NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Published: 30 July 1952
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

NIE-55/1

Declassified by Os375
Date 2 AUG 1977

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 28 July 1952.
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea through mid-1953.

ASSUMPTION

The hostilities in Korea are not expanded on UN initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communist military potential in Korea has been substantially strengthened since the beginning of the cease-fire negotiations. Troop strength has approximately doubled. Jet fighter strength has more than doubled. Combat effectiveness has improved and is now believed to be good to excellent.

2. The enemy is capable of launching a major ground and/or air attack with little or no warning. However, there are no current indications of Communist intent to launch large-scale ground or air operations in the near future.

3. There are indications that Soviet participation in enemy air operations is so extensive that a de facto air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR. The USSR almost certainly believes that additional commitments of Soviet air power could, under methods presently employed, be made in North Korea and Manchuria without serious risk of expanded hostilities. However, it is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that Soviet-manned aircraft could be committed over UN-held territory without a grave risk of global war.

4. The Communists now possess the capability of seriously challenging the UN air effort in Northwest Korea as far south as the Chongchon River and of expanding their air operations southward into forward UN-held territory and adjacent waters.

5. We believe that, during the period of this estimate, the Communists could not drive UN forces from Korea unless a major Soviet effort were applied. We do not believe the USSR will be willing to accept the grave risk of global war which such a commitment would entail.

6. The Kremlin appears desirous of avoiding global war over the Korean
issue and for this reason would probably prefer either a continuation of the present situation or an armistice.

7. Despite the capability to continue the war in Korea, we believe that internal economic and political considerations are probably exerting pressure on the Chinese Communists to conclude hostilities.

8. The Communists in Korea appear to be prepared for either a resumption of full-scale hostilities, an indefinite military stalemate, or an armistice. Although the possibility of a renewal of full-scale hostilities by the Communists cannot be ignored, we believe that the Communists will continue to negotiate and will not take the initiative to break the present military stalemate.

9. We believe it probable that the Communists wish to conclude an armistice. However, we believe that the Communists will procrastinate the negotiations so long as they consider that they can win advantages from the POW or any other issue, and so long as they estimate that a continuation of the Korean war does not entail grave risk of global war.

10. If an armistice is concluded, we believe that the negotiation of a political settlement will be complicated by Communist injection of Far Eastern issues unrelated to Korea.

11. Whether or not a political settlement is achieved, we believe the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. The Communists will proceed to redevelop North Korea as a militant and armed satellite, and to subject South Korea to subversion, sabotage, espionage, and guerrilla warfare.

**DISCUSSION**

1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE KOREAN AREA

Communist Military Forces in the Korean Area

12. Ground Forces. Enemy ground forces in the Korean area have almost doubled in personnel strength during the year since the truce negotiations began:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>July 1951</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korean</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>507,000</td>
<td>567,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In addition to the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) now in Korea, approximately 300,000 reserves from all areas of China could be committed provided that Peiping does not initiate hostilities elsewhere in Asia. A further 200,000 troops could be committed provided the Communists were willing to reduce their garrisons in China proper.

13. Fire power of the Communist armies has been substantially increased by a major program of reorganization and re-equipment and reinforcement. North Korean (NK) armored units have been brought up to strength in equipment and new units have been organized. The CCP has introduced new artillery units into Korea and has provided some organic artillery for tactical units. Enemy antiaircraft artillery units have increased and

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1The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, concurs in the conclusion that the Communists wish to conclude an armistice. However, he finds that this paragraph carries two inferences which are not warranted by available intelligence:

a. That the Communists would give in on the POW issue if the UN stands firm; and,

b. That the Communists might accept UN cease-fire terms if the UN were to threaten an expansion of the Korean war. Although the intelligence available does not deny, it equally does not support, these inferences.
the employment of fire control radar has made their antiaircraft fire more effective. 14. Extensive training programs have overcome the serious losses of trained personnel incurred by the Communists in the spring offensives of 1951. These programs have placed particular emphasis on small-unit tactics, leadership courses for noncommissioned officers, and company grade officers, and political indoctrination. Most officers of the grade of regimental commander and higher have had combat experience in Korea and they are firmly indoctrinated Communists. Morale throughout the Communist forces is excellent. Combat effectiveness is considered to be good to excellent.

15. The Communist logistic position has been improved in the long period of fairly static operations. A year ago Communist supplies had been depleted and critical shortages existed in most classes of supply. There are now sufficient supplies in forward supply points to support a major sustained offensive of from 5 to 10 days, and there are no known shortages of major items.

