MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence


1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Perfecting the Method of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs", by Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.
Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs

With the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear/missile weapons, in the technical equipment of modern armies, vast changes have taken place which have, of course, introduced much that is new into the methods of conduct of operations and of warfare as a whole. In searching for the new in military affairs, numerous comrades have recently expressed in publications a number of valuable theses directed toward more rapid exposition of the basic changes that are taking place and the theoretical interpretation and substantiation of the probable nature of armed conflict. The statements by authors of articles in the first issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" and certain other articles are of considerable interest in this regard.

We fully share the opinions of those comrades who speak out for a fundamental review of the existing basic tenets of the theory of military art, and we think that one of the most important factors assuring successful resolution of this complicated problem is the further improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs. This question acquires special acuity in connection with the numerical reduction of the armed forces and the increase in demands on the officer corps to master the practical skills in troop command. In his address at the All Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations in May 1960, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, among other tasks of increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces, pointed out the necessity "...to continue to improve the organization and the methods of operational, combat, and political training and to carry out, in a positive fashion, the struggle against the phenomena of oversimplification and weakness in troop training."
It is greatly regretted that not enough attention is devoted in practice to the problems of the methods of training troops and command cadres. There is evidence of this in the fact that the forms and methods of operational training during the postwar period have, in essence, undergone no serious changes. The presently existing methods of operational training of commanders and staffs consist mainly of carrying out command-staff and refresher training courses and group exercises with the command complement of district and army troops.

All of these methods of operational training, proven in the past, cannot, in present conditions and in full measure guarantee the qualitative training of command cadres since they are far from comprehensive and perfect. Among the deficiencies we include the following.

In the general system of operational training, the mastery by generals and senior officers of new combat equipment, and particularly of missiles of various designations, has been weak to date. Formally acknowledging the decisive role of nuclear weapons in the destruction of the enemy, and realizing that modern war will be waged with powerful long-range means of combat which in no way compare with the weapons of past wars, generals and senior officers are actually planning and organizing operations as of old, principally on the basis of World War II experience. It is a revelation to no one that methods for reaching decisions, all plans for operations, and other documents that are developed in staffs in the operational training system, differ very little in form and content from what existed during the period of World War II. The methods of training and execution of operations as they are stated in the articles of Comrades Gastilovich and Baskakov, have basically remained as before.¹

We ask why it is that we conduct the training of troops and command cadres without regard to the basic changes which have occurred in armaments due to nuclear/missile weapons?

¹ Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 1960, First Issue.
In our opinion, this occurs because the military-technical training of generals and senior officers is still inferior. It is precisely because of ignorance of the technical characteristics of nuclear/missile weapons and the means of their delivery to a target that many comrades are unable to evaluate properly the role of these weapons in modern warfare, to utilize them in a battle and operation in a qualified manner, and to assign tasks wisely to the troops utilizing these weapons. By the apt statement of Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, not all of us clearly realize what changes have been wrought in military affairs by the adoption of new means of combat and particularly of nuclear and missile weapons. One of the vital deficiencies, as is pointed out by the Minister of Defense, is the inadequate knowledge of the combat potentialities of nuclear weapons and missiles on the part of generals and officers.

Inferior military-technical training of command cadres is explained by a number of circumstances.

Firstly, within the system of operational training to the present time, the practical study of weapons of mass destruction, and especially of the means of delivery of nuclear warheads to a target, is not being planned for or carried out. Military-technical information on these weapons has been gleaned by generals and officers from various manuals, textbooks, military journals, etc. It is quite understandable that this information has been superficial and contradictory. The first four-day refresher training course, for the study of weapons of mass destruction, and principally of missiles of various designations, was held in 1960 in the Baltic Military District on its own initiative. Almost 150 generals and senior officers of the district troops participated in this refresher course. Many of them saw there for the first time those weapons which they "ably utilized" earlier in a battle and an operation.

