MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS: Table of Contents; "Methods of Achieving Tactical Surprise in Ground Troop Operations", by Colonel P. Savinskiy; and "The Organization and Conduct of the Defensive Combat of a Corps under Conditions Where Nuclear Weapons are Used", by Colonel V. Makarov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of the Table of Contents, one full article, and one partial article from the June 1961 issue of the SECRET Soviet Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Foreign Military Affairs" ("Voyennyy Zarubezhnik"). This collection is distributed down to commanding officers of divisions.

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Following are verbatim translations of the Table of Contents and an article titled "Methods of Achieving Tactical Surprise in Ground Troop Operations", by Colonel P. Savinskiy, which appeared in the SECRET Soviet Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Foreign Military Affairs" ("Voyennyy Zarubezhnik"). The issue in which these items appeared was sent to press on 10 June 1961. A fragment of an article titled "Organization and Conduct of Defensive Combat by a Corps Under Conditions Where Nuclear Weapons are Used (According to British Views)", by Colonel V. Makarov, is also included below.

Comment: This article is based primarily on the Army Field Manual FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations (Operations), September 1954, which was published in Moscow in 1955 (cf. footnote, page 8). The quotations from this manual which are used below are generally inaccurate and incomplete.
From the Editor

All the articles for the Collection and also inquiries concerning its publication, responses to published materials, and remarks concerning them must be directed to the chief editor of the journal, "Foreign Military Affairs" ("Voyenny, Zarubezhnik") in accordance with the regulations established for the transmittal of secret documents.

The articles of the Collection express only the opinion of the authors on the questions discussed.

The current issue of the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Foreign Military Affairs" is being distributed down to commanding officers of divisions.

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Methods of Achieving Tactical Surprise
in Ground Troop Operations
(According to Anglo-American Views)*

by

Colonel P. Savinskiy

The significance of surprise as a factor influencing the success of conducting combat and an operation has been known for a long time. In all wars, military commanders have striven to employ it for the attainment of victory. The cherished goal of a commanding officer is to discover the plan, to determine the possible nature of the operation, and the composition of the enemy's forces and weapons, and to simultaneously deprive his capabilities of foresight, to deceive, to mislead and, thus, to achieve surprise in one's own operations.

Surprise is regarded by the American and British commands as one of the most important conditions for the attainment of success. Surprise, according to their conceptions, makes it possible to win a victory with the least forces or, at least, to seize the initiative in operations for a definite period of time. Surprise adversely affects the enemy's will, subverts the fighting spirit of his troops, and their faith in their strength, in their command. It catches the enemy unawares and forces him to be on the defensive under conditions of insufficient preparedness for resistance, and compels him to operate in a disadvantageous situation. In paragraph 77 of the USA Army Field Manual, "Conduct of Combat Operations" (FM 100-5), it is stated that "surprise may decisively shift the balance of forces in favor of the side which achieves surprise".

* The Americans and British divide military art into strategy and tactics; tactics covers troop operations of tactical and operational scales. In accordance with American and British terminology, questions of tactical and operational surprise are examined in this article.
However, it is considered that the significance of surprise was not always the same. It grew in accordance with the development of the weapons of armed combat. Under modern conditions, the role of surprise in combat and operations has advanced extraordinarily, since nuclear weapons allow not only the infliction of enormous losses on the enemy but also the suppression of his will to resist, and the available means of camouflage ensure the secrecy of the preparations for an attack.

While, in the period of World War II, it was required to concentrate hundreds of guns and mortars on every kilometer of a front prior to an offensive for dependable suppression of the enemy's defense on the forward edge and in the immediate depth, now it is sufficient to have one or several guns employing nuclear ammunition. There have been estimates in the American press indicating that four battalions of "Corporal" guided missiles (URS) with nuclear warheads (boyegolovka) possess greater firepower than all the American artillery units possessed during World War II. Thus, modern weapons of attack not only make surprise affective but also create more favorable possibilities for its attainment.

