MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet View of the German Situation as of Late August

The following information, has been obtained:

a. According to several Soviet general officers not directly concerned with the German problem, the USSR may sign a peace treaty with East Germany in November 1962. Extensive military and political preparations are being carried out for this event. One or two notes will be exchanged, other propaganda moves will be made, and then the signing will take place.

b. These same officers believe that Khrushchev still is not ready for a major war, but he continues to feel that the U.S., Britain and France will not risk large-scale warfare over the German question.

c. believes that if the Western Powers are firm and stand up to Khrushchev, he will back down and postpone the signing of the treaty again, as he did in 1961.
Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Military Representative of the President
    Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
    The Director of Intelligence and Research
    Department of State
    The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
    The Director for Intelligence
    The Joint Staff
    The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
    Department of the Army
    The Director of Naval Intelligence
    Department of Navy
    The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
    U. S. Air Force
    The Director, National Security Agency
    National Indications Center
    /Deputy Director for Intelligence
    Assistant Director for National Estimates
    Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
(N.B. This report is one of a series on the Soviet attitude toward the German problem.)

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Copy No. 16
Following is a verbatim translation of a classified Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs position paper prepared as background for Ministry officials probably not regularly concerned with German affairs.
THE POSITION OF THE USSR ON THE GERMAN QUESTION

On 27 November 1958, in a note to the Governments of the U.S., England and France, the Government of the USSR raised the question of the necessity of finding "an independent solution to the Berlin question in the near future" in the event that the Western Powers refuse to participate in the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany, and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany—with the support of these same powers—conducts a policy obstructing the unification of Germany.

The Government of the USSR proposed that the question of West Berlin be settled by means of its transformation into an independent political entity—a free, demilitarized city with control over its own economy, administration and other matters.

In January 1959 the Soviet Government published a proposal for a peace treaty with Germany, which is represented at the present time by two states—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was proposed that the treaty be signed separately by the FRG and by the GDR in the event that the two states did not agree to joint signing.

In the proposal it was anticipated that in both states there would be national armed forces of a defensive nature, that revanchist and militaristic propaganda would be forbidden, as would the acquisition, possession and production of nuclear weapons, and that the borders of 1 January 1959 would be recognized, etc.

In Article 25 of the treaty it was proposed that prior to the unification of Germany, West Berlin would have the status of a demilitarized, free city.
In the same manner this tie and mutual dependence was all the more strengthened in declarations of the Government of the USSR. Thus, in a note to the Government of the U.S. of 3 August 1961 it was stated:

"But in actuality there does not exist an isolated West Berlin problem, separate from the German peace treaty. By refusing to participate in the peace settlement the Government of the United States would thereby place itself in a situation wherein the question of West Berlin would be decided without it, with all the ensuing consequences to the rights of the Western Powers based on the capitulation of Germany.

The proposal for the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized, free city signifies nothing other than the readiness of the Soviet Union to regularize, jointly with all interested parties, the question of the status of West Berlin after the signing of a German peace treaty."

Thus, by means of this proposal, the problem of West Berlin assumed to a certain degree a subordinate character in relation to the problem of the German peace settlement. Therefore, there is an evolution of our position from the original declaration that the question of Berlin requires an "independent solution." This new statement of the question is expressed in the formula: "A German peace settlement, and on the basis of it, the normalization of the situation in West Berlin."

Having achieved a peace treaty, the Government of the USSR demands: the cessation of the militarization of the FRG, in particular the warding off of nuclear arms in West Germany; the acceptance of the borders which were established after the war in Europe; and the cessation of revanchist propaganda.
The proposal on the Berlin question includes: the withdrawal of troops of the U.S., England and France which become the advance posts of NATO in the center of the GDR; the establishment of full sovereignty over the routes leading into West Berlin (that is, control over these routes); guarantees of free development of West Berlin (guarantees by the UN, or of the four great powers, or of the presence in West Berlin of troops of the UN or of neutral states, or the transfer to West Berlin of UN organs).

Some Conclusions of the Discussions on the German Question

The resolute struggle of the USSR for a solution to the German and Berlin questions led in particular to President Kennedy's giving, in May-June 1961, a more narrow definition of U.S. commitments in Berlin as "the defense of the freedom of the population of West Berlin", formally renouncing pretensions of concern (zabota) with regard to the GDR. This declaration to a certain degree paralyzed the reaction of the West to important measures of the Government of the GDR with respect to the strengthening of its borders in Berlin (13 August 1961).