16. Air Forces. The Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) is estimated to have available a total of approximately 2,100 combat aircraft of various types and some 200 small piston-type trainers. Included in the total combat figure are approximately 1,500 jet fighters. Approximately 1,300 combat aircraft (including 850 jet fighters) are believed to be in Manchuria and the remainder based in China proper, primarily around Peking, Shanghai, and Canton.

17. By US criteria the Communist air force in the Korean-Manchurian-China area is believed to be reaching a fairly high standard. Since there are strong indications of extensive participation of Soviet personnel in actual combat flying, however, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the continuing improvement in combat effectiveness reflects increased proficiency of Chinese Communist pilots. Since April 1952 the sortie rate has substantially increased. Communist fighter pilots who have been encountered have:
(a) displayed willingness to engage F-86s;
(b) demonstrated varying degrees of combat proficiency;
(c) intermittently harassed UN fighter bombers in the Chongiu-Sunchon area;
(d) occasionally launched attacks from cloud cover and used overcast for evasions; and
(e) launched frequent night attacks on UN light and medium bombers.

18. Airfield construction and repair has been underway in North Korea since June 1950. At present there are approximately 33 airfields in North Korea which are or could become suitable for military operations. Of these there are two, close to the Yalu River, which are operational for jet operations. In addition, six others, if repaired, could handle sustained jet operations. Since the UN/US air forces have repeatedly bombed most of these airfields, their useability varies from time to time depending on the rate of repair and the frequency of UN/US attacks. It is believed, however, that all these fields could be repaired and made operational within a
short period of time if UN attacks on them were curtailed.

19. Within Communist China an intensive airfield repair and facilities build-up has produced a good system of airfields capable of handling all types of aircraft now or potentially available to the CCAF. In Manchuria eight jet airfields are now being used operationally. The recently developed air facilities in Manchuria are so located as to provide excellent bases for the air defense of Manchuria; some are also so located as to permit Communist jets to range over North Korea and immediately behind UN lines.

20. The CCAF is wholly dependent upon Soviet aircraft and equipment, spare parts, and technical personnel. Most supplies received from the USSR, including POL, must be sent via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to transshipment points on the Manchurian border, and thence distributed over Chinese rail nets to Manchuria and China proper. A portion of the petroleum products supplied by the USSR is shipped by tanker from Vladivostok, Dalen, and the Black Sea area to Chinese ports, principally Taipingao. We have almost no information concerning the size and location of aviation POL stockpiles, but we believe that CCAF operations at the present time are not hampered by a shortage of POL. (See TAB "D" for estimated CCAF POL requirements.)

21. There are indications that Soviet participation in enemy air operations is so extensive that a de facto air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR. The USSR almost certainly believes that additional commitments of Soviet air power could, under methods presently employed, be made in North Korea and Manchuria without risk of expanded hostilities. However, it is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that Soviet-manned aircraft could be committed over UN-held territory without grave risk of global war.

22. Naval Forces. The small prewar North Korean Navy was largely destroyed early in the Korean war. In recent months, however, utilizing a wirexclusive collection of sampans, junks, and fishing craft, the North Korean Navy has conducted several successful small-scale amphibious operations against UN-held offshore islands. It has also conducted mining operations in coastal and harbor waters and manned an increasing number of coastal defense batteries.

23. The Chinese Communist Navy is not an effective fighting force. In the unlikely event of its entry into the Korean war, its activities would be limited to surprise raids on UN surface vessels by motor torpedo boats, mine warfare, and small-scale amphibious raids.

Communist Military Capabilities

24. Ground Force. The Communist ground forces in Korea are capable of the following courses of action:

- a. A large-scale offensive with little or no warning;
- b. Offensives to obtain limited objectives;
- c. Defense in depth for a prolonged period of time;
- d. Defense in successive positions;
- e. Limited guerrilla operations in South Korea.

Each of these ground force capabilities could be greatly enhanced by an all-out air offensive. We do not believe, however, that such an air offensive would improve enemy capabilities to the extent necessary to force a UN withdrawal from Korea.

25. If hostilities continue on the present scale, we believe that Communist capabilities will continue gradually to improve during the period of this estimate. There will doubtless be improvement in fire power and logistic capability; the development of air support techniques for close support of Communist ground forces may accompany increases in Communist air strength and effectiveness.

