NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

NIE-80
Published 3 April 1953

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 30 March 1953.

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6 May 1953

NOTICE TO HOLDERS OF NIE-80, "COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA," published 3 April 1953

SUBJECT: CHANGES IN ANNEX D AND MAP

The Intelligence Advisory Committee has noted the apparent inconsistency between data in Annex D to NIE-80 and data in the reference legend on the Map in that estimate, and has approved the changes below:

ANNEX D

1. Reference column headed "Combat Radius (Nautical Miles)". Revise heading to read "Maximum Combat Radius at Best Operating Altitude (Nautical Miles)" and revise figures for MIG-15 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radius (Nautical Miles)</th>
<th>MIG-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>816</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Revise Footnote (2) to read: "With two external 70 66 gal. tanks".

MAP

3. Reference legend in lower right-hand corner. Revise to read as follows (arcs on map should be changed accordingly): RANGES RADII OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM COMMUNIST BASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (Nautical Miles)</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 96 105</td>
<td>MIG-15 with two 550-pound bombs, and internal fuel only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 106 110</td>
<td>MIG-15 with no added armament, and internal fuel only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 240 255</td>
<td>MIG-15 with two 50-gallon 66-gallon wing tanks, and no added armament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 600</td>
<td>II-28 jet light bomber with a 4,400-pound bomb load, at 32/40,000 feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Strato mission with flight out and return at best altitude.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: NH-60: Communist Capabilities and Probable Course of Action in Korea

1. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, has noted that there is an apparent inconsistency between data in Annex D to NH-60 and data in the reference legend on the Map in that estimate.

2. The attached changes have been proposed by the Air Force to bring Annex D and the Map in line.

3. Please let me have your concurrence (or non-concurrence) by Wednesday, 29 April.

[Space for signature]

PAUL A. BROWN
D/Acting Director/Int.,
National Estimates

Distribution "A"
PROPOSED CHANGES IN ANNEX D AND MAP FIG-40
COMMunist CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION IN KOREA

ANNEX D

1. Reference column headed "Combat Radius (Nautical Miles)". Revise heading to read "Maximum Combat Radius at Best Operating Altitude (Nautical Miles)" and revise figures for HIG-15 as follows:

   1601  2251
   2252  2692

2. Revise Footnote (2) to read: "With two external 40,566 gal. tanks."

MAP

3. Reference label in lower right-hand corner. Revise to read as follows (area on map should be changed accordingly):

RANGE RADIUS OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM COMMunist BASES

1. 95-102 nautical miles - HIG-15 with two 550-pound bombs, and internal fuel only.

2. 195-140 nautical miles - HIG-15 with no added armament, and internal fuel only.

3. 260-225 nautical miles - HIG-15 with two 500-pound wing tanks, and no added armament.

4. 600 nautical miles - D-28 jet fighter with a 4,000-pound bomb load, at 32,000 feet.

Footnote:

a Strafing mission with flight out and return at best altitude.
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA THROUGH 1953

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea through 1953.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communist military potential in the Korean area has grown steadily since the initiation of cease-fire negotiations in mid-1951. Troop strength has more than doubled and logistic support has been substantially improved. Jet fighter strength has more than tripled. An estimated 100 jet light bombers have been introduced in Manchuria. Combat effectiveness of Communist military forces has improved and is now believed to range from good to excellent. A highly organized, well-integrated defensive zone extends possibly 15 to 20 miles to the rear of present battle positions. Many fortified areas have been constructed in rear of this zone and are being improved and expanded.

2. The Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC) currently has the capability of seriously challenging UNC daylight air operations under conditions of good visibility over North Korea. It also has the capability of expanding CAFIC air operations into UN-held territory and adjacent waters. If the Communists supported a major ground offensive by exercising the maximum capabilities of the CAFIC over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC supporting bases, and achieved optimum success in these operations, the enemy might place the UNC forces in Korea in jeopardy.

3. The enemy is capable of launching a major ground and/or air attack with little or no warning. On balance, current Communist military, diplomatic, and propaganda activities do not indicate that the Communists intend to launch large-scale ground or air operations in the near future.

4. Political and economic conditions within North Korea and Communist China are not exerting compelling pressure on the Communists to conclude an armistice in Korea.