Secondly, even today there are no textbooks on missile weapons in the military districts. The so-called handbook materials on the organization and tactical-technical data of missile troops that were distributed to military units at various times are very confusing, contradictory, incomplete, and can in no way serve as training aids in the military-technical training of generals and senior officers concerned with the planning for and the use of these weapons.
Thirdly, inadequate reflection on the limitations in the study of even the training data on missile weapons also affects the training of generals and officers adversely. At the present time missile weapons are available to only a few. The majority of comrades who are directly connected with the planning and utilization of these weapons are familiar with these weapons only from the periodical press. It is apparent that in order to have our command cadres really master the art of conducting modern operations, it is necessary to review and broaden the limits of study of missile weapons.

All of these circumstances have undoubtedly played a negative role in the military-technical training of generals and senior officers which cannot but reflect upon their practical activities.

The second deficiency existing in the methods of operational training during refresher training courses and commanders exercises with the command complement of the district (army), is the tendency to study the training problems and the conduct of operations by the methods of group exercises.

In our opinion, the method of group exercises for studying the problems of operational art in the system of commanders' training of the command echelon of a district (army) is unacceptable because it does not conform to the categories of the persons studying and it does not assure inculcation of the qualities necessary for battle, such as rapid formulation of decisions, boldness, and resoluteness in operations.

On the basis of many years of experience, it is known that training of command echelons of districts and armies is usually carried out in two study groups (the commander and the chief of staff) in which all commanders of arms of troops, chiefs of directorates, and departments are included. And within these groups, numbering 20 to 25 persons, consisting mainly of general and officer-specialists (artillerymen, engineers, chemical specialists, rear services troops) and one or two generals (officers) of combined-arms specialty, the training problems of the operation are worked out (determination of the task, evaluation of the circumstances, working out of the decision), which are chiefly the concern of the command echelon. During the exercises, only the
combined-arms generals and officers are fully and beneficially occupied. As concerns the specialists, they participate only briefly within the framework of their specialities, and for the remainder of the time they are obliged to be inactive. In turn, the generals (officers) of combined-arms speciality also gain very little benefit from these exercises, since the command complement of directorates of the district and armies has sufficient experience for the resolution of such problems as clarification of the task, evaluation of the circumstances, and making the decisions.

As a consequence, the method of group exercises so necessary for a number of reasons in higher educational institutions is not warranted in the training of staffs. Instead of training the command complement of a district (army) in their functional responsibilities and specialities and their skill in the organization of a battle and an operation, because of the existing method of operational training, we unwittingly expend valuable time in the resolution of secondary problems and engender in the subsequent practical activity of generals and senior officers unnecessary verbosity, an inclination toward all sorts of meetings and to hear all types of information and reports.

Proceeding from these considerations, we believe that the method of group exercises utilized in the system of command exercises of the command echelon of the district and army ought to be eliminated and replaced by the method of military-command map games. Depending upon the composition of the military districts and armies and the established training goals, the military-command map games can be single- or two-stage, one- or two-sided. These games, especially the two-stage and two-sided, permit the whole command complement of a district and army to realize conditions more nearly approximate to the combat situation in comparison with group exercises and to load all participants to the maximum with creative activity and to elaborate more fully the training problems and the conduct of the operations.

In 1959 the headquarters of the Baltic Military District carried out a two-stage, two-sided military-command game to which were invited
the command complement of the directorates of the district, of the combined-arms and air armies of the army corps, of large units of PVO of the Country, the fleet operational group and also certain chiefs of military departments of civilian higher educational institutions and retired generals. During the game the commanders of armies (corps), arms of troops, and chiefs of directorates acted as the appropriate commanders and chiefs in the composition of a front according to Soviet Army organization, and their deputies - as the corresponding commanders and chiefs within the composition of a group of "Western" armies. The remaining participants in the game performed the duties which coincided with their own responsibilities and specialties. In order to preclude contact between the two sides and to create the most favorable conditions for the game, the sides were located separately—in the district headquarters building and in the officer's club. In content and method of execution, the game received the approval of the participants. For some reason, however, they were not used in subsequent military-command games of staffs of districts and armies.