26. The Communists now possess the capability of seriously challenging the UN air effort in Northwest Korea as far south as the Chongchon River and of expanding their air operations southward into UN-held territory and adjacent waters. Specifically, at the present time, the Communist air force in the Korean area has the capability to carry out the following operations:

- a. Large-scale day interception in Northwest Korea;
b. Night interception under good visibility conditions in Northwest Korea;
c. Air-to-air battle of attrition with UN/US air forces in an effort to eliminate UN/US F-86 aircraft;
d. Limited fighter attacks against UN/US ground forces, forward airfields, and other forward installations;
e. Tu-2 bombing of targets in South Korea and adjacent waters. (The range of these attacks would be limited if the Communists considered jet escort necessary.)

27. The assignment of jet bombardment aircraft to the Korean area would greatly enhance these capabilities.

28. Air defense has a high priority in Communist China. With Soviet assistance, and possibly direct participation, the Chinese Communists have established a visual observer and radar air warning net which gives almost complete coverage from Hainan Island northward along the coast, through Manchuria to the Soviet frontier as well as some coverage in the interior. In addition, there are Soviet-trained, and possibly Soviet-operated, antiaircraft defense units along the coasts for the protection of industrial areas, harbor facilities, airfields, and communications and supply network. Some important inland industrial and military installations are likewise defended. In Manchuria, where there is a concentration of enemy jets, vigorous day fighter defense, and an active night fighter defense under conditions of good visibility, could be anticipated. Elsewhere in China, the CCAF may be able to deploy enough aircraft to defend a selected specific area against air attack, but the present available forces are too sparsely deployed for effective defense against simultaneous attacks against several areas.

29. We believe that the CCAF will probably be built up to a total of at least 2,500 aircraft by July 1953 irrespective of the outcome of the cease-fire negotiations. (See TAB "A" for projected strength of the CCAF.) Furthermore, the over-all air defense capabilities of the Chinese Communists with regard to early warning, ground-controlled interception and antiaircraft capabilities will probably continue to increase.

30. Naval Capabilities. Chinese Communist and North Korean naval capabilities will probably continue to be negligible during the period of this estimate. (See paragraphs 22 and 23 above.)

II. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

Soviet Global Interests

31. Whether the Kremlin estimates that Soviet interests in the Far East can be advanced by a prolongation or by a termination of the war in Korea depends in large degree on Soviet world-wide strategy. If, as we believe probable, the Kremlin would prefer to move toward the attainment of its objectives by means short of global war, the Kremlin would avoid courses of action in Korea which would entail increased risks of global war. While the Communist aggression in Korea has involved, throughout, an inherent risk of global war, the Kremlin has sought to limit its own role in the Korean war and has not sought to use the war as an excuse for initiating broader hostilities. The Kremlin thus appears desirous of avoiding global war over the Korean issue and for this reason would probably prefer either a continuation of the present situation or an armistice.

32. On the other hand, if present Soviet strategy envisages an early global war, which we believe is less likely, the Kremlin would probably seek to keep US military forces tied down in Korea regardless of the risk of global war.

Sino-Soviet Relations

33. The Korean war must already have raised the problem of the distribution of its burdens between Peking and Moscow. Although there is no evidence that this problem has yet weakened the Sino-Soviet partnership, a prolonged Korean war might produce friction between the two governments. It is highly unlikely, however, that such frictions will, within the period of this estimate, create major divergences in the policies of the two powers with regard to Korea.
The Internal Situation in Communist China

34. At the time of the outbreak of the Korean war the political and economic prospects of the Peiping regime were favorable. Internal control had been largely established; the regime enjoyed a considerable amount of popular support; fiscal stability appeared assured; and the government had announced its intention to devote its attention to a long-range program of economic development. Although the war in Korea stimulated national consciousness and intensified anti-Japanese sentiment, the postponement of domestic reconstruction programs in order to finance the war greatly reduced the prospects of economic improvement, and tightening of police measures decreased the regime's popular support. The Chinese Communist Government has had sharply to increase its mobilization and expenditure of human and material resources. Political, economic, and social strains have developed which, while not reducing the current capability of the Chinese Communists to carry on the war, will increasingly affect the long-term political and military capabilities of the regime.

35. The burden of the Korean war has been heavy. Available evidence, although extremely fragmentary, indicates that Chinese Communist Government military expenditures probably doubled in 1951 over 1950. Austerity has been keynoted by the regime during the past year. Western trade restrictions have undoubtly been added to the economic difficulties of the Chinese Communist regime. The operation of the existing productive plant at near capacity levels has created serious maintenance problems, notably in the vital railways and power plants. The requirements of the armed services and a rapidly expanding bureaucracy have confronted the regime with severe shortages of administrative and technical personnel.

