MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Soviet View of NATO Defensive Doctrine

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article examines NATO defensive doctrine as it is reflected in NATO exercises and expressed in US, British and West German field manuals. The author holds that NATO is an aggressive military bloc which will only reluctantly assume a defensive posture. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
FIRDB-312/04556-73

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Summary

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor A. Slobodenko, Candidate of Military Sciences. This article examines NATO defensive doctrine as it is reflected in NATO exercises and expressed in US, British and West German field manuals. The author holds that NATO is an aggressive military bloc which will only reluctantly assume a defensive posture. Extracts from NATO field manuals are cited to show the distribution of forces in the "forward defense" strategy.

End of Summary

Comment:

General-Mayor A. Slobodenko has authored many articles regarding NATO and military affairs of the armed forces of non-socialist nations. In 1968 he was a Candidate of Military Sciences and docent. He wrote an article, "The Character and Methods of Waging Limited Wars" which was published in Issue No. 6 (June) 1972 of Foreign Military Affairs. He was then identified as a docent and Candidate of Military Sciences. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past—TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
Views of Our Probable Enemies Concerning Modern Defense

by
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Candidate of Military Sciences

During the years 1965 to 1969, US troops in Europe and the combined armed forces of NATO conducted the extensive training exercises "Pyramid of Power" (1965), FALLEX-66, "The Big Game" (1967), FALLEX-68, and others, in which the forces of the aggressive bloc first acted as the defending side and only later, after successfully conducting its defense, went over to the counteroffensive. The question automatically arises: have the imperialist states renounced the doctrine of offense in favor of the doctrine of defense? Does the NATO command hold to the point of view that it is more favorable to conduct defensive operations at the beginning of a war than offensive operations?

The positions established in official military documents of the large imperialist states, and in their regulations, manuals, and instructions, all indicate that no essential changes have occurred in their basic views on combat operations, offense and defense.

Thus, in the Field Service Regulations of the US Army (FM 100-5), offense is regarded as one of the principles of war and of the conduct of operations. It "is undertaken with the aim of achieving decisive results and preserving freedom of action... In some instances, the commanding officer must resort to defensive operations, which, however, are to be regarded only as a temporary form of troop combat actions to create favorable conditions for going over to the offensive".* Offensive operations occupy an equivalent position in the regulations of the British and West German armed forces.

As regards the operational-strategic background created in the training exercises of the combined armed forces of NATO, its defensive appearance was mainly for political purposes: to represent the Warsaw Pact countries as the aggressor and the NATO side as the object of aggression. In addition, the Atlantic

strategists recognize that it is necessary to assume the defensive in individual periods of a war or at individual stages of an operation. The defensive may be assumed because of necessity or, under certain circumstances, by deliberate intention, not only on a tactical or operational scale, but also strategic.

The concept of modern defense. The attitude of NATO ruling circles toward defense on a strategic scale is reflected in the so-called strategy of "forward defense" or "forward lines", which was accepted as an official concept as early as 1963. In accordance with this concept, if there is an unfavorable strategic situation at the outbreak of war (most of all, in the Central European Theater), the NATO armed forces will adapt themselves for active defensive operations in order to hold previously designated lines, which are to be as close as possible to the borders of the socialist countries. If the threat of an enemy breakthrough of these lines arises, the NATO forces will go over to the use of, first, tactical and then, also, strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the extent and timing of the use of nuclear weapons will become dependent on the results of the operations of ground forces.

The strategy of "forward defense" was adopted instead of "peripheral strategy", which, under certain circumstances, had allowed the withdrawal of NATO ground forces westward all the way to the Rhine and their transition to the counteroffensive as though from the periphery, after the relative strength of the forces had been changed in favor of NATO through the use of nuclear weapons. At that time (1953 to 1960), the United States and NATO relied most of all on the massive use of nuclear weapons. Ground forces were relegated to a secondary role: they had the mission of assuring the mounting of a massed strike, and they were allowed to leave West Germany completely if it were necessary to fall back.

