FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
Number 966	  23 August 1966

SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL'"

No. 1, January 1966

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House, Moscow. The articles translated below are from Issue No 1, January 1966 which was signed for the press 25 December 1965.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090023-1
ESSENCE AND PHENOMENON IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

by Col I. Grudinin

Essence and phenomenon, categories of materialist dialectics, reflect the most essential relationships and facets of reality, just as do its other categories. At the same time they constitute stepping stones of knowledge. Skilled application of the categories of essence and phenomenon in combination with a high level of professional knowledge and flawless utilization of special methods enables one to solve the most complex problems of military theory and practice correctly and in a timely manner.

The Nature of War and Its Manifestations

War, as any event of the reality which surrounds us, has two inseparably interconnected sides: the external and internal. The external side of war is accessible to direct contemplation. Its inner side is hidden from direct perception and is cognized with the aid of abstract thought on the basis of the data of living contemplation and practice, scientific methods of cognition. The internal and external side of objective reality are reflected by categories of materialist dialectics -- essence and phenomenon.

Essence is the inner basis of objects, events, processes, concealed below the surface of phenomena and manifested in them. Phenomenon is a method of manifestation, the discovery of the essence (the term "phenomenon" is frequently used to signify "object," "event," "process." In this definition it reflects the internal and external sides of reality, that is essence and its manifestation. In this article the term "phenomenon" is used in a narrow sense, as a form of manifestation of the essence.) War is a qualitatively unique phenomenon, radically differing from all other occurrences in society. It has only one inner basis, one essence, hidden below the surface of phenomena and manifested. The essential nature of war consists in the fact that it constitutes a continuation of politics of classes and nations by violent means. This definition was formulated by Lenin in his work "Failure of the Second International:" "applied to wars, the fundamental thesis of the dialectic...is that "war is simply a continuation of politics by other (that is violent)" means "... this was always the viewpoint of Marx and Engels, who viewed each war as a continuation of politics of given, interested powers -- and different classes within them -- at a given time" (Poln. sobr. sobr. [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, page 224). This essence is manifested in all elements forming the content of war, mainly in the various forms of armed struggle, as well as the reorganization of the
In the course of war all battles, operations and strikes (independent of scope), directed toward destroying the enemy's armed forces and home front, represent in the final analysis a means of achieving political objectives pursued by classes and states waging war. This signifies that during the course of war armed struggle is always essential. It always represents the chief manifestation of the essence of war -- the continuation of politics by violent means. The significance of this thesis consists in the first place in the fact that it conditions the immense responsibility of the personnel of our Armed Forces and particularly command personnel in attaining the political objectives of war and in defending our socialist Fatherland. Secondly, it requires that command personnel, in resolving matters of military organizational development, preparation for and organization of a battle or operation, approach the problem from the standpoint of state interests. Thirdly, it prompts one to study carefully and skillfully utilize the objective, deep and essential relationships of armed combat. Fourthly, it aids in exposing those bourgeois ideologists who separate armed combat from the essence of war, endeavoring to prove that in war politics and armed combat represent independent elements. Under present-day conditions some bourgeois ideologists, realizing the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war and endeavoring to conceal the genuine culprits, announce that a new world war will not be a continuation of politics of classes and states. Bourgeois economist Sternberg writes: "In the atomic age war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means" (F. Sternberg, Die Militarische und industrielle Revolution, Berlin, 1957, page 82).

A new world war, if unleashed by the imperialists, will in its essence constitute a continuation of the adventurist policies of the ruling classes of capitalist states. This will be an unjust, predatory war by the aggressive forces of imperialism. As for the socialist nations, it will be a just war in defense of the socialist system.

The chief manifestation of the essence of war -- armed combat with missiles and nuclear weapons -- will be expressed primarily in mass strikes against major economic and administrative centers of the warring states, as well as against troop concentrations. The essence of war and its chief manifestation, being an inseparable unity, also possess important differences. The essence of war acts as a
The essence of war is relatively stable, while the phenomena expressing it are more mobile. This is due to the fact that the phenomena change to the degree of quantitative accumulations within the framework of the existing quality. In addition they can change with an alteration not of the entire essence but merely of one individual facet. Finally, the phenomenon changes when changes take place in the conditions for the tenure of the essential nature, although the essence itself does not lose its qualitative certainty. During the course of a single war, at various stages diversified methods of waging armed combat may be utilized. But this does not alter the essence of war. During the course of the great Fatherland War, at different stages as well as in different operations, diversified methods of warfare were employed. This was due to circumstances, a change in the relationship of forces and development of the art of warfare. Here the essential nature of war, that is continuation of the policies of the Soviet Union by means of force against Fascist aggression, did not change, while the forms of its chief manifestation, that is the forms of armed combat, underwent change. The multiplicity of forms of manifestation of one and the same essence is determined by the diversity of conditions under which it forms and develops, as well as qualitatively diverse stages in the development of an object, phenomenon, or process.

