MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence


1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2004
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
   Department of State

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The Director for Intelligence,
   The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
   Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
   Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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**SECRET**

16 August 1962

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Centralization of Forces and Means - One of the Most Important Conditions For the Success of Radio Countermeasures", by Lieutenant-Colonel Z. Merkin.

This article appeared in Issue 5 (60) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet Journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. Issue 5 (60) was sent to press on 25 August 1961. The Table of Contents for this issue contained the following:

Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.
COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE
The Centralization of Forces and Means - One of the
Most Important Conditions For the
Success of Radio Countermeasures
by
Lieutenant-Colonel Z. Merkin

Radio countermeasures have already existed in the
Soviet Army as a form of operational support for some
time. However, in spite of this, in the overwhelming
majority of articles devoted to this problem, the
authors remark that there is still much that is un-
clear and debatable in the organization and execution
of radio countermeasures. It is impossible not to
agree with this.

It is true that many problems of radio counter-
measures require further study. This evidently
explains the frequent appearance in the journal
"Military Thought" of articles in which problems of
radio countermeasures are set forth and fairly acutely
examined. In their articles, Comrades A. Ovchinnikov,
Yu. Tsybin, F. Bologov and A. Kosinov produce un-
answerable arguments in favor of centralizing forces
and means for radio countermeasures.

1. A. Ovchinnikov "Radio Countermeasures in Operation
by Ground Forces". Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" No. 1 (56), 1961; Yu. Tsybin,
"The Organization of Radio Countermeasures in Operations
During the Initial Stages of a War," Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 1 (56),
1961; F. Bologov and A. Kosinov "More on Radio Counter-
measures" Collection of Articles of the Journal
"Military Thought" No. 2 (57), 1961.
In fact, as a result of the decentralized subordination of SPETSNAZ units, the radio countermeasures sections of the headquarters of military districts (fronts) do not, essentially, exert any serious influence on the combat and operational training of these units, even though they are expected to carry out the unified planning of radio countermeasures to organize them in a centralized manner at the military district (front) level.

It would be a mistake to demand the subordination to the radio countermeasures section of such means for combat with the enemy's radiotechnical system as aviation, missile troops and artillery, for which the destruction and neutralization of radiotechnical means is not the chief task. As regards SPETSNAZ units, which are intended purely for jamming, their subordination to different commanders is indefensible.

Since the questions of radio jamming are not fundamental for the defense of either the communications troops or the antiair troops of military districts, their solution is not given sufficient attention. It is, therefore, not by chance that there is not a single specialist on radio jamming in the communications section of a military district, while officers without special knowledge and experience are occupied with the combat and operational training of SPETSNAZ units.

Matters are no better with the antiair defense troops. The solitary officer concerned with radio countermeasures on the staff (apparat) of the chief of the antiair defense troops of a military district is not in a position to supervise the combat and operational training of SPETSNAZ units. When exercises are carried out involving large quantities of forces and means for jamming, one must fall back on people who happen to be available and who do not possess the necessary qualifications.

In spite of the fact that there is a department (otdel) which was specially set up to direct the operational and combat training of SPETSNAZ units and
to control them in a combat situation, the control of jamming units is handed over during exercises to the radio countermeasures sections. The chiefs of communications, who are actually left as chiefs of the commanding officers of these units, themselves try to arrange the jamming in such a way that the main channels of communications remain untouched. As a result, it only seems that the exercise is being carried out under conditions of intensive jamming, for in reality jamming has no substantial effect on the communications system of the front, since it is beamed against secondary communications. In addition, communications chiefs not infrequently exercise pressure on unit commanders in the choice of positions for jamming equipment, attempting to locate them as far as possible from communications centers and, by so doing, to diminish the effectiveness of the jamming.

It is quite obvious that such a situation cannot be considered normal. The desire of certain communications chiefs to retain the direction of SPETSNAZ units can be explained simply by their fear of being helpless if jamming is carried out, not at their direction, but in accordance with the needs of combat training and as it will be carried out in a combat situation.

We have become convinced that SPETSNAZ units should be transferred to the subordination of the chiefs of the 9th department of military districts. This will radically improve the operational and combat training of these units, will make it possible to set up jamming correctly and without limitations during exercises, and, finally, will put the organs of troop control into the conditions in which they will have to work in an actual combat situation.

A second problem on which we wish to dwell is that of providing intelligence data to SPETSNAZ units. Comrade Ovchinnikov devotes the greater part of his
article to the problems of conducting radio intelligence and of organizing the coordination of radio intelligence with SPETSNAZ units. It is unnecessary to demonstrate the correctness of Comrade Ovchipnikov's statements on the importance of close and uninterrupted coordination between OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ radio units. However, in our view, the forms and methods for organizing this coordination are not understood with complete correctness by the author.

It is quite obvious that if the command post of a radio-jamming unit does not possess detailed data on the radiotechnical system of the enemy, there can be no question of setting up effective jamming.

But where should these data come from? The most detailed information about the enemy's radiotechnical system is held, naturally enough, by the OSNAZ radio intelligence units. Consequently, there should be the closest connection between these units and radio-jamming units. At the present time, there is a widespread opinion that it is desirable to have communications officers attached to radio intelligence units and sub-units in order to ensure the uninterrupted provision of intelligence data to SPETSNAZ units. It is supposed that such officers, being with the commanding officer (chief of staff) will be constantly abreast of the radio situation and will be able to transmit information to their radio-jamming units over special communications channels.

However, as the experience of a series of command-staff field exercises, carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops in 1957-1960, and the experience of headquarters and troop exercises in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts, have shown, one can conclude that such organization of coordination is not entirely successful. The fact is that, with frequent movement by OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ units and subunits, the routing and conditions for the passing of radio communications change sharply, a phenomenon which is particularly
apparent in mountainous and desert theaters of military operations. Radio communications frequently become uncertain and are sometimes lost completely for fairly prolonged periods, as a result of which intelligence information arrives at the command posts of radio jamming units after a considerable delay.

Bearing these circumstances in mind, one might recommend that OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ command posts should be jointly located, thus significantly facilitating and accelerating the arrival of information. However, one cannot assume that these units will act jointly and move simultaneously during the whole course of an operation, and in such vast theaters as the Middle East— for example, this is entirely impossible.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the transmittal of information to SPETSNAZ units is a secondary rather than a basic task for radio intelligence personnel, and that, as has been shown in practice, data on enemy radio networks which have been discovered were not always transmitted in good time to radio jamming units.

All of this leads to the conclusion that SPETSNAZ units should not be as wholly dependent as they now are on radio intelligence, since an interruption in communications or insufficient promptness by operational personnel on duty can condemn jamming facilities to inaction. We consider that the basic intelligence material necessary for the work of SPETSNAZ units should be obtained by them independently. If necessary, SPETSNAZ units can then carry out their work independently of the quality and quantity of information received from outside.

For this, of course, it will be necessary to provide SPETSNAZ radio units with appropriate radio intelligence equipment and to make up the staff of
their operational sections with radio intelligence specialists which will call for certain additional expenditures. However, the practical work of radio units shows that radio jamming units can only carry out their tasks under all circumstances when they have their own radio intelligence.