Peking sheds no clear light on Communist intentions in Korea. In fact the contrast between its seeming amenability on certain issues, its intransigence on others and the violent attacks on American brutality tends to obscure those intentions. Reflecting the Communist position at Panmunjom Peking hints at willingness to make concessions on ports of entry and the rotation of troops, but remains adamant on the questions of Soviet participation in the post-armistice inspection, and of repatriation. The airfields issue has been ignored for almost a month.

The denunciation of American atrocities is unprecedentedly violent; the Koje Island "massacre" is paralleled with new charges that America uses bacteriological weapons in the campaign to prove American bestiality and to refute American claims that many prisoners do not want to be repatriated. The bitterness of the bacterial warfare charges, when coupled with regional transmitters' references to epidemic teams for Korea, may be an indication of the seriousness of conditions there.

The Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary receives treatment similar to that noted last year, and the emphasis remains the same: the agreements insure the world against a resurgence of Japanese militarism. There is a noteworthy absence of references to the agreements providing for the transfer of Soviet-held properties to the Chinese.

Discussion keyed to the Colonial People's Day of Struggle is generally related to the Sino-Soviet anniversary pattern in that it too focuses on Japan. It stresses the Japanese people's resistance to remilitarization and their continuing fight to win independence from the American occupation. The recent flurry of attention to Hong Kong and Malaya has largely subsided and Peking does not attempt to maintain the momentum of the campaign within the context of Anti-Colonialism Day.

**No More Concessions on Ports and Rotation of Troops:** Peking continues to give no indication of future policy in regard to the truce talks. Discussions of the substantive issues show no tendency toward concession on the major points obstructing agreement. Final willingness to raise the number of ports of entry to five and to permit the rotation of 35,000 troops per month is termed as the "limit of the efforts" of the Communists, and there is continuing adamancy on the question of "voluntary repatriation" of prisoners. The question of the post-armistice rehabilitation of airfields has been passed over in complete silence for almost a month. Furthermore, there has also been no further discussion of the agenda of the high-level political talks which will follow an armistice.
The USSR the Greatest Proponent of Peace in Korea: Peking appears piqued over the U.N.'s rejection of the Soviet Union as a participant in the post-truce inspection. It reiterates that "if the Soviet Union cannot be put forward as a neutral nation, then there is no neutral nation in existence in all the world." In support of this position, Peking recalls that the Soviet Union "has consistently called for a peaceful solution of the Korean question" and that the truce talks were initiated by Jacob Malik's speech of last June. Stressing that the Americans have been unable to present an acceptable rationalization of their rejection of the USSR, current broadcasts declare that the Americans object because they know that acceptance "would ruin the 20-month smear campaign in the United States that the Soviet Union was involved in the Korean war." Concerning American demurrers based on the Soviet Union's contiguity to Korea, Peking says that the mountain of American propaganda, after laboring for 20 months to convince the world of Soviet intervention in Korea, "has brought forth the mouse of proximity." Peking pertinent fails to echo P'yongyang's frequent acknowledgments of Soviet aid (not specifically defined), and comment associated with the Sino-Soviet anniversary also fails to pay tribute even to spiritual aid in Korea. Parallelly, Peking points to Sweden's dispatch of medical units to Korea as a sign of that nation's tainted neutrality, glossing over the fact that several of the "people's democracies" have made similar contributions to the Communist forces.

Koje Massacre Shows Fiction of "Voluntary Repatriation": Reacting with sufficient alacrity to suggest that the Koje riot was anticipated, Peking employs all its propaganda artillery in assailing the inhumanity of the Americans. Basing its continued resistance to "voluntary repatriation" on the riot, Peking says that this murder of defenseless Koreans not only "discloses the hollow sham of so-called voluntary repatriation," but exposes the true face of the supposedly neutral Red Cross. This seems to be another indication of defensiveness regarding the Communist refusal to permit Red Cross contacts with North Korean areas. Peking categorically denies that the demonstration, allegedly participated in by all of the camp's 6,000 inmates, was precipitated by people who "would prefer to die" rather than be forced to return to Communist-held areas.

Americans Again Resort to Bacterial Warfare: The barrage of abuse concerning Koje is equaled in volume and vehemence by denunciations of alleged American dissemination of bacteria-infested insects over North Korea. Sparked by the official protest of North Korea's Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong, Peking expresses the indignation of that "broad cross-section of public opinion" which is always quoted on such occasions. Political, social, women's, youth, industrial, professional and intellectual groups all vie in the intensity of their abuse.

