THE KOREAN WAR

Subsequent to the suspension of the talks & October there has been a sharp increase in the volume of comment on the war. The following elements seem pertinent:

1. The sudden indefinite adjournment came at a time when Peking was demonstrating a disinclination to increase the general level of attention to the war. The sudden and violent reaction suggests that the break was unexpected and that the Chinese wanted particularly to establish an ostensible willingness to negotiate as the Communist position at the U.N. sessions.

2. Peking has charged that the unilateral suspension of the talks was intended to present the U.N. with a fait accompli demonstrating Communist intranigence and to make more palatable a full-scale resumption of the war. Stress upon this theme suggests Communist fears of just such an eventuality and may explain the special effort exerted to prevent a break.

3. Both Peking and Pyongyang insist that Nam Il's acquiescence to the removal of POW's to a demilitarized zone prior to repatriation, and to the presence of Red Cross and neutral observers during the release and repatriation processes was a major concession to the American viewpoint that should have facilitated a truce.

4. The PEOPLE'S DAILY's emphasis upon the fact that the "preliminary procedure of release" and "repatriation" were described as two separate actions seems intended to imply that once the formality of release had been completed, some acceptable means could have been found to reconcile the opposing views on repatriation.

5. An original note is struck by speculation that American distaste for a truce is caused by fear that returned U.N. personnel may reveal the "true picture of the war." French Peace Committee Chairman Yves Farge elaborates on this theme in postulating U.S. reluctance to have returned POW's substantiate the BW charges.

6. A letter from Peng Te-huai and Kim Il Sung to General Clark assails the U.N.'s lack of sincerity in the negotiations and calls for a resumption of the negotiations. In detailing American crimes in Korea, the latter refers to the BW charges. This is the first time that these charges have been directly related to the talks.

7. Although the number of references to the fighting continues to increase, Peking makes no claim that Communist forces are on the offensive. Official communiques report only counter-attacks and defensive battles which are taking a heavy toll of the enemy.

Communist Sought to Avoid Break: Although reports on military operations had increased five-fold over the previous month at the time the talks were
adjourned, the general level of attention to the war had varied less than two percent in the previous four weeks. This balance was effected by a corresponding decline in the volume of reference to the POW problem, American atrocities, the bombing of North Korean cities and the truce talks themselves. This apparent tailoring of comment to maintain fairly low levels of attention seems to have been intended to avoid provocation and to sustain the facade of Communist sincerity and willingness to negotiate, at least until the U.N. sessions began, with the expectation that pressure would be exerted in the General Assembly to reverse the American stand that no prisoner should be returned against his will.

Break Intended to Strengthen U.N. Support: Peking's quick and violent reaction to the break, and the oft-reiterated charge that the U.S. wished to present the U.N. with a fait accompli apparently demonstrating Communist intransigence, and thus elicit support for a full-scale resumption of hostilities, may well reflect Communist fears of just such an eventuality.

In breaking off the talks, Peking and Pyongyang declare, the Americans burned the bridges behind their satellites, forcing them to face the basic reality that the negotiations had failed and that the war continued. Korean papers are quoted to the effect that the Americans feel the war must be continued to protect their war-battened economy and provide a basis for the general world conflagration in prospect. The Communists call upon the U.N. to resist the threat to peace entailed in further adherence to American aims and to restore the prestige it has forfeited by settling the Korean problem according to the principles of international law.

Pak Hun Yong, the North Korean Foreign Minister, has officially requested the U.N. to permit Korean delegates to participate in the deliberations on the war, adding the conventional reminder that no decisions reached in the absence of such delegates will be binding. Although Peking has reported this request, it has made no mention of possible Chinese participation, consistent with the practice of portraying North Korea as the only official Communist belligerent, with the Chinese forces only "volunteer." Americans Silent About Communist Concessions: Peking and Pyongyang have declared that Nam Il's 8 October acquiescence to the movement of POW's to a demilitarized zone prior to "release and repatriation" represents a major concession to the American viewpoint which could serve to effect an equitable truce. The Americans are charged with deliberately glossing over this concession in an attempt to portray the Communists as unwilling to negotiate. Nam Il's further agreement that Red Cross representatives from both sides could oversee the release and that neutral observers should be present to supervise classification and repatriation are said to represent further deference to the American stand.

