TWO CAMPS

BW AND THE KOREAN WAR

Communist transmitters generally, and Moscow in particular, sustain the volume and intensity of their attacks on American use of biological weapons, but there are indications that the campaign may have reached its highest point. The following elements presently characterize Soviet exploitation of the BW campaign:

(1) Following an appeal from Chinese representative Kuo Mo-jo, the World Peace Council Bureau, meeting in Oslo, issued a resolution calling for world-wide insistence on the unconditional prohibition of bacterial weapons. The adoption of this resolution occurs just at a time when the volume of Soviet references loses some of the momentum which brought the previous sharp increases.

(2) Previous indications that the BW campaign has implications greater than the Korean war are strengthened by the growing tendency to remove the denunciations from the war context and to stress its world-wide political and humanitarian aspects.

(3) Moscow nearly always lags behind Peking—which is physically more involved in the charges—in exploiting the basic themes of the campaign. Thus, Peking gives markedly greater attention than Moscow to denunciation of American criminality and to documentation of America's previous history of preparation, justification and endorsement of biological warfare.

(4) Malik's vehement denunciation of the International Red Cross, which gives new impetus to Peking's violent rejection of that organization, suggests Communist intransigence regarding future IRC activities in Korea. Moscow has not as yet echoed Peking's equally virulent castigation of the World Health Organization.

WPC Calls for World-Wide Prohibition of BW: Following wide circulation of an appeal by Kuo Mo-jo for WPC denunciation of the American BW criminals, TASS reports that the WPC Bureau has approved a resolution calling for a world-wide campaign of support for the Geneva convention of 1925 which prohibits the use of biological weapons. The adoption of the resolution coincides with a new high point in the volume of Moscow's attention to BW. But the campaign loses some of its earlier momentum, and there is a tendency to concentrate comment in the Korean beam, seemingly at the expense of other beams. This coincidence suggests that the announcement of the support drive represents the culmination of the coordinated drive by Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang.
The resolution had been foreshadowed by both Moscow and Peking in appeals to the WPC for suitable action against the American germ criminals, and by frequent assurances that such action would be taken. The event was also anticipated by the increasing tendency for BW comment to transcend Korean war or Asian contexts.

Both Moscow and Peking keep attention to BW at record high levels. Commentaries beamed to the Soviet home audience decline in volume--another possible indication of future changes in the campaign--but news items in the domestic services have during the past two weeks totaled 65 items each, which makes this event by far the most heavily exploited in Soviet news broadcasts in the past year. During this SURVEY period Moscow broadcast 328 and 346 commentaries in the first and second weeks respectively, on germ warfare. In the second week attention to BW exceeded attention to Korea (within or without the BW context) by 39 items.

The extension of BW comment beyond the Korean war is accompanied by frequent allusions to the Americans' historical endorsement of germ weapons, by detailed references to official and unofficial American admissions that BW was contemplated, and by reference to American disregard for pertinent international conventions.

* Differences in Comment: Although there is apparent coordination between Peking and Moscow, the former generally lags in the presentation and development of BW themes.* In general, however, Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang join in charging that the Americans have exceeded the worst excesses of Hitler. They also join in assailing Acheson and Ridgway for their failure to condemn the use of BW and they condemn America's failure to abide by the Hague conventions and its refusal to sign the Geneva protocols of 1925 and 1949. Peking and Moscow both deny the existence of epidemics. There are increasing references to concrete data attesting to American guilt: pictures in Chinese and Soviet papers, minute details of the structure of the containers and carriers, and descriptions of the various bacterial media used. There are also comparisons of the opposed scientific goals of Soviet and American biologists.

But Peking and Moscow differ in their treatment of certain themes. Despite China's greater involvement in the BW campaign, Peking's campaign to stress the international implications of BW and its demand for world-wide condemnation of American criminality are more marked than Moscow's. Moscow's voluminous denunciations of American bestiality and criminality contain few references to possible legal condemnation. Peking's appeal for the establishment of a court to try the BW criminals is paralleled by more restrained claims that the "U. S. criminals will not escape their responsibility for the crimes they have committed." Jack Gaster, the British representative on the IADL mission to Korea, declares that "those who are breaking the law will find a second Nuremberg awaiting them," but such strong statements are unusual.

* For a more detailed analysis of Peking's development of the BW campaign, see FBIS SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS, 27 March 1952.
Moscow has not yet relayed China's 30 March charge that the Americans are planning to use the atom bomb in Korea. Nor has it reported North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hun Yong's call for the punishment of the BW criminals. (This seems consistent with Moscow's earlier caution regarding a similar statement by Chou En-lai.) Peking reveals that American prisoners have told of "secret inoculations" which convinced them they were being prepared for germ warfare, but this has not yet been broadcast from Moscow. A news item broadcast to North America, however, repeats a Pyongyang report that American POW's admitted that they fired germ shells into North Korean positions. Moscow has not yet picked up Peking's recent charge that the British are equally responsible with the Americans for the use of biological weapons in Korea.

International Red Cross a Tool of the Aggressors: Jacob Malik's 26 March denunciation of the International Red Cross, which was quickly given wide play in Moscow's international services, gives new impetus to Peking's earlier charges that the international organization is a corrupt tool of the aggressors. As did Peking, Moscow stresses the IRC's complicity in the mistreatment of Communist prisoners, impugns its "international" character, and insists that it is completely unacceptable as an impartial and disinterested party, and says it will not be permitted to investigate the BW charges. Although Peking has similarly condemned the World Health Organization in rejecting its inspection of possible epidemic areas, Moscow has not yet echoed this theme.

North Koreans Were Prepared for June 1950 Attack: A new claim, which seems at variance with Moscow's usual line concerning the start of the Korean war, declares that "having acquired information beforehand about the Syngman Rhee attack which was being prepared, the Government of the Republic was able to prepare a worthy rebuff." This contention is in direct contradiction to the usual claims that the South Korean attack came as a surprise and may be intended to establish the groundwork for future justification of the heavy concentration of men and materiel on the Parallel when the war started. It is broadcast only in the Soviet home service, however.

Moscow is somewhat more voluble than usual concerning the actual negotiations but the volume of reference is still low. The Americans are said to be deliberately stalling the talks, fearing that an end to the war will mean a curtailment of Wall Street's munitions profits and a slackening of tension which will make it difficult to sustain the people's war-mindedness. It is also contended that, by prolonging the negotiations, the Americans hope to gain sufficient time to reform their unwilling satellites who are becoming increasingly reluctant partners.