MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET); "Radio Countermeasures in the Operations of Ground Troops"; by Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kiyantse and Colonel V. Kanonyuk

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Radio Countermeasures in the Operations of Ground Troops", by Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kiyanitsa and Colonel V. Kanonyuk

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Radio Countermeasures in the Operations of Ground Troops", by Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kiyanitsa and Colonel V. Kanonyuk. This article appeared in Issue 6(61) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly.

Issue 6(61) was sent to press on 7 December 1961.

Comment: Military Thought is published by the Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.
Comment on a Previous Article

Radio Countermeasures in the Operations of Ground Troops

by

Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops

P. Kiyanska and Colonel V. Kanonyuk

Radio countermeasures, as we know, is one of the most important types of operational support in modern operations. It is, thus, not by chance that the article by Colonel A. Ovchinnikov on this subject* has attracted the attention of readers. It is necessary, however, to examine certain inaccuracies and errors which we believe are contained in the basic tenets of the article.

Thus, the author states that in modern operations the organization of radio countermeasures should be based on the principle of surprise. Surprise is, indeed, an important condition for the achievement of success in the use of radio countermeasures, but it would be wrong to consider it as an end in itself.

Also completely false, in our opinion, is the assertion that modern ground and air means for the jamming of very high frequency (ultrakorotkovolnovyy - VHF) radio communications are capable of ensuring the suppression of these communications without preliminary radio reconnaissance (our underlining - p.57).

It is true that enemy VHF means operate within the 20 to 70 megacycle frequency range, roughly speaking. However, all the VHF radio and radio-relay stations of our operational/tactical control link also operate within the same frequency range. The suppression of all enemy VHF communications

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without preliminary reconnaissance would be possible only if a solid jamming screen is set up in this fairly wide range. However, this leads inevitably to the full suppression of all our own VHF radio and radio-relay communications, which will be more thoroughly suppressed than those of the enemy, because the distances from the jamming stations to our radio installations will always be shorter than those to the enemy's radio installations. Moreover, this would require a large number of powerful jamming stations.

One is puzzled by the principle of the comprehensive use of the forces and means for radio countermeasures. It is hard to understand from the text of the article exactly what this principle consists of. One can only guess that the author is talking about the necessity for close cooperation between the means for radio countermeasures of the various types of armed forces and arms of troops. If this is so, then the question automatically arises-why introduce new, far-fetched and inaccurate concepts to replace concepts which are well known to everybody and which reflect the essence of the matter accurately enough?

In order to create a single center for the control of radio countermeasures within a front and an army, as the author suggests, it would be necessary to withdraw the radio countermeasures units from all the types of armed forces and arms of troops, and to unite them under a single command. Very serious difficulties would inevitably arise in performance of specific tasks of radio countermeasures conducted primarily on behalf of each type of armed forces and arm of troops. In our view, this shows the unsoundness of this suggestion.

Touched upon in the article is a question of principle - that of the subordination of the jamming units designated to jam the means of communications of the enemy's ground troops. These tasks, as was stated in the order of the Minister of Defense, No. 0078 of 14 September 1957, are to be fulfilled by communications troops, PVO (antiair defense troops), artillery, and engineer troops. The overall planning of radio countermeasures,
according to this order, is to be handled by the operations directorates (departments) of the front (army) headquarters and they are to be carried out under the direction, respectively, of the commanders of the communications troops, of antiair defense troops, etc. The subordination of the respective radio countermeasures units is also determined from this. Specifically, jamming units are subordinated to the commanders of the communications troops.

The author does not substantiate his suggestion of taking the jamming troops designated to suppress the radio and radio-relay communications of the enemy from the subordination of the commanders of the communications troops and of subordinating them to the commander of the radio countermeasures department (otdel) of the front headquarters instead, while subordinating the remainder of the forces and means for radio countermeasures, within the types of armed forces and arms of troops, to him only in regard to operations.

It must be said that this proposal is not new. A fruitless discussion on this subject has already been going on for a sufficiently long time in the pages of the military press and at military and scientific conferences. Its nature is formal rather than scientific and it probably does more harm than good to the common cause. It would be preferable to direct the entire effort of the military/scientific cadres and specialists among the troops toward the solution of the most important, top priority problems of establishing the necessary system of modern means of radio countermeasures and of increasing the effectiveness of their employment.

The low degree of effectiveness of the jamming which they produce is a basic defect in the combat employment of the special designation radio units (radiochast spetsnaz). Thus, in the exercise held by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Troops in the Ukraine in 1959, adequate jamming forces and means were used (three battalions and six independent special designation radio companies, with a total of 61 jamming transmitters and over 100 reconnaissance and target designation receiving sets). One could have expected that with such a large quantity of jamming means available, radio
communications between the participating HQ's, would be, if not completely disrupted, at least considerably impeded. However, a check showed that no less than 83 percent of the radio communications being swamped by selective jamming during the exercise were not those of the "enemy". That the operations of jamming units should have such a result must cause alarm.

On the whole, the jamming produced during this exercise by the special designation radio units proved to be ineffective and had practically no influence on troop control, except for two cases in which short-wave radio communications between a front HQ and two armies, which were at that time the sole means of control, were suppressed by jamming for several hours.

Operations by jamming units in the exercises conducted in military districts (army groups) have also, as a rule, been evaluated as ineffective. It seems to us that the basic reason for such a situation is the absence from the equipment of our jamming units of a system of modern technical means and of experience in using them in combat.

A disproportion has also developed between the allocation of specialists to the operations directorates of staffs planning radio countermeasures in operations, and to the arms of troops which provide direction for special designation units, and the practical implementation of jamming. Special departments for radio countermeasures have been created within the operations directorates of military districts (army groups) and in the directorates (departments) of communications, where the volume of work is considerably greater than that involved in the problems of planning; there is neither an organ of any kind nor are there positions for officers concerned with jamming.

This situation, in our opinion, also produces the nominal character of the resolution of the problems of radio countermeasures and shortcomings in the direction of special designation radio units. The special training of these units proves to be weak at times, and in practice little attention is given to searching out the most effective methods of jamming.
All this convinces us once more of the need to put in the forefront, now, the problem of the practical resolution of the questions of producing effective jamming under conditions which approximate most closely to an actual situation. It is advisable to make improvements in the organizational structure for directing special designation radio units after practical experience in the use of the whole system of jamming means has been acquired.

The problems of jamming enemy communications are closely connected with the stable working of our own radio-technical means and, above all, of our means of communications. It was for this reason that the directive of the Minister of Defense on operational training for 1961 set the task of searching for, and of mastering, methods for the rapid obliteration and suppression of the enemy's radio-technical means, and for ensuring the efficiency of operation of our own radio-technical means during intensive jamming.

The danger of suppressing our own communications with our own means of jamming can be eliminated only if these means are subordinated to the commander of communications troops. If the direction of jamming units is entrusted to radio counter-action departments, which do not and cannot know the whole extent of the situation of the communications of our own troops, jamming of the enemy's means for radio and radio-relay communications may cause more harm to our own troops than to the enemy. This, in our opinion, constitutes the determining factor in the resolution of this problem.

Moreover, with unified direction of the organization of communications and with the establishment of jamming by the commander of the communications troops, the best capability for the mass use of jamming is ensured by making additional use of organic means of radio communications brought in temporarily from units (subunits) and from the communications reserves. This conclusion on the organizational forms for the direction of jamming was reached unanimously at conferences of the commanding personnel of the communications troops as early as November 1959. We therefore see no reason to raise this question again.