The projected abandoning of West Germany, even though motivated by strategic considerations, did not suit the West German imperialists. Therefore, after the reconstitution of their armed forces, they achieved acceptance by the NATO bloc of the strategy of "forward defense" which had been worked out by representatives of West Germany. The following reasons were the main ones cited as justification for the advisability of adopting this strategy: the absence of conditions for deeply echeloned defense of West Germany because of the limited extent of its territory; and the necessity for exploiting the full potential of West Germany in planning defense, and for creating supposedly "moral psychological preconditions for public sentiment in favor of defense" (actually, of aggressive war).
In examining the changes in the nature and objectives of defense in connection with the use of nuclear weapons, the NATO military specialists have reached the conclusion that it is necessary to go on the defensive within a shorter time limit, and to resort to defense more often, than in previous wars. The Field Service Regulations of the US Army state that, "In conducting combat operations with nuclear weapons, there will frequently be rapid pre-planned transitions from offense to defense, and vice versa".

The objective of defense in such conditions has become more decisive than formerly. If, in the past, the main emphasis was placed on holding ground, the main objective of defensive operations at present is to destroy the attacking enemy.

Thus, the British Army manual on the conduct of combat operations by ground forces points out: "In combat operations using conventional weapons, a defending force achieves its objective as long as it holds its ground. In nuclear warfare, holding ground for an extended period of time leads to defeat. Consequently, the only way in which a defending force can achieve its objective is to inflict losses on the enemy until he no longer has the forces and means necessary to carry out his assigned tasks. Thus, the main objective of defense is to inflict a decisive defeat upon the enemy."* A similar definition of the objectives of defense is given in the regulations of the United States and West German armies.

These objectives have found concrete expression in the many training exercises of the NATO armed forces, including the latest large-scale exercise, FALLEX-68. In this exercise, the objective of the defensive operations of the Central and Northern Groups of Armies was to strike the enemy in the border zone and throw him back to his starting positions. In case of an enemy advance to the forward defense line and a breakthrough of that line (or the threat of a breakthrough), it was planned to use nuclear weapons and counterstrikes to inflict maximum losses on the attacking forces and then assume the counteroffensive. It is considered that the decisive objectives of defense can be attained only through highly aggressive methods. The most favorable possibilities along this line, according to the views of our probable enemies,

are offered by a mobile defense, a concept recognized officially in American regulations as early as 1954. This view of defense subsequently received further development and essentially came to be regarded as the main concept for defensive operations under conditions in which nuclear weapons are used. Mobile defense is based on the high mobility and maneuverability of forces, which can exploit the results of nuclear strikes and strive to defeat the attacking enemy by mounting counterattacks. All of this gives defense an extremely aggressive and mobile character and transforms it into so-called defensive-offensive operations which are sometimes difficult to distinguish from an offensive.

"Defensive combat using nuclear weapons," according to the British manual, "is essentially offensive in nature." And further, "a defending force must exploit all forces and means at its disposal in order to conduct aggressive defense. The requirements of defense may be fulfilled only through the conduct of offensive operations."*

Several changes are also to be noted in position defense. The Americans consider that it will in fact become "area defense", since troops must now prepare and hold separate areas and not continuous positions. Combat of this nature, to hold areas, allows troops to operate more flexibly and to maneuver widely along the front and in the depth.

The basic difference between mobile defense and area (position) defense lies in the makeup of the troop combat structures and in the methods of operating. In mobile defense the main forces are deployed in the depth and are designated to mount a counterattack (strike) to rout the main attacking grouping, while in area defense, on the contrary, the main forces are deployed in the first echelon in order to tenaciously hold an area which has been carefully prepared in advance with engineer works.

"Mobile defense relies first of all on troop mobility and their striking force, while position defense relies mainly on firepower on terrain conditions and on the engineer preparation of the terrain. Mobile defense is therefore used when the defending forces have at their disposal an adequate number of tanks and mechanized forces, and when the terrain and the air situation favor their successful exploitation. Troops will go over to position defense

when they do not have a sufficient number of armored strike units or when the terrain and the air situation substantially limit their capability to exploit these units."

On the whole, it may be said of mobile defense that it is distinguished by its flexibility, and because it allows the application of different variants of troop composition and the aggressive use of troops. But it also has vulnerable points: a weak first echelon, which can be broken through quickly by even small advance detachments; and the existence of large, concentrated groupings, which favor the enemy use of nuclear weapons. The destruction of those groupings sharply weakens the overall defense and enables the enemy to overcome it rapidly and with small forces.

Position (area) defense, in its turn, has its strong points along with its weaknesses (immobility and lack of flexibility): an appreciable number of targets which are not worthwhile for nuclear weapons, the widespread use of barriers and favorable terrain conditions, and the protection of troops in structures equipped against nuclear and chemical attack—all of which make it difficult to overcome position defenses.

