Except for occasional NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY accounts of the negotiations at Panmunjom, Moscow ignores the cease-fire talks--including the final agreement on Point Two of the agenda. It exerts a special effort to deny American charges that the Communists mistreat U.N. prisoners and intensifies its own charges that the U.S. industrialists are profiting from the war--perhaps to counteract any influence the Hanley charges may have had. There are occasional references to Communist air strength, but these departures from previous patterns are far less in magnitude than the familiar reiterations of conventional assertions concerning American motives and morale.

Hanley Charges Denied, but Comment Is Restricted: Soviet radio comment on American charges that the Communists have mistreated U.N. prisoners has been marked by what appears to be concern to counteract the effect of these charges on the American audience and by an attempt to limit the scope of the controversy. This in turn suggests a desire to avoid arousing American tensions to a pitch that might obstruct the negotiations. It may also reflect a desire to curtail propaganda that is essentially defensive. (It seems possible that Moscow had some foreknowledge of the American announcement; a 2 November broadcast to North America made the unusual charge that clearly marked prisoner of war camps in North Korea were deliberately attacked by American aircraft. This broadcast received only limited publicity but may have been intended to take some of the sting from the subsequent American charge.)
Col. Hanley's 14 November statement was quickly and repeatedly denied—in broadcasts beamed almost exclusively to American audiences. The denial took the form of quotations from American prisoners who, in letters previously cited, described the kindness of their Communist captors. It also took the form of quotations showing that the American press was skeptical of the figures released in Tokyo and Washington. The prominence given the denial in broadcasts to America suggests Moscow's concern over the possibility that Hanley's announcements might stiffen American attitudes toward the war. This possibility is also suggested by the fact that a 22 November commentary asserted that in releasing the announcement the high command was motivated by a desire to stiffen American attitudes; Moscow frequently projects in this fashion.

Increasing Attention to American Profit-seeking: During the second week there is an increase in charges that American industrialists seek further profits from the war in Korea. These charges are about equal in volume to denials of mistreatment of prisoners; this coincidence may reflect a desire to counter the affects of the American assertions.

Negotiations Ignored: Moscow gives almost no attention to the actual deliberations at Panmunjom and thus continues to dissociate the USSR from any connection with those deliberations. Andrei Vishinsky's Paris reference to terms of settlement is widely publicized, as is Pak Hun Yung's statement of terms. But Moscow does not initiate substantive comment on any of the issues raised in these two statements.

Little Comment on the Air War: Moscow continues to be chary of comment on the air battles in Korea; actual engagements are seldom mentioned, even in communiques, and the tactical and strategic issues are consistently ignored. A 15 November broadcast notes the "great losses" of B-29's and on 21 November Moscow mentions General Vandenberg's concern over the fact that the United States no longer controls the Korean skies; both references are a departure from the previous silence. Here again, however, there is no detailed discussion of jet battles or of General Vandenberg's implicit threat to bomb Chinese bases.

The shooting down of the American navy petrol plane is completely ignored and not even the Soviet protest note of 7 November has been mentioned. (When American planes allegedly raided airfields near Vladivostok in October 1950 the official Soviet protest note was transmitted without comment.) Such incidents, could, of course, be incorporated into standard comment on American hostility toward the USSR.

Broadcasts for Korean, American Audiences: Certain elements of Moscow's propaganda for Korean audiences highlight the continuing attempt to portray the Americans as the enemies of the Koreans in war and peace. Three broadcasts attempt to destroy listener confidence in Voice of America broadcasts. A series of broadcasts details America's traditional hostility toward Korea, and a spate of commentaries charges that America is exploiting South Korea; these latter broadcasts are peripherally related to the war situation, but they are almost identical to pre-war comment.

Broadcasts for American audiences give prominence to the denials of mistreatment of prisoners and continue to dwell on the American people's opposition to the war. A 25 November commentary is also related to this
attack on American morale, but it takes a somewhat different tack; it recalls that the American Civil War is ample proof of the futility of efforts to solve problems by force. This same commentary also revives Stalin's February claim that American troops are good troops but "they have no desire to fight" the unjust war in Korea.