The intensity of this assault at this moment further beclouds Peking's purposes. It also suggests that the charge may be an attempt to cope with an increasing incidence of disease in Communist territories. This possibility is further strengthened by the regional transmitters' frequent reminders of scientists' and doctors' promises to provide more vaccines and sera for Korea. There are equally frequent claims that anti-epidemic teams are being sent to battle areas. Further indications of unsatisfactory medical conditions in Korea may be gleaned from the stress in domestic transmissions on the crimes of these preparing medical supplies for the troops.
The picture of American depravity and bestiality is rounded out by frequent allusions to the inhuman tortures inflicted upon Koreans, and by the graphic description of the indignities perpetrated against Korean women. Charges which have been infrequent in recent weeks—that prisoners are being used in atom-war experiments, and for target practice—return in full force. Allegations that continued American atrocities and disregard for agreements concerning non-violation of the truce area "lead to speculation as to whether the Americans' written word can be honored" may be an indication of future charges.

Sino-Soviet Pact a Deterrent to Aggression: The general themes used in the celebration of the Sino-Soviet Pact anniversary parallel those of last year; they stress the Pact's importance as a deterrent to Japanese aggression or to aggression by any other nation uniting with Japan. The postponement of Sino-Soviet Friendship Week seems to have had little effect upon the volume of comment broadcast in the overseas transmissions, but regional broadcasts do not equal the effusiveness of last year. Although references to Soviet aid for China are abundant, they do not attain the volume of Soviet stress upon the USSR's largesse to China. Rather the major contention is that the treaty "has effectively stalled the outbreak of a new war" and remains the best guarantee of peace in the Far East, Asia and the world. This general approach was employed in Chou En-lai's PRAVDA article of last year, and the Premier currently reiterates these claims in a widely broadcast article. There appears to be quite a bit more saber-rattling in Chou's pronouncement this year, but the discrepancy between Peking's aggressiveness and Moscow's stress upon the ties of aid binding the two nations suggests that China's bellicosity stems from a desire to buttress flagging morale at home and to present a facade of strength abroad rather than from a desire to heighten existing tensions.

Anniversary broadcasts report that the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association now has a membership of 23,170,000 persons, a formidable increase over the 3,000,000 claimed last year, when the goal for this anniversary was set at 20,000,000.

Although the festivities are reported throughout China, by far the majority of regional references come from areas close to the Soviet Union, where Soviet influence and the need for amenable towards the Soviet Union would seem greatest. Reports from Dairen and Port Arthur praise Soviet aid, guidance and inspiration, and Manchurian leader Kao Kang lauds the Soviet Union in glowing terms. However, these reports fail to mention the transfer of Soviet-held properties or the Changchun Railway, although Chou En-lai's 1951 PRAVDA article specifically referred to the USSR's quick adherence to these specific agreements. Nor are there allusions to the properties already returned to China.

China Must Learn From Soviet Experience: Regional broadcasts do not stress the need to love the Soviet Union; rather they urge the people to learn the lessons of Soviet science, technique and experience and to strengthen their concept of "proletarian internationalism." Poet Wei's declaration that the friendship of the Soviet Union is "heartwarming and unforgettable" is about as strong a statement as any publicized.
NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang demonstrates greater interest in home front problems and fighting spirit than it does in the Panmunjom negotiations. A few commentaries charge that the Americans resort to bacteriological weapons, to delays in the negotiations, and to such brutality as the Koje Island massacre to conceal their defeats and their desire to continue the war. But, by and large, the major interest is in morale and supply problems.

American Insincerity and Brutality: Pyongyang broadcasts daily communiques on the fighting and on the truce negotiations. But there are only occasional commentaries initiated by Pyongyang on the negotiations and related events. These occasional commentaries give a conventional perspective to the negotiations: they maximize American hypocrisy and Communist sincerity. The Koje riots are said to have occurred when the internees realized that the Americans were exerting pressure to prevent the return of some of the internees. But there is no discussion of the principle involved in the controversy over voluntary versus automatic repatriation.