With regard to all this, surprise, in accordance with American and British conceptions, is now one of the basic principles in the conduct of combat operations and lies at the basis of military art. According to their views, victory in combat and in an operation can also be achieved, of course, without the presence of the surprise factor, but only by means of thorough preparation of operations, concentration of superior forces, etc; but such a victory will require greater efforts and greater sacrifices than with surprise operations. Therefore, a directive concerning the necessity of attaining surprise by all the command echelons during the entire operation stands out in American regulations, manuals, and instructions.
Under these conditions, our task will be, naturally, not to give the enemy an opportunity to use the element of surprise. The solution of this task is impossible without knowing the ways and methods employed by the enemy for the attainment of tactical surprise.

* * *

In the USA Army Field Manual FM 100-5 it is stated that surprise "is attained by the infliction of a strike against the enemy at a time, at a place, or by a method for which he is not prepared. It is important, as stated further in the regulations, that the enemy be caught unawares and be unable to undertake countermeasures in time. Surprise can be achieved by the speed of an operation, by keeping secret the plan of the impending operations, and by misleading the enemy as regards one's intentions, by the use of various means of combat and methods in the conduct of combat, and also by the employment of a terrain which at first glance appears to be unfavorable for an offensive".*

All the measures conducted by the American and British commands for the attainment of surprise in combat and in an operation may be broken down into three groups.

The first group includes those measures which permit one to discover the plan and the intention of the enemy and at the same time prevent him from obtaining information concerning the actual composition, condition, disposition, and the true plans and immediate intentions of the opposing troops. The following pertain to them: the aggressive conduct of intelligence collection and the prohibition of the activities of all types of enemy intelligence; the

proper determination of the degree of document secrecy, the restricted reproduction of combat documents and their strict safekeeping, and the limitation of the number of individuals allowed to work on and be acquainted with combat documents; the strict observance of the established regulations during discussions on the telephone and radio, eliminating the disclosure of the command's plans; the thorough camouflage and concealment of field installations, combat materiel, and troops; the maintenance of the previously existing routine of the combat activity of the troops and the work of the means of radio communications; the maintenance of a number of other requirements directed at the keeping of military secrecy by all personnel.

Measures which have as their goal to mislead the enemy and to have him create a distorted, incorrect notion about the composition, disposition, and possible plans of the troops opposing him, pertain to the second group. They include: the execution of all sorts of demonstrative troop operations; the dissemination of false information by means of communications, through prisoners of war, deserters, and agent intelligence (agenturnaya razvedka), the creation of dummy installations, structures, barriers, etc.

Measures connected with troop combat activities, that is, concerning the methods and ways of combat operations, pertain to the third group. The following apply to them: the selection of a favorable time and moment for the infliction of a strike or the beginning of other combat operations, speed of combat operations, employment of new means of combat, ways and methods of combat operations novel and unexpected for the enemy; the skilful selection of the main strike direction, namely where the enemy does not expect it.

All the measures enumerated for the attainment of surprise differ little from those which were carried out by the British and Americans during World War II. However, the specific substance of some of them has changed considerably under modern conditions and requires more complex measures for its implementation.
The first and most important measure for the attainment of surprise, according to American and British opinions, is the thoroughly organized intelligence. Although intelligence, in contrast to other factors enumerated, in itself does not create surprise, it promotes its achievement. Therefore, in American and British regulations, manuals, and the periodical military press it is emphasized that in all cases, irrespective of the measures being carried out for the attainment of surprise, thoroughly organized intelligence is necessary. Surprise cannot be attained without sufficient data on the enemy, his grouping, and especially the disposition of his nuclear/missile weapons. For the attainment of surprise it is necessary to foresee the possible reactions of the enemy to our operations and his countermeasures. It should be known how the enemy will operate under specific conditions and which actions he expects of us. A commanding officer is required to know the strong and weak sides of an enemy and have at his disposal information concerning the state of morale and fighting spirit of his troops and on the effectiveness of his intelligence. Not having these data, it is difficult to determine which results of surprise can be relied on and whether there is sufficient basis to risk the safety of one's own troops.

If operational camouflage and deception of the enemy are envisaged by the plan for the attainment of surprise, then it is necessary to have beforehand the most complete and detailed data concerning his intelligence collection, the methods of its conduct, and its capabilities.