36. The Chinese Communists have undertaken drastic measures to meet the requirements of the war as well as to solidify their political power. Taxes have been increased, and irregular levies have become more frequent. Propaganda activities have been greatly expanded to eliminate potential opposition and to increase the centralization of authority and the popular support of the war effort. Organized programs of terror have sought to purge the government administration and eliminate the power of the business and bourgeois classes.

37. The Chinese Communists probably have the capability, with continuing Soviet assistance, to support their war effort at current or expanded levels for at least the next year. Current production of consumer goods is likely to be maintained and crop prospects both in China proper and in Manchuria are favorable. However, the regime almost certainly estimates that indefinite prolongation of the war will seriously retard its domestic development program and will increase popular disillusionment with the regime. Despite the capability to continue the war in Korea, we believe that internal economic and political considerations are probably exerting pressure on the Chinese Communists to conclude hostilities.

The Internal Situation in North Korea

38. Increasingly severe food shortages, continued destruction of industrial facilities and power plants, and vanishing prospects of unification have caused deterioration of civilian morale in North Korea. Serious unrest has been prevented by shipments of consumer goods, principally food, from the USSR and Communist China, and by Communist control measures.

39. The highly effective apparatus of control developed by the North Korean regime prior to the outbreak of hostilities remains basically intact. There is no evidence of serious deterioration in the effectiveness of the police, or of the presence of subversives in the armed forces and administration. In addition, the North Korean propaganda organization, for a time badly disrupted, has been strengthened during the current military lull.

40. Even though a prolongation of the war will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on internal conditions in North Korea, this will probably have little bearing on Communist courses of action in Korea.
Since the North Korean regime is controlled by the USSR, its interests will be subordinated to the global or regional interests of the USSR. However, Soviet policies in Korea will presumably be influenced to some extent by the Soviet desire to restore North Korea as a "model" satellite of the USSR and by the fear of increasing Chinese Communist influence in the internal affairs of North Korea.

Political Developments in South Korea
41. The recent political crisis between Syngman Rhee and the Assembly ended in a substantial victory for Rhee. There continues, however, to be conflict among Rhee, some of his supporters in his recent actions against the Assembly, and the Assembly. The constitutional changes effected as a solution to the political crisis will probably foster increasing friction among President, Prime Minister, and Assembly. In view of US pressure as well as international disapproval, however, it is probable that Rhee will be disposed to refrain from further openly unconstitutional actions and flagrant acts of intimidation. The security of the UN forces has been maintained as a result of the ROK political settlement, but over a period of time the efficiency of the South Korean military forces may be weakened by the appointment of political supporters of Rhee to high command.

42. Communist propaganda concerning the political conflict in South Korea has treated the conflict as evidence of the unpopularity and deterioration of the Rhee regime. However, political developments in South Korea, unless they seriously weaken the UN military position, will probably have only minor influence on Communist actions in the area.

III. INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Military Indications
43. Communist military activities in Korea or elsewhere provide no conclusive indications of Communist intentions. Despite the great strengthening of Communist military ground force capabilities since the beginning of the armistice negotiations, the Communists have maintained a generally defensive posture. The ever-increasing Communist air potential is not in itself an indication of an imminent expansion of the enemy air effort over Korea. However, the military strength and disposition of the Communist forces are such that an offensive could be launched with little or no warning.

Propaganda Indications
44. Communist propaganda has reflected continued intransigence on the POW issue in the armistice negotiations, and has stressed Communist determination not to be intimidated by military pressure. At the same time the propaganda has stressed the Communist desire to continue the truce negotiations.

45. However, there have been some indications in Communist propaganda which can be interpreted as preparations for a cessation of the Korean war. There has been a growing tendency in the last six months to discuss the war in the past tense and to emphasize the benefits which the Communists have achieved from the war. The domestic propaganda of the Chinese Communists has emphasized the regime's internal program. North Korean propaganda has also given less attention to the war and more to "normal" propaganda themes such as North Korean economic problems, attacks on the Syngman Rhee government, and guerrilla activities in South Korea.

Indications from the Truce Negotiations
46. During the course of the negotiations the Communists have clearly revealed two attitudes: first, that they are in no hurry to reach an agreement, and second, that they wish to place the onus on the UN for any breakdown in negotiations, and for any resumption of offensive operations. The negotiations have been narrowed in the last few months to the single issue of repatriation of POW's.

Indications from Communist Diplomatic Moves
47. On the diplomatic front, there have been a number of indications, from both the Soviet and Chinese Communist sources, of a desire
to find a solution for the POW issue. For example, Indian efforts to break the Panmunjom deadlock met with temporary encouragement in Peking. The USSR for its part has put out feelers at the UN.