Operational formations will use both types of defense together during an operation. "A defensive operation of a field army may proceed in such a way that part of its forces will conduct mobile defense, part will conduct area defense, and part will conduct delaying actions."**

Furthermore, it is considered possible to combine mobile and position defense on the scale of large units as well. "In addition, troops can begin a mobile defense and then go over to position defense, and vice versa. The line between mobile and position defense is often obliterated."***

*Regulations of the West German Army, The Command of Troops, published by the Chief Intelligence Directorate General Staff, 1962.

**Field Service Regulations of the US Army, Larger Units Theater Army Corps (FM 100-15), published by the Chief of Intelligence Directorate General Staff, 1968.

***Regulations of the West German Army, The Command of Troops.
However, the attitude toward these forms of defensive operations is not the same in the armies of the largest NATO countries. In the United States and Great Britain priority is given to mobile defense, while position defense is criticized as inflexible, immobile, and passive. It is emphasized in every possible way that defense is not to hold ground but to rout the enemy.

In West Germany, both types of defense are theoretically on the same level, but in actual practice, in training exercises and maneuvers, there is more of an inclination toward the organization and conduct of position defense, apparently arising from the fact that the territory of West Germany does not have depth and that all possible defensive methods must be used in order to hold it.

Thus in discussing the concepts of our probable enemies regarding the organization and conduct of defensive operations under conditions in which nuclear weapons are used, we may single out the following characteristic traits.

First, the orientation of troops toward gaining the initiative. In their opinion, the main thing that must be striven for in the organization and conduct of modern defense is to seize the initiative, impose the defenders' will on the enemy, and force the enemy to advance on an axis favorable for defense.

Second, the organization and conduct of defense, not on lines prepared in advance with engineer works and not on a continuous front, as was formerly the case, but on separate axes, with appreciable gaps between units and large units.

Third, the main emphasis is on the use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of how defense is organized and conducted, the mounting of nuclear strikes is anticipated. The principal objective of defending forces is to compel the enemy to advance in dense formations and to inflict maximum losses on him with nuclear weapons.

Fourth, the principle of great aggressiveness and mobility is the foundation of defensive operations. Counterattacks and counter-strikes in combination with the massed use of nuclear weapons are regarded as the basis of modern defense.

As an outgrowth of the foregoing, views have also changed as to the nature of engineer preparation of terrain. It is considered that under conditions of the wide use of nuclear weapons, prepared defense lines will no longer have as vital a significance as formerly. The forward defense and rear lines which are planned for
Western Europe in case of military operations are not being prepared in advance, during peacetime, nor are permanent installations (Maginot Line, etc.) being restored.

According to the views of NATO military specialists, defensive positions which are carefully prepared with engineer works can be set up in advance only on certain axes as strongpoints and areas distributed irregularly along the front and in the rear, and there may be rather large sectors of terrain in which there are no installations at all.

Judging by materials published abroad, the following are the reasons why our probable enemies changed from a trench system of defense to a system of defense centers.

Separate small trenches are more stable than a continuous trench system against nuclear explosions. The coefficient of protection provided by a detached open trench for firing from a standing position is eighty percent, according to American data, and from seventy to eighty-five percent in a partially exposed two-man trench; it drops to only fifteen percent, however, in sectors of standard open trench systems with a full section 7.6 meters long.

A system of separate strongpoints and areas, having short trenches and distributed irregularly along the front and in the rear, also withstands nuclear explosions better than a continuous trench system of defense. A nuclear strike of medium yield (twenty to forty kilotons) may destroy no more than one company strongpoint. In addition, more time and resources are required to dig trenches and create a continuous trench system of defense than to set up defense centers.

Further: the trench system of defense does not permit the exploitation of the growing mobility and striking power of troops supplied with tanks and armored personnel carriers. It is difficult to deploy them within a trench system and very complicated to use them for counterattacks and counterstrikes. The system of defense centers is more advantageous in this connection.

The layout of a trench system is comparatively easy to discover. A system of defense centers may also be discovered, since strongpoints are noticeably distributed on the ground; but if alternate and dummy strongpoints and areas are created, it is more difficult to discover the FEBA and the actual deployment of combat disposition than it is with a trench defense system.
Finally, a trench system does not solve the problem of overall defense when nuclear weapons are used, since even a strongly fortified trench system can be destroyed easily by nuclear weapons and the defense zone breached.