Realizing other measures for the attainment of surprise, pertaining to the first group, the Americans pay particular attention to the security of operations (skrytnost deystviya). In paragraph 3 of USA Army Field Manual FM 100-5 it is stated that "if the principle of security is disrupted, all the measures in misleading the enemy, even the most insignificant, are doomed to fail at the very beginning".* It is considered that security

* Headquarters Comment: This does not appear in paragraph 3 of FM 100-5.
is an effective and necessary condition in the attainment of surprise. Security in itself can provide positive results. The concealed disposition of troops and fire weapons, and keeping secret the plan of the impending operations, make them unexpected to the enemy and, consequently, increase the impact of surprise.

Security is achieved by a whole complex of measures, and first of all by combat with the enemy's reconnaissance through the execution of so-called counterreconnaissance measures.

First of all, the conduct of effective combat against air as well as ground reconnaissance of the enemy is envisaged. In this, the Americans divide the measures of combat against enemy reconnaissance into active and passive. As active counterreconnaissance measures, they list combat with piloted and unpiloted aerial means of reconnaissance, the destruction of the means of radio-technical intelligence, and observation posts, combat with the enemy's agent net and his diversionary-intelligence groups. As regards passive measures, those activities are relevant which allow the concealment from enemy intelligence of true objectives and show him false objectives, and create jamming of radio-technical intelligence means of the enemy, attempting by any method to mislead his intelligence activity.

Other important measures of counterreconnaissance are: control over the observance of the rules in guarding secret documents and ensuring the security of the work of communication means, the establishment of military censorship, control over the activities of press representatives, etc.

The indispensable condition for the attainment of security is keeping secret the plan of actions and the impending plan of an operation. This is achieved by restricting the number of persons participating in working out the plan of combat and operation, by curtailing the quantity of documents being worked on, by transmitting the missions to the executors by personal visits of the commanding officers,
by prohibiting the conduct of conversations by technical means of communication, and also by prohibiting correspondence with subordinate and coordinating staffs on questions relating to the preparation of an impending operation.

For example, during the command-staff exercise "The Bear's Claw" (in 1955) code names of units, large units, and officials were widely used for the achievement of security; the transmittal of various messages was conducted in shortened form according to a previously worked out system; the use of radio communication on short wave was limited; special coded maps of the terrain were worked out. In the areas of disposition of command posts, during "The Black Lion" exercise (in 1957), specially numbered passes were introduced and previously prepared operational and combat documents of a single form with coded tables and maps, were widely used.

All this, to a certain extent, promotes the attainment of security, although it does not completely guarantee it.

At the present time the British and Americans are introducing a self-coding and rapid-operating radio communications apparatus (samokodiruyushchaya i bystrodeystroyushchaya radioapparatura svyazi) and ultra shortwave radio sets with a limited range of operation to the troops.

The measures as regards the ensuring of security of the preparation of an operation must not be noticeably reflected in the changes of the routine of behavior and combat activity of the troops. The Americans consider that a change in the routine of behavior of the troops always alerts the enemy and impedes the attainment of surprise. Therefore, such measures in a period of preparation of an operation as the reinforcement of reconnaissance, the conduct of reconnaissance, the creation of engineer structures, and the organization of roads and column routes must be executed in such a way as not to attract enemy
attention. In those interests it is considered necessary to keep up the previously existing routine of work of communication means, especially of radio.

The Americans and British consider the Normandy operation in France and the Inchon landing operation in Korea as the classic examples of secure preparations of large operations. During the preparations of these operations, thorough concealment of the troops was observed and all measures were taken in order to keep secret the plan of the forthcoming operations. Thus, for example, the areas of concentration of troops were isolated from the local population and the movement of units and large units was carried out only during the night. No personal contact or correspondence of the military personnel with the civilian population was permitted. In the Inchon landing operation, the troops concentrated and carried out embarkation onto ships in various ports of Japan and South Korea, separated from one another by a great distance. During the transport of the troops, a blackout was conducted on the vessels and the transport ships.

