Communist rotate medical personnel in Manohurlat surgery unit, in Mapohurla. In a message from Shanzhai, it was informed that all its personnel, with the exception of three individuals, must leave. The messages also stated that all comrades who had returned from Korea would return at once to Shanghai. (SUMA, No. 26, Oct. 31, 1956). In Manohurlat was informed in a message from Shangha to Mapohurla, that all its personnel would be returned at once to Shanghai. (SUMA, No. 26, Oct. 31, 1956).

COMMUNIST ROTATION OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Communist rotate medical personnel in Manohurlat surgery unit. In Mapohurla, in a message to Shanghai, it was informed that all its personnel, with the exception of three individuals, must leave. The messages also stated that all comrades who had returned from Korea would return at once to Shanghai. (SUMA, No. 26, Oct. 31, 1956). In Manohurlat was informed in a message from Shangha to Mapohurla, that all its personnel would be returned at once to Shanghai. (SUMA, No. 26, Oct. 31, 1956).
enemy lost four TU-2 light bombers, one MIG-15 jet and possibly six IA-11 conventional fighters in the engagement. These aircraft are believed to have been subordinate respectively to the Eighth, Second and Third Chinese Communist Air Divisions. (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 251, 2203Z, 5 Dec; USAFSS CM IN 57218, 30 Nov 61)

Comment: Communications intelligence provided the advance information of this enemy bombing mission which enabled Far East Air Force jet fighters to intercept it.

The losses are comparable to initial Far East Air Force statements that six TU-2's, one MIG-15 and three IA-9's (conventional fighters, easily mistaken for IA-11's) from a total of 60 MIG's, 12 TU-2's and 16 IA-9's were destroyed in the 30 November encounter.

The Chinese Communist Air Force appears to have carried out this operation without substantial Korean or Soviet participation.

12. KOREA. North Korean air officers confer at new headquarters in Sinuiju: A 30 November North Korean air message from Sinuiju to Pyongyang stated that "there is a conference on 5 December, so, see that the Sariwon, Pyongyang, Kangdong (chiefs) arrive in Sinuiju by 4 December." (SUEDE AFSA-251 0020Z, 3 Dec 61)

Comment: Recent indications have pointed to the transfer of control of most North Korean air operations, principally training, from Pyongyang to Sinuiju. This change, occurring between 30 October and 4 November, was signalled by the movement of Wang Ryon, North Korean Air Force commander, from Pyongyang to Sinuiju.

The recent appearance of a Korean-language ground-controlled intercept net in the Sinuiju area is probably tied in with this headquarters shift, but in an as yet unexplained manner. It is believed that the North Korean Air Force, along with the Chinese Air Force, has reached a considerable state of operational readiness.

13. North Koreans continue training of air personnel: A 2 December North Korean air message from the Manchurian training base at Yenchi to air headquarters in Sinuiju reports that "440 students of the training battalion will be dispatched to the 1st Regiment and the 2nd Regiment of students on 3 December." (SUEDE AFSA CM IN 47813, 3 Dec 61)

Comment: While no indication is given as to whether these students were pilot or ground personnel trainees, the size of the class, which has apparently completed basic training, indicates a continued emphasis on the training of air force personnel.
Continued North Korean interest in naval training indicated: A 17 November message from a west coast defense brigade to one of its battalions requested that "the list of names of students of the preparatory course of the naval academy, the students of the naval training school, the requisite personnel for the repair of ships, and the non-commissioned officers and privates who possess naval technique is to be forwarded by the 16th (of November)." (SUEDE AS CM IN 57550, 2 Dec 61)

Comments: The embryonic North Korean navy, consisting of a few motor-torpedo boats, converted minesweepers and armed junks, was largely destroyed in the early days of the war. Since that period the enemy's navy has been primarily a shore-based one charged with coastal defense and mine-laying.

While the scope and character of naval training in North Korea are unknown, this message seems to indicate a continued interest in sea-going personnel.

Early North Korean messages reveal guerrilla organization: Recently available North Korean messages of June and July 1951 shed some light on the organization of North Korean guerrilla forces in South Korea during that period.

Most of the messages were addressed to either the "Liaison Officer" or the "Section Chief" of the "Eastern Section"; however, one message was addressed to the "Southern Section" and another referred to a "Western Section." The "Eastern Section" during this period seems to have been operating under radioed orders in mountainous eastern Korea, in the vicinity of the South Korean coastal city of Samchok. Subordinate to the "Eastern Section" were five "detachments," one of which had a strength of approximately 1,000 light armed troops.

One message distinguished between these "detachments" and guerrillas, in that the detachments were ordered to maintain liaison with the guerrilla troops. (SUEDE AS CM IN 56265, 27 Nov; 56266, 27 Nov; 56272, 27 Nov 61)

Comments: FECOM carried enemy guerrilla strength in South Korea during this period at 5,000.