MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "On Military-Scientific Work in the Ground Forces", by Colonel V. Zemskov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of CSOR reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "On Military-Scientific Work in the Ground Forces", by Colonel V. Zemskov. It appeared in Issue 3 (64) of 1962 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. Issue 3 (64) of 1962 was probably sent to press in May or June of 1962.

Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.
Experience shows that while the means of armed combat are being extensively developed, examination of the problems of operational art and tactics cannot be confined within the framework of the scientific-research work being carried out in the higher military-educational institutions and special scientific-research institutes. Military-scientific work carried out directly in the troops also possesses great significance.

The main efforts of scientific-research work for 1961 were concentrated on the examination and elaboration of the questions of the preparation and conduct of offensive operations and of combat in the initial period of a war, of the combat employment of missile troops, of the control of troops in modern operations using automated and mechanized equipment, of the combat employment of the arms of troops and special troops, and of other questions.

The basic forms of military-scientific work in the districts (groups of forces), armies and large units were the elaboration, by generals and officers, of theoretical questions, with subsequent practical checking in troop, experimental and command-staff exercises, and the dissemination of the experience of these exercises, and of military-scientific conferences, meetings and briefings. It is sufficient to say that /3-digit figure missing/ district and army conferences were conducted, during
the year and 460 divisional, corps and military school conferences. The exchange of information on highly important theoretical conclusions and on practical achievements in military-scientific work between military districts and academies began to be widely practiced, facilitating profounder treatment of various problems of operational art and tactics and increasing the purposefulness of military-scientific work.

The strengthening and further development of scientific links between the military academies and the districts and groups of forces is also accomplished by the conduct of demonstration and experimental exercises with troops, in accordance with the plans of the scientific-research work of the academies. Thus, the Baltic Military District carried out a two-sided divisional tactical training demonstration for students of the Military Academies of the General Staff, i/n M.V. Frunze, i/n V.V. Kuybyshev and of the Military Institute of the KGB i/n F.E. Dzerzhinsky on the subject "An Offensive by a Motorized Rifle Division Against the Enemy’s Defense, with the Forcing of a Water Barrier in Conjunction with an Airborne Landing." On the eve of the demonstration the directing and teaching staff of these institutions of higher military education presented a series of reports on the subject of the demonstration for the generals and officers of the troops of the district.

In addition, the directing staff and the professors and instructors of the military academies take an active part in the troop, experimental and command-staff exercises during the testing of equipment and in the work of seminars and military-scientific conferences.

The improvement of links between the military academies and higher military schools and the troops and scientific-research institutes and of the links
between themselves has made it possible to make a significant increase in the quantity and an improvement in the quality of military-scientific work which is carried out jointly. The results of theoretical investigations and practical recommendations have begun to be introduced with greater efficacy into the educational process of academies (schools) and into the practice of educating the troops. All this has permitted a significant widening of the framework of military-scientific work, the attraction to participation in it of a large "army" of experienced generals and officers, and the transformation of military-scientific work into an effective factor in the improvement of the combat readiness of the Ground Forces.

Last year generals and officers of the Ground Forces prepared and defended about 115 theses on the most diverse and pressing subjects. There was an increase in activity among the command staff in the production of reports, papers, lectures and articles on various questions of modern military theory, equipment, and armament and on the practical activities of troops.

The single fact that during the past year more than 3000 theoretical articles were written and published in the central and local military press, indicates that military-scientific work has become an integral and organic part of the official activities of commanding officers and chiefs at all levels.

Proper communication of the results of military-scientific work has great organizational significance. For example, in the Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts special orders are issued at the end of each year, noting the positive and negative aspects of military-scientific work and showing the best and worst formations, large units and units; incentives are announced for generals and
officers who participate actively in military-scientific work and specific tasks are allocated for the coming year. In addition, in these districts, the condition of military-scientific work in staffs and among the troops, and measures for its improvement are discussed at the beginning of the new academic year at the meetings of the military councils.

In the past year the activity of voluntary military-scientific societies attached to district and garrison Officers' Clubs has increased greatly. In their work great attention has been devoted to the writing of memoirs and of works of a historical nature. However as the experience of the past three years shows, the voluntary military-scientific societies in the directorates of districts, armies and large units have completely lost their practical significance and, in fact, no longer exist.