A third and no less serious deficiency in the method of operational training of the command echelon is, in our view, the fact that staffs of districts participate too infrequently in the arrangements for operational training which are carried out in accordance with the plan of the Center. For example, not one operational exercise was carried out by the headquarters of the Baltic Military District during the past six years. The district troop commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the operations directorate have not participated in the activities of operational training on a strategic scale for many years now, if we exclude their participation as umpires in the exercises of the Southern Group of Forces.

Such a situation cannot be called normal. The headquarters of districts must themselves participate in the role of trainees periodically and prepare themselves as troop control organs under the immediate direction of the Center. This will permit a significant increase in the effectiveness of the work of staffs, the study of new developments in military affairs, the adoption of experience in the organization of large exercises, and the observation of one's own errors and deficiencies which go unnoticed under normal conditions.
We realize that the measures carried out by the Center in operational training with the districts involve definite material expenditures. However, it is possible to find methods which would not require large monetary expenditures.

It is also necessary to find methods for improving the special training of army commanders, chiefs of staffs, chiefs of operations directorates (deparments), i.e., those commander-comrades who have direct responsibility for operational and special training of large numbers of generals and senior officers. While the chiefs of arms of troops and services (artillery, PVO, etc.) have increased their knowledge to some degree at special refresher courses during the past years, the above-mentioned category of persons have, for incomprehensible reasons, remained out of the field of vision for many years. Do not commanders and chiefs of staffs have need to study the missile weapons and the resultant revolutionary changes they have wrought in the operational art? Absolutely. And, it seems to us, they also need special refresher courses for the study of the latest equipment and the urgent problems in the field of strategy, operational art, and tactics.

Noting the deficiencies in the existing methods of operational training, we propose a change in the system of conducting the training of generals, senior officers, and staffs since it is obviously antiquated. Our proposals for improving the methods of operational training consist of the following:

For practical study of nuclear weapons and methods of their delivery to a target, military-technical refresher courses for the district command complement, including commanding officers of large units, should be held at the beginning of the training year. During these refresher training courses, lasting 4 to 5 days, there should be study of the new equipment received by the district troops, and chiefly of missiles of various designations. The refresher training courses should conclude with formulation of operational-tactical leaflets on problems of the use of this equipment in a battle and an operation.

Upon completion of the military-technical refresher training courses, and within the time limit fixed by the operational training plan, a two-stage military-command map game should be conducted with the participation of the command complement of the district, of the armies and
large units subordinate to the district, and also of the command complement of the other types of armed forces and military-educational institutions that are located in the district territory, and with the generals of the reserve.

As far as possible, military-command games should be two-sided. In this case, one of the sides (main command echelon) must operate in accordance with the organization and tactics of the Soviet Army, the opposing side—in accordance with enemy organization and tactics. This will permit a study in depth of the troop organization and the methods for conducting operations of our probable enemies and, by comparative analysis, the detection of the strong and weak points of both sides.

It is expedient for both sides in war games to be located in different places (buildings) in order that participants do not have the opportunity for personal contact and so that each side carries out its internal control by technical communications means with observance of all rules of cryptographic security (skrytoye upravleniye voiskami-SUV).

The decisions of each side will be presented to the director of the games according to an established schedule and, in keeping with these decisions, combat operations will be developed and new situations will be introduced in accordance with the operational schedule.

The duration of military-command games of a district is 4 to 5 days.

In addition to these undertakings, a district and its armies should conduct one operation command-staff exercise of 6 to 7 days on the spot with the participation of the staffs of combined-arms large units and the staffs of missile units (large units).

In their content, the operational command-staff exercises presently being conducted do not satisfy the requirements for the conduct of modern operations. The majority of these exercises are being conducted too methodically, without sharp changes in the situation. The staffs being educated usually create easy conditions for themselves: the initial situation is presented beforehand at their points of permanent assignment, the decisions made on the basis of the initial situation are put into practice without substantive changes during the entire course of the exercise; changes of location of control points do not take place, the entire activity of the
staffs amounts basically to the collection of data on the situation and the development of various types of combat documents. Naturally, such exercises are not beneficial to the command complement and they only create incorrect impressions for generals and officers about the nature of modern warfare.