Leading British and American military men hold the point of view that thorough engineer preparation of concentration areas and their concealment, using natural and artificial camouflage, night marches and transportation, dispersed troop billeting in depth, reliable screening of them from the air, and also vigorous combat with the enemy's reconnaissance, can to a considerable degree ensure the secrecy which appears to be a necessary condition for achieving surprise. At the same time it is taken into account that under modern conditions, with highly effective technical intelligence means available, concealment of large groupings of forces and combat equipment, as well as conduct of secret maneuver with them, becomes still more complicated. Now, along with the usual camouflage goes the conduct of antiradar, antithermal, and antimagnetic (protivomagnetnometricheskiy) camouflage. Besides, it is necessary to undertake more active measures to achieve surprise, particularly concerning measures for deceiving the enemy.
According to paragraphs 109 and 110 of the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, measures for deceiving the enemy are conducted for the purpose of concealing the concentrations, capability and intentions of one's own troops and compelling the enemy to function in such a way that his troops will be in a position disadvantageous to them, and they will reveal their forces and weapons. In the regulations it is emphasized that, "It is imperative that commanders constantly realize the importance of combat deception and that they train their troops and staff in the methods for conducting these measures."

Thus, measures for deceiving the enemy for the purpose of achieving surprise are assigned an important role, according to the Americans and British. Among the decoy and demonstrative actions are the creation of various dummy installations and the dissemination of false information. All this was done in previous wars and it is foreseen that it will be done in the future.

Demonstrative actions can be carried out on various scales and in various operations. During the Second World War and in the course of postwar instruction of American and British troops, demonstrative actions were most often practiced in offensive operations, and also in amphibious operations. Usually such actions were conducted when it was impossible to conceal the preparation of the operation from the enemy, and thus, to achieve surprise, it was necessary to conceal the truth and indicate a false direction of the main strike or foster an improper notion in the enemy, of the other side's periods of readiness for action. The result of this was that the enemy was deprived of the possibility of conducting effective counterpreparation and was obliged to act under conditions unfavorable to him.

Demonstrative operations can have various forms: demonstrative creation of false groupings of troops and means for supply of nuclear weapons, dummy radio networks in diversionary areas, activation of reconnaissance and increasing engineer work on secondary axes, etc.
The measures taken by the command of the Normandy landing operation are often cited as a positive example of the above actions; in this operation deception was carried out with the aim of convincing the enemy that the assault would come through the Dover Strait and land in the region of Boulogne and Calais. For this purpose aviation heavily bombed these areas and caused little disturbance in the region of the Bay of the Seine, where the actual landing of the force was being prepared. To make the deceptive version more convincing, preparations for landing were being simulated in the area of Dover, Deal and Folkstone; in the Pas de Calais ships increased their patrol activities. From the initial move of the assault, special detachments of warships and aircraft, aided by metallic reflectors and scattered foil, made it appear to the enemy's radiotechnical reconnaissance means that there was a movement of large forces in the area of Calais and Boulogne.

Deception was also used in other operations, for example, in the crossing of the Volturno River in Italy by the American 5th Army at the beginning of 1944, in the Inchon landing operation in Korea in September 1950, etc. They have also been used widely in various operations in postwar exercises and maneuvers. It is considered that under modern conditions, wide use of deception to conceal the axis of the main strike assumes special significance, since this deprives the enemy of the capability of effectively using nuclear weapons according to plans worked out in advance.

One of the most widespread forms of deception is the simulation of decoy, troop groupings and dummy installations. It is thought that wide use of this form of disorientation diffuses the efforts of enemy intelligence. In a number of cases the confused enemy will be forced to expend his nuclear warheads against decoy objectives. At the same time the actual forces and means will remain intact, and their striking power in an attack, or stiff resistance in defense will take the enemy by surprise.
During the Second World War the Americans and British practiced rather widely the setting up of decoy groupings and other objectives. For this, various mockups and simulated technical means were used and troops were brought in. With the help of these forces and means decoy concentrations of transport landing craft and groupings of troops were set up, decoy transport by rail and highway was conducted, etc. It is considered by the foreign press that the most instructive example in this respect, is the operations of the British 8th Army in Africa. In 1942, long before the attack at El Alamein the command of this Army began to simulate the arrival of two armored tank divisions on its right flank. The deception plan was so calculated that the enemy intelligence could ascertain the falsity of these measures. In this the British were successful: Italian-German aerial reconnaissance immediately established that the British were only simulating the concentration of tanks on the maritime axis, because repeated photography of this area corroborated that there, in place of tanks, stood their mockups. The night before the attack, the British secretly moved up two armored divisions on the right flank, and tanks replaced the mockups in the area of the "dummy" concentration; the mockups, in turn, were shifted to the left flank and arranged in the positions formerly occupied by the departed divisions. The Italian-German reconnaissance did not discover this transfer and continued to believe that the grouping of the Eighth Army remained unchanged. Therefore, the strike on the maritime axis came as a complete surprise for the Italian-German troops, and played an important role in their complete rout.