In their place in the opinion of the majority of the districts it would be advisable to set up military-scientific aktivs, which should also serve to support commanding officers and chiefs in their resolution of all the important questions of military-scientific work. This has been repeatedly written about in the pages of the journal Military Thought, but so far nothing has been decided.

What are the results of military-scientific work in the Ground Forces for the year 1961?

The Main Staff and the Directorates of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces produced the theoretical works: "The Employment of Missile Troops in Front Operations" and "The Organization of Troop Control in Front and Army Operations". Examination of the questions of employing missile units and subunits of various designations was of special significance in strengthening the combat readiness of troops. With this aim, work on ten
subjects has been completed (with the active participation of the Artillery Command Academy), in which, on the basis of theoretical research, practical recommendations are presented for the control of missile large units and units, for their supply with missiles in offensive operations, for a reduction in the time for the preparation of operational-tactical missiles for firing, for an increase in the effectiveness of their operation, for the topographical support of missile troops and artillery and for other subjects. Much literature on educational methods has been published, including a textbook on the tactics of ground artillery, and training aids on missile weapons, on operations by battalions of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, on the fire control of a missile battalion and on other subjects.

Research on questions of the organization and conduct of antiair defense of the Ground Forces and on control of the forces and weapons of the PVO in combat and in an operation is of great importance. In the main, work on this subject has been completed.

Research on questions of the combat employment of airborne troops in modern operations has been completed with the production of the work "Airborne Troops, Their Use and Development."

A considerable amount of research has been devoted to questions of engineer support for an operation and of the further development and improvement of the means of engineer armament, to questions of the organization of tank-technical support of troops in a modern front offensive operation, and to problems of the development of chemical weapons and of their employment in modern operations. The theoretical work "Methods of Determining Areas and Levels of Radioactive Contamination and Their Surmounting by Troops" has been completed.
The academies of the Ground Forces made a great contribution to the development of the theory of the operation, and especially of the combined-arms battle, and an elaboration of the questions of the employment of missile troops, artillery and tanks in a battle and in an operation was made by the academies of the Ground Troops.

The Military Academy in M.V. Frunze prepared and published a series of theoretical studies on the most important questions of a combined-arms battle ("A Meeting Battle and a Meeting Engagement," "The Forcing of Rivers from the March in an Offensive Operation by a Combined-Arms Army," "Long Distance Marches," "Troop Operations in Zones of Radioactive Contamination in Combat and Operations"). The subject "Control" has been completed and an advanced project for an automated system for the control of troops at front and regimental levels has been submitted.

The Military Academy of Armored Troops continued work on the theory of the combat employment and operational use of the tank troops in a modern war, research into the possibility of controlling tank troops with the aid of means of automation and mechanization, and into the comprehensive support of a tank army and of its large units in modern operations, together with work on the elaboration of the theoretical bases for design of and calculations on combat vehicles, on the substantiation of tactical-technical requirements and on the elaboration of new decisions in the field of construction of future models of armored equipment. This was reflected in the works: "The Employment of Missile Troops in an Offensive Operation by a Tank Army," "The Surmounting of Zones with a High Level of Radioactive Contamination and Great Destruction by Tank Troops and Operations in Zones during an Offensive Operation," "The Development of the Tactics of Tank Large Units and
Units when Nuclear/Missile Weapons Are in Use," "Research into the Possibility of Using a Gas Turbine Engine on a Tank and the Elaboration of Methods for its Calculation", and a series of others.

Characteristic of the scientific-research work of all the academies is an increased quality, the broadening and strengthening of constructive links with the troops, with industry and with scientific-research organizations, and active participation in the production of manuals and regulations.