In our practical activities we proceed from the guiding postulate that war can start suddenly. The so-called threatening period will amount to several hours or will be entirely absent. Consequently, the system of staff training must proceed from a more complicated situation in which staffs will be brought to readiness in a limited time and will be dispatched to the reserve command post from which they will assume troop control. Therefore, such undertakings as operational command-staff and staff exercises should begin with calling the staff trainees to alert and imparting to them the initial situation when they arrive at the designated areas from their points of permanent assignment. Prior to the sounding of the alert, it is necessary to take all measures to achieve its surprise effect. Then we will have the opportunity to reveal, although not completely, an accurate picture of the readiness of the staffs for troop control in a complicated situation, and the exercises themselves will approximate combat conditions.

Guided by these considerations, in May 1960, the command complement of the Baltic Military District arrived at the 11th Guards Army without warning and issued a directive to the commander which required the army troops to go on combat alert, to be brought up to combat readiness, and to be regrouped by the combined method on another axis within a limited time for fulfillment of the combat task. All of these measures were to be carried out under the conditions of combat operations that had already been initiated by the enemy. Simultaneously, groups of officers were dispatched to the large units of the army with authority to control the conditions of the bringing to alert of each large unit. During this particular exercise, in addition to the directorates of the army, one division at full complement and only the staffs of divisions and one motorized (tank) regiment each in the remaining large units were alerted.

The commander and the staff of the army had to notify the subordinate troops to bring them to the areas of concentration, plan the
regrouping over a large distance, brief the troops on the task, and prepare them for march a few hours after the alert was sounded. These requirements were also laid on the troop staffs. Due to the surprise alert, the command complement of the army and the unit staffs were placed in a complex situation and they gained practical work experience in the control of troops under such conditions. Both the directors of the exercise and the participants had the opportunity to observe their own weak spots and gaps in training in general, and in combat readiness in particular.

In our view, operational command-staff exercises to improve the staffs as organs of control should be conducted in complex and sharply changing situations at the front and in the rear, demanding of participants the adoption of new decisions in short periods of time. In the background of this situation, there should be practice in shifting control points by air transport, and also in effecting continuity in troop control among the various command echelons. With these aims, it is obviously advisable to reduce to a minimum the dependence upon the rear services units and establishments which are included in the command-staff exercises so that control points will be highly mobile and efficient.

As an example of how these exercises should be conducted, we can refer to the experience of the front operational-rear services exercise with designated troops which was carried out with participation of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko in the Baltic Military District in June 1959.

In accordance with the directive of General Headquarters (STAVKA), the staff of the front (district) planned an offensive operation and received instructions for its execution. By initial decision, the tank army, which was to enter into the composition of the front during the progress of the operation, made up the second operational echelon and was to be brought into combat on the 3rd or 4th day of the operation. When the operation was already planned, it became known that General Headquarters had the opportunity to transfer the tank army into the composition of the front earlier than the previously designated time and offered the use of it in the first operational echelon on the main axis. The command and staff of the front were placed in
a difficult situation and had to replan the operation anew in a limited period of time, pass on the decision to the troops, and to carry out their regrouping. In this episode the staffs obtained considerable work experience under complex conditions.

In the course of the operation, by direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, there was repeated introduction of elements of sharp change in the situation, which resulted in the need for sharp changes in the tasks of formations and large units and there was also practice in alerting the troops and committing them to combat from the march from their permanent billets.

In the final phase of the exercise, a proposal was made to the district staff that it develop and execute an army exercise within a limited period. During the course of the army exercise, by direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, a situation was created wherein the advancing army was forced to change its direction of advance by 90° which, of course, required intensive work on the part of the troops and staffs.

These exercises were a good training school for generals, senior officers, staffs, and troops. It appears to us that operational command-staff exercises should be carried out in just this fashion.