Release and Repatriation Separate Operations: A widely broadcast PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary stresses the point that the "preliminary procedure of release" and "repatriation" are two separate actions not to be considered simultaneous, and this may be intended to imply that once the formality of "release" had been completed, some acceptable means could be found to complete the process of "repatriation" to the satisfaction of both sides. Against the interpretation of this formula as a promising concession stands the Communist failure to accept previous opportunities to maintain face.
U.S. Doesn't Want Prisoners to Come Home: A hitherto neglected element in the discussion of the POW problem is provided by a PEOPLE'S DAILY article which ascribes U.S. reluctance to effect a truce to fears that returned American and other U.N. personnel 'may reveal the true picture of the war and the facts about the good treatment of POW's in the hands of the Korean and Chinese forces.' Yves Farge, Chairman of the French Peace Committee who toured China early in the summer, elaborates on this theme by claiming that the U.S. Government is blocking the exchange of war prisoners because it is afraid the POW's will substantiate the BW charges.

Peng-Kim Letter to Clark Assails BW: In a widely reported letter to General Clark, People's Volunteers Commander Peng Te-huai and North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung assail the American lack of sincerity in the negotiations, review past evidences of American recalcitrance, denounce the attempt to invest POW's with the rights of political refugees, and call for a speedy resumption of the talks on the basis of the Communists' proposal of 8 October. It is noteworthy that the letter, in detailing American crimes in Korea, mentions the BW charges. This is apparently the first time that these charges have been so closely related to the truce talks. The Communists' consistent failure to intrude the BW charges into the talks during the various stages of the denunciatory campaign has been considered the result of concern lest the introduction of the charges so exacerbate relations as to make further discussion impossible.

Communists Counterattack But Remain on the Defensive: Although comment on purely military operations has increased five-fold over the last month, there has been no claim that Communist forces are on the offensive. Communiques continue to report counterattacks against limited U.N. drives and defensive actions on the part of the Koreans and Chinese that have inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. There have been references to the destruction of entire South Korean battalions and to depleted U.N. ranks, low morale and disunity. Pyongyang continues to inveigh against the Americans for their premeditated bombings of "orphanages" and "homes for the aged," while providing assurances of victory despite present difficulties.
Confrontation with homefront problems continues to dominate Pyongyang comment during this period. The "warm consideration" of the Government and Party are again highlighted in references to the increased rations and the postponed tax in kind, while farmers are urged to show their appreciation by increased production and greater food conservation. Problems posed by the approaching fall and winter weather bring calls for a fall plowing campaign, and a "system of mutual aid" has been proposed for preparation for winter. November has also been set aside as "winter anti-epidemic month." Soviet aid is highlighted in the exchange of messages and in comment on the fourth anniversary of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union, and is echoed by Pak Den Ai's address before the 19th Party Congress in Moscow. The approach of the 25 October anniversary of China's entry into the Korean war in 1950 occasions comment on this "fine" example of "internationalism."

Fresh Efforts Urged to Demonstrate Gratitude: Pyongyang broadcasts exhort farmers to greater efforts to express their gratitude for the 1 October cabinet decisions announcing increased food rations and partial exemption from the tax in kind. The relief measures are attributed to the "kind consideration of the Party and Government under difficult wartime conditions," possible only "where sovereignty is held by the people" and are compared with similar Government decisions following the establishment of the North Korean People's Republic; that is, before the Korean war. This considerate treatment is contrasted with the allegedly miserable conditions in South Korea, the traditional "breadbasket" of Korea, where the people are starvings.