Under modern conditions, when more effective technical reconnaissance means are available, the Americans and the British consider that such measures will be considerably more difficult to carry out than in the past. However the Americans, for example, believe, that use of a special covering paint for the mockups, capable of reflecting radio-magnetic waves, will allow simulation of decoy troop concentrations even at the present time. In the American and
some other armies of the imperialist powers, special simulation subunits have been created, equipped with inflatable rubber mockups of tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, aircraft and other combat equipment, covered with a metallic paint. Such subunits can, in a few hours, simulate a "concentration" of entire large units.

Under modern conditions, in order to conceal the storage places of nuclear ammunition and the locations of the means of its delivery to target, together with thorough camouflage there will be widespread practice of setting up decoy areas of disposition of these means, decoy firing positions, and dummy storage places of nuclear ammunition. For this all possible means of deceiving the enemy will be used: setting up of mockups; simulated activities of communications means and radiotechnical stations, which service subunits using nuclear means; creation of artificial intelligence indicators of the location of nuclear means, such as, for example, evacuation of the civilian population and reinforced security in specific areas; setting up approach routes and firing positions; transport of ammunition in special containers under guard; etc. All this, it is believed, will make the reconnaissance and destruction of nuclear means more difficult.

The next measure, provided for misleading the enemy, is the spreading of false information. It is believed that cleverly worked out and skillfully spread false information can bring no less effective results than deception or other measures for misleading the enemy. The advantage of this method of deceiving the enemy is that it does not usually require large expenditures. False information can be disseminated by carrying on conversations over communications means, with the expectation that they will be intercepted by the enemy, planting documents on defectors, prisoners, agents, the local population, and other channels. The basic requirement in spreading false information can be summed up as follows: it must be thoroughly worked out, appear plausible and should be supported by some other information. Dissemination of false information must be combined with other measures for misleading the enemy. Moreover, persons
through whom false information is disseminated, as a rule, should not be aware of this, that is they must be convinced that they are telling the truth. For example, British and American pilots, taking off on a combat mission before the Normandy Operation, were told that the landing would not be in the north, but in the south of France. Thus, if a pilot were captured he involuntarily became a disseminator of misinformation.

Measures for achieving secrecy and deceiving the enemy are usually coordinated. Not one of them, in the opinion of the Americans and the British, by itself, guarantees full and positive results. Dissemination of false information, for instance, should be combined with setting up dummy installations, conducting decoy and feint activities, maintaining the secrecy of the actual plan of operations, etc. Only all these measures, skilfully carried out as a complex, can reliably achieve the element of surprise.

The reviewed ways and methods of operations designed for achieving the element of surprise, have great significance; they can be widely used by commanding officers of all levels. Paragraph 110 of the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5 states that measures for deceiving the enemy are continually conducted by all combat units, using field expedients as well as organic means for this purpose. It is believed that a commanding officer with initiative can use many varying ways and methods of such operations and thus achieve operational or tactical surprise.

Of great significance in the performance of this task is the speed and skilful timing of operational use of new means of combat and original methods of operations.

The speed of troop action, in the opinions of the Americans and British, is an indispensable condition for achieving surprise. The longer the preparation for combat and the operation, the more probable is the detection of the plan by the enemy, and thus, the more difficult it will be to achieve surprise. Therefore, speed, in itself, is one
of the important methods of achieving surprise. Shortening the preparation time of the operation, making a quick decision and informing the troops of it, executing regroupings quickly, and, when necessary, even shifting the efforts from one axis to others, timely transfer of troops to the place of combat operations - all this, in combination with other measures, can play an important role in achieving surprise.