Great importance in modern defense is given to engineer barriers, especially with mixed mines and set charges. Their installation during defensive operations is the responsibility of previously created mobile engineer reserves, and also of engineering units and subunits brought in with helicopters or with vehicles possessing high cross-country performance.

Recently, thorough studies have been made of methods for using nuclear land mines in defense, at the beginning of a war and during it. It is considered that they can find wide application, in combination with conventional barrier and destructive means, in containing the advance of strike groupings, impeding the movement of enemy forces, and compelling them to concentrate in areas against which nuclear and conventional strikes have been prepared. Nuclear mine barriers will be set up both before and during a defensive battle or operation. In the latter case, nuclear land mines will be included in the unit of fire of engineer units and subunits.

In strategic defense, nuclear mine barriers are projected for use as a nuclear mine belt along the borders with the countries of the socialist camp in order to cover the deployment of groupings of ground forces for an offensive or for the conduct of defensive operations.

When only conventional strike means are used, defense will also be mainly by centers, as a rule, and will consist of strongpoints and areas irregularly distributed along the front and in the depth, with no engineer works in the areas between them. Wide use will be made of tanks and self-propelled artillery, dug into the ground, and of various types of engineer barriers. Priority here will be given to position defense.

The structure of defense. On the operational scale, a cover zone of fifteen to fifty kilometers in depth is usually created, and a defense zone of 160 to 200 kilometers, or more, in depth. The latter, in turn, includes a forward defense line and one or more rear area lines located forty to sixty kilometers apart, depending on terrain conditions.
It is projected to create the forward defense line, the main element of defense, at a distance of twenty to sixty kilometers from the national border. Thus, in the "Pyramid of Power" training exercise of the combined NATO armed forces, the plan was to place the line thirty to fifty kilometers from the national border; in FALLEX-66, twenty to sixty kilometers; in "The Big Game", twenty to sixty-five kilometers; in FALLEX-68, twenty to sixty kilometers; and in the US Seventh Army Corps CPX, "Carbide Steel", twenty to fifty kilometers.

At the tactical level, for example, a security zone and a defense zone are created in a division; the defense zone, in turn, consists of a forward defense area and an area of division reserves. Each defense line may include the tactical elements indicated above.

When defense is organized in advance, its makeup will be deeper and more developed than when assuming the defensive after the beginning of combat operations, as, for example, because of an unsuccessful outcome of a meeting engagement in the border zone (in which case the depth of the makeup of forces would be built up rapidly).

In all of the large-scale training exercises of the combined NATO armed forces conducted in recent years, the divisions and army corps built their combat structures in two echelons. The depth of the combat structure of a division was twenty to thirty kilometers; and it was up to thirty to forty kilometers when the security zone (area) created in front of the FEBA was included. In mobile defense, the main forces of the divisions are deployed in the depth, in the so-called area of division reserves, at distances from ten to twelve kilometers up to twenty to thirty kilometers from the FEBA.

An American corps usually builds a combat structure in depth: up to 80 to 120 kilometers in the initial period of the war, and up to 50 to 60 kilometers during the war when there is no cover zone.

At the present time there are no field armies in the composition of the ground forces of the main imperialist countries (United States, West Germany, and Great Britain) in Europe, the US Seventh Field Army having been disbanded in 1967. Army corps are now part of a group of armies. However, field armies may be created again in time of war. The operational makeup of field armies and of a group of armies in defense is envisaged to be in-depth and echeloned. According to US Field Service Regulations.
"The defense zone of a field army includes the security zone, the forward defense echelon, and the reserve echelon. The commander of a field army allots troops and fire means to each echelon in accordance with the plan of defense."

The security echelon usually includes all forces and weapons operating in the cover zone and on the flanks. In addition to reconnaissance units and subunits, they may also include covering forces allotted from the army or, more often, from the army corps of the first echelon. In FALLEX-66, one motorized infantry division of the First Army Corps of the West German Army was assigned to the cover zone; and in FALLEX-68, armored cavalry regiments were used as covering forces along with units and subunits of combat engineers, tanks, motorized infantry, and artillery.

The forward defense echelon includes the main forces of an army or a group of armies. It is deployed on the forward defense line at a distance of twenty to sixty kilometers from the national border.

