MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Continuity of Control of Rocket and Artillery Troops

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article postulates the rocket and artillery troop command and control problems which will arise in combat and recommends ways of dealing with them. The primary solutions presented are to hand control down the chain of command or to the rear. The resultant training, communications and document handling changes required for these approaches are treated briefly. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
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Intelligence Information Special Report

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Early 1967

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11 December 73

SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Continuous Control of Army and Front Rocket Troops and Artillery

SOURCE
Documentary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel F. Trofimov. This article postulates the rocket and artillery troop command and control problems which will arise in combat and recommends ways of dealing with them. The primary solutions presented are to hand control down the chain of command or to the rear. The resultant training, communications and document handling changes required for these approaches are treated briefly. A chart of the proposed control transfer scheme is included.

End of Summary

Comment:
Colonel F. Trofimov has been associated in the past with the Dzerzhinskly Academy. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
Continuous Control of Army and Front Rocket Troops and Artillery

by

Colonel F. Trofimov

Continuous control of front and army rocket troops and artillery is one of the basic conditions required for them to fulfill effectively their assigned missions. This control is achieved in various ways, particularly by organizing control in a timely manner from several command posts, including those command posts which are one step lower in the chain of command. We shall present several views on this subject.

If we were to depict schematically, with due regard for subordination, the system of command posts, both at the operational level and at the nearest tactical level, and analyze their interconnection, then the transfer of control from one post to another can be represented in the following manner (see diagram).

As shown by the diagram, an army (division) will have to assume control when both the front (army) command post and the front (army) forward command post are put out of action. According to current views, in case of necessity, troop control can and should devolve on the front (army) rear control post. And truly, in principle, a surviving rear control post can take upon itself the functions of control of all forces and means. But, regretfully, its personnel complement does not yet include officers properly qualified to control front (army) troops, including rocket troops, especially when it comes to preparing and delivering nuclear and chemical strikes.

Hence, we support the view that when the command post and forward command post are put out of action, control must be assumed immediately by a lower echelon command post (headquarters) previously designated and trained for this purpose. It must fulfill this task when communications with senior commanders are lost on all channels. This command
post (headquarters) assumes control by transmitting a previously established signal.

To ensure the rapid transfer and reliable control of rocket troops during an operation when a particular command post goes out of action, it will be necessary, in our opinion, to implement a variety of measures during operational and combat training. Let us examine the principal measures.

The first measure is to systematically involve officers of an army rocket troops and artillery headquarters (division artillery headquarters), to which control is to be transferred in command-staff exercises, war games, and staff training at the appropriate headquarters (officers from the army to be involved with the front; and officers from the division to be involved with the army) with the purpose of not only acquainting them with the scope and conditions of work, but also of having them acquire practical skills in carrying out their functional duties of controlling rocket troops at a higher level.

It would also be very desirable to have the commanders and staffs of front rocket large units and units (in an army, those of the army rocket brigade) participate in the joint training. This will permit the army (division) rocket troops and artillery staff to clearly appreciate the amount of work at all levels, to establish mutual understanding with commanders and staffs of front (army) rocket large units and units, and to formulate control documents and the regulations governing their use, etc.

The second measure is to provide the combat documents required to control front and army rocket troops (see diagram) not only for the front (army) forward command post, but also for the army (division) to which control is to be transferred. During an operation these documents must be continuously modified and refined, based on information from higher headquarters and reports from subordinate headquarters.

The third measure is to organize communications for the control of front and army rocket troops based on the consideration that control may have to be transferred to another post or to a subordinate headquarters. At present, front communications troops do not have enough reserves to
enable them to allocate additional amounts of communications forces and means to those subordinate headquarters on which control will devolve.

In our opinion, to assure communications under these conditions, the following steps are feasible:

-- to set up auxiliary communications centers of higher headquarters near those control posts (headquarters) to which control is to be transferred;

-- to position a certain portion of the front (army) communications reserves near the army (division) command post to which control is to be transferred; this will create favorable preconditions for rapidly switching these reserves into the overall communications system of a given army and will also help the army communications chief define their tasks for them.

The fourth measure is to develop and create an information exchange system between the front (army) command post and forward command post, and between higher and subordinate headquarters, that will permit each of them to have the basic data necessary for the purposeful control of front (army) rocket troops and artillery, namely:

-- data on the enemy situation, primarily concerning his nuclear attack means and his front or army first-echelon forces;

-- data on the situation, condition, and supply situation of the rocket large units and units, of the antitank reserve, and of artillery units subordinate to the front and armies;

-- data on the time periods required to prepare and deliver rockets and munitions to rocket and artillery large units and units respectively.

In connection with the problem of burdening communications channels, this information may have to be transmitted to a subordinate headquarters over designated time intervals. All other data being accumulated as a result of information and reports from subordinate
headquarters can be collected by the headquarters (forward command post) which assumes control.

Having examined the principal measures for the transfer of control to other posts, it is appropriate to pose still another series of questions.

At present a number of organizations are developing an automated control subsystem for rocket troops and artillery. Though this subsystem will provide for the switching of control from one post to another, we must now reckon with the fact that the subsystem equipment to be used by rocket troops and artillery headquarters needs to be further improved and developed so that problems of front-level scope can be solved by an army and problems of army-level scope can be solved by a division. It may be necessary, within the overall rocket troops and artillery control subsystem, to provide one of the armies (and in an army, one of the divisions) with the very same equipment that a front (army) will have.

Furthermore, it seems advantageous, for the sake of experience, to investigate the degree to which officers of the rocket-artillery armament directorate (department) can be used to command rocket troops and artillery from the rear control post (when control is transferred to it), if even for a short period of time only. This concerns primarily the preparation and delivery of nuclear and chemical strikes. We think that, at present, during the operational training of staffs, a group of officers from this directorate (department) should be specially trained to cope with these problems at the rocket troops and artillery headquarters of the military district (army).

It will also be advisable to investigate the possibility of including in the complement of the rear control post a group of officers from the rocket troops and artillery headquarters of a second-echelon army of a front who are trained in the control of appropriate forces and means during an operation. Together with these measures, it would also be worthwhile to check the soundness of incorporating for a short time the headquarters of an artillery division (a group of officers from the headquarters) into the headquarters of one of the armies to which control will be transferred.
The questions posed constitute only a small part of the wide-ranging problem of providing reliable and continuous control over rocket troops and artillery. Naturally, a comprehensive elucidation of this problem will also require the examination of many other measures (based on exercise experience) put into effect to support rocket troops and artillery, and also the front (army) as a whole, since the organization of the control of each arm of troops is determined, in the final analysis, by the overall structure of the control of a formation.
DIAGRAM OF THE TRANSFER OF CONTROL OVER ROCKET TROOPS AND ARTILLERY FROM ONE POST TO ANOTHER
AND OF MAINTAINING CONTINUOUS CONTROL OVER THEM DURING AN OPERATIONAL

Possible variants in the transfer of control from one post to another

Composition of a control group of rocket troops and artillery at control posts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy chief of rocket troops and artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy chief of staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy chief of operations department</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of rocket troops and artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of staff</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of operations department</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations officer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain-artery commander</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy chief of staff for artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division artillery commander</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of staff</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant chief of staff</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of communications</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 5

Documents used for control

1. Control map for rocket troops and artillery.
2. Schedule for preparation of initial nuclear strike.
3. Artillery reconnaissance plan.
4. Excerpt from the plan to provide rocket and artillery weapons.
5. Control tables.

PCP = Forward command post
CP = Command post
NCP = Near control post