MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT: Restoring Losses Incurred As a Result of Nuclear Attack

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." This article addresses the problem of restoring troops to combat effectiveness on the battlefield after a nuclear attack. The main argument is to replace an entire unit if it suffers heavy casualties. The article appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

W. E. Colby
Deputy Director for Operations
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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT: Restoring Losses Incurred as a Result of Nuclear Attack

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SUMMARY

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." The author of this article is Colonel I. Bukatin (Candidate of Military Sciences), whose comments on restoration of combat effectiveness to troop units which have been decimated by nuclear strikes was inspired by previous articles on this subject in the same journal. The main point of his article is that such units should be replaced as a whole, and not brought up to strength by replacing individual casualties. He points out that this may be complicated because the second echelon and reserves may also be hit by nuclear strikes. His recommendation for protecting troops during the replacement phase is to move airborne troops and heliborne motorized rifle units into the enemy rear.

COMMENT:

Col. I. Bukatin was identified in Krasnaya Zvezda of 9 October 1964 as a colonel and candidate of military sciences. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
Shortening the Time Needed to Restore the Combat Effectiveness of Front Troops and Conducting an Offensive with the Forces Remaining After an Initial Nuclear Strike

by Lt. Col. I. Bukatin
Candidate of Military Sciences

In this article we shall attempt to examine two questions: possible ways of shortening the time needed to restore combat effectiveness of the first echelon of a front while advancing and during its commitment to battle; and methods of conducting operations with the forces remaining after the initial exchange of nuclear strikes by the two sides under various conditions under which the front troops go over to the offensive.

Knowledge gained from the research war game "Zashchita"** and other exercises and games shows that the time it takes to restore the combat effectiveness of an army of the first echelon of a front, whose army had been subjected to nuclear strikes

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**Participating in the research were the Military Academy i/n M.V. Frunze, Military Engineering Academy, the Academies of Chemical Defense, Rear Services and Transport, and the Military Medical Academy.
during its advance toward the national border, was from several hours to 24 hours, and even longer on some individual axes. During this period the enemy was able to deliver repeated strikes and thereby break up the offensive. In order to prevent this it is necessary to find new and improved methods of restoring the combat effectiveness of front armies, especially those which have been designated to conduct the offensive in the direction of the main strike.

It is our view that shortening the time needed to prepare to go on the offensive by armies of the first echelon of a front, whose armies had been subjected to an enemy nuclear strike, is primarily possible when the main effort in restoring combat effectiveness is not directed to reforming regiments and divisions put out of action while advancing in the main direction (as is often recommended), but to replace them with new ones from the second echelon and from reserves, provided, of course, that they have survived.

Planning for the use of forces and means for such a possibility is extremely important, because during periods of decisive nuclear actions it is impossible to keep divisional organization intact for long periods of time, no matter how desirable this may be. Obviously, the aforementioned measure does not exclude the possibility of transferring combat effective subunits to divisional units from regiments put out of action, especially those subunits which at the time of a nuclear strike were separated from the main force (in forward detachments as march security or in reserve) and were not subjected to the strong morale and psychological effects of nuclear weapons. In principle, however, the method of reforming battalions and regiments put out of action by nuclear strikes into combat effective military entities, as is done in exercises, is acceptable for restoring the combat effectiveness of reserves or large units of the second echelon of armies, as well as divisions of the first echelon going over to the offensive later than the main strike grouping of the army.
In restoring the combat effectiveness of an army of the first echelon from the reserves of large units of the front, more time is spent on the march to the line of commitment to battle, which is difficult to accomplish at high rates of speed under the conditions being examined here. A delay in moving out can be caused by the absence of front reserves in a given axis and by losses suffered during the initial strike or while moving to the zone of the army being reinforced.

The time needed to restore the combat effectiveness of the first echelon can be shortened by planning well in advance for the reinforcement of the army, which is to have the most important role in destroying the enemy, with one or two divisions moved close to the main axis of the army's offensive, and taking the most effective measures to protect them from enemy nuclear strikes prior to moving out and then when actually moving out.

The effect of enemy nuclear strikes on the divisions designated to replace those put out of action may be reduced by greater dispersal in assembly areas, by the use of shelters, and by changing the sequence of moving them toward the line of commitment to battle. According to existing views, the move of a large unit out of the reserve is carried out along parallel routes on which the forward units proceed at approximately the same rate toward the line of commitment to battle. This method facilitates control movement and ensures the simultaneous commitment of forces to battle. However, this does not contribute to the safety of troops proceeding in columns along parallel routes to prevent them from being hit by a single nuclear warhead of large yield or from being blinded by bursts of medium size warheads.