The essence reveals the inner basis of war, the most important element in its quality, the root causes of its coming into being. The essential nature of war determines the overall character of armed combat and its other manifestations. At the same time there is something unique and characteristic only of each concrete phenomenon of war. Because of this the phenomena of war are richer and more diversified than the essence. The essence of war is manifested indirectly, chiefly through armed combat and is cognized by abstract reasoning. The phenomena of war -- armed combat, reorganization of the economy on a war footing, changes in the ideological and diplomatic struggle -- appear and act directly.

The job of science consists in reducing the apparent movement to the inner movement. Consequently, in studying war one cannot stop at the surface of phenomena but must penetrate into the deep-lying processes, into their essential nature. This enables one to elucidate the nature of each war, the natural laws governing its origin and development, to predict the course of events, to expose those enemies who are endeavoring to conceal the essential nature of their policies.

The essence of war is linked with the social and economic structure, for according to Lenin's definition politics is the concentrated expression of economics. From this proceeds the task of cognition, consisting in penetrating from the essence of the first order into the essence of the second order: from the study of the essence of politics to transition to a study of the essence of economics, which determines
A superficial examination of the phenomena of war inevitably leads to subjectivism, to flimsy, hairbrained schemes, which serve as one of the main reasons for profound blunders in military organizational development and in the art of war. The adventurism of many bourgeois military leaders proceeds from the social essence of imperialism, doomed to inevitable destruction, as well as from the metaphysical method by which they are guided. The aggressive ideas and actions of imperialist reaction under present-day conditions once again confirm the correctness of Lenin's conclusion that imperialists are adventurists in their social essence: they may fail to consider the relationship of forces which are present in the world arena, and hence they may unleash a new series of wars. The American imperialists and those countries under their domination write and speak much of the necessity of preserving peace between nations. But the essential nature of their policies consists in the fact that they are striving to prepare a maximum quantity of forces and then, employing the element of surprise, to unleash a massive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and other Socialist nations, gaining victory by abruptly altering the balance of forces in their own favor. Under these conditions it would be a most profound error to assume that the aggressors will not risk attacking the Soviet Union and other socialist nations.

On 18 January 1962, President John Kennedy gave an address at the White House, in which he stated that the first principle of American strategy is a further increase in much more powerful nuclear armaments than the nuclear striking force of the Soviet Union. The second principle consists in "possessing more numerous and more modern ground forces and other types of conventional armed forces." The third principle is the organization and improvement of special forces for underground and guerilla warfare. The essence of this plan is manifested in the intensified race for missiles and nuclear arms, in the increasing size of the army, in the organization of special forces for waging anti-guerilla war- fare, for diversionary and subversive activities. Changes in directing the development of forces and weapons, as well as the strategy of the American imperialists, demand penetration into the essence of these changes and timely consideration of these changes in military organizational development.
The all-out development of science is essential for a timely disclosure of the essence of new phenomena in military affairs. Profound theoretical research with utilization of the latest scientific methods and technical devices is called upon to reveal the role of conventional and qualitatively new weapons, each branch of the armed forces and type of troop unit, and consequently the direction and intensity of development of corresponding branches of military economics.

A correct appraisal from the military viewpoint of new achievements of science is impossible without the timely revelation of the essence of these achievements. Here as in any other area a lack of coincidence between phenomena and essence is inevitable. Therefore, as well as due to attachment to the accustomed (in view of the well-known conservative nature of thought and a number of other causes), frequently the new and original, emerging beyond the framework of the generally accepted, is perceived for a certain period of time as insubstantial, but ideas which seem insubstantial very frequently include ideas which have comprised an entire era in science, in social and historical realities and in the development of military science. For example, French Marshal Foch said: "Perhaps the aeroplane is fine as a sport, but not for the army; it is useless for war" (B. L. Simakov, I. F. Shepilov, Vozdushnyy flot. Strany Sovetov [The Soviet Air Force], Voyenizdat, 1958, page 81).

As early as 1924 Soviet specialists developed a system of cumulative charges for the engineer troops. But they were negatively assessed and not utilized until 1942. An analogous case occurred in 1933 with an electronic mine detector: it was condemned as dead weight, and in 1939-1940 had to be redeveloped on a crash basis.

