5. North Korean combat engineer course to extend to 30 June:
The North Korean 8th Division in eastern Korea informed one of its subordinate regiments, probably the 82nd on Kaesong guard duty on 8 April, of two future "short courses" for engineer officers. One, to be conducted by the engineer troops of an unidentified corps (probably the I Corps), was to begin 15 April and terminate on 15 June. Another course for engineer staff officers was to be held at "Front-line Headquarters" from 1 June to 30 June. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-J-561, 17 May 52)

Comment: Although this intercept is dated, it would appear to be a clear indication that at the time no increase in current military operations was contemplated by North Korean senior tactical commanders.

Despite the flurry of military activity throughout North Korea in April, which led to speculation of an impending offensive, there are no clear current indications of immediate Communist intentions other than defensive.

6. Easing of North Korean military manpower situation indicated: An unidentified North Korean regiment, probably on coastal security duty in eastern Korea, instructed a subordinate unit on 13 May to "report the men who are above the age of 32 and have no technical ability and the wounded men who are unable to serve and send them to the regiment at once." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/12470, 17 May 52)

Comment: On 30 January the 7th Railway Security Regiment in Hamhung passed similar instructions to a subordinate battalion, indicating that these manpower categories would be discharged. Other unidentified units have issued similar orders.

These messages, while indicating that some order is being injected into the recruiting policies of the North Korean Army, have a connection in that perhaps the manpower need of the civilian population is so great that it forces the North Korean Government to discharge marginal military manpower. It might be speculated that the deactivation of two North Korean corps within the past nine months and the reduction of major tactical units to a number for which replacements can more easily be provided fits into the government's over-all manpower policy.
7. Major North Korean V Corps unit remains near Hamhung in east: In a message, probably addressed to the chief of the military security bureau in Pyongyang, a North Korean officer reports on 14 May the desertion of four men from the 6th Division. He locates the place of desertion as "Kumsuri," a small town near Yonghung, a rail center south of Hamhung. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-J-539, 17 May 52)

Comment: The 6th North Korean Division is a subordinate of the V Corps, which has been located in the general Hamhung area since its withdrawal from combat in late 1951. A number of recent reports have alleged that the V Corps was to return to combat, relieving one of the North Korean corps on the battle line.

8. North Korean tank regiment to be extremely security-conscious: The "political" officer, probably attached to the North Korean 10th Mechanized Division, on 17 May instructed "the political regimental commander of the tank regiment" to place a "junior propaganda man" in each tank platoon and to dispose "one informant" in each tank section. (SUEDE ROK Int Group, 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-J-578, 17 May 52)

Comment: Previously observed security penetration down to this level has been confined to "elite" units, such as the Kaesong Guard Force, the 82nd Regiment and the North Korean Air Force.

9. 10th Air School activity noted at Yenchi in Manchuria: Four YAK-11 trainers of the 10th Air School were to fly on 16 May from Yenchi to Fengcheng, both in Manchuria, according to a Chinese Communist Air Force message. (SUEDE 6920 Security Group Johnson AB Japan, AP 831, 16 May 52)

Comment: Prisoners of war have reported that the major North Korean air training installation in Manchuria was the "10th Manchurian Air Academy," under direct command of North Korean Air Force Headquarters, located at Yenchi.