GLOBAL AFFAIRS

KOREAN WAR: Restraint Marks Heavy Attention to Truce Moves

Moscow broadcasts on Korea bear almost exclusively on the peaceful settlement of the war and exhibit unusual restraint. Although Moscow has documented the Communist position throughout the war by articles written by Radio Moscow's own commentators, there are no items of that kind during the current period. In place of these familiar commentaries Moscow gives wide dissemination to the statements of Chou En-lai, Kim Il Sung and Molotov as well as to the editorials published in the Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY of 5 April and PRVDA on 11 April. There is no reporting of Soviet reaction to peace proposals except for the above-mentioned PRVDA editorial and a non-committal NEW TIMES editorial on 10 April which was reported only by TASS.

This apparent restraint and hesitancy to commit the Soviet Union to anything but a carefully outlined position is maintained in reportage of the resumed Panmunjom liaison meetings. As in its past attention to truce meetings, Moscow relies exclusively on dispatches from NCNA correspondents and occasional REUTERS or AFP accounts of the progress of the meetings. No independent TASS dispatches have been reported.

Political Problems of Truce Treated Only by Moscow: The two authoritative Soviet statements on the truce proposals--Molotov's statement and the widely broadcast PRVDA editorial on 11 April--both refer to aspects of the Korean settlement avoided entirely in Peking and Pyongyang broadcasts; namely, political or post-truce settlement. Molotov linked the issue of U.N. membership for Communist China and Korea with a Korean armistice, while PRVDA introduces the problem of Korean unification and indicates apparent Soviet willingness to return to a situation comparable to that before the Korean war. The editorial advocates that the Koreans should "themselves decide the questions concerning unification and the internal arrangement of the Korean state," a position similar to that advanced by the Soviets at the 7th-General Assembly session, although this Korean arrangement is presumably to come about without the assistance of the international commission proposed by Vishinsky at that time. There is no elaboration on the terms for possible Korean unification and Peking and Pyongyang avoid comment on this proposal as well as on Molotov's suggestion for U.N. membership.

The PRVDA editorial also provides the first Communist reaction to alleged rumors in Washington regarding the inter-relation of the Korean and Indochinese questions and possible attempts to move the division of Korea north of the present line of contact and may reflect growing Communist concern over Administration attempts to effect a settlement of all Far East tensions. Moscow, reacting with unusual promptness, denounces these proposals as the products of "hidden enemies of a peaceful solution of the Korean question," but speculates that the alleged proposals are perhaps for bargaining purposes. The editorial carefully avoids characterizing the "rumors" as official U.S. policy, but warns that, if persisted in, the proposals could indicate U.S. unwillingness to reach a Korean settlement.
Additional reportage on 12 April paraphrases the recent WASHINGTON POST editorial regarding the inconsistency of the rumored U.S. position favoring settlement of the wars in Korea and Indochina but continuation of the hostility between Taiwan and the mainland. No explicit reference is made to the French-American communique of 28 March warning Communist China against using a Korean truce period for stepped-up aggression elsewhere in the Far East. The PRAVDA editorial and Molotov's endorsement of the Chou proposal are both given unusual attention in broadcasts to the Satellites.