Calculations show that it is possible to avoid the simultaneous destruction of troops while they are moving forward, and to reduce significantly the chances of their being blinded, by using the new variant of march formation for large units. Here the columns of units moving along parallel routes (when it is not
possible to have intervals of about ten kilometers between them) would move out in tandem, i.e., the columns of one unit would be at the same interval from the units on the left and on the right. Such a formation will not affect prescribed rates of march, but it may significantly reduce the degree of destruction of troops by enemy nuclear strikes.*

It is extremely difficult to shorten the time needed to restore the combat effectiveness of a strike group of a front by replacing an army of the first echelon, whose army had lost its combat effectiveness, with the second echelon of the front. The solution of this problem in many ways also depends on the condition of the troops when they finally reach the line of commitment to battle.

First of all, this will, of course, depend on the degree to which the enemy means of nuclear attack have been neutralized and how well the air cover has been organized. But even if this is all achieved, there is no guarantee that an army of the second echelon of a front, when moving forward, will not be subjected to enemy nuclear strikes resulting in a certain number of command posts, large units and units of various arms of troops, and special troops suffering considerable losses.

In this case, as with the armies of the first echelon, the greatest amount of time for restoring combat effectiveness will be spent in reforming units and subunits. This process may be accelerated by the selective merging of combat effective divisions and regiments remaining from the first echelon of the strike grouping of the front and of the army being moved forward as

*Used in compiling them were charts which appeared in the work "Combat Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons," Voyenizdat, 1967, pages 289 and 297.
replacement. Typical methods of restoring combat effectiveness can be: the organization of control at one of the surviving army command posts and reinforcing it with officers and means of communications; the restoration of the first echelon by using surviving divisions and regiments of the army being replaced from large units (units) of the second echelon of the front which managed to reach the line of commitment to combat; and the creation of a second echelon (combined arms reserve) of an army by combining surviving units and subunits.

The most difficult conditions for the front forces will arise when heavy losses are sustained simultaneously by the armies of the first echelon, the second echelon and reserves of the front. In this situation the front is practically prevented for a certain length of time from rapidly restoring the combat effectiveness of an army of the first echelon from its own forces.

In order to make this situation advantageous to the front in these conditions, it will be necessary to call on the means of the senior commander, first of all, to destroy the remaining enemy groupings which are endangering the front. This will become especially necessary on those axes where the armies of the front will not only sustain such heavy losses that they will be unable to go on the offensive, but they will also be unable to put up any resistance to enemy troops should the latter undertake active operations. On the other hand, the destruction of large enemy groupings will allow the front to release some of the forces and means from several sectors for the restoration of combat effectiveness of those armies designated to attack in the direction of the main strike.

Under the conditions being examined the army and front will have to create composite army and front groups as an intermediate step prior to restoring the combat effectiveness of armies. The principles involved in forming them and the nature of their composition may vary considerably. These problems have been thoroughly examined in articles mentioned earlier and therefore will not be discussed here.
Speaking of the methods of conducting operations after the initial nuclear strikes, we should like to turn our attention to the following fundamental matters.

When the main forces of a front go on the offensive simultaneously, the most effective way to conduct operations is to carry out frontal attacks in depth through areas of mass nuclear strikes and through breaches in the enemy's operational formation, as is recommended in the article by Marshal of Armored Troops A. Babadzhanyan. Under the conditions being examined it is not advisable to conduct an offensive along convergent axes for the purpose of surrounding and destroying enemy units which have sustained heavy losses and become separated. This could lead to loss of time and momentum in the offensive into the depth.

Otherwise it will be necessary to conduct the operation in a situation where, because of the extremely dissimilar conditions of the armies and the different distances they are located from the deployment line, the front forces will go over to the offensive on separate axes at different times. Here it is necessary, first of all, to take maximum advantage of the successes of the armies which were the first ones to go on the offensive. Their rapid advance will create favorable conditions for pressing home the destruction of the enemy holding the lines in front of the army which is going on the offensive with its main forces later than its neighbors. Pressing home the destruction of an enemy who has started to withdraw his forces can be accomplished by delivering frontal strikes while simultaneously enveloping one or both flanks through zones of neighboring formations which have already penetrated to a considerable depth.

Thus, when the forces of the front go on the offensive at different times, a combination of several methods of conducting operations becomes possible. Breaking up enemy groupings by frontal strikes and simultaneously breaking out to the flank and rear will be combined with strikes delivered for the purpose of surrounding and destroying the most dangerous individual groupings,
Under the conditions being examined, the speed with which the enemy's first operational echelon is destroyed depends to a large extent on the scale at which airborne assaults are used for strikes from the rear. As is known, up to now we had planned to use mainly tactical airborne assault forces of battalion size for this purpose, or regimental size at best, which had been dropped in most cases to overcome areas containing nuclear mine barriers, for action behind the forward defense line. Of course, these drops and actions are of considerable help to the advancing forces, but still not as much as might be required by the armies of the first echelon of the front which will be in an extremely weakened state when they go on the offensive for the purpose of interdicting the enemy at the beginning of the action and seizing the initiative.