5. We believe that during the period of this estimate Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea will not be materially reduced by frictions and conflicting interests.

1 The term CAFIC is meant to include North Korean air units and Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communist Air Force.
6. The Communists probably estimate that the Korean war exerts a divisive influence on the Western Powers and that at least during the period of this estimate the UN/US is unlikely to commit the military strength in the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time the Communists probably believe that the UN/US will take actions during the period of this estimate which will increase the costs and risks of the Korean war for the Communists.

7. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek to maintain strong military pressure in Korea while retaining a primarily defensive posture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their military strength in the Korea-Manchuria area in order to be in a position to exploit any advantage which might develop or to counter possible UN/US intensification or expansion of the war.

8. We believe that so long as the military stalemate in Korea continues, the Communists are unlikely to make concessions on the POW issue to secure an armistice.1

9. We believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.

DISCUSSION

CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA

Force Strengths

10. Ground Forces. Enemy ground forces in the Korean area have grown steadily in personnel strength since the initiation of armistice negotiations in mid-1951, and currently are more than double their mid-1951 strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTH OF ENEMY GROUND FORCES</th>
<th>KOREA</th>
<th>JULY 1951</th>
<th>JULY 1952</th>
<th>MARCH 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korean</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>287,000</td>
<td>294,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>388,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>502,000</td>
<td>667,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, there are about 250,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and 120,000 in North China. These forces could be used in Korea should a situation develop which required rapid, substantial Communist reinforcement of their current forces.

11. The combat effectiveness and morale of Communist ground units in Korea is judged to range from good to excellent. Major programs of reorganization, re-equipment, and reinforcement, particularly in armor, artillery, and antiaircraft artillery units, have resulted in substantially increased enemy fire power. In recent months, improvements have been noted in the enemy's employment of field and AA artillery and in training, as evidenced by

1 EE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China" (dated 9 March 1953), concludes that a naval blockade of Communist China, in conjunction with large-scale and sustained air and naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportation lines, would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on present UN terms.
better leadership and tactical use of troops, particularly in small unit tactics. There has been an increased emphasis on the use of fire and maneuver and less emphasis on "human sea" tactics.

12. The Communist logistic position in Korea has improved during the long semi-static period since the beginning of armistice negotiations. Although UNC operations against lines of communication in North Korea have made Communist re-supply efforts difficult, the enemy has been able, though at considerable cost in effort and equipment, to transport sufficient supplies to meet his combat requirements and to create stockpiles. It is estimated that the enemy now has stockpiled in Korea sufficient supplies to support about 35 days of offensive operations. However, because of a limited transport capability for support of his attacking echelons, the enemy probably would not be able to sustain a large-scale offensive for more than 10 to 14 days. It should be noted, however, that the enemy's build-up in military strength in North Korea has brought an accompanying increase in his logistic requirements. Thus, effective logistic support of a major sustained offensive would now necessitate, more than at any time in the past, a steady flow of supplies to forward areas.

13. Air Forces. The Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC)* has grown steadily since the initiation of truce negotiations in mid-1951. It is estimated that the enemy's jet fighter strength has more than tripled since mid-1951. In addition, CAFIC strength has been increased in recent months by the introduction of IL-28 jet light bombers, an estimated 100 of which are now in Manchuria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTIMATED CAFIC TO &amp; E STRENGTH†</th>
<th>July 1951</th>
<th>July 1955</th>
<th>February 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Light Bomber</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Types</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Present actual strength of CAFIC units is not known, but most units are believed to be near their authorized strength. Table of Organization and Equipment strength is used as the basis for estimation of CAFIC strength since it is considered that prior to any deliberate Communist expansion of the war the USSR probably would provide the CAFIC with sufficient aircraft to bring any under-strength units to their full TO & E complement. See Annex A and Annex B for a tabular and graphic presentation of Communist air strength since the outbreak of the Korean war, together with a strength forecast through the period of this estimate. See Annex C for a tabular presentation of Pact East air strength, and Annex D for CAFIC and Soviet Air Force aircraft performance characteristics. By way of comparison, the actual UNC air strength in mid-1951 was about 900 aircraft, the majority of which were piston type. The actual UNC air strength at present is about 1,710 aircraft, of which approximately 775 are jet fighters.

