KOREA

Stress on Sino-Soviet Assistance to Korea: The Soviet-North Korean agreement on aid announced on 19 September has been widely reported. The economic agreement confirms the grant of one billion rubles to North Korea for the rehabilitation of large industrial enterprises—adding that it was made "without compensation," provides for Soviet material and technical assistance, for the training of Korean cadres, and for new and more favorable terms of repayment of past obligations. There is no explicit reference to the intended use of Soviet technicians in North Korea, although Kim Il Sung himself in his speech before the 6th Labor Party Plenum during the first week of August had indicated Korea's need for such personnel and the intention to invite them. At that time the Korean Premier urged Koreans to learn faithfully from their Soviet comrades and warned against a shirking of responsibility.

Failure to mention Soviet advisors either in the official communique or in peripheral comment may indicate that Pyongyang prefers to condition the Koreans gradually to acceptance of Soviet advisors. The influx of Soviet advisors into China was anticipated propagandistically by Peking, probably in an effort to convince a reluctant population of the need for their services. Pyongyang broadcasts have noted the superiority of Soviet techniques and have publicized the skill of Soviet-trained Korean workers, but references to the advantages of having Soviet technicians actually present in Korea have been avoided. It does not seem likely that the use of Soviet technicians is no longer contemplated.

Pyongyang's comment on the Soviet-North Korean agreement centers largely on the official communique on the negotiations and has included no reaction to Malenkov's 19 September address. The Soviet Premier devoted only general attention to Soviet-Korean relations and spoke more specifically of the awakening of Asia and of the rise of China as a "great, new power." Moscow has broadcast Malenkov's address widely and has in addition given prominent attention to a PRAVDA editorial echoing the Premier's words. Heavy attention is also given the official communique and the Kim speech.

In contrast, Peking broadcasts of the communique and of the two principal speeches by Malenkov and Kim Il Sung appear only in the home service and the speeches are broadcast only once each, despite Malenkov's stress on the role of China in Asia. Although Moscow seems to have assumed major responsibility for orbit relations with Korea, the presence of the Chinese ambassador to Moscow in the negotiations indicates Chinese acceptance of a continued and important role in Korea. Indicative of this role is a 21 September NCNA release reporting a recent directive of the CPV Political Department ordering the active assistance of Korean rehabilitation and relief efforts by CPV units. Further the Tientsin TA KUNG PAO on 22 September asserts editorially that the Chinese, grateful for Soviet assistance, will in turn learn Soviet "internationalism" and will apply this principle in the continued assistance to Korea. Pyongyang's recognition of the continued
role of the Chinese in Korea, a subject largely neglected up to now, seems to be indicated in a MINJU CHOSUN editorial on Peng Te-huai's review of CPV activity during the war. The editorial, as reported by Peking, stresses that the "inseparable comradeship" of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean people has become an "outstanding example of the spirit of internationalism" and goes on to speak of the "continued support" of the Chinese. Another recent comment records that firmer Sino-Korean friendship will contribute to "the common prosperity of the two peoples."

Roundtable Principle Not Emphasized: Peking broadcasts contain little independent reference either to the proceedings of the United Nations or to the controversy surrounding the political conference. The Chou En-lai cable to the U.N. and the complementary North Korean cable were given extensive publicity as was the PEOPLE'S DAILY echoing Chou's message, but a noticeable decline in attention has been apparent following this initial flurry. Except for rebroadcasts of Vishinsky's opening speech in the U.N. demanding Chinese Communist membership, Peking has ignored the U.N. session. The only effort to highlight the principle of a roundtable conference was demonstrated in NCNA's reportage of Prime Minister Nehru's speech before the Indian Parliament and in peripheral mention of favorable Indian and British press comment. This meager effort may mean that Chou intended more to delay and disrupt Western plans rather than to establish firm Communist opposition to a two-sided conference.

Pyongyang on the other hand devotes a special commentary to Secretary Dulles' speech in the U.N. on 17 September, denouncing him in familiar terms as "that notorious war merchant," and charging that his speech was a "tirade" containing only "hypocrisy, falsehood and distortion." Dulles' remarks on Korea invoke the brunt of Pyongyang's vitriolic denunciation, and the commentary concludes that it is clearly "impossible to hold the political conference under the 15-nation resolution."

Lee Rejects American Query Concerning 3100 Americans: Peking broadcasts have not confirmed Wilfred Burchett's statement that 23 American POWs and one British prisoner have opposed direct repatriation. An NCNA transmission of 21 September merely repeats that "more than 300 South Korean and about 20 non-Korean prisoners" who, "despite persuasion," have refused repatriation will be turned over to the neutral nations commission in a few days' time. The item confirms that there are Americans in the group and one of these is quoted as condemning "Jim Crowism."

General Lee Sang-cho rejected the American request for information concerning 3100 American prisoners not repatriated, according to NCNA on 21 September. Lee affirmed that the "majority" of these men were not captured by Communist forces, and avoided completely the American claim that the list was compiled in part from Communist sources--broadcasts and letters--and in part from reports from returned American prisoners.