Although economic assistance from the Soviet Union and other Communist states continues to be mentioned prominently in connection with these relief measures, Stalin's gift of 50,000 tons of wheat earlier in the year is the only specific food gift cited.

Pyongyang utilizes its comment on the relief measures to exhort the farmers to pay increased attention to their task of strict food conservation, and warns them not to be diverted from this task. Farmers are urged to harvest their paddy promptly, dry it thoroughly and thus meet their tax-in-kind payments on time. These instructions are pressed in order to avoid past mistakes which resulted in great waste. A fall plowing campaign is also announced. Promises of a large harvest continue, with Pyongyang claiming that shortages of manpower, draft animals and fertilizer have been successfully overcome.

Winter Campaigns Geared to War Effort: Preparations to meet the rigors of the fall and winter seasons are now under way, according to Pyongyang broadcasts. Special "military and political significance" is attributed to the efforts this year since "the enemy atrocities have created various
difficulties in our everyday life." Arrangements are being made for a "system of mutual aid in preparation for the cold season," under which priority will be given to "materials for factory workers." Other efforts include distribution of Government relief goods and organization of local units to prepare shelter and fuel, and to care for the destitute.

Anti-epidemic work is also discussed, with November set aside as winter anti-epidemic month. Emphasis is laid upon the strengthening of local health units and upon their functions of general disinfection and sanitation. There is no mention of bacterial warfare.

"Brotherly" Soviet Aid, Chinese "Internationalism" Hailed: Messages and comment on the fourth anniversary of Soviet-Korean diplomatic relations and the address of Pak Den Ai before the 19th Party Congress in Moscow stress Korean gratitude for Soviet aid, past, present and future. Tribute is paid to the "brotherly and unselfish" aid of the Soviets, which is the only road to the "prosperity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

The anniversary messages exchanged between Stalin and Kim Il Sung are comparable to those of previous anniversaries and Kim's references to Soviet aid are echoed in comment on the anniversary. Assistance rendered North Korea after the "Liberation" is stressed, but no mention is made of military assistance during or before the war. Instead, what little reference there is to the war praises the Soviet Union for having "consistently advocated and worked for the peaceful solution of the Korean war."

The "brotherly relations" of the Korean and Soviet peoples are said to be firmly based on "complete quality and mutual interests."

The second anniversary of Chinese participation in the Korean war, to be celebrated on 25 October, is the subject of limited advance comment. The Chinese action is hailed as a "fine example of new internationalism" not found among capitalist imperialists. The familiar refrain that the Chinese intervened only after the United States had ignored a warning not to invade North Korea and threaten China's borders is repeated.

Pledge Made to Soviet Party Leadership: Pyongyang, reacting quickly to Stalin's closing speech at the Moscow 19th Party Congress, pledges that the "Korean people will be faithful to the theories of the Lenin-Stalin Party and will discharge to the end their role as true assault corps members." The NODONG SINMUN declares Stalin's words have "clarified the characteristics of the mutual support between the Soviet Communist Party and other fraternal parties."
Lee Rejected by Assembly: Syngman Rhee's nominee for Premier of South Korea, Lee Yun Yong, was rejected 17 October by the National Assembly which the day before had voted to continue the old simple majority rule for confirmation of a premier. The Assembly, convened in special session, has yet to consider other administration bills concerning a supplementary budget to meet military expenditures, election of members of the Upper House, and by-elections to fill the seats of those Assembly members kidnapped by Communists and long missing.

Police Ask Cooperation: A recent announcement by the Director of the Public Security Bureau reveals that efficient police operation has been adversely affected by the lack of cooperation from the general public. He admits the existence of a "disagreeable feeling" on the part of the public toward the police, which he attributes to "an evil hangover" from the days of the Japanese police. The public is assured, however, that the Korean police exist "for the welfare of the general public." Public cooperation with the police in security functions is vital for success, according to the Director.