More effective Communist training with AA rockets reported in Korea: A garbled and fragmentary Chinese Communist message of 4 May states that an unidentified Communist unit commenced antiaircraft firing on 3 May with equipment tentatively identified by translation as "rocket launchers."

The unit reported that it expended rounds of ammunition at various altitudes from 10,800 to 24,600 feet. The message stated further that two of the launchers "performed splendidly" and that it was estimated that "we either hit and damaged or hit and dropped" each of the targets. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2752, 11 May 52)

Comment: This report, as received, indicates that the Communist forces are training with AA rockets possessing vertical range and accuracy characteristics in excess of those of any known Soviet or Chinese rocket. During the last three months, there have been a series of sightings of Communist AA rockets at steadily increasing vertical ranges, but this is the first indication of a ground-launched rocket attaining 24,600 feet.

The USAF reports that rockets directed against UN aircraft to date have been ineffective and inaccurate. This message suggests that the enemy may have new equipment which will increase his AA capability.

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12. Higher North Korean echelon expresses interest in intercepted UN message: The day following the 9 May report of the North Korean 23rd Brigade Commander that he had intercepted a UN message revealing operational plans in western Korea, an unidentified North Korean unit, probably IV Corps headquarters, queried "let me know where the regiment commander caught the enemy wireless communication telegram." (SUEDE 15th RSM Det 1, 15RSM/12241, 11 May 52)

Comment: The interest evoked by this intercepted UN message and the method of handling it suggests that these North Korean military units, at least, do not have access to intelligence derived from UN communications.

13. North Korean regiment receives artillery ammunition: The commander of an unidentified North Korean regiment, possibly the 21st Antiaircraft Artillery, received a message on 10 May stating that "1,400 76 mm" shells and 96,050 armor piercing shells had arrived at the "field ammunition depot." Ten additional truckloads of ammunition were to be delivered to the regiment "this evening," according to the originator. (SUEDE USM 664, SK-J-320, 11 May 52)

Comment: On 5 May, the 21st North Korean AAA Regiment was ordered in a "top secret" message to establish an ammunition depot in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. This apparently is the first arrival of ammunition at the newly established antiaircraft artillery depot.

14. Unknown Chinese unit moving to the Korean front: An unidentified Chinese Communist unit in western Korea, possibly an antiaircraft artillery unit, was advised on 5 May that "your submitted plan failed to advise us as to what time you intended to move. . .you will please submit a report prior to any move you make that we may send representatives forward to control the move and the traffic on the road. . ." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2737, 11 May 52)

Comment: This message possibly refers to the recently noted forward deployment of small Chinese antiaircraft artillery units in western Korea. The statement that traffic control would be instituted, however, may be an indication that a larger unit is on the move.
16. Chinese in Korea short of skilled ordnance repairmen:
"The No. 27 Large Depot has no skilled weapons and motor personnel" a 12 May intercept from a Chinese regiment revealed. The message said, "We have received 60 motor cylinder repair orders and are hoping to recruit qualified personnel from our own regiment. . . It will require two months time to complete (backlogged orders?)." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2788, 12 May 52)

Comment: The Chinese Communists are estimated to have received 5000 additional vehicles in Korea since December. This message may be the first sign that this sudden increase in motor transport is seriously taxing their maintenance capabilities. The 27th "Large Depot," one of four logistical regiments in the 4th Supply Area, would ordinarily be responsible for major motor repair orders. It would seem that the reporting regiment has been forced to recruit its own personnel for this work.