The use of nuclear weapons in modern operations allows shortening of the time for their preparation. It makes it unnecessary to concentrate large groupings of artillery and aviation, or to deliver great quantities of conventional ammunition to the axis of the proposed attack. This not only shortens the time needed for preparation, but it decreases the number of indicators, by which the enemy might detect the preparation for an attack. The Americans and British believe that the actual possibility of shortening the preparation period of an operation has been confirmed by a series of exercises. Thus for example, where the preparation for the counterattack in exercise "COUNTERSTRIKE", (1954), was allotted 20 to 25 full days, and in exercise "LIFELINE" (1955) - 20 full days, in exercise "BLACK LION" (1957) - only 7 full days were allotted, and in exercise "BLUE LION" (1958) - even less: only two full days. Furthermore, there have been noted instances in recent years, that the Americans plan to go over to the offensive without preliminary regrouping of troops or with an insignificant amount of regrouping. Moreover, there may be an equal balance of forces in conventional forms of armament, or the enemy may even be superior in this respect. The decisive means now are nuclear weapons with which it is possible to deprive the enemy of his superiority in the period of nuclear preparation for the offensive. During exercise "BLACK LION", for instance, the transition to the counteroffensive was planned after an insignificant regrouping of the field army troops, and was carried out under conditions, where both sides had an equal balance of ground troops. An offensive under similar conditions, guarantees to a large degree, the achievement of surprise, since, as a rule, troop concentration and regrouping are the most important intelligence indicators of the enemy's preparation for an offensive.
In achieving surprise in combat and in operations, an important role is played by the selection of the time and place for launching a strike or for initiating other combat operations. With this goal in mind, an offensive may begin at any time of day or night. Thus, during some exercises the American troops, in order to achieve surprise, went over to the offensive during the second half of the day or at night. In US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, paragraph 346, it is stated that: night combat, which is commenced unexpectedly, and which capitalizes on natural fear, may lead to considerable success, since the increased agitation of the troops augments the effect of surprise of the attacker's operations.

In determining and selecting the time for commencing operations, the best way to achieve surprise is to avoid the commonplace, and to have commanding officers at all levels use intelligent initiative. In US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, paragraph 219, it is stated that, "In order to assure surprise of operations and to prevent the enemy from preparing in advance to repulse an attack, it is necessary to avoid designating stereotyped times for commencing an attack."

A definite degree of surprise can be achieved, even in a defense, by the correct selection of time for conducting the counterpreparation, delivering strikes by ground troops in front of the main line of resistance, and for conducting counterattacks and counterstrikes. For a greater degree of surprise, nuclear counterpreparation may be commenced even before the enemy fully completes his preparation for the offensive. Following the nuclear and artillery counterpreparation, strikes may be delivered by ground troops, especially by armored divisions, in order to complete the rout of the demoralized enemy grouping while it is at its departure position.

Using high troop mobility, counterattacks and counter-strikes, may, in regard to timing, be delivered earlier than in the past. For example, in order to achieve surprise,
the army counterstrike may even be delivered while the battle for the tactical depth of defense disposition is taking place. In order to achieve operational-tactical surprise, the offensive may take place with various versions of nuclear and artillery preparation, while the main strike can be delivered on an axis which the enemy does not expect. The US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, paragraph 202, states that, in a breakthrough "surprise in operations is achieved by attacking in a place, on an axis and at a time unexpected by the enemy, as well as by selecting the appropriate form of offensive maneuver and using the forces and means necessary to attain this goal". American regulations emphasize that in an offensive operation, the axis of the main strike does not necessarily have to pass through the most advantageous terrain. On the contrary, in order to achieve surprise the axis of the main strike can also be projected through terrain which is difficult of access. However it is considered unwise to advance on an axis where insurmountable obstacles will be encountered.

Using nuclear weapons, it is possible to break through not only a weak, but also, a strong defense. This increases the possibility of selecting the areas for breakthrough and the axis of the main strike. Delivering the strike at the place where the enemy least expects it, or where he considers an offensive to be difficult or impossible — this is the certain means to achieve surprise.