Before the Great Fatherland War the works of several Soviet authors (V. Melkov, R. Eydesman, R. Tsiffer) asserted that the nature of the initial period of war would be army cover operations, which would enable the main forces to be deployed. And yet the initial attacks by Nazi Germany against its neighbors demonstrated the endeavor of the aggressor to reach its objectives by surprise attack by previously deployed armies. Yet the essence of this phenomenon was not discovered in a timely manner and our military organizational development continued to be oriented toward a period of mobilization. The main cause of this situation was a blind faith in the experience of past wars. In order to avoid this, in all things (including military science) it is necessary to orient oneself on the new and developing --- this is a law of human activity conditioned by the constant development of surrounding reality on an ascending line. Lenin teaches us: "...one must advance and look not at the past but rather toward the future..." (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 36, page 264). Of course it does not follow from this that one can ignore historical experience and not utilize it to a proper degree of feasibility.
Penetration into the essence of a situation is possible only on the basis of a thorough knowledge of military science, on the basis of close interaction of vital perception, abstract thought and practical activity, that is well-organized, skillfully and continuously conducted reconnaissance in combination with analysis by appropriate staff personnel and military leaders. Penetration into the essence of a situation involves overcoming difficulties generated by the effect both of objective and subjective causes. These difficulties are conditioned by the lack of convergence between phenomenon and essence, the speed and intensity of combat operations, the absence of precise information on the enemy and finally by deliberate enemy actions designed to camouflage his plans.

The lack of convergence of essence and phenomenon, including in military affairs, is caused by the individual peculiarities of specific objects, events, processes, as well as by the unique nature of the conditions of their existence. One of the objective forms of manifestation of the essence of objects and events is semblance, which expresses the lack of convergence between essence and phenomenon.

The methodological significance of the thesis of nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence is immense. It teaches us first of all that one should not underestimate the results of live perception or sense degree of cognition, including sensations, perceptions and ideas. At the same time it requires that we not stop in the cognition of phenomenon at the stage of live perception. In order to penetrate into the essence of phenomena, analysis of the result of sense perception with the aid of abstract thought is essential. Sense cognition, perceiving the external side of a phenomenon, views it as from afar, and this is frequently deceptive. A superficial study of semblance in military affairs can serve as the cause of serious blunders. On the other hand a thoughtful analysis of semblance forms an essential condition for penetrating into the essence of a situation and constitutes a guarantee of making the right decision.

For example, in 1944 the command of the Third Ukrainian Front initially assumed that the bridgehead to the south of Tiraspol was not at all suitable for launching the main attack, due to its limited size.
In addition to direct nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence one should bear in mind that many phenomena are not at all perceived by our sense organs without the aid of appropriate instruments. One of these phenomena was written about by the American magazine United States News and World Report. "Around the Soviet Union," states the magazine, "we have set up powerful radio monitoring stations which work around the clock. These 'ears' not only record all transmissions by stationary radio stations but also pick up short-wave radio communications between mobile units of the Soviet army from points thousands of kilometers away." For the timely revelation of the essence of such phenomena a well-organized intelligence setup is necessary, utilizing the most advanced technical devices, and extreme vigilance is essential.

One should also constantly bear in mind that in military science the nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence is intensified by the peculiar features of warfare and conscious camouflage of essential nature on the part of the enemy. In order to deceive the Soviet government and carry out a sneak attack on the USSR, the Nazi Germans employed all types of false information and camouflage. With this objective in mind they created the impression of a concentration of the main German forces in preparation for crossing the English Channel and invading the British Isles, while they tried to sell their troop concentrations along the Soviet borders as an attempt to misinform the British. In addition they disseminated versions on the necessity of securing their new possessions (in Czechoslovakia and Poland), displacing troops in areas not subject to British air attack, and the conduct of operations in the Balkans. The essence of these actions by our probable adversary was not revealed by us in time, and this was one of the causes of the incorrect appraisal of the military and political situation and the success enjoyed by the Nazi German troops in the initial period of the war. The main role in concealing the essential nature of a situation and misleading the enemy is played by the subjective factor: skill, initiative and other personal qualities of military leaders, as well as all military personnel. It is they who utilize the features of terrain, season, time of day and military equipment for concealing the essential nature of the plan being implemented and the specific situation.
The bourgeois military press recommends that radio be used more extensively for misleading information, for radio can be used to create the apparent existence of command posts, nonexistent airfields, to demonstrate supposed preparations for an operation by increasing radio communications volume, and to simulate the employment of fighter planes and guided missiles. It is considered that radio misinformation should be conducted together with other measures intended to mislead the enemy. Other measures include the following: rumors to incite confusion, the semblance of shifting troops and equipment, simulated heavy use of roads, and fictitious offensive operations. It is recommended to build decoy missile launching pads and mock-ups of nuclear warhead storage areas, to effect decoy transfers of nuclear weapons under heavy guard, to limit the movements of military personnel and totally prohibit civilians from areas simulating deployment of nuclear weapons.