Military districts and groups of forces worked on research into many problems of military practice. Thus, collectives of generals and officers of the Leningrad, Baltic and Odessa Military Districts worked on the subject "The Preparation and Conduct of an Offensive Operation Using Nuclear/Missile Weapons and Other Means of Mass Destruction in the Initial Period of a War on a Maritime Axis with the Cooperation of Naval Forces"; the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Northern Group of Forces worked on "Some Problems in the Conduct of a First Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of a War When Nuclear/Missile Weapons Are Being Used"; the Belorussian Military District completed the preparation of the work "The Re-grouping of Front (Army) Troops over Long Distances and their Commitment to Battle from the March to Develop an Offensive in the Initial Period of a War"; the Transcaucasus Military District produced "Special Features of Troop Combat Operations in Mountains"; the Kiev and Carpathian Military Districts worked on "The Forcing of a Broad Water Barrier from the March by a Tank Army"; the Ural and Transbaykal Military Districts on "The Organization of an Offensive by a Combined-Arms Army with Movement by the Main Forces from the Depth."
The Leningrad Military District worked on the project "Guiding Principles for Combat Operations by Troops in the Transpolar Area (zapolyariye) and the Arctic." Generals and officers from a number of districts participated directly in the preparation of separate chapters of the new Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces (division - regiment); from the Ural Military District in "The Preparation of Troops for Combat Operations," from the Moscow Military District in "Defense," from the Odessa Military District in "The Meeting Engagement," and from the Kiev and Belorussian Military Districts in "The Offensive."

The military-theoretical journal *Military Thought* provided great assistance to districts and groups of forces in their performance of the tasks of military-scientific work. It should be plainly stated that in the Collections of the journal, and particularly in its special editions, generals and officers found answers to many of the questions of military theory and practice and actively participated in their elaboration and discussion.

The material published on the pages of the journal on important problems of military art, such as the nature of modern war and the role in it of branches of the armed forces, the content and nature of the initial period of a war, the preparation and execution of the first offensive operations, the development and combat employment of missile troops, the paths of future development of the tank troops, the control of troops in operations and the organizational structure of operational staffs, combat with the nuclear weapons of the enemy, troop operations in zones of radioactive contamination, problems of radio-countermeasures and intelligence, - much of this coincided with the themes of the military-scientific work of districts, groups of forces and armies. Naturally
all this bore directly, not only on the quality of finished military-theoretical works, but also on the solution of many of the practical problems of the operational training of troops.


directorates and of departments of districts, commanding officers of large units and others, a total of more than 70 persons, participated in the writing of a series of important articles.

This all shows that the Collections of the journal and its special editions hold a leading place in the elaboration of the theory and in the practice of modern military art, and exert a direct influence on the content of military-scientific work in the Ground Forces.

The preparation for the journal of articles by generals and officers of all categories, and especially by the directing personnel (troop commanders of districts and armies, commanding officers of corps and divisions, chiefs of staff of directorates and departments) indicates active and direct participation in military-scientific work, and the creative and operational solution of its problems.

What basic theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations have been reached by districts and groups of forces in their military-scientific work?

The regrouping of troops over a large distance and their commitment to battle from the march. The basic method of moving troops over a distance of about 1000 km, in the opinion of the Belorussian, Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts, is to move them with their own means of transport. However, this raises the problem of conserving the motor transportation potential of tracked equipment, and this must be resolved by the issue to the troops of trailers with more powerful prime movers. The existing prime movers (Dnepr, MAZ-214, KRAZ-214) do not ensure a speed of more than 18 to 20 km/hour even over good hard-surface roads, and
are completely unsuitable for the transport of heavy cargoes over dirt roads.

In the conditions which prevail in the Western Theater of Military Operations, in which the density of roads leading in a latitudinal direction reaches 5 to each 100 (?) km of the front, the regrouping zone of an army can be within the 200 km range, and that of a front in the 300 to 500 km range (Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev and Moscow Military Districts).

The regrouping of a tank army from the depth of the country will probably be carried out under its own power. However, the performance of this task is limited by the cruising range of the tanks in respect to fuel, caterpillar tracks and engines. It is therefore advisable to set up combat stocks of POL, spare parts and caterpillar tracks on the routes along which the army will probably move.

It is better to move the missile brigade of an army along separate routes at the level of the first echelon divisions, and during the approach to an area of combat operations - in front of the division, preceding the latter by 3 to 4 hours. The missile battalions should move at the head of the column of the main forces, behind the vanguard, and during the approach to the line of commitment to battle, they should be 1 to 1.5 hours of movement ahead of the divisions.

