The 25 April PRAVDA editorial on President Eisenhower's speech was widely broadcast to foreign and domestic audiences, and reviews of the Soviet central press indicate that the text of the President's speech was carried by most Moscow newspapers. The editorial gives the impression that the Soviet leaders are in general sympathetic to the principles expressed in Eisenhower's speech, but that he failed to supply adequate evidence of U.S. intentions "to march along the road of detente in international relations." PRAVDA's contention that the Soviet Union still cannot be certain of the foreign political attitude of the United States at the present moment centers on what interpretation should be given Secretary Dulles' speech of 18 April. "Dulles' martial inclinations have been known for a long time and it may be that his utterance is a somewhat free interpretation of the President's speech.... If the true meaning of Eisenhower's address is as represented in Dulles' more detailed speech, it cannot produce positive results for the interests of peace." The editorial does not assert in the usual dogmatic style of Soviet propaganda that all leaders of the U.S. government are agreed on an aggressive policy, but rather implies that the function of Dulles' speech is not completely clear.

There is also very little of the editorial couched in the usual ideological terms. The proposed solution of international issues is based on the idea that "these problems have become ripe for solution," and on "the actual relationship between the forces and the factors which determine the international situation."

While the PRAVDA editorial did little more than deny Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Satellite radios are carrying numerous articles on the "new, better, happier life" afforded the people as the result of the establishment of people's democratic governments. Radio Warsaw asserts that President Eisenhower's concern for the peoples of Eastern Europe is "superfluous and uninvited."

There has been little additional comment from Moscow on the President's speech and the only follow-up of the PRAVDA editorial comes in the form of reviews of the foreign press. These press reviews vary somewhat from the usual Soviet procedure of selecting only material which unconditionally supports the Soviet point of view. For example, Moscow quotes without comment Sulzberger's remark that the PRAVDA reply "deliberately retained vagueness with regard to the main issues."

KOREAN WAR: All-time Low Reflects Reticence on Korean Topics

Moscow initiates little comment on the Korean war and the latest truce proposals and gives only limited distribution to NUNA accounts of the truce developments. Moscow's reticence—no commentaries on the war are broadcast to home or Satellite audiences during the past week—is illustrated by the progressive decline in comment on the war following initial exploitation.
of the Chou-Kim-Molotov peace bids. The present all-time low of 12 items was paralleled only once before in late October 1950 during the disastrous rout of the North Korean forces when 15 items were broadcast. The almost completely negative position on Korea equally avoids contradiction as well as elaboration of Moscow's present general "peace" pronouncements. Further evidence of Moscow's reticence is reflected in Soviet failure to continue or initiate comment on the following points of contention:

1. The issue of membership of Communist China and Korea in the United Nations, contained in Molotov's statement on peaceful settlement of the Korean war and implicitly linked to that settlement, has not been mentioned since by Moscow, with the exception of the PRAVDA editorial on Eisenhower's speech.

2. The suggestion that the unification of Korea and its internal arrangements be left to the Koreans themselves, advanced in the PRAVDA editorial on 11 April, has received no further Soviet exploitation nor have Peking or Pyongyang even referred to it.

3. The interpretation given the Chou-Kim-Molotov proposals is restricted to a Korean settlement and only oblique references have been made linking settlement of the Korean war to ultimate settlement of other Far East or world tensions.

4. Charges in the U.S. press concerning atrocities against U.N. prisoners are treated briefly in a single TASS comment reporting the "sensationalism" surrounding the stories which were seized upon by certain Congressmen opposed to a Korean truce. (Moscow denies these "atrocity" charges indirectly by devoting increased news-item attention to reports—particularly British reports—that humane treatment was accorded Communist-held prisoners.)

5. In contrast to Peking's charges of U.S. atrocities against Korean and Chinese prisoners, Moscow virtually ignores this topic, reporting only briefly the "mockery and outrage" experienced by the prisoners.

Prominent South Koreans Single Out for Denunciation: Indication of possible Moscow intention to replace its attention to Korean war topics with topics of domestic Korean concern more or less unrelated to the war is contained in unusual references to spring agricultural preparations in North Korea and to the South Korean political situation. Five prominent South Korean political leaders are singled out for denunciation as "arch-enemies" of the Korean people and "lackeys" of the warmongers. Moscow usually discusses South Korean affairs in reference to a specific event such as an election or in general framework of charges of imperialist exploitation. Seldom do the accusations contain charges against specific individuals, with the exception of Syngman Rhee. This present denunciation may be an endeavor to bring about the political isolation of these men in the event of a future unification arrangement, which, according to previous Soviet proposals, would be left to the Koreans themselves. (The same five leaders, Lee Bum Suk, Shin T'K Hui, John Chang, George Paek and Cho Bong Am, were featured in an article in the 20 January 1953 issue of THE REPORTER magazine as possible successors to Syngman Rhee.)