SECRET 240320Z DEC 74 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: TEHERAN INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

EYES ONLY [ ] FROM [ ] VIETNAM

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM [ ] VIETNAM TO AMBASSADOR HELMS.

"AMBASSADOR MARTIN HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM ON BASIS OF WHICH AMBASSADOR MARTIN HOPES THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO EXERT SOME DISCREET INFLUENCE IN ENSURING THAT THE IRANIAN DELEGATION IS STAFFED ADEQUATELY AT THE TOP LEVEL TO BEGIN WITH AND THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE STRENGTHENED IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF ITS DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION. AT PRESENT THE IRANIANS ARE A VERY POOR FOURTH WITH THE OTHER THREE NATIONS (HUNGARY, INDONESIA, POLAND) HAVING PRODUCED VERY ABLE SENIOR PERSONNEL. OUR INTEREST IS OF COURSE NOT SO MUCH IN THE INDIVIDUALS THE IRANIANS DECIDE TO SEND HERE BUT IN THE FACT THAT AT PRESENT, AND PARTICULARLY NOTICEABLE SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF SADRY, THE TWO COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS SIMPLY OUTCLASS THE INCORPORATIONS WHILE THE IRANIANS AT THE MOMENT JUST DON'T COUNT. TEXT OF MEMORANDUM FOLLOWS:

SUBJECT: REPLACEMENT FOR AMBASSADOR ASSAD SADRY

REPL: TEHERAN 1225 (STATE)

1. THE DEPARTURE OF AMBASSADOR ASSAD SADRY HAS BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS THE RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF THE IRANIAN DELEGATION AS COMPARED TO THE OTHER THREE DELEGATIONS ON THE ICLOS. SADRY'S EXPERIENCE, INTELLIGENCE AND DRIVE ALONG WITH HIS ABILITY TO GET THE BEST OUT OF HIS SMALL, GENERALLY YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED STAFF, KEPT THIS WEAKNESS FROM BECOMING EVIDENT EARLIER. THE IRANIAN DELEGATION, BECAUSE OF SADRY'S ASERTY OF

HR70-14

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: MAR 2008

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COOKE: DIPLOMACY, LEADERSHIP AND FLEXIBILITY, 
DETAILED CONSTANT PRESSURE ON THE COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF 
1965 TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE 
PANAMA AGREEMENT. IN SO DOING, EVIDENCE OF POLISH AND 
HUNGARIAN INDIPLOMACY WAS RECORDED AND EXPOSED IN THE 
PANAMA SESSIONS, CAUSING THEM EMBARRASSMENT, HOWEVER, 
THEI DEPARTURE WAS LEFT THE IRANIAN DELEGATION WITHOUT 
EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP.

2. THE REFERENCED CABLE INDICATES THAT THE IRANIAN 
GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING REPLACING SADRY WITH THE IR 
PRESENT AMBASSADOR TO BANGKOK WHO IS ALSO ACCREDITED 
TO SAIGON. IF HE WOULD BE POSTED TO SAIGON TO WORK 
FULL TIME ON THE ICCS THIS WOULD BE A FINE SOLUTION. 
ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE WOULD RETAIN HIS PRESENT 
FUNCTIONS AND ALSO ASSUME THE ICCS ACCREDITATION, THIS 
WOULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS AS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE 
POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO 
ACCEPT ACCREDITATION FOR ONE AND THE SAME PERSON AS 
AMBASSADOR TO THEIR GOVERNMENT AND CONCURRENTLY 
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ICCS, IN WHICH POSITION HE WOULD 
HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE FROG. THE EMBASSY INFORMALLY 
INDICATED THIS VIETNAMESE CONCERN TO THE IRANIAN 
DELEGATION. HOWEVER, MINISTER KHAZENI SENT WORD BACK 
THAT HE COULD NOT BRING THIS MATTER TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S 
ATTENTION BECAUSE IT WOULD BE PREMPTUOUS OF HIM TO 
COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF ANOTHER OFFICER FOR THIS 
ASSIGNMENT.

3. THE PRESENT ACTING HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, 
MINISTER K. KHAZENI MOGHADAM, IS NOT CAPABLE OF HANDLING 
THIS ASSIGNMENT. HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE AT CONFERENCE 
DIPLOMACY, RETRING BUREAUCRATIC TEMPERAMENT AND 
INABILITY TO GET THE MOST OUT OF HIS STAFF RESULT IN 
VERY POOR PERFORMANCE. HE IS FURTHER HANICAPED BY 
HIS POOR ENGLISH WHICH IS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE 
ICCS AND WHICH THE OTHER AMBASSADORS ON THE COMMISSION 
ALL SPEAK. A FURTHER COMPLICATION LIMITING KHAZENI'S 
CAPABILITY TO UNITE AND LEAD THE IRANIAN DELEGATION 
SEEMS FROM A FEUD WHICH DEVELOPED BETWEEN HIM AND
SECRET

The Embassy has received rumors and
complaints from both sides, accusing the other party
of internal corruption. The truth in these allegations
is impossible for our Embassy to judge, but as a
rule, the diplomatic delegation recently lost
several staff members, and the remaining two junior
officials’ only interest now is to stay clear of the fight
and find other assignments.

4. One indication as to the capability of the Iranian
diplomatic delegation to compete with the others can
be seen in the comparative size of their diplomatic
staffs. The Iranians now have three diplomatic officers,
the Belgians seven, the Poles thirteen, and the
Hungarians sixteen. Numbers tell only a part of the
story: the Communists not only have much larger staffs
but they have many senior officers who have had much
greater experience than the two junior officers (a third
secretary and a junior attaché) on the Iranian delegation.
The weakness of the Iranian diplomatic staff is
attributed by Sadry to the fact that the Foreign
Minister was unwilling to give him the support he
needed, and what little he received came because
of the Prime Minister’s backing. Sadry also indicated
that, unless the Shah personally took an interest in
finding a competent replacement, the job would go
empty. If the Shah orders an official to take a
post, he can’t refuse, but no one else has the
authority to force someone to take an undesirable
assignment. No competent official has shown any
interest in being posted to the ICCs.

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