The technical capabilities of modern equipment (with the exception of heavy tanks, some types of prime movers, and road and special vehicles) ensure troop movement at a speed of 20 to 30 km/hour, which permits a 24 hour forced march of large units to be planned for a depth of 350 to 400 km. However the limited cruising range of equipment with regard to fuel and the need to refuel
vehicles in the course of a march do not, in practice, permit a 24 hour march of more than 300 km to be carried out. The maximum permissible stress period for equipment and for the physical resources of personnel is 3 to 4 days (a march of about 1000 km). After this, a 24 hour rest and time for the technical servicing of equipment are needed (Belorussian Military District).

In order to control the troops of a front and an army it is essential to set up a PKP (field control point - polevoy kontrolnyy punkt) which will enter the area of combat operations at the beginning of a move in order to plan and organize the offensive operation, a KP (command post - komandnyy punkt) (the operational group) which must occupy itself with the full mobilization and with the organization of the movement of troops and 1 to 2 operational groups to control the troops on the march (North Caucasus and Belorussian Military Districts).

During regroupings on the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp, cover from the air of troops and of installations in a front's rear area must be carried out mainly by the forces and means of the PVO of these countries. Bringing in the PVO troops of a front for these purposes will only lead to their dispersal, and to the weakening of the cover of the main grouping of the troops of the front (army), during their commitment to battle (Odessa Military District).

It is recognized that still during peacetime it is advisable to set up, in each theater of military operations, a single administration to control all means of transport, lines of communication, communications, road, repair and evacuation and fueling forces and means for the support not
only of mass combined movements by troops into front areas, but also for the movement of the local population. The territorial functions of the administration must tie in with economic areas and with the military districts (Odessa and Belorussian Military Districts).

In the opinion of a number of military districts, the commitment to battle of operational formations must be carried out immediately after the arrival of the missile units and first echelon divisions at the area of combat operations. Moreover, if, at the moment when, for example, an army is committed to battle, large units of the front are operating in its offensive zone, the latter should be turned over to the committed army. However, during operations in a mountainous theater of military operations the commitment to battle of operational formations will be a very rare event. As a rule, efforts will be increased by the successive commitment of separate large units.

A meeting engagement in the first operation during the initial period of a war. The Moscow Military District considers deep envelopment and encirclement to be the most expedient form of maneuver in a meeting engagement involving the widespread use of nuclear weapons. This permits the basic siting areas of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons to be more rapidly approached, enables him to be deprived of the opportunity to use this weapon, and allows the enemy grouping to be split up in a short period of time and destroyed piecemeal. When it is impossible to inflict sufficient destruction on the enemy with nuclear weapons, or when our troops are unfavorably placed to carry out a flanking maneuver, several frontal splitting strikes can be delivered against axes.

The selection of an axis for operations by a main grouping of the ground forces must depend on
the axis on which nuclear weapons are being massed. However, this does not signify direct dependence (on terrain). The art of leading troops will find its clearest expression when the nuclear means and ground forces of the enemy, contained from the front by our own smaller forces, are routed by nuclear/missile strikes, while our main forces are sent around them or through breaks which have been made in the enemy formations.

In the opinion of the Baltic Military District, the success of a meeting engagement depends, to a great extent, on comprehensive engineer support; on engineer reconnaissance and on the preparation of routes and cross-country routes for movement forward, deployment and maneuver; on the support of exposed flanks and on securing captured lines; on the rapid preparation of launching sites and on their camouflage. In regiments and divisions it is essential to set up traffic-control detachments, equipped with motor vehicle transport with high cross-country ability, with MTU bridge-laying tanks, bridges on wheels (koleynyy most) and road mine-detectors. At the army level, instead of a traffic-control detachment, it is advisable to have one road and bridge detachment on each army route, and helicopters to deliver engineer subunits and materials to points where they are needed for the quick passage of troops through barrier areas and areas of great destruction.

The control of missile units and large units. It is advisable to centralize the control of operational-tactical missile large units and units at the scale of the front. The Kiev Military District proposes two methods for the centralized control of the nuclear/missile fire of a front.

Under the first method, commands from the chief of the missile troops and artillery of the
front are given directly to the front and army missile brigades and battalions, and the chiefs of missile troops of the armies are informed subsequently of the tasks assigned to the army brigades and of the tasks being performed by the front's weapons in the zones of the armies. Under the second method, the decision of the commander of the troops of the front for a massed nuclear strike is given to the missile brigades (battalions) subordinate to the front, by the commands of the chiefs of missile troops and artillery of the front, and to the army missile brigades, by the allocation of operational-tactical tasks by army commanders with the subsequent issue of commands by the chiefs of the missile troops and artillery of the armies.

