms
reserve of the front is located and the deployment lines for the delivery of counterstrikes can be 100 to 150 kilometers.

In forming a grouping of ground forces, it should be borne in mind that in amphibious landing operations the enemy makes considerable use of amphibious tanks. He also uses amphibious armored personnel carriers to land the first infantry echelons, and immediately after the first few waves he tries to land conventional tanks. Thus, combat against tanks becomes extremely important in anti-landing defense. Therefore, both the front and the divisions must have strong antitank reserves. It is sufficient for a front to have two or three such reserves, each with up to one tank-destroyer artillery regiment or an antitank guided missile battalion. Antitank reserves may be of combined composition.

In addition to antitank reserves, a reserve of engineer troops must also be created. It is advisable that a front have at least an engineer-sapper battalion and the means for mechanizing engineer work. At the same time, because of the short time available for organizing the defense and because of the mobile nature of defense, it is necessary to have large (from a company to a battalion), well-equipped, mobile obstacle-construction detachments for operations both on water and on the shore. It is advisable that they be equal in number to the antitank reserves, to permit them to conduct joint operations. One or two detachments are also needed for erecting anti-landing obstacles.

Border units stationed in the front zone can be used in the departure area mainly for security and patrol of the coast in the intervals and gaps between the large units and units of the first echelon; for combatting diversionary-reconnaissance groups and detachments landing by sea and air; and, in certain cases, for combatting tactical airborne and diversionary-amphibious landings by the enemy.

The grouping of rocket troops in an anti-landing defense will be determined on the basis of the presence of rocket large units in the front, the number of tasks involved in conducting an offensive operation, and the scope of the enemy landing operation. The grouping can include, when necessary, front rocket units, a rocket brigade of an army advancing along the coast, and coastal rocket units of the navy. The rocket grouping will also include rocket
battalions of large units, as well as rocket ships of the navy that are engaged in repulsing and destroying enemy landing forces. Considering the ever-increasing capabilities of the rocket means of the front (army) and the navy, in a number of cases it might not be necessary to create a separate grouping of rocket troops for anti-landing defense. Maneuver by trajectories will prove to be the basic method of utilizing rocket troops to deliver a strike against the enemy landing forces.

The grouping of forces and means for air defense includes the forces of organic and attached antiaircraft units, antiaircraft missile units, and radiotechnical units of the front; air defense troops of the country; and naval air defense means deployed on the coast and those on board ships. The broad front of the anti-landing defense, the distance between axes accessible to landings, and the limited means of air defense, do not permit reliable cover for troops along the entire length of the coastline. The efforts of air defense means will be concentrated on covering only the main grouping of troops. As a result, therefore, air defense will typically be a combination of zonal and installation cover, and also broad maneuver of antiaircraft missile units on the axis of the main efforts of the air enemy.

The grouping of front aviation for the fulfilment of tasks for anti-landing defense will be accomplished only after the beginning of the battle against the enemy landing; and, as a rule, its complement will be limited, since the basic forces of the air army will be used to support the attacking forces of the front. However, at critical moments of the air-landing defense, the air army may direct all its efforts to repulsing the enemy landing.

The engineer preparation of the terrain, in view of the considerable length of the coastline and the limited allocation of forces for anti-landing defense, is organized only on the most important axes accessible to landing attack. In these sectors of the coastline, the anti-landing defense is formed on the principle of creating regimental sectors and divisional areas of defense, whose basis will be company strongpoints. Alternate sites can be prepared for rocket units and air defense means on the axes threatened.
by landings, and temporary airfields can be prepared for aviation.

In secondary sectors of the coast, depending on their size, separate battalion areas or regimental sectors of defense are prepared. In those places where security and patrols are organized, separate platoon strongpoints can be set up when necessary.

Since the troops begin organizing the defense of the coast only after intelligence uncovers enemy preparations for the landing operation, it does not seem possible to set up a deep position defense. Therefore, as a rule, anti-landing defense will have the nature of a series of strongpoints and will coordinate closely with the defense of naval bases, ports, coastal cities, and individual areas, sectors, and lines from which it is readily possible to deliver strikes against enemy landing forces with fire from all our means, both during the landing and during the battle on shore.

The preparation of a deeper defense, in our view, will be possible only by organizing it in advance in the departure area, or in those cases where individual large units, in anticipation of an unavoidable landing attack by the enemy, undertake engineer works well in advance. The creation of a deep position defense on the coast is also possible at the final stage of the front offensive operation, when the troops in a number of cases have occupied the defense in advance on axes threatened by landing attacks. To accomplish this a significant amount of forces can be allocated.

In organizing defense on a broad front, and in concentrating the basic troop strength to hold sectors of the coast accessible to landings, under conditions in which the grouping of forces and means on one or another axis is finally accomplished while repulsing the enemy landing by using the forces along the coast and from the interior, one of the basic engineer tasks is the preparation of routes for moving troops.

