MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "On Planning a Follow-up Operation in the Course of the Preceding One and the Problems of Increasing Effectiveness in the Work of an Army Staff", by Colonel D. Nazaryants

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "On Planning a Follow-up Operation in the Course of the Preceding One and the Problems of Increasing Effectiveness in the Work of an Army Staff", by Colonel D. Nazaryants. This article appeared in Issue 3(61) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly.

Issue 6(61) was sent to press on 7 December 1961.

Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.
COMMENTS ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE

"On Planning a Follow-up Operation in the Course of the Preceding One and the Problems of Increasing Effectiveness in the Work of an Army Staff"

by

Colonel D. Nazaryants

In their article, Colonel A. Kolguabkin and Lieutenant-Colonel I. Bershadskiy were completely correct in the way they posed the problem about the prior planning of a follow-up army offensive operation in the course of the preceding operation.

It is natural that the planning of the follow-up operation is examined not in an isolated way but in close connection with the specific conditions of the operational and tactical situation which appear during the conduct of the first operation. The main consideration, however, does not lie in having a plan worked out in detail for the follow-up operation, but in the practical execution of a whole system of measures connected with its preparation and already set forth in the plan of the first operation.

To enable an army to begin a follow-up operation without an operational pause, by the end of the first operation it is necessary to create reserves of missiles of different designations; to create a grouping of forces and means which would make it possible to shift to combat operations to fulfill the missions of the follow-up operation without a substantial regrouping; to bring up materiel supplies; and to restore and replenish armament, combat equipment, and motor transport to the maximum degree.

We cannot agree with the opinion of the authors about the advisability of dividing all the personnel of the army field command into two operational groups, of which one would direct the combat operations

of troops in the preceding operation and the other would plan the new operation. The latter group would participate later in the direction of the combat operations of troops according to the plan which it had worked out, while the first group would begin planning the next operation. Such a division weakens the efforts of troop control.

The new operation can be prepared by a small planning group comprising officers who participated in the planning of the first operation. This group will contain two or three officers from the operational department, two officers from the staff of missile troops and artillery, and one officer each from the intelligence department, the communications department, the engineer and chemical services, and one or two officers from the rear services: in all, up to 10 to 12 persons, headed by the deputy chief of staff of the army. The group must begin its work immediately after the planning of the first operation is concluded, without waiting for a directive from the front on conducting the follow-up operation.

The initial planning will be based on the general orientation given by the front troop commander on the concept of the front operation as a whole, on the role and place of the army in carrying out the subsequent mission of the front, during which the follow-up operation of the army is to be conducted, and on the amount of materiel supplies on hand at the end of the first operation. Upon receipt of the operational directive of the front (it is quite desirable that the staff of the army have it two to three days before the beginning of the operation), and on the basis of the decision of the army commander, the planning group makes a detailed elaboration of the operational plan. This plan will be made more specific depending on actual conditions during its preparation, and it will be prepared in its final form before the start of the new operation.

The participation of the chief of staff and of the commanders of arms of troops and services of the army in the process of working out the decision of the army commander will make it possible to draw up the plan in a more effective manner. This precludes numerous subsequent agreements on details of the plan between the staffs of arms of troops and services.
The timely execution of preparatory measures depends on the successful fulfillment by the army troops of the tasks during the preceding operation. Consequently, the army commander, the chief of staff, and the commanders of arms of troops and services must concern themselves not only with planning but also with preparing the new operation.

We do not agree with the authors' statement that the army command must concern itself only with the solution of operational tasks. Under modern conditions, when combat operations will be developed along separate axes, it is very important for the commander and staff of the army to know also the tactical situation and the position of this or that regiment, and even battalion, on which the achievement of the total operational success may greatly depend. Of course, this does not mean that the army commander and his staff must constantly interfere in the functions of divisional commanding officers in the direction of the battle.

In our opinion, the main demand which must now be made on operational staffs is to change the method of working out the decision for the operation, to communicate the tasks rapidly to the troops, and to collect information on the situation. During the operation it is extremely necessary that the army commander, the chief of staff, the commander of the operational department, and the commander of the missile troops and artillery, with a small group of officers, be located together, because this will eliminate the need to allot special time to reach agreements on various problems between field command departments. In the event that the above-mentioned commanders are with their troops or are busy directing their subordinate departments and services at a combined control point, responsible duty generals and officers must be made available.

The experience of exercises shows that there is no need for the remaining commanders of arms of troops and services to be located with the army commander, because their participation in the solution of problems of troop control during an operation is not always necessary.

Without concerning ourselves with the whole system of control points, we suggest that in the complement of the rear control point there should be a staff operational group which is able to assume
the direction of troop combat activities in case the control point is put out of action. The group must contain operations officers, intelligence officers, and officers of arms of troops. It is extremely desirable that at the head of departments and services of the rear area there should be officers and generals with sufficient combined-arms training, and that the army rear area should be headed by generals with excellent operational knowledge. Of course, such a group would not be able to fulfill the functions of a command point for a long time, but for a definite time it would be able to perform the tasks of troop control. This thesis needs to be checked at operational exercises and staff games.

In conclusion, we want to say a few words about the problem of equipping an army field command for work in the field. Since it moves two or three times in a calendar day, the army staff must quickly deploy and redeploy itself and be able to control troops while it is in place and while it is in motion. For this, it must have a sufficient amount of well-equipped staff vehicles in which it would be possible to work and rest. The vehicles must be equipped with transmitters for remote control, selector communications and low-power radio sets for internal communication. There has long been an urgent problem concerning the centralized industrial manufacture of the needed field equipment and supplies for army staffs, and this, on the whole, will save resources and will create the best conditions for army staffs to work in the field.