In connection with the abolition of the directorates of front missile-technical bases and the availability of a considerable number of separate missile-technical units, directly subordinate to the front, it is proposed that, in the interests of reliability and continuity of control, reliable means of communications should be allocated to the chief of the directorate of missile-artillery armament.

The use of electronic computers to help missile troops has demonstrated the accuracy of calculations and the possibility of a deeper analysis of an operational situation and of the substantiated use of nuclear weapons. However, the "Arrow" ("Strela") electronic computer does not fully meet these requirements because of its low operating speed, the insufficient capacity of its operational memory and, most important, because of the impossibility of using it directly among the troops.

A landing operation in the initial period of a war aimed at the capture of a large island. In the opinion of the Far Eastern Military District,
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A landing operation in the initial period of a war aimed at the capture of a large island. In the opinion of the Far Eastern Military District,
A landing operation is a means of disrupting aggression and of routing the enemy on his own territory in the initial period of a war. All branches of the armed forces will participate in the conduct of the operation, their operations being subordinate to a single plan. The capture of a large island will require the allocation of a combined-arms army, a large unit of airborne troops, missile large units, air and naval forces, and strategic missile troops may even be brought in to deliver nuclear strikes. In a number of cases it will be necessary to strengthen the front, for the period of the operation, with missile large units from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command.

The basic method of capturing a large island consists of amphibious and airborne landings (drops) following a powerful nuclear strike, the seizure of key positions, the division and piecemeal rout of the enemy with long-range and front aviation and naval forces supported by missile troops from the mainland.

The landing of troops from the sea must be carried out in special, high-speed landing craft. The movement and landing of amphibious forces on amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers can only take place during the negotiation of narrow straits. It is advisable to land an airborne division in a single wave and to carry out a drop in 4 or 5 areas.

In a landing operation the naval forces must take part in the delivery of nuclear strikes, fight the ships and submarines of the enemy, transport the landing forces across the sea, capture the landing zone, support the combat operations of the landing forces on the island with shipboard artillery fire and missiles, provide sea communications and carry cargo for the landing forces.
In a landing operation the need for engineer troops is greatly reduced. A motorized rifle (tank) division, landed by sea, must be reinforced with combat engineer, road engineer and crossing and landing battalions.

Some of the problems of an offensive operation in mountainous desert terrain in the initial period of a war. The natural conditions of some theaters of military operations compel troops to conduct combat operations on separate and dissociated axes hundreds of kilometers removed from each other. In order to ensure that the troops of a front go over rapidly to the offensive at the start of a war, their peacetime location must permit the assumption of the necessary operational formation without lengthy regrouping, having on each operational axis a strike grouping capable of conducting an offensive independently to a great depth and at high speeds. The first echelon of an operational troop formation must include separate units and detachments, earmarked to perform specific tasks in the capture of passes, road junctions and oases. Tactical and operational air landings may be used for this purpose. In addition, the front should possess powerful reserves, of various designations, located on the most important axes.

Experience shows that the average rate of march in a desert, when up to 30 percent of the vehicles in a column have poor cross-country ability, can be 70 to 75 km a day; if the column only contains vehicles with good cross-country ability the rate of march may increase to 120 to 130 km a day. In order to provide for the march of large units (units) through sandy deserts it is necessary to establish detachments to support the movement, equipped with means for towing with high cross-country ability. Each vehicle should also have 5 to 6 meters of road covering and means for
pulling itself free.

Cooperation with the armies of the member-countries of the Warsaw Pact. At the start of a war it is necessary to eliminate dual control of allied armies (by the front commander and the military leadership of the allied countries). The armies should receive combat tasks only from the front commander. The means with which the military leadership of the allied countries will support their troops, and the length of time for which they will do this must be clearly established, together with the time from which the front will support them, and the volume of this support. This applies particularly to arrangements for the replenishment of armament and materiel and to the replacement of troops who have lost their combat effectiveness.

Rear area support should be carried out in accordance with a single plan. The military leadership of the member-countries of the Warsaw Pact must provide the front with the necessary materiel, on the basis of the needs of the armies for the entire front operation, and must supply a specified number of rear area units and establishments for the composition of the front’s rear services. In addition, these countries must take upon themselves such problems of rear services support as the formation of new rear area units and establishments, servicing, the building of roads and road installations and bypasses, and the materiel-technical support of troops passing through the territory of the allied countries.

