MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Deployment of Command Posts to Survive Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This brief article recommends linear deployment and decentralization of command posts to prevent their destruction by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (85) for 1968.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Deployment of Command Posts to Survive Weapons of Mass Destruction

Summary

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (85) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel P. Murashko. This brief article recommends linear deployment and decentralization of command posts to prevent their destruction by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Comment:

Colonel P. Murashko is the author of two articles appearing in the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The first is entitled "Some Problems of Troop Control Support in an Initial Front Offensive Operation", which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965. The second, of which he was co-author, is entitled "Operational Groups and Representatives of Collaborating Staffs in a Front Offensive Operation", which appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
The Defense of Command Posts from Weapons of Mass Destruction
by Colonel P. Murashko

The diversity of casualty producers to be found among modern means of combat, the considerable differences in the characteristics of the installations which are to be protected against these means, and other factors, present considerable difficulties in arriving at a unanimous view on the basic principles concerning the distances separating the elements (constituent parts) of control posts when siting them in a manner affording them protection.

The experience of troop, command-staff, and staff exercises testifies to the fact that, for the most part, the distance between departments (services) of an army field directorate amounts to several hundred meters, although, as is known, according to established standards this distance should be from one-and-a-half to two kilometers. Approximately the same situation also applies to a front. What is the explanation for this? The fact is that increasing the distance between the elements of control posts hampers the organization of internal communications (increases the expenditures of cables and vehicles, and complicates the work of communicators), and affects the time required by a control post to deploy and get ready. In addition, increasing the distance between organs of the field directorate of a formation impedes personal contact between supervisory personnel and hampers the security and defense of each control post.

How can we resolve this contradiction? Probably, the correct solution will be to disperse the elements of a control post by separating from the command group and the main departments (directorates) of the field directorate those subunits (elements) which are characterized by a large number of identifying features (radio transmitting and receiving centers, helicopter and aircraft landing strips, courier mail service posts, vehicle parking areas, etc.). As regards command groups and departments (directorates) and services, their dispersal must be planned in each instance by taking into account the specific situation and the terrain conditions.

Besides keeping command groups apart from those components which have many identifying features, it is also necessary that command groups be separated from those departments (directorates) which carry out specific tasks and which require less frequent personal contacts with the command and staff of the formation.
It seems to us that the air defense chief and his organization can be located at a greater distance from the command group than, for example, the chief of rocket troops and artillery and his staff. Certainly the operations department (directorate) of the army (front) command post must be closer to the command group than the intelligence department (directorate), etc.

A significant way of effectively increasing the protection of a control post from enemy nuclear strikes is to arrange it in a linear pattern, and to exploit those protective characteristics of the terrain and of vehicles which provide a shield against the effects of nuclear weapons. Research has shown that a nuclear strike delivered on a command post offering a linear target is less effective than one delivered on a command post occupying an area in the shape of a circle or square. It is quite true that the distances separating some departments and services will be several times greater in a linear arrangement than in the other. Therefore, as has already been stated, it will be necessary to consider all the factors. A linear arrangement, or one like it, can be recommended when, for example, the control post will be at a site for only a relatively short period of time and when internal communications are available.

A number of scientific-research and other studies have often recommended the integrated method of protecting control posts. Essentially, they amount to the following: work sites for key personnel of a field directorate and all the communications equipment should be set up in transport means which can withstand shockwaves and thermal radiation and can afford enough protection from poisonous and radioactive substances, and bacteriological means, that personnel can work inside the vehicles without having to wear personal protective equipment. This recommendation has already been implemented in various types of command-staff vehicles and mobile communications center vehicles. The time has come to consider changing over from mobile communications centers to mobile control posts, which must have control equipment and armor-protected command-staff, headquarters, and special vehicles, all able to dig themselves in.

The implementation of integrated protective measures against weapons of mass destruction for the entire formation, and also the skilful positioning of control posts and their elements (constituent parts) on the terrain, will greatly contribute to uninterrupted troop control.