Having built a defensive wall around West Berlin, the Socialist countries effectively reduced to a minimum NATO's possibilities of using West Berlin for the undermining of the economy of the GDR and for subversive activity against the Socialist countries, strengthened the positions of the USSR in negotiations with the West, and permitted free maneuvering with respect to the timing of the settlement of the German question.

1 At the present time the GDR controls only civil transport from West Germany into West Berlin. The military transport of the U.S., France and England is controlled by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic's civil transport into West Berlin comprises 90% of all transport.
question. This is a huge success in the foreign policy of the USSR and other Socialist countries. Considering that the Western Powers do not want to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, or with FRG, the problem now is how to reconcile (совместить) a USSR-GDR peace treaty with the West's interests in the FRG and West Berlin.

In April 1962 A.A. Gromyko, appearing before a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, reported on the progress of the struggle for the implementation of Soviet proposals for a peace settlement in Germany. He said:

"What is involved is that simultaneously with the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviet Union and those states which want it, there must be achieved an agreed solution to the complex of the questions arising out of the post-war peace settlement."

These questions are: the normalization of the situation in West Berlin; proper respect for the sovereignty of the GDR; consolidation of borders; the non-arming with nuclear weapons of both German states; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Organization of the Warsaw Pact.

A.A. Gromyko noted, after a meeting with Secretary Rusk in Geneva in March 1962, "as a positive factor . . . the declaration of the American side that it does not see obstacles to the combining of free access to West Berlin with the demand for respect of the sovereignty of the GDR". With respect to the question of the non-arming with nuclear weapons of the GDR and the FRG, A.A. Gromyko noted that "on the American side there is understanding of the importance of this question. This is a positive fact if, of course, these sensible gleams do not die out here under the influence of other winds."
A.A. Gromyko further noted that "in the course of exchange of views between the Governments of the USSR and U.S. there was achieved in principle mutual understanding regarding the necessity of concluding, in one form or another, a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Organization of the Warsaw Pact. This is a move in a useful direction."

However, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany applied pressure on Washington in order to disrupt the contemplated agreement. As a result, in the West they have again discussed the arming of the FRG with nuclear weapons; the question of a non-aggression pact has not been decided; Adenauer and deGaulle announce non-recognition of borders; provocations continue in West Berlin, etc.

In such a situation the Government of the USSR has again declared that what is needed is not a "discussion of incidents" in West Berlin, as was proposed by the U.S., France and England, but a "radical sanitation" (korennoye ozdorovleniye) of the situation—the conclusion of a German peace treaty and on its basis the normalization of the situation in West Berlin" (note of 5 September 1962). In the TASS announcement regarding the provocation of the U.S. against Cuba on 12 September 1962, it was pointed out that at the present time in the negotiations on the German question "there has come a pause... They say that it is currently difficult for the United States to carry on negotiations on the German peace treaty insasmuch as in November of this year there will be elections to the American Congress. This, too, the Soviet Government is ready to consider." The announcement, however, emphasized: "The Soviet Government, as before, stands for an early conclusion of a German peace treaty and the regularization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin. This objective must be obtained and shall be obtained. The sovereignty of the GDR must be protected and shall be protected. The remnants
of the second World War, including the occupation regime in West Berlin, must be liquidated and shall be liquidated. This satisfies the interests not only of the Soviet Union and the GDR, it satisfies the vital interests of all states, of all peoples."

On the Position of the U.S. at Present

Recently the ruling circles of the U.S. have been vigorously rattling the saber on the threshold of new negotiations on the German question. On 28 September Defense Secretary McNamara emphatically stated that the U.S. is ready to use nuclear weapons in the struggle for its rights in West Berlin. Fanning psychoses, McNamara again repeated that the situation now is the most serious for the U.S. since the Korean war. Many people note that, in its preoccupation with Cuba, the United States is diverting its attention from the more important problem of Germany. Kennedy has a conference with Foreign Secretary Home and Secretary Rusk on the German question. In the press it is pointed out that after November 1962 the USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR, and that a new "blockade" of West Berlin will take place.

Up to now the foreign policy of the U.S. has not been able to resolve one of the contradictions of its position on Berlin. The U.S. does not want to leave West Berlin. But in this case, after the transfer of control to the GDR of the routes to West Berlin, the Americans will have to negotiate with the Government of the GDR on questions of access. There is a discussion in the U.S. press with regard to the degree to which the U.S. should recognize the sovereignty of the GDR. In this matter it is borne in mind that Chancellor Adenauer is against any kind of recognition.

30 September 1962