As stated above, the Americans and the British attach great importance in ensuring surprise, to the new means of combat. As a result of using these means, the enemy is unprepared for organized countermeasures, and this increases the effectiveness of surprise. In addition, the factor of surprise will be effective until the enemy masters appropriate methods of effective countermeasures to the new means of combat. In this way, for example, the German use of cruise missiles (samolet-naryad) against London during World War II, paralyzed the London area for a considerable length of time. Only the small destructive power of the
cruise missiles of those times and Germany's limited capabilities for producing them saved the cities of southern England from complete destruction.

Nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, according to the views of the Americans and the British, have within themselves, great possibilities for the achievement of surprise. By means of these weapons surprise can be attained both in the scope of their use and in the time and objective of the strike.

Of all the means for delivering nuclear weapons to the target, the missile is called upon to play the leading role in achieving surprise. The basic advantages of missiles as a means for achieving surprise are their tremendous speed, long operational range, their present invulnerability to PVO weapons and their capability of delivering a nuclear charge to the selected target quickly and with great accuracy, regardless of meteorological and other conditions.

However, it is considered that nuclear weapons must not be used in a stereotyped manner; lest the effect of surprise be considerably reduced. In the NATO Journal Revue Militaire Generale, of January 1957, it was stated that, "If massed atomic weapons are used only in one sector, this will reveal to the enemy the plan of the offensive being prepared, and will allow him to strengthen the defense (on this axis). Therefore, for the purpose of misleading the enemy, it will often be advisable to deliver several atomic strikes against various sectors of the front, and then to carry out the offensive against one of them. Sometimes the massed use of atomic weapons against one of the sectors of the front can be justified, if it is used to deceive the enemy and force him to concentrate his reserves on this axis, while at the same time the actual offensive is begun suddenly under cover of darkness, on another sector of the front, and is carried out without the support of atomic weapons".

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Regarding the new methods of combat operations, as a way of achieving surprise, under modern conditions, the Americans and British first of all include the offensive from the march and a mobile defense.

An offensive from the march allows more successful concealment of the concentrations of the troops who are to deliver the primary strike. In this case, troops of the strike grouping, are not disposed in direct contact with the enemy, where they would be easily discovered during the relief period and while taking up the departure position, but are situated at a greater depth, and at a considerable distance from the main line of resistance. This, in addition to concealment, makes it more difficult for the enemy to carry out his counterpreparation, since the strike grouping of the offensive side, in this case, will be outside the range of the main body of artillery and tactical missiles of the defender.

Moving the strike grouping forward from these areas when going over to the offensive should, as a rule, be carried out under cover of darkness, and more rarely - in daylight under heavy cover of the means of antiair defense. The troops go over to the offensive immediately after a surprise massed nuclear strike.

In a situation where the troops occupy the departure position for an offensive, while they are in direct contact with the enemy, surprise may be achieved by going over to the offensive without artillery preparation. Sometimes it is considered expedient to carry out artillery preparation along other axes than that of the main strike, in order to mislead the enemy. In this case the offensive may begin primarily with tank units and large units, following the nuclear strike or even without it; nuclear weapons may be used on this axis later, in the course of the offensive itself.

The basic idea of using mobile defense consists of luring the troops of the attacking enemy into a "pocket"
("meshok") created for him, or into a particular area which is advantageous for the defender, in order to force him to concentrate there so as to destroy him by the sudden massed use of nuclear weapons. The final rout of the enemy is concluded by counterattacks or a counterstrike, which are delivered, as a rule, on several axes.

In order for such operations of the defender to be truly unexpected by the enemy, engineer preparation of the terrain along the axis where the mobile defense is to be carried out should not differ from that of the adjacent axes. If a "pocket" is created, it should be camouflaged thoroughly by wide use of dummy installations and barriers. In many cases, "pockets" may not even be created, but artillery and missile fire (including nuclear warhead fire) is readied against a predetermined area into which it is proposed to entice the advancing enemy and complete his destruction.

In carrying out mobile defense, the greater part of the forces are disposed in the defensive depth, comprising a counterstrike grouping, disposed in a dispersed and concealed manner. Means for delivering nuclear weapons are also thoroughly camouflaged and kept in full readiness to carry out a sudden strike against an enemy who has broken into the defense or who has been squeezed into a "pocket".