According to existing views, operational airborne assaults of divisional strength are made at depths of 300 to 500 kilometers in order to take advantage of the results of strikes by strategic nuclear means. Airborne assaults at the above depths will still be used in the future. However, this should not preclude the use of operational airborne assaults to assist the strike groupings of the front in pressing home the destruction of the basic forces of the enemy's operational echelon in the early stage of the development of the operation. The attacking forces will especially need great assistance when, while still on the move they have to force a large water barrier which the enemy may have converted into a powerful defense line. Should the front not have any airborne assault forces and the situation permits the use of such forces, a strike can be carried out from the rear by light units of motorized rifle divisions. Their actions near the areas subjected to mass nuclear strikes will greatly assist in the fulfilment of tasks by the forward detachments of forces advancing from the front.

After going on the offensive following an exchange of nuclear strikes by both sides, it is most important to prevent the forces of the front from sustaining further heavy losses. The success of this effort depends on many factors, and first of all on the
effectiveness of combatting the enemy nuclear weapons. In carrying out this task, besides locating and destroying them with strikes by missile forces and aviation, it is very important that the tank and combined arms troops that started the attack advance rapidly into the depth of the enemy's position. Breaking up the forces of the enemy's first echelon into smaller units prevents him from setting up nuclear barriers and delivering mass nuclear strikes with surface bursts against formations of the front, for fear of hitting his own forces located in the intervals between the advancing strike groupings of the front.

The timely seizure and neutralization of areas of enemy nuclear mine barriers laid in the direction of the offensive of the front's strike groupings can be accomplished by sending ahead strong forward detachments of formations, by having tank divisions move swiftly into the depth, by making tactical airborne assaults, and by airlifting light motorized rifle forces to the enemy's rear.

To accomplish this task the attacking forces can be greatly assisted by air assault units and large units with the capability of successfully delivering strikes against the enemy from the air by combat helicopters. They can carry out landings and destroy enemy troops in areas prepared for the laying of nuclear mines, and they can clear nuclear mines.

It is advisable to carry out airborne assaults by air assault subunits and units following nuclear strikes and bombing-assault strikes by air against enemy forces located beyond the areas of nuclear mine barriers in order to seize by surprise attack the remaining control points and to destroy their nuclear explosive devices. Following this, the troops landed by helicopters will destroy the covering units with strikes from the rear and from the flanks while supported by combat helicopters. Part of the landing force will be seize-and-destroy troops which will locate and put out of action nuclear mines. In many cases, after the enemy has been destroyed by combat helicopter fire, the seize-and-destroy groups can be landed directly in areas of nuclear mine barriers.
The landing of air assault detachments can be very effective at the time when the retreating enemy forces have entered the area of nuclear mine barriers. After occupying an advantageous position in the rear of the barriers and after cutting off retreat routes, the landing forces can prevent the enemy troops from breaking out of the dangerous zone and, consequently, make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to use his nuclear mines to destroy our forces operating from the front.

In conclusion, I would like to bring up yet another question which, in my opinion, is important—the restoration of second echelons and reserves of a front and of armies while conducting an operation.

There are serious difficulties involved in the resolution of this task because it is almost impossible to expect large units and formations to arrive from the Headquarters (Stavka) reserve, especially in the first two or three days of the operation. The movement of forces from internal military districts will be complicated because of the creation of nuclear obstacles and vast zones of radioactive contamination and destruction.

Therefore it is very important to find ways of restoring a front's reserves primarily from its own resources. Certain parts of the second echelon or of the reserves can be reinforced by merging individual subunits and units remaining from divisions which have lost their combat effectiveness and have remained in the rear of the front to work at removing the aftereffects of an enemy nuclear strike. However, it is doubtful that this will solve the problem. In our opinion, the most effective way is to remove part of the forces from unprofitable axes (in operations in which mass use is made of nuclear weapons such changes in the situation are possible) or to go on the defensive temporarily in different sectors of the front for the purpose of relieving combat effective units and large units and using them in the direction of the main strike of the front (army).
It is a very complicated matter to perform the work of restoring the combat effectiveness of troops and reinforcing second echelons and reserves under rapidly changing conditions and the constant threat of new units and large units being put out of action by nuclear strikes. Therefore, in order to resolve these tasks in the staffs of the front and the army, it will often be necessary to create groups for the restoration of reserves. These groups would continually collect and consolidate data on losses; make proposals to commanders of formations for the replacement of losses; direct the restoration of reserves by using units and subunits remaining from large units which had been subjected to nuclear strikes; and continually apprise the troops that have been restored to combat effectiveness about the radiation conditions in their areas of deployment and give them whatever assistance is needed from the available forces and means.

The further development of the problem being examined and the verification of the individual recommendations through practical application will allow more effective solution of the problems of restoring the combat effectiveness of front strike groupings and their going on the offensive following nuclear strikes, and will avoid the use of stereotyped methods for destroying opposing enemy groupings.