9. Activity of Mukden-based 3rd Air Division revealed: A 23 February message from Mukden to Liaoyang referred to a flight of YAK-11 trainers of the Chinese Communist 3rd Air Division. According to the reporting agency, this is the first reference to this division since 15 January, when it moved to Mukden from Antung. While this division is equipped with at least 30 MIG-15's, a few YAK-11's are usually attached to Chinese jet units. (SUEDE 6920 Security Group, Johnson AB Tokyo, SG 494 25 Feb 52)

Comment: When this division was based at Antung its aircraft flew many combat missions over Korea. Although activity by 3rd Division aircraft since mid-January has not been detected, this message suggests that they are still in the Mukden area.


Comment: In this Chinese message "allied" probably means "Soviet" rather than "Korean" (the most likely alternative meaning), since only Soviet and Chinese aircraft are believed based at Tatungkou, one of the principal combat fields in Manchuria. The phrase "Allied Air Force," not previously observed in these messages, strengthens the probability that some of the MIG-15's encountered by UN aircraft over Korea are elements of the Soviet Air Force.

11. KOREA. North Korean officers begin two months' training course: Eight line-company commanders, probably from the North Korean 82nd Regiment at Kaesong, were ordered on 23 February to come to their parent division for a training course:

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The officers were instructed to bring "two months (?) of provisions" and a field manual on the attack of fortified positions.

Field analysis notes that eight company commanders would not be released from a line regiment for two months if any operations were planned during that period. The suggestion that the course will include offensive tactics, however, is a further indication of Communist offensive-mindedness. (SUEDE CINCPE, SIB 449, 26 Feb 52)

Comment: This is further evidence that the enemy is not contemplating an offensive in the immediate future. However, numerous indications, both in communications, intelligence and other reports, have pointed up the enemy's continued preparation for any eventuality—including an offensive.