IV. PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION

48. During the past year the Communists have substantially increased their military strength in the Korean area. At the same time they have continued negotiations for an armistice at Panmunjom, permitting differences over truce issues to be narrowed to the single issue of POW exchange. These negotiations have recently been supplemented by Communist diplomatic moves. Communist propaganda, while making capital of the armistice issues, has not closed the door to a negotiated settlement and may, in its broader perspectives, anticipate such a settlement.

49. The Communists in Korea appear to be prepared either for a resumption of full-scale hostilities, an indefinite military stalemate, or an armistice. Although the possibility of a renewal of full-scale hostilities by the Communists cannot be ignored, we believe that the Communists will continue to negotiate and will not take the initiative to break the present military stalemate.

50. We believe it probable that the Communists wish to conclude an armistice. However, we believe that the Communists will protract the negotiations so long as they consider that they can win advantages from the POW or any other issue and so long as they estimate that a continuation of the Korean war does not entail grave risk of global war.

51. If an armistice is concluded, we believe that the negotiation of a political settlement will be complicated by Communist injection of Far Eastern issues unrelated to Korea.

52. Whether or not a political settlement is achieved, we believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. The Communists will proceed to redevelop North Korea as a militant and armed satellite, and to subject South Korea to subversion, sabotage, espionage, and guerrilla warfare.

*See comment of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State on page 2.
### TAB "A"

**ESTIMATED CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE AOBs FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1950 THROUGH MID-53**

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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>375</strong></td>
<td><strong>371</strong></td>
<td><strong>872</strong></td>
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### CCAF Aircraft Technical Capabilities

#### Fighters

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<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COMBAT RADIUS</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>ARMAMENT</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>MIG-15 (internal fuel only)</td>
<td>180 N.M.</td>
<td>540 N.M.</td>
<td>2-23mm 80 rounds/gun 1-37mm 40 rounds Bombs unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-15 (with two external 70 gal. tanks)</td>
<td>315 N.M.</td>
<td>840 N.M.</td>
<td>BAMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-9</td>
<td>330 N.M.</td>
<td>750 N.M.</td>
<td>1-37mm rounds unknown 2-21mm 75 rounds/gun Bombs unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAK-15</td>
<td>300 N.M.</td>
<td>750 N.M.</td>
<td>2-25mm rounds unknown 8-8 German 35mm rockets Bombs unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAK-9</td>
<td>540 N.M.</td>
<td>1100 N.M.</td>
<td>1-23mm 120 rounds 2-15.7 190 rounds/gun Rockets and bombs can be carried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA-7</td>
<td>300 N.M.</td>
<td>810 N.M.</td>
<td>2-25mm 250 rounds/gun 6-122mm rockets (probable 2-220 lbs. bombs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA-9</td>
<td>440 N.M.</td>
<td>950 N.M.</td>
<td>4-23mm 100 rounds/gun Rockets and bombs can be carried</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Bombers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COMBAT RADIUS</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>ARMAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TU-3</td>
<td>500 N.M.</td>
<td>1040 N.M.</td>
<td>2-20mm 150 rounds/gun (fixed) 3-15.7mm 253 rounds/gun (flexible) 2500 lbs. bombs 3300 lbs. bombs Guns same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-10</td>
<td>170 N.M.</td>
<td>350 N.M.</td>
<td>2-23mm rounds unknown 2-7.92mm rounds unknown 1-15.7mm rounds unknown 2-132mm rockets 800 lbs. bombs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Top Secret**
### ESTIMATED CCAF POL REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Number Aircraft</th>
<th>Average Fuel Consumption per Hour (Gals)</th>
<th>Average No. Flying Hrs. per Aircraft per Month</th>
<th>10% allow. for Logistic Losses</th>
<th>Total Monthly reqt (Gals)</th>
<th>Est. Total hrs. per Plane per Month</th>
<th>10% allow. for Logistic Losses</th>
<th>Total Monthly reqt (Gals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jet Ftr</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2,531,400</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9,697,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>583,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strat Ftr</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>155,222</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>543,840</td>
<td></td>
<td>375,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grd. Attack</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>123,260</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>375,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,801,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Bomber</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>400,460</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,801,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,133,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>224,784</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,133,440</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,541,440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS**

|                 |                 | **3,740,018** |  | **13,541,440** |

**NOTE:** The CCAF is estimated to require 4,733,740 gallons of POL per month at current rates of consumption. This represents an upward adjustment of the estimated peacetime requirements on the assumption that the 600 Communist jet fighters in the Manchurian-Korean area average 15 flying hours per aircraft per month instead of 6.8 hours as estimated above for peacetime jet fighter operations.