†The term CAFIC is meant to include North Korean air units and Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communists.

Of the present total combat strength of 2,350, approximately 1,460 combat aircraft (including 1,000 jet fighters and the 100 IL-28 jet light bombers) are believed to be in the North Korea-Manchuria area. The remaining combat aircraft (including over 300 jet fighters) are believed to be in China proper, based primarily around Peking, Shanghai, Canton, and Huchou.

14. By US criteria, CAFIC fighter units are believed to be reaching a fairly high standard of combat efficiency. There has been a steady improvement in enemy air tactics and, although the degree of individual enemy pilots' aggressiveness has fluctuated periodically, the proficiency and aggressiveness of enemy fighter pilots by US standards is considered "good" at the present time. The most serious current CAFIC weakness is its deficiency in all-weather and night-interception capability. Although the CAFIC has been able to maintain sustained air activity over the past year, the average CAFIC daily sortie rate, based on sightings by UN aircraft, appears to be only a fraction of the number of sorties possible with the total aircraft believed to be available.

15. Airfield construction and repair has been underway in North Korea since June 1950. At present, there are approximately 33 airfields in North Korea which are or could be
come suitable for military operations. Of these, there are eight airfields which could within a short time be capable of handling sustained jet operations. Within Communist China, an intensive airfield repair and facilities build-up has produced a good system of airfields capable of handling all types of aircraft now available to the CAFIC. In Manchuria, the recently developed air facilities are so located as to provide excellent bases for the air defense of Manchuria, and the ten jet airfields in the Antung Mukden complex are so located as to permit Communist jet fighters to strafe — but not to bomb — forward UN installations.  

16. The CAFIC is almost wholly dependent upon the USSR for logistical support, including aircraft, fuel supplies, ammunition, and armament. In addition, the USSR appears to be providing advanced pilot training within the USSR for CAFIC pilots, and Soviet personnel may be exercising operational control of the CAFIC, either directly or indirectly.

17. Naval Forces. The small prewar North Korean Navy was largely destroyed early in the Korean war. Except for a substantial capability for mine-laying, its present effectiveness is insignificant. The operational Chinese Communist Navy consists of about 100 ships, including 42 amphibious vessels. The Chinese Communist Navy has increased its effectiveness in the past year. There has been no indication to date of Chinese Communist naval aid to North Korea.

18. The USSR is supplying the Chinese Communist Navy, and to a lesser extent, the North Korean Navy, with motor torpedo boats and other small naval vessels, as well as naval ordnance, mines, POL, radar and deck and minesweeping gear. No Soviet submarines are known to have been transferred. The Chinese Communists and the North Koreans are probably receiving Soviet guidance and training in naval warfare and coastal defense.

Over-All Military Capabilities

19. Ground Forces. There are currently deployed in North Korea approximately 19 Chinese Communist armies and 5 North Korean corps. Artillery, rocket launcher, and armored units are attached to infantry divisions. Approximately 300,000 of these forces are either engaged in or immediately available for coastal defense operations. The bulk of this force is disposed in the coastal areas where amphibious operations might be anticipated. The Communists have been engaged in the strengthening of their coastal and front-line defenses since 1951. A highly organized, well-integrated defensive zone extends possibly 15 to 20 miles to the rear of present battle positions. Many fortified areas have been constructed in rear of this zone and are being improved and expanded. A defensive zone is believed to exist slightly to the rear of the forward fortified area and a third zone has been reported across the waist of Korea. Reports indicate extensive employment of entrenchments, wire, mines, and roadblocks in all defensive areas. Strong field fortifications have been constructed in depth along present front lines and along the east and west coasts. Logistical reserves have been substantially improved in these areas.

20. At the present time and under present conditions of limited air support, Communist ground forces in Korea have the following capabilities:

   a. A large-scale offensive, with little or no warning;
   b. Limited-objective offensives;
   c. Defense in depth over a prolonged period;
   d. Limited guerrilla operations in South Korea.

21. Air Forces. The CAFIC currently has the capability of seriously challenging UN daylight air operations under conditions of good visibility over North Korea and of expanding CAFIC air operations into UN-held territory and adjacent waters. CAFIC capabilities appear to have been greatly increased during the past six months by the conversion of two light bomber regiments in Manchuria to IL-28 jet light bombers. The maximum estimated combat radius of the IL-28 is such that by

*See attached map.
staging from Southern Manchuria bases the
CAFIC could launch attacks throughout
South Korea and part of Japan.2

22. The CAFIC does not have the present ca-
pability, however, of challenging UNC air
operations under conditions of poor visibility
and has only a limited all-weather capability.
CAFIC capabilities against UNC ground forces
and installations are presently limited by the
lack of operational jet fighter installations in
Korea from which short-range attacks, em-
ploying bombs or napalm, could be mounted.
The CAFIC has not yet demonstrated the
capability of carrying out either effective air-
ground support operations or effective high-
altitude bombing by jet aircraft.

23. Communist air defense capabilities in
Korea, Manchuria, and to a lesser extent in
China proper have considerably increased
during the past year as a result of intensive
effort. A visual observer and/or radar air
warning net has been established which pro-
vides almost complete coverage along the
China coast from Hainan Island through
Manchuria to the Soviet frontier. An exten-
sive radar net has been developed in the
Korea-Manchuria area. However, despite the
considerable progress made, present Commu-
nist radar control and communications facili-
ties are not believed capable of operating
effectively against mass or saturation raids.
Communist antiaircraft fire in North Korea
has continued to increase in volume and ac-
curacy over the past year and now includes
some use of radar-controlled searchlights and
guns. The Communists have an estimated
1,000 jet fighters in the North Korean-
Manchurian area and have the capability in
this area of making a vigorous fighter defense
against UN air attacks under conditions of
daylight and good visibility. However, these
fighter defense capabilities are severely limited
by darkness and poor visibility. Elsewhere in
Communist China, the CAFIC may be able to
deploy enough aircraft for defense of selected

specific areas against air attack, but the pres-
ently available forces are too sparsely deployed
and other elements of the air defense system
are too weak to prevent saturation of the air
defense system through simultaneous attacks
against several areas. There is no indication
that airborne intercept radar equipment is
available to the CAFIC.

24. Combined Air and Ground Capabilities.
If the Communists employed their maximum
air capability simultaneously with a major
ground force offensive but restricted their air
activity to Communist-held territory, they
would interfere at least initially with UNC
close-support and interdiction operations.
This relief from UNC air action against enemy
forward elements and LOC would improve
considerably the enemy's opportunities for
limited success. However, under these circum-
stances, Communist forces would probably not
have the capability to eject UNC forces from
Korea. If the Communists supported a major
ground offensive by surprise attacks exercising
their maximum air capabilities over the entire
Korean theater of operations and UNC sup-
port bases,3 the enemy would cause consider-
dable damage to UNC jet airfield installations
in the forward areas. In addition, such at-
tacks would divert some UNC aircraft and AA
weapons to purely defensive missions. There-
fore, the ground force capabilities would be
enhanced in that their troop movements and
logistic efforts would be under considerably

3 Insufficient information is available on which to
base a firm estimate of the maximum number of
CAFIC aircraft which could be committed to the
initial attack of a major air offensive. However,
assuming that units in the CAFIC are assigned
approximately 80 percent of their T/O & E
strength and that a stand-down inspection was
held prior to a major air offensive, the
enemy, without redeployment of aircraft, could
practically commit at present about 700 jet fighters,
120 piston fighters, 40 jet light bombers, and 25
piston light bombers. With redeployment, and
with the same assumptions as above, these fig-
ures would increase to about 950 jet fighters, 150
piston fighters, 49 jet light bombers, and 150
piston light bombers. The sortie rate which
could be sustained after an initial air strike is
estimated to be 18 per month for each jet
fighter, and 15 per month for all other types.

1 See attached n.d.p. IL-28s are believed to have
a combat ceiling of 27,000 feet, approximate
maximum air speed of 450 knots, and bomb-load
capacity of up to 6,500 pounds.
lighter air attacks. Although no firm estimate can be made of the situation which might ultimately develop under these circumstances, it is possible that if the Communists supported a major ground offensive by exercising their maximum air capabilities over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC supporting bases, and achieved optimum success in these operations, the enemy might place UNC forces in jeopardy.

25. Naval Forces. With the exception of mine-laying, North Korean naval capabilities continue to be negligible. If the Chinese Communist Navy should enter the Korean war, it would be capable of assisting the North Korean Navy as follows:
   a. Motor torpedo boat surprise attacks on UN shipping in the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea.
   b. Laying and sweeping naval mines.
   c. Supplying up to 1,000 trained submarine personnel.
   d. Providing amphibious lift for a balanced force of 3 to 4 divisions in the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea, using conventional landing craft. Control of the sea and air are necessary to conduct such operations.

   a. Under continued conditions of a stalemate war in Korea. Under these circumstances Communist capabilities probably would continue to improve during the period of this estimate. The enemy is capable of continuing the augmentation of ground forces by the introduction of additional infantry, artillery, and armored units, and of continuing the improvement of fire power, tactical use of troops, and logistic support. If the USSR continued to support the CAFFIC, the over-all capabilities of the Communists would probably be significantly improved and the threat to UN installations in Korea would be increased. The Chinese Communist Navy is believed capable of absorbing considerably more naval equipment, including small coastal submarines or coastal destroyers, than is now apparently being supplied to them by the USSR. Whether or not such additional Soviet support is given, Chinese Communist naval capabilities for operations described in paragraph 25 would continue to increase. North Korean naval capabilities would increase to a very modest extent.

26. In the event of a cease-fire in Korea. The most significant trend likely to develop in enemy capabilities under these circumstances would be the rebuilding and re-equipping of North Korea's airfields.

Soviet Capabilities to Intervene in the Korean War

27. Ground Forces. If the USSR should decide to intervene openly in the Korean war, it would at the present time commit to combat within Korea an estimated 13 to 18 divisions (215,000—250,000 troops) within 30 to 60 days after a decision had been made to employ these forces. No firm estimate can be made of the Soviet forces available for use in Korea in the event of full mobilization in the Soviet Far East. The total force under such circumstances would probably be substantially in excess of 13—15 divisions.

28. Air Forces. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Force consists of present of an estimated 5,000 aircraft, including 1,760 jet fighters, 320 jet light bombers, 1,150 piston light bombers, and 220 TU—4 piston medium bombers. It is believed that available facilities would allow deployment into the Korean theater of less than 20 percent of the above total strength. However, the Soviet air forces could launch air strikes with approximately 150 jet light bombers, 820 piston light bombers, and 130 piston medium bombers from present bases in the Southern Maritime and Port Arthur areas against UN installations in Korea and Japan while maintaining an air defense of Soviet territory. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Force could also provide an air


TO & E strength. See Annex C.
borne lift for 6,700 to 7,500 paratroops, or it could lift 15,000 to 18,000 paratroops in an operation extending over a 5-day period.

20. Naval Forces. Present Soviet naval strength in the Pacific area is estimated to be 321 surface vessels, the largest of which are two heavy cruisers and 3 destroyers; and 93 submarines, of which 64 are modern types. This force could be immediately employed in the Korean area. Soviet naval aviation in the Far East (all shore-based and included in totals given above for the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force) is estimated (TO & E) to consist of 1,540 aircraft. Utilizing their presently known number of 42 amphibious vessels, it is estimated that the Soviets could provide amphibious lift for a balanced force of 2 divisions against the east coast of Korea or Japan. Utilization of merchant vessels would afford an increased capability.

30. Likely Trends in Soviet Military Capabilities in the Korean Area. No major changes are expected in Soviet Far East ground force or naval capabilities during the period of this estimate. The effectiveness of the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force will probably improve through continued re-equipment of existing units with jet fighters and jet light bombers, and through increased proficiency of flying personnel with respect to formation flying, high altitude bombing, and long-range navigation under both clear and restricted visibility conditions.

PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

Soviet Global Interests

31. In terms of Communist global interests, the Korean war has had both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the war has served to tie down US military forces, has created a source of tension between the US and its allies, and has provided a useful focus and stimulus for Communist propaganda and other forms of political warfare. On the negative side, the war has been a drain on the resources of the USSR and Communist China and has provided a stimulus for maintaining the West's rearmament efforts.

Moreover, the Communists probably estimate that a closing out of the war by concessions to the UN would encourage the West to maintain a firm position on other issues of the East-West conflict, would involve a loss of prestige, and might increase Communist military defections in the future.

32. Whether the Kremlin estimates that Soviet interests in the Far East can be advanced by a prolongation or by a termination of the war in Korea depends in large degree on Soviet world-wide strategy. The Kremlin probably would prefer to move toward the attainment of its objectives by means short of general war. While the Communist aggression in Korea has involved, throughout, an inherent risk of general war, the Kremlin has sought to limit its own role in the Korean war and has not sought to use the war as an excuse for initiating broader hostilities. The Kremlin appears desirous of avoiding general war over the Korean issue and for this reason would probably prefer either a continuation of the present situation or an armistice to a spread in hostilities that in its view would lead to general war.

Internal Conditions in Communist China and North Korea

33. Communist China. During the Korean war, Chinese Communist political controls have been intensified. Forced collection of funds has been instituted in order to finance the war and the regime's internal programs. These coercive measures have in all probability decreased the degree of willing support given the regime and the war effort. But the increasingly effective totalitarian measures of the regime are almost certainly adequate to control any resentment which may develop.

34. The economic and political strains imposed on Communist China by the Korean war are probably less at present than they were in 1950 and 1951. The rise in the industrial and agricultural output of Communist China and the strengthening of political and economic controls have increased the resources at the disposal of the regime.
therefore believe it unlikely that domestic factors, either economic or political, are placing the Chinese Communist regime under any immediate and demanding pressure to conclude an armistice in Korea. So long as the USSR continues to furnish a large share of the military equipment and supplies for the war and provides economic assistance, the Chinese Communist war effort, at current or even somewhat expanded levels, is not likely to subject the economy to serious strains.

35. North Korea. A critical food situation apparently exists in North Korea. Although the regime has claimed a bumper crop for 1952, food production and distribution have apparently not met civilian and military requirements, and substantial assistance from Communist China has been necessary. North Korean housing, industry, and electric power have all been severely curtailed by UNC operations. In addition, major shortages exist in consumer goods and in agricultural manpower. Accordingly, morale among the civilian population has continued to decline and there is some evidence of factionalism within the regime. However, there is no evidence that resolution of the North Korean regime or the morale of the North Korean armed forces has been substantially weakened. A prolongation of the war will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on internal conditions in North Korea. However, this will probably have little influence on Communist courses of action in Korea because the interests of the North Korean regime will continue to be subordinated to the global or regional interests of the USSR.

Sino-Soviet Cooperation in Korea

36. Although there is evidence of a recent increase in Chinese Communist influence in North Korea, we believe that the USSR still dominates North Korean affairs. The question of primary influence in North Korea may eventually have an adverse effect upon Sino-Soviet relations, but it is unlikely that such rivalry will, during the period of this estimate, have any major effect upon Communist courses of action in Korea.

37. Continuation of the Korean war almost certainly creates strains in the Sino-Soviet partnership. The war undoubtedly raises the problems of the distribution of its burdens between the two powers. Furthermore, the death of Stalin has probably created some uncertainties in the Sino-Soviet relationship. In addition, Communist China's growing military and economic dependence on the USSR probably poses other difficulties which could eventually place serious strains on the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the conflicting individual interests and the frictions, actual and potential, which may exist in the Sino-Soviet partnership have not to date hampered the enemy's effective cooperation in Korea, and there is at the present time no evidence of changes in the Korean policies of either of the two powers. Communist China probably views its security as being closely linked to that of the USSR and has demonstrated its willingness to subordinate its immediate interests to the broader objectives it shares with the USSR. Therefore, we believe that the effectiveness of Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea, at least during the period of this estimate, will not be materially reduced.

Current Indications of Communist Intentions in Korea

38. Military Intentions. Present Communist military activities in the Far East indicate a Communist intention to maintain their military commitment in Korea. While the nature of Communist military activities in Korea suggests an immediate intention to continue defensive-type operations, the continued build-up of both ground and air strength of all types appears to anticipate the possibility of the resumption of full-scale ground fighting and an extension of air warfare.

39. Indications from Communist Diplomatic Movements. Soviet and Chinese Communist diplomatic actions, while providing no conclusive indications of Communist courses of action, suggest an intention to continue the war in Korea. In particular, the Communists have
refused to make any concessions on the POW issue. Since the indefinite suspension of truce negotiations at Pannonjum on 8 October 1952, the Communists have not indicated any readiness to compromise on their demand for “total repatriation” of POW's. This intransigence was demonstrated in the Soviet Union's violent rejection of the Menon Resolution in the UN General Assembly. The Moscow Sino-Soviet discussions and the September 1952 Sino-Soviet exchange of notes on the retention of Soviet forces in Port Arthur offer no conclusive indications of Communist intentions in Korea. However, these events do indicate a Communist desire to impress the West with the solidity of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

40. Propaganda Indications. Recent Communist propaganda has indicated no disposition on the part of the Communists to accept a truce on other than their own terms. The main burden of recent Communist propaganda has concerned itself with alleged US plans to extend the war and Communist ability to thwart these plans. However, there has been no indication in Communist propaganda of a major Communist offensive in Korea. Chinese Communist propaganda has stressed that its internal economic plans need not be disturbed and indeed can be stimulated by a continuation of the Korean war.

Probable Courses of Action

41. The Communists probably estimate that the Korean war exerts a divisive influence on the Western Powers and that at least during the period of this estimate the UN/US is unlikely to commit the military strength in the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time the Communists probably believe that the UN/US will take actions during the period of this estimate which will increase the costs and risks of the Korean war for the Communists.

42. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek to maintain strong military pressure in Korea while retaining a primarily defensive posture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their military strength in the Korea-Manchuria area in order to be in a position to exploit any advantage which might develop or to counter possible UN/US intensification or expansion of the war.

43. We believe that so long as the military stalemate in Korea continues, the Communists are unlikely to make concessions on the POW issue to secure an armistice.11

44. We believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.

11 SE-31, “Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China,” dated 8 March 1951, concludes that a naval blockade of Communist China, in conjunction with large-scale and sustained air and naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportation lines, would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on present UN terms.
### ANNEX A

THE ESTIMATED TO & E STRENGTH OF THE
COMMUNIST AIR FORCE IN CHINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>JULY 1950</th>
<th>JULY 1951</th>
<th>JULY 1952</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>JULY 1953</th>
<th>JULY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Fighter</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Attack</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Light Bomber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Light Bomber</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ANNEX C**

**ESTIMATED SOVIET FAR EAST TO & E AIR STRENGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT TYPE</th>
<th>1 JULY 1952</th>
<th>1 JANUARY 1953</th>
<th>1 JULY 1953</th>
<th>1 JULY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet</td>
<td></td>
<td>630</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bomber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>5,740</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>5,850</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX D

### CCAF AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>COMBAT RADIUS (Nautical Miles)</th>
<th>COMBAT CEILING (Feet)</th>
<th>ARMAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-15</td>
<td>160 1</td>
<td>50,500</td>
<td>2/23 mm, 80 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/37 mm, 40 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-9</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>1/37 mm, 100 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/23 mm, 75 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAK-15</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>2/20 mm, rounds/gun unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6-8/55 mm, rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAK-9</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>1/20 mm, 120 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/12.7 180 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA-7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>2/20 mm, 200 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4/23 mm, 100 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA-9</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Light Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-28</td>
<td>590 4</td>
<td>37,000 8</td>
<td>4/23 mm, guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>690 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,400/6,600 lbs. bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Light Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-2</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>23,000 8</td>
<td>2/20 mm, 150 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3/12.7 mm, 250 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,300 lbs. bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-10</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/23 mm, 150 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/7.62 mm, 750 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/12.7 mm, 150 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/132 mm, rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>880 lbs. bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-4</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>37,000 8</td>
<td>8/2.7 mm, 500 rounds/gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,150 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/20 mm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 lbs. bombs (normal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 lbs. bombs (maximum)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Internal fuel only.
2 With two external 70 gal. tanks.
3 With two external 220 gal. tanks.
4 Stripped-down version.
5 Combat ceilings will vary with gross weight.