In the arrangement of preparations for command-staff exercises it is expedient for the staffs of a district and of armies to carry out two to three calendar days' staff training on the spot, utilizing communications means to train, principally generals, officers, departments, directorates, and staffs as a whole in rapid development of operational documents in accordance with a given situation and in the ability to carry on communications on technical equipment and with cryptographic security documents during the movement and deployment of control points.

Therefore, during the course of the training year, it is necessary, in our view, to conduct in a district, as operational training, 1) military-technical refresher training courses, 2) a military-command game, and 3) operational command-staff exercises on the spot. In all, 15 to 20 calendar days are required for this training.
We also consider it necessary and feasible to have the staff of a district participate no less than once in two to three years in an operational training exercise carried out by the Center on a strategic scale. They can be strategic command-staff exercises on the spot with means of communications or strategic military-command map games involving several military districts. When a district participates in a strategic command-staff exercise or game, district measures for operational training inevitably relate to measures carried out by the Center, and the second exercise planned by the district is not carried out.

As concerns military-command map games on a strategic scale, they can be conducted with the staffs of districts stationed at their points of permanent assignment, and it appears to us that the method for conducting them should be as follows. Having determined the group of military districts that are to participate in the game and the complement of participants from each district, the Main Staff develops the initial situation (tasks) and disseminates it to the participants. The staffs participating in the game are suddenly alerted and proceed to their reserve control points. To supervise the work of the exercise, groups of generals or officers—representatives of the Main Staff and the central directorates, may be dispatched to the staffs of the districts.

In the course of a strategic military-command game, in order to present the plan of the operation and to get agreement on coordination with other districts participating in the game, the commander or the chief of staff of the district along with commanders of arms of troops will go by air at a definite time to the Center and to neighboring district headquarters.

The basic content of a strategic military-command game, it appears to us, must be the resolution of such practical questions as bringing troops up to increased combat readiness during the threatening period, the removal of these troops from a possible enemy strike, the immediate execution of retaliatory nuclear strikes, the elimination of the results of a nuclear attack, and joint operation with the armies of the other Socialist States.
The method proposed for a strategic military-command game does not require large expenditures of material means and will undoubtedly have great benefit in the training of the command complement of the districts and their staffs. The duration of conduct of such exercises should be no more than 6 to 7 days.

Therefore, a total of 20 to 25 days will be required for the operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs of a district, including the exercises which are carried out on a strategic scale.

It is quite obvious that execution of the measures indicated does not end the operational training of generals and senior officers. The principal method of studying the theory of operational art remains their independent efforts to synthesize and master the developments which are continually appearing in the military affairs.

However, the volume of military literature being published at the present time is so large that one person has practically no opportunity to comprehend, nor even to read, all that is published on various aspects of military affairs. Therefore it would be expedient, in our view, to plan and carry out so-called operational rallies (aktiv) at least once every six months in the headquarters of districts, with the participation of generals and officers of the principal directorates and departments of the district and its armies.

The basic aim of such rallies is to convey to generals and officers of the command complement, in a comprehensive form, the new changes which have occurred during a certain period of time in operational art, tactics, and organization of our troops and those of the enemy. At these rallies it would be possible, within a short time, to familiarize the generals and officers with the basic contents of the most important exercises carried out in the Soviet Army and abroad, to bring changes in troop organization to their attention, and also to review the questions and postulates raised in the order of their presentation in the periodical press. Of course, for these undertakings it is advisable to make preparation and to pass to the audience only those problems in which the solutions disclose fundamentally new tendencies.
With approximately this same aim, but with a view to special problems, and at more frequent intervals (no less than once in 1 to 2 months), it would be beneficial to plan and to have operational information (operationaya informatsiya) in directorates and departments in the staffs of districts and armies in order that the generals and officers be continually aware of new trends in operational art.

In connection with further improvement of the methods of operational training and the raising of the level of military knowledge of generals and senior officers, there is a need to improve the quality of the training aids being published, especially those on nuclear/missile weapons.