With the objective of fortifying the "authenticity" of measures observed by the enemy it is planned to feed enemy intelligence appropriate "documentary" materials. In order to successfully deceive the enemy it is considered essential to study the enemy intelligence setup and to know the indications according to which enemy intelligence identifies a given installation or phenomenon. One's own intelligence has the assignment of determining how the enemy will react to measures taken to deceive him. In order not to be deceived by the enemy it is essential to analyze and check extremely carefully all information obtained, to thoroughly expose the essential nature of enemy intentions and actions.

The Decisive Role of the Commanding Officer in Revealing the Essential Nature of a Situation

The essential nature of a situation is cognized by men and not machines, and consequently the process of cognition depends on their subjective qualities. In 1940 the Allied Command was unable to determine the main direction of the imminent offensive by the Nazi German forces. Ardennes, where the main blow was to come, was weakly defended by French troops. This occurred in the first place because Anglo-French
The concealment of the essential nature, that is the internal, deep side of a situation below the surface of phenomenon is fostered by war itself, with its constant danger to human life. During war the manpower and weapons of the enemy are frequently exaggerated. Numerous facts of history attest eloquently to this. During the first week of the German offensive in France 2,500 German tanks were transformed in the eyes of the French General Staff officers into as many as 7,500. (Col D. M. Proctor, Vomny v Yevropy 1939-1941 [The War in Europe: 1939-1941], Voyenizdat, 1963, page 301).

The thesis that one can penetrate into the essential nature of a situation only through comprehensively analyzing phenomena extends to all constituent elements of the art of war: strategy, operational planning and tactics. It remains in force even in the area of operating military equipment. Frequently phenomena which seem insignificant are viewed by some specialists as small matters, for which they must pay dearly. Since phenomenon, as the expression of a given facet of essence, is always significant, one cannot tolerate underestimation or even one phenomenon until its real essence is determined. Otherwise one may overlook an essential factor, knowledge of which may greatly aid in achieving victory, while to ignore or underrate it leads to defeat. There are many examples of such underestimation. On 7 December 1941 the American radar station located at the north end of the island of Oahu detected some suspicious targets rapidly approaching Pearl Harbor. The radar operators reported this fact to headquarters. But the duty officer assumed that it was a squadron of "Flying Fortresses" which was expected to arrive from the mainland that day. Actually radar had detected the first wave of Japanese carrier-based aircraft, 45 minutes flying time from the American base. There was enough time to sound the alarm and prepare to repel the attack. By failing to reveal the essential nature of the phenomenon detected by the radar the Americans were taken totally by surprise. Under modern conditions the outcome of an entire war can depend to a great extent on the ability to discover the essential nature of such a phenomenon in a timely manner.

If a phenomenon expresses a given individual side of the essence and not the essence as a whole, this signifies that in analyzing a situation it is essential to study not isolated phenomena but phenomena in their entirety. Only by penetrating into the essential nature of a situation is it possible to discover targets and enemy troop concentrations, a blow against which will provide maximum effect. Otherwise a scattering of forces is inevitable, in strikes against secondary targets and the pursuit of phantom success. For example, if in the fall of 1941...
The genuine (aggressive) essence of such a phenomenon as the creation of military-political blocs by American imperialism was revealed in a timely manner by the Communist Party and Soviet government. This enabled us to take timely and necessary measures to strengthen the defensive capabilities of our country. At the present time one should bear in mind that in order to camouflage an armed attack under preparation the imperialists may create the appearance of a lessening of international tensions. Timely discovery of the essential nature of a situation depends to a decisive degree on many causes, including the quantity and quality of technical intelligence devices, on acts of initiative by persons capable of utilizing with maximum effectiveness the most advanced technical devices for rapid determination of enemy forces and enemy plans. It is therefore extremely important to effect a comprehensive and timely preparation and training of a sufficient number of special cadres capable of immediately distinguishing decoy enemy actions and installations from authentic ones.

