MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence


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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Problem of New Forms and Methods of Organizing and Planning Aerial Reconnaissance in Operations", by Lieutenant-Colonel T. Goryachkin. This article appeared in Issue 6(61) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly.

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COMMENTS ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE

The Problem of New Forms and Methods of Organizing and Planning Aerial Reconnaissance in Operations

by

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Goryachkin

At the present time (and in the immediate future), aerial reconnaissance is one of the most effective forms of reconnaissance, having the capability, in a short time and at a considerable depth in the zone of front operations, of revealing the exact location and condition of the enemy's means of mass destruction. With its help, it is possible to obtain most accurate documentary data on the opposing enemy grouping, which is very essential for the preparation and launching of our nuclear/missile strikes. In the light of this, the exchange of opinions which has been going on in our military press on the problems of the theory and practice of conducting aerial reconnaissance on behalf of a front and of increasing its operational efficiency has been very useful. Thus, in his article, "On New Forms and Methods of Organizing and Planning Aerial Reconnaissance in Operations", Colonel N. Suvorov proposes that the organization and planning of aerial reconnaissance be entrusted to the intelligence directorate of the front staff. In the opinion of the author, this will bring the basic forces and means of aerial reconnaissance closer to the principal consumers; it will eliminate the many steps in levying tasks on aerial reconnaissance by doing away with the intermediate level, the air army staff; and it will create conditions whereby the staff of missile troops, and also the staffs and directorates of other arms of troops, can quickly receive reconnaissance data.

A careful study of Colonel N. Suvorov's proposals shows that it is not possible to agree with him on all points. For example, it is not possible to consider it advisable to transfer the organization of aerial reconnaissance to the intelligence directorate of the front.

What, in fact, does it mean to transfer the functions, even if only those of the organization of aerial reconnaissance, to the intelligence directorate of the front staff? It means entrusting the intelligence directorate with full control of the reconnaissance aviation regiments. Otherwise, there is no need to talk about the organization of aerial reconnaissance, and still less about the organization of a reconnaissance flight.

The organization of aerial reconnaissance is more than merely the levying of tasks on those who are to carry them out. It provides for an entire series of measures and begins long before the sortie of the reconnaissance aircraft on its mission. The organizational work begins upon receipt of a reconnaissance assignment: preparing the crews for sorties; and putting into operation all systems of navigational support, the air army's means of radio countermeasures, the destruction and neutralization of enemy antiaircraft guided missile (ZUR) launchers and radar stations by the fighter-bombers, bombers and missile troops of the front. Besides this, in the event of changes in the situation in the air or on the ground, it may also be necessary to control the flight of the reconnaissance aircraft. The control of aircraft in the air greatly increases the possibility of an unimpeded flight to the reconnaissance objectives and decreases the danger of their entering zones of enemy ZUR or fighter aircraft. Without a well-organized system of control, it is also impossible to alter the course of flight of the reconnaissance aircraft in case of need, to redirect its crew to carry out new tasks, or to designate, in good time, landing fields where the reconnaissance results can be quickly processed and the crew and aircraft prepared for a second sortie. Naturally, to carry out the above set of measures, which is far from complete, it is necessary to have an official
organizational system of control especially designated for this purpose. Such a system already exists in the form of the air army staff, and, in our opinion, it would be superfluous to create a new one merely for the control of aviation reconnaissance forces.

Inasmuch as the air army staff knows the tasks for reconnaissance, and inasmuch as it is better informed than the front intelligence directorate concerning the capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft crews and the actual condition of enemy PVO forces and means, the air army staff is able to cope independently with the organization of prompt, reliable and stable aerial reconnaissance. But this is not all. As is known, there are always more objectives for reconnaissance in the zone of the front than can be detected by the limited number of reconnaissance aviation regiments. In connection with this, the air army commander entrusts some of the reconnaissance tasks to the non-T/O reconnaissance squadrons of combat units and large units. At the same time that these subunits carry out their basic tasks, they also conduct reconnaissance. How are these reconnaissance forces to be treated? To entrust the organization of their operations to the front intelligence directorate is impossible, since they carry out other functions besides reconnaissance; and to exclude them completely from the makeup of the forces and means of aerial reconnaissance is clearly inadvisable.

Thus, a simple transfer of functions from one organ to another will not, in our view, remove the basic problems of aerial reconnaissance.