The reserve echelon includes the reserves (second echelons) of the field army (group of armies), made up of separate divisions and regiments. Thus, the reserves of the US Seventh Field Army in "The Big Game" exercise consisted of one division and one armored cavalry regiment. A large unit attached to a corps may also serve as the reserve for a field army, with certain limitations being attached to its use. In combat operations in which nuclear weapons are used, nuclear weapons form the basis of the reserve of a field army.

The reserve echelon of a group of armies may include an army corps or several separate divisions, or both. In FALLEX-68 in particular, there were three separate divisions and one brigade in the reserve of the Northern Group of Armies, and four separate divisions in the Central Group.

The forces of the reserve echelon are deployed behind the forward defense echelon, 100 to 200 kilometers from the forward defense line. Site areas for Sergeant and Pershing guided missiles are prepared at a distance of 60 to 250 kilometers from the national border or the FEBA.

*Larger Units Theater Army-Corps, Field Service Regulations of the US Army (FM 100-15), 1969.
Thus, the depth of the operational makeup of a group of armies (field army) in the initial period of a war may be 200 to 300 kilometers and more. If the troops are in direct contact and there is no cover zone, the depth of the operational disposition may be somewhat less: 200 to 250 kilometers for a group of armies and 150 to 200 kilometers for a field army.

The absence of strong second echelons and reserves in formations naturally weakens defense. In a nuclear war the main reliance is on the massed use of nuclear weapons, while in operations using only conventional weapons, it is based on the first echelon of forces (the forward defense echelon); but in case of an attack, and under the threat of a breakthrough, the use of nuclear weapons is once again anticipated.

It is perfectly obvious from this that the main strike targets for our advancing troops must be, above all, the enemy means of nuclear attack.

Since the absence of strong reserves is a vulnerable point in the enemy defense, while the presence of powerful nuclear groupings is a strongpoint, our troops are faced with the task of taking measures to weaken the enemy nuclear grouping and to disrupt his nuclear attack.

It is expected that defensive operations at the beginning of a war will be conducted by forces and means prepared during peacetime without any appreciable mobilization. In training exercises, large units and formations defended themselves in zones whose widths are shown in the table. It may be concluded from this that our probable enemies plan to allot significantly wider defensive zones to formations than was the case in previous wars.

Considerable significance is attached to antitank defense, particularly when combat operations are conducted with only conventional strike weapons. The defense is set up in order to cover the most probable approach routes of enemy armored and mechanized forces and is set up to the full depth of the defense area or zone; with the maximum exploitation of natural obstacles and engineer antitank barriers.

The conduct of defense. In a general nuclear war, our probable enemies will place their main hopes on a nuclear attack designed to carry out the principal objectives of operations in the initial period of the war regardless of whether they are offensive or defensive operations.
Width of defense zone, in kilometers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Units and formations</th>
<th>FALLEX-64</th>
<th>Pyramid of Power (1965)</th>
<th>FALLEX-66</th>
<th>The Big Game (1967)</th>
<th>Carbide Steel (1968)</th>
<th>FALLEX-68</th>
<th>On the main axis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>30-70</td>
<td>30-110</td>
<td>30-110</td>
<td>25-100</td>
<td>60-120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army corps</td>
<td>60-140</td>
<td>65-175</td>
<td>50-180</td>
<td>50-160</td>
<td>70-180</td>
<td>40-180</td>
<td>40-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field army</td>
<td>240-260</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>250-460</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250-280</td>
<td>220-440</td>
<td>220-400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups of armies</td>
<td>260-500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250-650</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>220-440</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is planned to carry out a nuclear offensive in a theater of military operations mainly with forces of tactical aviation, but carrier aviation units and strategic means may also be used. Ground forces will participate in a nuclear offensive on their own axes, using operational-tactical missiles (Sergeant and Pershing) in the first strike and, in subsequent strikes, tactical missiles (Honest John or Lance) and atomic artillery (203.2 millimeter and 155 millimeter howitzers).

The question of conducting counterpreparation is not altogether clear. According to official documents of the armies of the main imperialist countries, it is not ruled out, but no time is indicated for it. It will evidently take place for the most part in operations during the course of a war, under conditions of direct contact between the troops of the opposing sides. Counterpreparation may also be conducted in operations during the initial period of war as contact is established with the enemy forces and it is learned they are preparing for an offensive.