While the ability to discover in a timely manner the essential nature of a situation serves as a primary condition for opening the possibility of victory in a battle, operation and in a war as a whole, a careful camouflaging of one's own forces and the ability to deceive the enemy and mislead him in respect to one's own plans and actions serves as one of the major conditions for transforming this potential into reality. In the summer of 1944 the headquarters of the First Ukrainian Front, in order to conceal preparations for an operation, drew up a plan of camouflaging activities, which provided for simulating the concentration of two tank armies and one tank corps on the left side of the front in the zones occupied by the First Guards and 18th Armies. In order to carry out this deception on a large scale we employed false tank movements by railroad, simulated tank soyedineniya staging areas, designated their routes of movement and concentration areas and conducted appropriate radio communications. In the false areas of concentration a large number of mock-ups of tanks, trucks, heavy guns and field kitchens were set up. At the same time steps were taken to conceal the regrouping of troops along the front. All movements of chasti and soyedineniya were conducted only at night, under strictest concealment. Although we were unsuccessful in completely deceiving the enemy (he detected the location of the armies in the first echelon along the front), redeployment of the First Guards Tank Army to an area south of Lutsk and the Fourth Tank Army into the Ternopol' area remained unnoticed, which was of major significance.
is inconceivable without knowledge of the unique nature of effect of the objective laws of warfare. Expressed in science, these laws constitute the sum total, the synthesized result in cognizing the essence of a phenomenon. "Law and essence," said Lenin, "are homogeneous (of the same order) concepts or more accurately are of the same degree, expressing more profound cognition by man of phenomena and the world." (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol. 29, page 136). However law and essence are not identical concepts. As mentioned above, essence is the inner, relatively stable basis of objects, processes of objective reality, concealed below the surface of phenomena and manifested in them. In contrast, "law is a relationship...a relationship of essences or between essences" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol. 29, page 136). It follows that knowledge of the laws of warfare creates the potential to discover relationships between essences in a battle, operation and in a war. One of the most important laws of warfare is the law of battlefield support. Nowadays the possibility of victory can be quickly lost even with an unlimited quantity of high quality manpower and weapons if the commanding officer commits errors in organizing battlefield support, primarily reconnaissance, camouflaging, anti-atomic, anti-chemical, anti-bacteriological protection and operations against enemy radio and electronic devices. Without well-organized reconnaissance and intelligence activities, conducted continuously and utilizing all the most advanced technical devices, it is impossible to discover the essential nature of a situation in a timely manner and to locate the position of enemy nuclear weapons, the main direction of the imminent strike and the time of the strike, and it is impossible to open up the potential for a victory and achieve it.

Without well-organized camouflaging and successful counter-operations against enemy reconnaissance and intelligence it is impossible to keep one's nuclear weapons intact. Only with superior intelligence, reconnaissance, camouflaging and superiority in suppressing enemy intelligence and reconnaissance is it possible to gain advantage in a battle and combat operation, in directing nuclear and conventional strikes against enemy nuclear weapons.

The potential of being first in a battle and combat operation to engage in nuclear and conventional strikes and the possibility of swift combat operations in turn can be transformed into reality only by correct utilization of the law of interaction. The precise and reliable interaction of all branches of the armed forces and types of units promotes concentration of superior forces in selected areas and realization of the potential to defeat the enemy. Skilled actions by the military in accordance with the above-mentioned objective laws, bearing in mind their interrelationships and interdependencies, makes it possible simultaneously to follow the demands of the law of maximum destruction of enemy manpower and weapons with minimum losses. This makes it possible to reduce the potential of the enemy, to alter the situation in one's
When the military leader fails to bear in mind the essential links, objective laws and their interaction, or if he commits serious errors in cognizing and utilizing the laws of warfare, this inevitably reduces the potential of his troops, promotes change in the situation in the enemy's favor and leads to defeat. Toward Voronezh our troops had 1,000 tanks against 500 enemy tanks; thus, they had the potential of frustrating the planned German summer campaign of 1942. However, due to a lack of ability to penetrate into the essential nature of the situation, to cognize and utilize the objective laws of warfare, due to the lack of initiative and firmness in directing our troops on the part of the Voronezh Front command, this opportunity was lost.

The lessons of the last war as well as experience gained in field exercises attest to the extreme importance of teaching our officers and generals (both in line assignments and in Armed Forces schools) the ability to discover the essential nature of a situation, the ability to think, analyze and creatively comprehend, and not simply to assimilate course material. Only on this basis is it possible to train and develop initiative and decisiveness in the actions of command personnel. Simple assimilation of material is based primarily on live perception. It does not demand thorough independent logical thinking. Each commanding officer in his practical activities encounters at every step the necessity of independently revealing the essential nature of a situation. Consequently it is necessary that our command personnel training programs in line assignments and in armed forces schools always provide for conducting classes which in content and form will promote maximum development of independent thinking for timely revelation of the essential nature of a situation.