MEMORANDUM FOR:  DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
VIA:  Deputy Director (Plans)  

1. This Task Force made a general report to Congress which has been released. They produced separate classified reports for the Department of Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MSA, CIA and other agencies of government. The classified reports were furnished to the agency or service reported upon and to the President.

2. The report pertaining to the Department of Defense has several references to CIA and contains some critical statements on subjects of primary interest to this Agency. The letter of transmittal, for example, implied in general that the Task Force was considerably hampered in its investigation of the intelligence community by the fact that the security restrictions around CIA were such that they could not adequately collate their report between agencies. They recommended that any future Task Force be left unhampered by such security requirements. It was noted that the report is not confined to intelligence activities.

3. This report covers among other matters, the subject of defectors, agreed activities, intelligence collection by clandestine means, cover for CIA, war planning, including evasion and escape facilities and requirements for the support of guerrilla warfare and other CIA responsibilities pertaining to operations and intelligence. The following is a quote from one of the conclusions and recommendations in the Department of Defense report:

"Conclusion: Either CIA has been unable to develop and maintain adequate assets in the evasion and escape and guerrilla warfare areas or is furnishing inadequate information to the Services concerning its assets. Such a condition can only result in duplication of assets, inadequate planning and failure in operations."

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"Recommendation: That the National Security Council review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare".

4. The Department of Defense has started the action which will lead to the implementation of the numerous recommendations in the report and they informed the White House of this action on 10 November 1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested reports from their overseas commanders regarding the above quoted conclusion and recommendation for use as a basis for the Department of Defense report to the National Security Council. We in CIA recently became aware of the request made by the JCS when our own war planners in London, Tokyo and Honolulu requested guidance regarding the JCS directive which had been referred to them for comment.

5. An erroneous but logical assumption held by certain officials in the Department of Defense came to light during a discussion of this subject on 9 December 1955. Namely: That wherever a conclusion or recommendation appears in the Defense report in which CIA is directly involved that the same conclusion and recommendation must have been included in the CIA section of the report inasmuch as all sections of the complete report were indorsed by the same member of the Hoover-Clark Task Force. Consequently CIA must also be preparing their action in response thereto and if CIA is not doing so, the White House should request comments from CIA.

6. I am sure that the items in the Defense report, which reflect on CIA and its responsibilities, are not reflected in the CIA report in the same terms, if indeed the subject is even included in our report. Some items do not pertain to intelligence activities. The CIA report does include a discussion of paramilitary assets for use in support of military action and the conclusion is in contradiction to the conclusion in the Defense report which I have quoted above.

7. The PPC Staff has started action to coordinate a report from the point of view of CIA on questions raised by the above quoted conclusion and recommendation taken from the Department of Defense section of the Hoover-Clark Task Force Report.

8. Recommendation:

a. That the Director of Central Intelligence obtain, officially, a copy of the full report prepared by the Hoover-Clark Task Force on Intelligence Activities as being within his overall responsibilities as Director.
b. If the entire report cannot be obtained by the Director of Central Intelligence then he should, in his capacity as Commander of the Agency, demand those portions of the report which mention the Central Intelligence Agency or which reflect upon the responsibilities of this Agency.

Chief, Planning and Program Coordination Staff