At the present time, there is available to the troops a large quantity of various forms of tables, lines, and graphs for the determination of the basic data for the use of destruction weapons and for the protection of troops against them. But all of these aids were prepared in primitive fashion and by amateurish methods, are inconvenient to handle, and are far from perfect. A tremendous amount of money is expended for the preparation of these aids in the districts. Is it not time to formulate a single, more sophisticated training aid for the whole army by a centralized method and financed by those funds which are being wasted in districts? It seems to us that an affirmative answer to this question will economize on financial expenditures and will provide the staffs with more sophisticated aids for which they have such great need.

The proposals suggested by us for the improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs claims in no measure to be an exhaustive exposition of the problem posed. Therefore it would be desirable to exchange opinions in the pages of the military press in order to discover more sophisticated forms of operational training of generals, officers, and staffs, and then use them to fulfill more qualitatively the requirement of the Minister of Defense contained in the directive on operational training No. 0060.

Major-General M. Ivanov
The general task of any command-staff or staff training exercise on the spot is the training of commanders and staffs for operations in complex conditions of modern combat reality. Whatever the specific arms established by the command for each exercise and whatever the methods used to carry out the exercise, the final aim boils down principally—to training the command complement, preparing the staffs, and continually raising the level of their combat readiness.

It is understandable that the quality and results of an exercise depend to a great extent on the nature of its preparation and organization. In the exercises carried out during the past years, there can be noted a number of negative points common to all of them which, in the interest of the subject, we feel it advisable not to ignore in the future.

The desire to commit the headquarters, not with their existing, but with considerably increased, personnel composition, communications means, and organizational transport is striking. This results in the withdrawal of transport equipment and personnel from subordinate troops, which in turn disrupts the everyday life of units and subunits. Using the personnel and motor vehicles attached to the headquarters for the period of the exercise, there is hasty formation of temporary, disorganized subunits for carrying out such functions as commendant's service and assistance to the 'Military Store' (Voyentorg); their personnel are not usually utilized in accordance with their specialties. Commanders and staff officers are placed in a false position because the staffs are brought out for the exercise not as they actually are, but "reinforced" at the expense of weakening other troops. The most harmful thing here is the fact that commanders and staffs become accustomed to participating in
training exercises only after definite organizational measures, but the enemy really will not often permit this, especially in the initial period of a war.

The best solution would be to have the staffs be the exercise with whatever composition they happen to have at the moment and to give them some "reinforcements" during the course of the exercise; to teach the commanders and staffs to command and direct with their available, though limited means, and not to place them in an easier and more favorable situation in advance. The example should be set by higher headquarters, chiefly of districts.

The presence at a command-staff exercise of large numbers of umpires is not always expedient, and occasionally is downright harmful, at times not promoting the successful progress of the exercise as much as distracting and tying up the participants. We are not even speaking about the fact that a significant number of umpires, and especially of their vehicles, at control points very often interferes with the camouflaging of the latter.

These deficiencies are plainly noted when, for example, the commander summons to his field control point (PKP) vehicle or tent one or two subordinate officers but instead, three or four persons arrive, since each person summoned is trailed by one or two umpires. They usually attempt to justify the assignment of so many umpires with the excuse that it is done in the interests of training. But these aims should be achieved by classroom study, by group exercises, and war games. And in reality, a commander will never organize this type of meeting, which in actual conditions would take extra materiel equipment (large tents, transport for their movement, personnel to service them). Frequently the commander and the staff, in preparing to go on an exercise, concern themselves principally with where to billet and how to provide lights and food for the umpires, and in what vehicles to transport them. But after all, this is not the important thing.