Calculations indicate that in a divisional defense 80 to 120 kilometers wide, 480 to 550 kilometers of roads would be needed for units to reach the shore for the purpose of
occupying the prepared areas of defense and of advancing the reserves to the counterattack line, and also for a maneuver to be completed into the zones of adjacent large units. On the maritime axis of the Western theater, 70 percent of this requirement would be met by the existing network of roads; and the remaining 30 percent of the requirement would be met by having engineer units build another 160 to 180 kilometers of roads.

In addition, on certain axes threatened by landing attacks it will evidently be necessary to prepare routes for the movement of rocket units, air defense and engineer units, mobile obstacle-construction detachments, and site-preparation, pontoon, and river-crossing units.

The need to prepare routes for movements, coupled with other engineer requirements in organizing anti-landing defense, suggests that a considerable number of additional engineer troops, in addition to organic engineer forces and means, will be required on coastal fronts.

Special features of the organization and conduct of anti-landing defense in an offensive operation carried out only with the use of conventional means of destruction. Under these conditions, as in the case in which nuclear weapons are used, the anti-landing defense will be set up only on axes threatened by landing attacks; and it will also be built up as troops advance along the seacoast. Troop actions will be based on broad maneuver of forces and means on the threatened axes. But there will also be substantial differences.

In the first place, we must take into account the fact that in non-nuclear warfare, as has already been pointed out, the capabilities of front troops for defeating enemy landing forces are sharply diminished, especially when the fighting takes place on distant approaches to the defended coastline. The main means of destroying amphibious landings in the concentration areas, points of embarkation, and in transit at sea, will be our long-range and missile-carrying aviation, our submarines and, on the near approaches, our front aviation as well. However, the capabilities of these forces and means are limited. Their use at best would only weaken to a certain extent the landing forces of the enemy; they would be unable to stop the landing operation at the
very beginning. Therefore, the destruction of enemy amphibious landings will be accomplished, as a rule, by repulsing the landings or, after the landing, directly on shore.

All this attests to the fact that in non-nuclear warfare the significance of anti-landing defense during a front offensive operation on a maritime axis increases considerably. And in combatting amphibious landings, ground forces play the decisive role. The operations of naval air large units and of aviation will be directed toward weakening enemy landing forces on the near approaches to the defended coastline and creating favorable conditions for their final destruction in the landing area. Thus, at all stages of a front offensive operation, stronger groupings of ground forces will have to be created for anti-landing defense, and several additional combined-arms large units will have to be allocated for this.

In view of the constant threat of the use by the enemy of weapons of mass destruction, the troops, as in nuclear warfare, operate in dispersed combat deployment. However, the extent of their dispersal can be less. This is due to the fact that defense on the coast requires the creation of a denser fire plan for conventional weapons and the formation of deeper combat dispositions for large units. For the same reason, the defensive front of units and large units will, in all probability, also be reduced. Experience in command-staff exercises held in recent years shows that, taking into account special problems in organizing the defense of the seacoast, the width of a division defensive zone during combat operations with conventional weapons can fluctuate between 40 to 50 kilometers, and only in certain cases was it somewhat greater.

With the shift of the gravitational center of the battle against amphibious landings directly to the landing areas, the need increases for the troops to firmly hold those sectors of the coast located on axes threatened by probable landing attacks. Here the defense must be prepared and occupied by the troops in advance. The defense will be deep and fairly well-developed from the engineer point of view. Two or three positions can be prepared directly on shore (one along the water's edge), and defensive lines will be established in the depth by reserve forces.
Along with a firm hold of important areas and of prepared defensive positions, the defense of the seacoast is based on massing fire from conventional weapons on the axes of the enemy landing, broad maneuver of forces and means, and all-out counterattacks and counterstrikes. The fire plan will include fire strikes and the creation of zones of dense multi-layered fire of all types in front of the forward edge of the battle area, on the flanks, and in the depth of the defense, as well as its rapid shift to any threatened axis. In contrast to operations using nuclear weapons, the line of the closest coordination of the means of destruction and the delivery of massive strikes on the amphibious landings will move considerably closer to the defended coast. Calculations show that its distance from the coast, based on the range of tactical rockets and large-caliber coastal artillery, is 30 to 50 kilometers. Just as when nuclear weapons are used, under these conditions special significance is attached to the creation on shore of a carefully conceived antitank fire plan, involving the extensive use of tank subunits for direct fire and the use of antitank guided missiles and artillery.

In conducting combat operations with conventional weapons, one of the most dangerous enemy means of destruction against troops engaged in anti-landing defense will be his aviation, especially carrier aviation. Its massive use by the enemy can inflict considerable losses on defending troops, delay the advance of reserves to the landing sectors, and disrupt troop control. The ability of air defense to ward off massive enemy air strikes and to reliably cover the troops during the decisive moments of the battle is the most important factor in successfully repulsing enemy amphibious landings in operations involving only the use of conventional means of destruction.