To make more certain the attainment of surprise, the troops can first prepare positional defense, and go over to mobile defense immediately before the beginning of the enemy attack. Going over to mobile defense may be accomplished even in the course of defensive operations. This makes for more suitable conditions for achieving surprise, as the enemy, carried away by the success of his attack, has relaxed his attention and his vigilance is blunted.

The Americans consider that a certain degree of surprise can be attained even in a positional defense. In Army Field Manual FM 100-5, paragraph 291, it is stated that, "The employment of dummy installations in the defense allows occasional deception of the enemy and brings about
a dispersal of his fire. Timely replacement of weapons mockups with real weapons may surprise the enemy occasionally and reflect on the success of his actions." Surprise in positional defense may also be achieved by the erection of dummy obstacles and security zones, by concealed layout of defense zones and firing positions, by shifting the main efforts to the depth of the defense, by the concealed deployment of the second echelons and reserves, by surprise execution of counterpreparation, counterattack, and counterstrikes, and by rapid maneuvering of forces and weapons from one axis to another.

An important method for achieving surprise, according to the Americans, is the use of airborne landings. The presence of organic troop aviation and helicopters in the large units and formations of the American Army permits the wide employment of tactical airborne landings in battle. To achieve operational surprise, special airborne large units can be used as large landing forces.

"Airborne troops", it is stated in US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, paragraph 408, "are a means by which a commander can decisively influence combat operations. Airborne troops have high mobility, which increases the possibility for rapid and decisive maneuver to gain tactical advantages or strategic surprise.

As is apparent from all that has been said, the means and methods used by the Americans and British for achieving surprise are very extensive and diversified. However, it is considered that the path to the achievement of surprise is not only difficult, but also dangerous. A commander trying to achieve surprise is undertaking a calculated risk, as a result of which he himself may be faced with the unexpected. But nowhere, in the opinion of the Americans and British, does the risk justify itself as much as in surprise operations. Therefore, it is recommended that commanders employ them decisively, at the same time thoroughly comparing the risk to which his troops are subject, with those advantages to be derived as a result of the surprise achieved. The
commander is required to take into account carefully, and utilize, all the enemy's weaknesses, especially the inadequacies of his intelligence capability. From this it is apparent what great importance our intelligence activity has acquired in modern times and how much its role and responsibility have grown. Only thorough, unceasingly vigorous intelligence collection, utilizing all the methods and means presently available, will expose the enemy's preparatory measures for surprise operations and assure the frustration of his plans.
THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSIVE

COMBAT OF A CORPS UNDER CONDITIONS

WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED

(ACCORDING TO BRITISH VIEWS)

by

Colonel V. Makarov

In the past several years the British military command have to a considerable degree changed their views on the organization of forces in the defense and on the nature of defensive combat.

The emergence of nuclear weapons as armament had a substantial influence on the organizational structure of the ground forces, and subsequently - on the nature of the defense and the organization of forces in the defense. The British military command reorganized the ground forces. The essence of the new reorganization consists in the conversion of the army to brigade groups, which are tactical large units. Thus, according to the new table of organization, three types of brigade groups were created within the ground forces - infantry, anti-tank and parachute. In conformance with the new organization, the division does not have a fixed composition. Depending on the nature of the tasks being solved, it may include 2 to 4 brigade groups. In conducting the reorganization of the ground forces from bottom to top, the British command decided to abolish the army command link, and the corps was made directly subordinate to the army group. A corps, according to the new organization may include up to three division staffs and up to eight brigade groups (two armored and six infantry).
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The corps in the British Army is considered to be the highest tactical large unit, which may organize defensive operations, within the army groups or independently. It can conduct positional as well as mobile defense.

In the British military press there appeared a series of statements that, in a modern war, when nuclear weapons will be widely used on the field of battle, the need for position defenses will completely disappear. This is explained by the fact that nuclear weapons are capable of neutralizing any fortified defense installations, and a wide dispersal of the defending forces along the front and in the rear areas will allow the moving attacking forces to circumvent without hindrance any defense installations.

In line with this, British military specialists propose that in a modern war a corps will most frequently conduct a mobile defense or holding operations for the purpose of harassing the forces of the enemy and ensuring the conditions for going over from the defensive to the offensive.

It is considered that, when a corps goes over to the defensive it is vital to pay primary attention to the proper selection of the defense area, if only - [available text ends here].