The main thing is how to make one's headquarters combat ready and mobile, to set up the headquarters and ensure that its activities are inconspicuous to the enemy, thus guaranteeing uninterrupted con-
control of the troops. Therefore, in preparing for the exercise, its
director is obligated to adopt the measures which are necessary
to eliminate the concern of the commander and staff conducting
the exercise about umpires. One should include only the minimum
number of umpires. For the headquarters of a large unit, there
should be no more than 5 to 7, and not 25 to 30 persons, as usually
happens. In order to observe properly the work of contiguous
departments and specific individuals it is advisable to combine
the work of umpires and to assign one person for 2 or 3 depart-
ments, e. g., for the operational and intelligence departments,
the rear services, special services, artillery, and aviation.
In case of extreme necessity it is possible to assign an assistant
to certain umpires. In this situation, it will be less crowded and
the participants will work more independently with more interest.
During the course of the exercise, the secondary personnel will
be under the management of the commander, the chief of staff, and
the chief of the department. Therefore, 5 to 7 qualified officers
of the senior staff will be enough to instruct and to check a sub-
ordinate commander and the staff of, let us say, a division or
corps.

It is particularly desirable to note the role of terminal umpires
(kontsevyy posrednik), if they are present at the exercise. First
of all, it is necessary that they be located in operating areas and
that the commander and his staff participating in the games should
have communications with both the umpires and their subordinates
by the actual means that are possible in the given situation. An
exercise does not achieve the desired results when the terminal
umpires are located at reduced distances. It is necessary that the
terminal umpire fulfill the will and orders of the commander if
they are not incomprehensible. The director of the exercise must
so instruct the umpire as regards decisions adopted by a commander.
It is not possible to acknowledge the following situation as pro-
cedurally correct. Having assigned a subordinate (final umpire)
the task of an offensive in the mountains, the commander cate-
gorically required him to make a broad enveloping maneuver,
utilizing the many available routes. The terminal umpire acted in-
correctly, and against the commander's orders, hit the enemy
"head-on", met with no success, and during the critique the director
of the exercise rebuked, not the terminal umpire, but the participating commander.

Neither is it possible to tolerate the fact that with the wide use of liaison aircraft and helicopters in all branches of the national economy, through the fault of the command, they are used very little or not at all in command-staff exercises. In the event of a restriction in the operation of radio communications, the participating commander and his staff are obliged to utilize only vehicular transport, at a time when the helicopter (airplane) would be an incomparable means of liaison if you consider that the troops will usually be located at great distances from one another.

The problem here is certainly not in the real economy of resources but in the fact that in "departing further from sin" and from superfluous "extraordinary occurrences" (ChP), we do not train the commanders and staffs to fulfill important responsibilities by mastering air transport (selection of landing areas, concern about materiel support). Furthermore, we neither teach nor train commanders and staff officers in observation, reconnaissance, and orientation from the air. This is a very serious gap in the conduct of command-staff exercises. For corroboration of the above, we shall cite an example from the experience of the command-staff exercise of the Turkestan Military District which was carried out in 1959. The day before the start of combat operations the commander of a large unit was summoned for clarification of his task to the senior commander's headquarters, which was located at a great distance from the large unit. The commander, taking the deputy chief of the operations directorate with him, proceeded by vehicle to the airfield, expending four hours of the night going cross country. Upon arrival at the airfield, it turned out that the commander did not have to make the flight. He returned to his command post (P) in another 4 hours, just 30 minutes prior to the "attack". The deputy chief of the operations directorate returned by airplane from the higher headquarters to the area of location of his own headquarters on the second day of operations and, in his own words, found the headquarters, but the pilot, not being trained for operations under these conditions, was afraid to land. The officer returned to his
headquarters after the end of the exercise. The above again corroborates the fact that at the tactical level (zveno), not to mention the operational, it is necessary to utilize air transport more widely for the control of troops and to train officers and staffs as a whole to use air transport more sensibly.

Two-sided command-staff exercises are carried out in an interesting fashion, but they demand great flexibility of the command echelon in the course of the exercise and also adequate communications with the umpires of both sides, in order to permit correct reaction in good time to the decisions adopted by the sides. For example, if the "northern" troops depart at 1700 hours from their areas of concentrations to new areas, it is not possible to evaluate positively the results of a strike by the "southerners", carried out against these areas after the departure from them of the "northern" troops.