In area defense (position defense), units and subunits strive to hold terrain. In the event of an enemy penetration, it is projected to stop his further advance by occupying and holding defense
areas (positions) in the depth or by mounting counterattacks. Such counterattacks are usually conducted successively: the division counterattacks first, then the corps, etc.

The conduct of mobile defense and delaying actions is considered the most typical for a defensive operation in the initial period of war. The dynamics of the operation are conceived as follows. The covering forces, conducting delaying actions and falling back from line to line in the cover zone, strive to hold back the enemy, direct his advance into axes more favorable for defense, and lure him into "sacks" and "traps" in order to destroy him with nuclear weapons and counterattacks (counterstrikes) by our forces located in the depths. Such counterattacks by a division and corps may be carried out not successively but simultaneously, merging together into one powerful strike mounted immediately after the massed use of nuclear weapons.

A counterstrike by a field army or a group of armies may be mounted in the struggle for not only the forward defense line, but also for the intermediate (rear) defense line, by forces from separate divisions from various directions, or by an army corps immediately following a massed nuclear strike. At times a counterstrike by a group of armies may coincide with a counterstrike by an army or may take place immediately after it. If the army counterstrike is successful, it will be further developed with reserves from the group of armies.

The overall result of a counterstrike by an army or a group of armies must be to destroy the enemy forces which have broken through and to assure its own capability for assuming the counteroffensive. If they fail to accomplish this, the defending forces will conduct holding actions and fall back to a strategic line, gaining time for the concentration of fresh forces which have been designated to assume the counteroffensive.

Defensive operations in which nuclear weapons are not used may begin with an operation by the air forces to win air superiority. The air forces will deliver massed strikes against enemy aviation, control posts, and munitions dumps. After winning air superiority, they will switch over to the direct support of ground forces. Aviation and artillery, using conventional munitions and combustible mixtures of the napalm type, will deliver massed strikes against enemy forces on the defense approaches, including the security zone or the cover zone.
In the event of an offensive by superior enemy forces that cannot be stopped, the covering troops will fall back to the forward line. The main forces of large units and formations deployed on the forward defense line will conduct defensive operations to keep the enemy from establishing a wedge into the depth of the defense zone, inflict losses upon him, and, by committing reserves, throw him back to his starting positions. The principal method of achieving this objective is considered to be the mounting of counterstrikes and counterattacks supported by massed aviation and artillery strikes.

If the objectives of destroying an enemy wedge and restoring the original position prove impossible to fulfill with conventional weapons, and if friendly forces are threatened with defeat, the use of nuclear weapons is projected.

Thus, in almost all of the training exercises of the combined armed forces of NATO during the last five to six years, a situation has been created in which NATO forces have gone over to the use of nuclear weapons when a breakthrough of their forward defense line was threatened. The non-nuclear period lasted from a few hours to a few days.

The transition to nuclear weapons may take place gradually, in line with the readiness of the nuclear forces. A situation may develop in which massed use is made of all the means of nuclear attack (tactical and operational-tactical).

For example, nuclear land mines were exploded on the first day of FALLEX-68 when combat operations were being conducted in the cover zone. On the second day, during combat operations to hold the forward defense lines, NATO forces began the selective use of nuclear weapons to inflict losses upon the enemy strike groupings and force them either to break off combat operations and withdraw their forces to their starting positions, or run the risk of unleashing general nuclear warfare. On the third day, when the assigned objectives had not been achieved by the selective use of nuclear weapons, the NATO forces, having begun a massed nuclear strike, went over to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and stopped the enemy advance with counterstrikes, thus creating favorable conditions for a subsequent transition to the counteroffensive.

The foregoing indicates that our probable enemies are seeking those methods of conducting defensive operations which will enable them to attain the decisive objectives of defense, i.e., the destruction of the main grouping of advancing enemy forces and the
In their view, modern defense must be highly mobile and aggressive. Its organization and conduct are based on the massed use of nuclear, or only conventional, weapons and on troop counter-attacks and counterstrikes. On the whole, modern defense in a nuclear war is characterized by defensive-offensive operations conducted not in linear forms of combat structures and not on a solid front but on separate axes in a given area of considerable depth.

In military operations using only conventional weapons, the main form of defense is considered to be position (area) defense, characterized by denser makeup of combat structures in the first echelon, an abundant supply of antitank and other fire means for them, and the wide use of engineer barriers.

All of this must be taken into account in the theory and practice of training our armed forces.