TO: IMMEDIATE GENERAL BRET SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: AMBASSADOR HELMS, TEHRAN
PLEASE DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS MARCH 18.

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SECRETARY 
   KISSINGER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. MET GENERAL BARZANI AND DR. MAHMUD 
   UTHMAN WITH THEIR SAVAK LIAISON OFFICER EVENING 16 MARCH AND 
   WITH GENERAL NASSTRI, CHIEF OF SAVAK, ON 17 MARCH. BOTH 
   CONVERSATIONS ARE SUMMARIZED SEPARATELY BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION 
   AND TO SOLICIT YOUR WISHES AS TO HOW BARZANI AND IRANIAN REQUESTS 
   FOR INCREASED ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE HANDLED. SIMILAR SUMMARY BEING 
   CABLED.

3. "BARZANI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

   "A. KURDISH MORALE AND WILL TO RESIST THE IRAQI BA'TH 
      REGIME HAS NEVER BEEN HIGHER. KURDS FROM ALL OVER IRAQ HAVE 
      BEEN LEAVING THEIR CITIES AND TOWNS AND STREAMING NORTHWARD TO 
      JOIN BARZANI'S FORCES. ALL KURDISH CABINET MINISTERS, ALL 
      KURDISH ECONOMISTS, VIRTUALLY ALL KURDISH MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL 
      GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH AND 5,000 POLICE OFFICERS AND MEN WITH 
      THEIR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION HAVE RALLIED TO BARZANI.

   "B. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS HAD BEEN A GREAT 
      POLITICAL SHOCK TO THE BA'TH REGIME WHICH HAD PROBABLY HOPED
That a substantial element of the Kurdish community would seek an accommodation with the government. The government has withdrawn its garrisons from the most exposed places in the north, such as Rawanduz, Qala Diza, Raniya. The entire Turkish border area and the Iranian border area down to Halabcha are now in Kurdish hands. Baghdad has maintained garrisons at the two vital dams of Dukan and Barbandi Khan however.

"D. With the influx of 250,000 people and a virtual economic blockade of the Kurdish area by the government, Barzani's administration requires not only additional arms (surface-to-air rockets, anti-tank rockets, and more anti-aircraft machine guns) but also civilian supplies and money. They need more food, tents, clothing. They have come to ask the Shah and their other friends for an increased level of support.

"4. Told Barzani that he would pass his request along and that we would be discussing it. Of course, with the Iranians, however, he should know a few things which might make it difficult for us to do more than we were now doing.

"A. Even the Iranians do not have hand-held ground-to-air rockets and we have none in our own inventory which are of foreign manufacture.

"B. Organization does not have unlimited funds and it may well be contributing the maximum available in its budget and cash payments.

"C. As he knew, security and secrecy were essential to this project and, if through an attempt to raise the level of
5. Barzani said he thinks that the Iraqis may plan to bomb the Kurds and that the Turks may collaborate with the Iraqis as well. He noted that the Turks have massed a lot of troops along the border. He said the Kurds are not seeking war and would like to avoid it but they refuse to give up any Kurdish territory.

6. Barzani then went on to say that the root of his trouble with the Ba'ath is his refusal to cooperate with the Ba'ath and the communists against Iran and the West. He said he has to think about the welfare of his people and if he can't get sufficient support from Iran and the USA perhaps the best thing would be for him to leave the area, seek asylum in Iran, and tell the Kurdish people to make the best deal they can with the Ba'ath. He went on that as he sees it they have only two choices: either to accept the Ba'ath autonomy proposals and join the National Front, or to refuse and to fight.

Said there was possibly another alternative which would be to continue strengthening themselves militarily and to continue talking and negotiating with a view to avoiding an all-out military confrontation. The Kurds could pay for the breakdown and perhaps work with anti-Ba'ath Arab elements to weaken and eventually overthrow the regime.

8. Barzani said he would like Iranian approval to set up and protect an Iraqi Arab and Kurdish government in the north.
WHICH WOULD CLAIM TO BE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, BUT WOULD IRAN AND THE USA RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT IT? ASKED HIM TO IDENTIFY THE ARAB IRAQI LEADERS WHO COULD FORM SUCH A GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT REVEAL THEIR NAMES FOR SECURITY REASONS UNTIL THE APPROPRIATE TIME. IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY HAVE NO SUBSTANTIAL GROUP OF ANTI-BA'TH ARAB LEADERS WHO ARE PREPARED TO COLLABORATE AT THIS TIME.

HE REPEATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET THE AMBASSADOR AND TO GO TO SEE DR. KISSINGER. REPEATED ALL THE VALID REASONS WHY THIS WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE OR EVEN FEASIBLE. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW HIM, HE WOULD ASK HIM TO URGE DR. KISSINGER TO RECEIVE HIM. MAYBE DR. KISSINGER WOULD INTERCEDE WITH GROMYKO, TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO TELL THE IRAQIS NOT TO ATTACK THE KURDS.

IMPRESSION IS THAT WHAT THEY MOST WANT FROM US NOW IS MORE MONEY AND ORDNANCE. FROM THE IRANIANS THEY WANT MUCH MORE MONEY, MORE WEAPONS WITH WHICH TO ARM THE REFUGEES, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. INFORMED THAT OUR STOCKS OF SUITABLE BLOC AND FOREIGN ORDNANCE HAVE BEEN LARGELY DEPLETED BY OUR DELIVERIES TO DATE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME ITEMS LEFT WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL.

ON 17 MARCH GENERAL NASIRI RECAPITULATED THE SITUATION IN KURDESTAN AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL BARZANI. HE STRESSED THAT TURKISH MILITARY FORCES WERE SEALING THE BORDER TO THE
SECRET

NORTH OF BARZANI'S FORCES AND THAT IRAQ HAS IMPOSED AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. HE SAID THE KURDS NEED:

A. GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES,
B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS,
C. ANTI-TANK MISSILES,
D. MORE RIFLES.

THEY ALSO NEED TENTS, CLOTHING, FOODSTUFFS, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

"12. NOTED THAT WE HAD SOME ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FOR THE 12.7MM HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AND NOTED THAT WE HAD PROVIDED SAVAK WITH $25,000 WITH WHICH TO PURCHASE GAS MASKS. SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT THE IRANIAN AND KURDISH REQUESTS TO HEADQUARTERS AFTER DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

"13. MENTIONED THAT IN HIS TALK THE PRECEDING DAY GENERAL BARZANI HAD SURFACED THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF HE DID NOT RECEIVE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT HE MIGHT DECIDE TO GIVE UP THE STRUGGLE, SEEK ASYLUM IN IRAN AND RECOMMEND TO HIS PEOPLE THAT THEY MAKE THE BEST DEAL THEY CAN WITH THE BA'TH. GENERAL NASSIRI DOUBTED VERY STRONGLY THAT BARZANI WOULD DO THIS AND AGREED WITH HIM. WE SPECULATED THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY A TACTICAL PLOT ON BARZANI'S PART TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE IRANIANS AND US TO PROVIDE INCREASED SUPPORT. GENERAL NASSIRI'S OWN POSITION IS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SUPPORT FOR BARZANI BE GREATLY INCREASED SINCE BARZANI HAS NO OPTION BUT TO CARE FOR THE MILLION AND ONE HALF PEOPLE WHO ARE IN HIS AREA AND CUT OFF FROM OTHER MEANS OF SUPPORT."
14. BEFORE WE PROCEED FURTHER WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OR THE KURDS, WE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE KNOWING HOW YOU WANT THIS HANDLED.