7. Communist ground capabilities in western Korea significantly reduced: The recent movement of the Chinese Communist 63rd Army from the immediate rear in the western sector of the front reduces significantly the probability of a Communist general offensive, according to Far East Command. It also represents a serious weakening of the enemy's immediate defensive capability.

This army's new position further west leaves the Communists with no immediate reserve known to be in support of the front line from the west coast to Pyonggang in the central sector. (S CINCFE Telecon, 18 Oct 52)

8. Chinese artillery moves into west coast defense positions: An unidentified Chinese artillery unit, using a cryptographic system similar to that of the 1st Artillery Division, reported on 5 October that it had contacted the headquarters of the Chinese 63rd Army in western Hwanghae province and had received orders to "reconnoiter the area north of Yonan...and in the vicinity of Paekchon." (CANOE L____T-1365, 5 Oct 52)

Comment: The area of reconnaissance is a coastal one, often mentioned in enemy messages as a possible landing area for an expected UN attack. This early October movement of additional artillery is an indication of the enemy's continued anxiety about a possible amphibious attack.

9. Chinese armor reluctant to engage US tanks: The Chinese Communist 2nd Tank Company, supporting elements of the 38th Army in the battle for White Horse Hill, reported on 11 October that "our tanks were ordered to counterattack the enemy tanks." The message concluded with the laconic statement that "after we stated our opinions, we did not go." (CANOE L____T-1332, 11 Oct 52)

Comment: This message may be interpreted as providing additional evidence for the thesis that the current role of Chinese armor at the front is one of direct fire-support rather than an anti-tank weapon. It is further possible that the Chinese, with the lighter T-34, were being realistic in refusing to face heavier-gunned US medium tanks.
10. North Korean attempt to contact guerrilla unit in South Korea: A recently available North Korean message of 24 June revealed that the Communists at that time were planning to contact Communist guerrillas in South Korea. The line-crossers were to deliver storage batteries to the insurgents through a local South Korean labor party organization. (CANOE C[____]T-2, SPOT 4026A, 15 Oct 52)

Comment: As a result of vigorous UN antiguerilla activity, begun in December 1951, Communist guerrilla strength in the Republic of Korea is now reduced to less than 2,000. Partisan raids at present are conducted primarily to obtain food and arms, with sabotage efforts only secondary. On the basis of communications intelligence, there has been no radio contact between the guerrillas and North Korea in over a year.