It is also impossible to agree with the proposal to transfer to the front intelligence directorate a component part of organizing aerial reconnaissance -- planning. There is a wide range of specific aviation problems that cannot be solved by the
intelligence directorate of a front staff unless it participates directly in the planning process of the staff and the commander of the air army. For example, the chief of front intelligence, or even the aviation representatives, will not know in detail the capabilities of the reconnaissance regiments to the extent that the air army staff will know at any given moment. And this is a very important starting point for the proper planning of aerial reconnaissance. Besides this, the intelligence directorate will not be able to do the planning on as complete a scale as the front can, since it will have at its disposal only the limited resources of the reconnaissance aviation regiments, which are not in a position to carry out independently all the tasks of reconnaissance. As the experience of exercises has shown, one or two reconnaissance regiments are not enough for the wide range of problems of aerial reconnaissance in the zone of front operations.

It is a different matter if aerial reconnaissance is planned by the air army staff. Since it has at its disposal a reconnaissance reserve in the form of non-T/O reconnaissance subunits of aviation large units, the air army staff can properly provide for and coordinate the interests of aerial reconnaissance with the combat employment of these subunits in conformity with their predesignated functions. In a number of cases, the air army staff entrusts them with up to 40 percent of the tasks of aerial reconnaissance. But a front intelligence directorate cannot do this. As a rule, it will encounter insurmountable difficulties in planning the use of reconnaissance reserves which are not in its hands but are under the command of the air army commander.

The situation will not be saved even by detaching any part of the tasks from the reconnaissance plan and transferring them to the non-T/O reconnaissance
aviation subunits. By being within the makeup of an air army they will remain, as before, a bottleneck for reconnaissance, since their position will be indistinguishable from that now occupied by the reconnaissance aviation regiments.

Consequently, a redistribution of the planning and organization functions of reconnaissance will not bring about a radical improvement in it. The exclusion of the air army from the process of organizing reconnaissance (in the broad sense of this word) gives rise to new difficulties, which will not permit aerial reconnaissance to improve on its present capabilities.

A number of Colonel N. Suvorov's suggestions on the organization of aerial reconnaissance, do, of course, merit attention. Particularly useful are his proposals for the specific planning of aerial reconnaissance on a daily basis, for the organization of closer coordination of all the reconnaissance forces and means of a front, etc. At the present time, however, this is not the main consideration in the establishment of full-fledged aerial reconnaissance. The main problem of aerial reconnaissance is the creation of improved piloted and pilotless flying machines with high performance characteristics, and also the creation of appropriate electronic reconnaissance equipment and automatic devices for processing and transmitting reconnaissance data.

A special reconnaissance aircraft must be capable of solving its tasks under complex conditions caused by the short time in which operations must be organized and the rapid tempos at which they are carried out, by strong enemy PVO, and by the careful camouflage of nuclear/missile weapons and other means of mass destruction. It must also have a strong capability of accurately detecting
In our view, it is essential to make provisions now for the incorporation of the front intelligence directorate and the missile troop staff into the existing wire and radio-relay communications lines of the reconnaissance regiments, and also into the radio network of aerial reconnaissance. To be sure, it will then be necessary for these organs to have aviation officers who know the specifics of aerial reconnaissance and the fundamentals of controlling it. In return, however, this will bring the means of aerial reconnaissance so close to the principal consumers of its information, that it will not only shorten the time for levying new tasks on those who carry them out, but also for getting the acquired information to the staffs. In addition, the intelligence directorate will become capable of redirecting reconnaissance forces, both in the air and on the ground, in full accordance with the developing operational situation. It is important to note that this solution of the problem does not impose any new functions on the front intelligence directorate, but only contributes to its becoming a more valuable organ, coordinating the efforts of all types of reconnaissance.
The experience of the exercises of the Belorussian Military District fully supports the validity of this presentation. During these exercises the staffs of the missile and ground troops did not have radio stations, only radio receivers which were in the aerial reconnaissance radio network. And it was only this measure that permitted them to receive immediately and directly from the aircraft all the necessary information on the enemy objectives against which strikes were to be launched.

In addition, at the request of the staffs of these troops, the aviation representatives redirected the reconnaissance aircraft in the air, sending them into areas where new targets could be discovered. Those crews called out for reconnaissance from the state, "duty on the airfield," were assigned tasks by radio. During the exercises this kind of call for reconnaissance aircraft was often carried out on the decision of the front chief of intelligence through the crew of the reconnaissance aircraft which at that time was in the air over the area of combat operations. This method for the assignment of tasks and for the receipt of reconnaissance information sharply increased the operational efficiency of aerial reconnaissance, and requirements from the front intelligence directorate and the missile troops staff were satisfied promptly without delay. Moreover, these organs did not get entangled in the organizing and planning of aerial reconnaissance in the sense envisaged by Colonel N. Suvorov in his article.

Thus, in our view, the forms and methods of organizing (including planning) aerial reconnaissance which Colonel N. Suvorov has proposed are an attempt to adapt an aerial reconnaissance, which has lagged in its development, to the demands of the present day; and this adaptation is accompanied by major and unwarranted measures for the reorganization of the air army, reconnaissance aviation, and the front intelligence directorate.