In resolving the problems of coordination, the tasks of allied troops who remain on their own territory, in the rear area of the front, must be defined. These tasks may include: the destruction of enemy landings or of enemy groupings which have
broken through and which remain, participation in covering troops and the rear area installations of the front from the air and other measures.

In the works of districts and groups of forces there are also highly valuable theoretical and practical proposals on a whole series of other questions. Thus, the opinion is expressed that at a rate of movement of 100 km a day the expenditure of combat supplies ( боеприпасы ) and especially of fuel, increases. The mobile stocks of fuel in a division (reckoning these as available in tanks, unreduced in quantity) provide for the conduct of a battle for only two days, which is quite insufficient. The norms for mobile POL stocks and combat supplies, and their echelonment, must be so recalculated that they provide for the conduct of combat operations for 5 days. The total mobile supplies of an army (except for foodstuffs), which amount approximately to requirements for three days, are also insufficient, particularly since in fact an army base holds stocks which provide for the requirements of the troops for only one day.

In organizing combat for a city one should not rely exclusively on nuclear weapons, since there is no need to destroy all the cities and large populated points which offer resistance. One of the leading methods of combat for cities and large populated points must be their capture from the march.

In examining the struggle for fire superiority the authors of some works maintain that the performance of this task will be beyond the capability of one front. It can be successfully performed only by joint operations by several fronts with the Supreme High Command in the role of organizer.

A short analysis of the military-scientific work of the districts shows how purposefully and
specifically the most important questions of an operation are resolved by them.

In our opinion, the lack of planning in the development of basic measures must be considered as the basic deficiency of military-scientific activity. Let us take military-scientific conferences as an example. It has already become traditional for these to be planned for the last months of the year. Thus, in October 1961 one conference was held in the Turkestan Military District, in November conferences were held in four districts and groups of forces and, in December, in eleven.

Some consider that by holding conferences at such a time all the theoretical and practical activity of the past academic year is summed up. Undoubtedly this is so. However, it is a fact that the tasks of combat and operational training and of military-scientific work which are assigned for the next academic year call for new solutions, and at times for new theoretical and practical recommendations. For this reason, it seems to us that the method of planning for the conduct of conferences at all troop and operational levels is not entirely correct. The result is that military-scientific conferences are turned into a sort of seasonal measure, conducted sometimes so that the appropriate line in a report to a higher element can be filled in. Moreover, at the end of a year, commanders, commanding officers and staffs usually occupy themselves with the carrying out of various types of operational and methodological meetings with planning of combat and operational training for the new academic year, and with the improvement of the materiel-technical educational base in accordance with the new requirements of troop training. As a result, the holding of conferences is often postponed because of shortage
of time, and the periods are turned into ordinary training periods, in which the participants listen to a report, a series of subreports ... (several lines missing) ... command cadres, which will undoubtedly favor not only the successful solution of some of the theoretical problems of combat and of an operation, but also the direct introduction into the practice of training of the recommendations which have been developed.

The development of theoretical subjects is, in most cases, also planned for the last months of the academic year. For this reason, and also as the result of inadequate direction of military-scientific work, and because of the low demands made by some commanding officers of large units and units and chiefs of directorates (departments) of districts, the necessary development of subjects for the troops is not completed in a timely fashion. Thus, the subjects "The Movement of the Troops of a Front over Large Distances with the Aim of Developing an Offensive in the Initial Period of a War", by the Moscow Military District, and "Methods by Which a Motorized Rifle (Tank) Division Can Achieve High Offensive Rates", by the Chief Directorate of Combat Training for the Ground Forces, were not completed; the Turkestan, Ural and Far Eastern Military Districts, too, did not complete work on individual tactical subjects.

The most important questions, requiring comprehensive checking and investigation in exercises, are not always determined in advance. Collation of troop, experimental and command-staff exercises carried out in the districts (groups of forces) (several lines missing).
Comment: The present Soviet Field Service Regulations (division-corps) are dated 1959. Many of the articles cited on page 10 of this article appeared in the TOP SECRET version of Military Thought.
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