Control of forces and means in anti-landing defense. Experience gained from exercises and war games attests to the fact that the command of an anti-landing defense during an operation must be directly exercised by the commander of troops of the maritime front in coordination with the navy command. Any desire to shift this responsibility to one of the armies, as is often proposed, can hardly be justified.

Our reasoning is based on the fact that the defense of a seacoast during a front offensive operation can be not
only of operational, but also of strategic significance. Other branches of the armed forces which are taking part in a strategic operation can be called upon to repulse, together with front troops, a large amphibious landing. If we take into account the spatial scope of anti-landing defense, it becomes quite obvious that the army commander would hardly be able to coordinate the actions of the various forces. Experience gained from exercises shows that only front headquarters is in a position to cope with this problem. We are inclined, moreover, to think that at certain moments of a strategic operation in a theater of military operations, the battle against an enemy amphibious landing can reach such proportions that the command of the anti-landing defense will have to be assumed by the High Command of the war theater, if one has been created, or by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

As in the solution of other problems at sea, once the battle against the landing has begun during a front offensive operation, a situation can develop where it is advisable for the front commander to operationally resubordinate those large units of the navy, long-range aviation, and air defense troops of the country that are taking part in the battle against the enemy amphibious landing. He will coordinate their actions through representatives of the commands of these formations (large units), assign them their tasks, approve their plans, and direct the preparations for anti-landing defense.

This, of course, does not mean that at certain stages of the battle with the enemy amphibious landing, the commander of front troops cannot place the control of the forces under the commander of the army operating in the coastal zone, the chief of rocket troops and artillery, the naval commander, or the aviation commander.

Thus, in order to achieve more effective use of the means of destruction in anti-landing defense, control of front rocket troops, coastal rocket units of the navy and the artillery might best be concentrated in the hands of the chief of front (army) rocket troops, with control of all air defense means in the hands of the air defense commander. This will have to be done first of all on the most important axes threatened by landing attacks, where the main forces of the enemy landing are expected.
While inflicting strikes on the enemy landing force at points of embarkation and during the sea passage, and when the assigned tasks are being carried out mainly by naval forces with the participation of long-range aviation large units, and sometimes also front rocket troops, control of all forces brought in for this purpose can be placed under the commander of the navy. In most cases he will also direct combat operations during the pursuit of any landing force withdrawing by sea after an unsuccessful landing attempt.

In repulsing a landing force and its destruction on shore by our troops, direct command will, as a rule, be assumed by the front troop commander, since this mission incorporates all the forces taking part in the defense of the seacoast.

In the organization and disposition of control posts in anti-landing defense, as in the organization of control of front troops as a whole, it must be borne in mind that most of the attention of the front troop commander and of the front staff is concentrated on the basic task, i.e., directing the combat operations of the main forces of the front attacking on the maritime axis. Here the command post is set up as the basic control post, along with the forward control post, and the rear area control post of the front. In addition to the front commander and the front staff, operations groups of the large units and formations of the branches of the armed forces coordinating with the front are also located at the command post. As long as there is no threat of an amphibious landing by the enemy, the direction of anti-landing defense of the coast is also exercised from this same post.

The direction of anti-landing defense during this time will involve mainly the organization of cover and defense of the seacoast; preparations to move the reserves, artillery, rocket troops, and aviation into the sectors threatened by landing attacks; and the buildup of the defense and the elaboration of tasks for large units in the anti-landing defense. When an immediate threat of an amphibious landing by the enemy arises, an auxiliary control post can be set up at the front for the control of forces and means of anti-landing defense.
At this point, under the direction of the front commander, the front headquarters, in conjunction with naval headquarters and representatives of headquarters of other branches of the armed forces, sets in motion a full range of measures designed to repulse the landing. As the situation at sea becomes more serious, the role and significance of the auxiliary post increase, and its functions in the organization of the battle against the landing forces are broadened. Basic communications will be transferred here, ensuring the control of all air defense forces and means; and representatives of all the branches of the armed forces arrive for detailed resolution of the question of coordination. When the enemy landing operation begins, the entire center of gravity of the leadership of the battle shifts to this auxiliary control post.

It is possible, of course, that in some cases the auxiliary post of the front will have to be set up in advance. Such a necessity could arise, for example, in a case where enemy amphibious and airborne landings are expected at the beginning of an offensive operation and significant forces are committed to organizing anti-landing defense. It could also arise when, during an operation, the defense of the seacoast is conducted at a considerable distance from the main forces of the front; and as the buildup continues and additional forces are committed to it, the defense becomes more and more independent.

At the concluding stage of the offensive operation, if the seacoast extends for a considerable distance, the front could go over to the defense with a more significant number of forces. In this case, anti-landing defense will be one of the main tasks, and the front troop commander and front staff, relying on the front command post, will have to devote most of their attention to its direction.

These are our thoughts on a number of questions concerning the organization and conduct of an anti-landing defense during a front offensive operation. Although the defense of the seacoast is not the main purpose of this operation, it is nevertheless of great significance. Therefore, I should like to point out the necessity of deeper and more thorough research on this problem.