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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Another View on
Continuity of Control of Rocket and Artillery
Troops


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article disputes views on the same subject by a previous author. The present author argues that divisional and rear rocket and artillery troops have neither the knowledge nor skill to take over the functions of higher headquarters. Instead, this author recommends that the army rocket brigade be given the functions of higher and forward command posts which have been put out of action. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Late 1967

[Redacted Box] DATE 11 December 73

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Continuous Control: How to Achieve It in the Rocket Troops and Artillery

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel B. Gryuk. This article disputes views on the same subject by a previous author. The present author argues that divisional and rear rocket and artillery troops have neither the knowledge nor skill to take over the functions of higher headquarters. Instead, this author recommends that the army rocket brigade be given the functions of higher and forward command posts which have been put out of action.

End of Summary

[Redacted Box] Comment:


There is no information in available reference materials which can be firmly associated with the author. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.

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
Continuous Control: How to Achieve
It in the Rocket Troops and Artillery
by
Colonel B. Gryuk

An article on this subject by Colonel F. Trofimov has already been published in the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought".^{*} Though we fully share the author's point of view, we believe that at the army-division level there are still other and more effective ways of assuring continuous control.

We shall begin by taking some exception with the author. In our opinion, when the command post and the forward command post are put out of action, it is hardly advisable to give the control of army rocket troops to one of the artillery chiefs of a motorized rifle (tank) division. A division artillery headquarters has limited personnel and, as a rule, has no experience in the control of operational-tactical rocket units and mobile repair-technical bases. In addition, the division artillery chief has an extremely limited number of control means available (chiefly radio means); he will require much time to establish communications with army rocket units and with the chief of front rocket troops and artillery.

The suggestion that officers of the army rocket-artillery armament department, which is located in the rear control post, be trained beforehand in the control of rocket troops and artillery also seems extremely problematical, for the following reasons. First, to fulfill this task requires the possession of a great amount of special theoretical knowledge and solid practical skill in directing troop combat actions. These qualifications can only be acquired by prolonged study and extensive practical work. Second, a rocket-artillery armament department is

^{*} Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (80), 1967.



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expected to accomplish the functions of supplying an army with weapons, rockets, and munitions with its authorized numerical strength. If some of its officers are used for troop control, the department will not be able to fully carry out its principal tasks.

In our opinion, when the army command post and forward command post are put out of action, it is more advisable to transfer the control of rocket troops and artillery to the command post (and staff) of the army rocket brigade.]


This opinion is confirmed by the following considerations. The brigade commander and staff officers are better trained in the combat employment of rocket troops and, especially, in the employment of operational-tactical rocket units and mobile repair-technical bases. As a rule, these officers have served in tube artillery units and have the practical ability to lead separate rocket battalions of a motorized rifle (tank) division and of artillery. A brigade headquarters has more personnel and is better provided with control means. For example, a rocket brigade has enough communications means, particularly powerful radio sets (R-102, R-118, radio-relay communications, secret communications devices, etc.).

Most importantly, there is no need to re-establish communications with operational-tactical rocket units and mobile repair-technical bases. The brigade commander has continuous communications with the chief of front rocket troops and artillery; and over the rocket repair-technical and supply lines he has communications with the army rocket-artillery armament department and the mobile repair-technical base. We should add that the brigade command post will often be situated a relatively short distance away from the army rear control post, which will itself take over control if the command post and the forward command post are put out of action. Hence, the rocket brigade commander will be able to arrive quickly at the rear control post and establish personal contact with the army deputy commander for rear services.


A rocket brigade headquarters will, as a rule, be divided into two groups for the control of its units. When the brigade commander departs with one control group for the army rear control post, his deputy remains behind with the



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second control group, a group which can firmly control the brigade rocket units.



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