Another example. The results of the action taken by the "northern" side created favorable conditions for the landing of a tactical airborne force in the rear of the "southerners", which was carried out after the necessary substantiations and calculations. The senior umpire of the "northern" side noted all of this. However, when this matter reached the director of the exercise, he changed the conditions radically, "annihilated" the "northern" airborne force, and "threw back" their left flank for a considerable distance, to the benefit of the "southerners". Such lack of understanding between the director and the senior umpires cannot pass unnoticed by the participants, as well as the fact that at exercise critiques, quite correct actions by one or the other side are declared incompetent and incorrect without any basis.

In two-sided exercises, the sides must receive particularly precise results of reconnaissance of targets in the depth which cannot be observed from the ground, especially if there are no actual means of reconnaissance available to the participating staffs. In order that the exercise proceed with great interest and in order that the assignment of tasks to reconnaissance and the receipt of its results be made more concrete and substantial, it is expedient in command-staff exercises to use realistically simulated means of reconnaissance, particularly aerial reconnaissance.
In recent years, units and large units of troops have begun to participate more frequently in command-staff exercises where, as the background of a given exercise, they develop a definite theme in the program of combat training and examine some particular problem. Undoubtedly the inclusion of these troops raises the interest of the participants of the exercise and compels them to be...

Depending upon how and when the reconnaissance, communications, and control of intelligence organs is organized, the latter are responsible for furnishing pertinent information on the enemy which must arrive at the headquarters via actual means of communications, for example: by radio from an artillery fire-adjusting plane; from a staff officer observer in a helicopter, reconnaissance plane, or bomber; from a reconnaissance group dropped into the enemy rear; radio intelligence from a higher headquarters, etc. But the content of this information and the nature of its arrival must be as close as possible to those of a real situation.

Completeness of information on the enemy is frequently dependent, not upon well-organized and well-directed reconnaissance, but upon how persistently an intelligence officer follows "on the heels" of the umpire and peers at his map.

At command-staff exercises carried out on the spot, many opportunities exist to organize and carry out reconnaissance with realistically simulated means and even with actual reconnaissance subunits. This is especially important in two-sided command-staff exercises. Of course, there must be designated persons (umpires) in helicopters, airplanes, and subunits of troop reconnaissance who, depending on the nature of the operations of the crew (subunit), will be responsible for furnishing the necessary information and relating this information to the locale which a given crew is observing. In the capacity of umpires, in airplanes (helicopters) and in subunits, it is expedient to have the commanders of these subunits, who will be able to instruct their subordinates in the conduct of reconnaissance simultaneously. This means that the subunits included for this purpose must be composed of their own standard complement and not of a contrived one.

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more careful in considering the situation and in calculating time realistically; it obliges them to keep in mind the presence of troops; to be attentive also when resolving problems of materiel supply, which frequently are simplified in the absence of actual troops. In the course of the exercise the command echelon must not forget the participating troops, but must train them also. The deputy commander of troops, in particular, must be responsible for this.

At times, due to a number of reasons (hindrances due to sowing of crops, which creates a lack of sufficient motor vehicle transport, etc.), it is expedient to have the troops participate only in certain stages or phases of the exercise. It is always permitted and is never advisable to decline, to simulate troops as subunits of motorized infantry, tanks, artillery, other arms of troops, and also of aviation. This is always justified and will make the exercise more interesting and instructive. The execution of command-staff exercises with simulated troops has special significance now for skeletonized (skadrirovannyy) large units and units and for units and large units maintained at reduced complement. However, even with simulated units, the commanders and staffs must operate in realistic areas and not in reduced areas.

In conclusion, it is advisable to note once again that any command-staff or staff exercise will be more beneficial and instructive only if the staffs participate in the exercise at the strength which they actually have, at the strength in which they will be caught in a real situation, without extra preparations calculated for show and effect of equipment. It is necessary to give the staffs only a strictly limited time period for preparation to go on an exercise or to put them on the alert and place them in conditions close to actual reality.

Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov