THE KOREAN WAR

Although the U.N. debates on the Korean problem had been accorded constantly decreasing attention following the minor flurry coincident with the opening sessions, Peking's voluminous seconding of the USSR's rejection of the Indian proposal occasioned a sharp reversal in the trend. The propaganda of the past two weeks has contained the following salient elements:

1. Although Peking remained noncommittal on the Menon proposal for almost a week, it was quick to second Moscow's rejection of the proposal as a completely unacceptable facsimile of the American insistence on retaining POWs.

2. The call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, with the repatriation issue to be settled later, has been described as the primary virtue of the amended Soviet resolution although no such suggestion was included in the original proposal.

3. The provision that questions concerning the Korean issue would be settled by the Soviet-proposed U.N. Commission on the basis of a two-thirds vote seems intended to provide evidence of the Communists' willingness to abide by majority rule. However, the four Soviet-bloc members of the Commission could effectively veto any solution sanctioned by the remaining seven.

4. Eisenhower's contemplated trip to Korea continues to be assailed as a futile, melodramatic gesture. Peking insists that only a retreat from the intransigent positions on POWs can bring a truce and warns that recourse to any of the suggested radical solutions for ending the war can only mean greater American defeats.

5. Peking ridicules the contention that South Korean forces are ready to assume the major burden of the war, and notes increasing war-weariness, disgruntlement and defections among such troops now in the field.

6. The present military operations are described as "tactical counterattacks" designed to destroy the enemy's effective strength. Although there are specific denials that Communist forces are on the offensive, the capture of U.N. positions during the past three weeks is reported.

Indian Proposal No Different from American Plan: Peking remained noncommittal on the Menon resolution for almost a week, but was quick to endorse Moscow's eventual rejection of the plan as merely a camouflaged version of the American scheme to retain Communist prisoners. Earlier comment had
noted the disagreement between the Americans on the one hand, and the British and the Indians on the other, as proof of the widening gulf between the allies. The accompanying allusions to India's consistent support of Chinese participation in the UN, and the extremely circumspect tone of the related comment seemed intended to create the impression that Peking, if not completely amenable to the Indian proposal, at least considered it an improvement over the American resolution and a basis for negotiation. However, Chou En-lai and the official PEOPLE'S DAILY quickly echoed the Soviet rejection in concert with the entire propaganda apparatus. This would seem to indicate that Peking's position was somewhat undetermined and depended to a large extent on that assumed by the USSR.

Communists Claim Priority on Peace Now Proposal: Although the Soviet resolution of 10 November contained no reference to an immediate cessation of hostilities—with the repatriation question to be discussed later—the inclusion of this principle in the amended version of 24 November has been hailed by Peking as the resolution's primary virtue, as a mark of deference to the universal desire for peace and as a demonstration of Communist tractability. Peking echoes Moscow and Pyongyang in hailing this "new approach," although a virtually identical suggestion had been made by Pakistani delegate Zafrullah Khan on 14 November, and both Peking and Moscow had several times referred to such a proposal by Progressive Party presidential candidate Vincent Hallinan.

Soviet Bloc Can Veto Any Commission Proposal: In continuing to call for the formation of a new eleven-member Commission to settle the repatriation issue and related Korean problems, Peking and Moscow have noted that all decisions will be subject to a two-thirds vote and have presented this as evidence of Communist willingness to abide by majority rule. However, the four Soviet bloc members of the Commission could effectively veto any solution sanctioned by the other seven. To further minimize the possibility of the Commission successfully breaking the present impasse, Peking has specifically declared that no decisions inconsonant with the stipulations of the Geneva Convention on prisoners will be accepted.

Eisenhower's Trip Cannot End Korean War: The President-Elect's contemplated trip to Korea continues to be assailed as a futile, melodramatic gesture resulting from a fraudulent "vote-catching" promise to end the war. There has been repeated insistence that the solution to the Korean impasse lies not in meaningless junkets but in a withdrawal of the unreasonable and illegal demand to retain prisoners. Peking warns, too, that recourse to any of the radical solutions suggested for ending the war can only bring a more tragic repetition of MacArthur's abortive "end the war" offensive of 1950. Conventionally, Eisenhower is said to be more interested in "blood-soaked profits for his Wall Street masters" than in peace.

Eisenhower's assurance that he would support the principle of nonforcible repatriation is said to demonstrate that he has no interest in finding a genuine road to peace and that "he will insist on keeping the door to an armistice closed," assailing his purported plan to use South Korean
troops to man most of the line with a view to their eventual assumption of the entire defense burden, Peking quotes western sources as considering this principle a "pipe dream." The South Koreans are said to be ill-equipped, badly trained and war weary, and Peking notes increased disgruntlement among the troops, the growing number of defections, and the swelling ranks of South Korean guerrillas.

Attrition is Primary Goal of Present Operations: Although there has been a constant and considerable increase in the volume of references to the operations on the central front around Kumhwa, official communiques and related comment report that the Chinese and Korean forces are engaged in defensive maneuvers and "tactical counterattacks" designed essentially to "whittle down effective enemy strength." U.N. losses during the past month are said to have been great, with American power constantly on the downgrade. The campaign to have "Asians fight Asians" is described as an attempt to force the masses of Asia to continue the hopeless struggle in the Far East in view of the U.S. satellites' unwillingness to provide additional cannon fodder for the American war machine.