Pak Hon Yong's protest over the Americans' alleged use of bacteriological weapons is endorsed in reports of newspaper editorials and of statements by prominent Koreans. Chou En-lai's endorsement is reported two days after it was released by NONA. Pyongyang's comment on the issue is conventional in its emotional phraseology and in its analysis:

For what reason are the two-footed beasts perpetrating such atrocities? Needless to say, they do so in an attempt to transform Korea into their strategic base and recoup their repeated failures. In conducting criminal warfare the American imperialists are utilizing such war criminals and germ-warfare experts as Ishii Shiro, Jiro Wakamatsu and Kitano Mosaburo in their efforts to massacre the Korean people.

(in Korean, 25 February)

Pyongyang also makes reference to wanton air raids and to mistreatment of Koreans in occupied areas. But, although it appears to follow Moscow's lead in attacking the United States, it does not take up racial persecution in America even though that topic is currently being stressed in Soviet broadcasts. This seems to reflect the general absence of racist charges in comment on the war.

The question of Soviet participation in the prospective inspection teams is taken up in a commentary supplementing KCP reports from Panmunjom. Echoing Chinese Communist contentions, Pyongyang argues that the USSR is more qualified than either Sweden or Norway to participate since it has consistently sought to bring about a peaceful solution. American insincerity and obstructionism are also cited in this context; KCP argues that the Americans have failed to give a valid reason for refusing Soviet participation and are only intent on delaying the discussions. This point is underscored in a caustic claim that an American staff officer napped during the discussion.

CONFIDENTIAL
The Problem of Fighting Spirit: Pyongyang's efforts to maintain the fighting spirit of the Korean people are prominent in most news broadcasts. There are repeated references to the cordiality of Sino-Korean relations, to the strength of the Chinese Republic, and to the extent of the support received from the People's Democracies that seem intended to bolster self-confidence. Another phase of the campaign includes reminders of the heroism displayed by Korean troops, Chinese volunteers, and Soviet partisans, and Soviet troops in World War II. Here again there is relatively little commentary attention to any of the elements of this category. For example, although Pyongyang reports the activities of and the cordial reception given the Korean delegation visiting China it does not broadcast commentaries keyed to these events.

In an effort to personalize the urgings for sustained fighting spirit Pyongyang broadcasts exchanges of letters between troops and their relatives; these letters are usually read by the respective authors.

The Problem of Production: Throughout Pyongyang's news broadcasts and commentaries there are reminders intended to spur production of food and other essential commodities and to effect economies in production and marketing. There are reports of a meeting of "enthusiastic farmers" and of a conference of bank officials which emphasize the need for production and economy; these reports make relatively pointed charges concerning shortcomings during 1951 and there are messages to Kim II Sung pledging improvement.

The Moscow Line: Pyongyang adheres closely to Moscow's pattern in broadcasting comment on such diverse topics as America's economic weakness, the Soviet-Hungarian treaty anniversary, the Victor Hugo anniversary, the coming conference on East-West trade, Soviet Army day and so on. This imitation carries over into news items for Pyongyang quotes TASS almost as often as it quotes KCP. In available broadcasts the volume of such non-Korean comment appears greater than comment on the negotiations as such.

SOUTH KOREA

There is continuing concern over inflation, rice supplies, and the return to Seoul and there are continuing calls for unification of Korea. But there is relatively little attention to the negotiations. Pusan does not appear to comment on the bacteriological warfare charges or the Kojé riots. The Assembly debates on election of the President are reported via official statements; the observations attributed to Syngman Rhee suggest his determination to keep the issue alive and to appeal for popular support.
Assembly Debates: On two occasions Syngman Rhee declares that public opinion favors direct election of the President; he indicates his determination to take the debate out of the Assembly in a 17 February call to voters to express their opposition to the present electoral method. He calls on the voters to recall all representatives who do not carry out the public mandate in this matter.

This leads to the question of recall and Rhee declares that the absence of a Constitutional provision on recall does not mean "there is no provision not to recall them." As usual Pusan takes no direct part in this controversy. It reports Chief Justice Kim as cautioning that recall procedures must be according to law even though the Constitution does not specifically provide for recall.

Rhee continues to call for public action on the electoral question and on 20 February Pusan reports that he is confident that the Assemblymen are wrong in believing that the public is opposed to direct election. Pusan does not appear to publicize the opposition arguments regarding elections or recall.