There has been no recent concentration on atrocity propaganda although there are scattered references to new American abuses of prisoners, reports of new aerial violations of Chinese territory, and claims that U.N. fighters have again carried out indiscriminate bombings of Pyongyang and of camps containing U.N. prisoners.
Cabinet Proclaims Amnesty, Free Medical Service: Evidence of continuing concern with home-front difficulties is contained in the recent promulgation of two Government decrees apparently designed to alleviate local conditions and cope with a serious shortage of manpower. On 13 November a Cabinet decision decreed that "universal free medical service shall be provided for all people at state expense." The service, intended to prevent the outbreak of disease made possible by the enemy's "inhuman atrocities" and the destruction of all public health facilities, is hailed as yet another indication of the "popular nature of the Republic's public health system." The medical plan is scheduled to go into effect on 1 January 1953.

On 18 November, an amnesty proclamation was issued covering all prisoners serving terms of 3 years or less. The prisoners, whose patriotism and hatred of the enemy are said to have been aroused, are to be released "in order to atone for their crimes" and "to engage in construction on the home-front." The NODONG SINMON reveals that the released prisoners will be "the responsibility of party organizations and officials" who "must do their utmost to secure the expected successful results of the generous Government measure." However, persons convicted of anti-State activity, counterfeiting and currency misuse, murder, arson and robbery are not to be released.

Adult Education Program Aimed At Rural Discontent: An adult education program to continue during the slack period in rural areas was established on 1 December, apparently to combat the discontent which continues in rural areas despite repeated claims of bumper harvests and recent Government farm relief measures. Although the education program is ostensibly meant "to enhance the political consciousness and cultural standards of the people," comment stresses that the farmers' belief in "ultimate victory" must be enhanced and they must be "rallied solidly around the party and Government." The underlying motive of the program is perhaps revealed in an unusually explicit warning by an official of the Korean Farmers League that if the farmers do not study and educate themselves, "it will be easier for the American imperialists and the Syngman Rhee gang to deceive them." However, Pyongyang has not broadcast any recent reports of cooperation with enemy agents.

Other comment on internal affairs reports the progress of the anti-epidemic work and the receipt of more letters from Kim Il Sung thanking individual farmers for donations of food for the battlefront. Pyongyang continues to encourage farmers to concentrate on preparing vegetable fertilizer "inasmuch as chemical fertilizer has become unavailable because of enemy bombing." References to the effectiveness of U.S. bombings are infrequent, although there have been previous allusions to the destruction of chemical fertilizer facilities.
New Deputy Prime Ministers Appointed: Pyongyang announced on 16 November the appointment of Choe Chang Ik and Chong Il Yong as Vice Prime Ministers. This brings the number of Vice Premiers to five as Pak Hun Yong, Hong Myung Hui and Ha Kai Ui already hold that title. Choe apparently continues to hold his office as Minister of Finance and Chong his office of Minister of Heavy Industry. No explanation of their appointment has been forthcoming, although it may reflect the importance of these ministries in the continuing war effort.

Eisenhower Trip Linked to "Dangerous Plot": Pyongyang refers to Eisenhower's coming visit to Korea as "a preparatory act pregnant with a harmful and dangerous plot" and tells its listeners that the American people are being deluded into believing Eisenhower is going to Korea to fulfill his campaign promise to end the Korean war. Eisenhower himself is condemned as a "Jiseong" who was "a fervent supporter and organizer of opposition to the Soviet Union" and derived his reputation from war. Pyongyang reports that the intense security preparations in progress in Seoul are indicative of the people's opposition to the visit and that suppression and terror are being used to insure Eisenhower's safety.

SOUTH KOREA

Japanese Industrial Revival Threatens Korea: Syngman Rhee, drawing a parallel between the rapid industrial expansion of Japan under American aegis and the lack of such progress in the Republic of Korea, warns that Japan is fast reverting to its prewar role as the primary producer nation in the Far East. He urges the Korean industrialists to exert greater efforts to build up an industrial base in Korea even at the temporary sacrifice of profits and asks the people to boycott all foreign goods in an effort to counter the menace of Japanese exploitation. A CHUNGHANG ILBO editorial echoes Rhee's warning and reports that Japan, with her rebuilt industrial complex, is "moving to control all Asia." The editorial lays much of the blame for this on the economic policy of the United States which has helped in the rehabilitation of Japan's industry but has failed to buttress the economies of other Asian nations.

Further anti-Japanese sentiment is expressed in continued protests over the treatment of Korean residents in Japan. The National Assembly, in apparent recognition of the importance of these Koreans in future relations with Japan, on 24 November approved the participation of six representatives of these Koreans in the National Assembly. The representatives are to be observers only, however, with no rights of discussion or vote.

Preparations for Eisenhower Visit Outlined: Although a complete news blackout on Eisenhower's coming visit to Korea was established on 21 November, Pusan does report on preparations to welcome the President-Elect. The Director of the Pusan Radio has instructed all regional stations to relay broadcasts of welcome ceremonies as well as to organize local broadcasts concerning the visit. The Director has instructed the regional broadcasting stations during the visit to stress the need for unification of North and South Korea, for strengthening the ROK forces, and for increasing economic aid to alleviate the misery in South Korea.