THE FAR EAST

KOREAN WAR: Moscow Avoids Commitment but Revives Atrocity Propaganda

Despite the wide play given Andrei Vishinsky's reply to Ambassador Kirk, Moscow continues to avoid an explicit propaganda commitment to any outcome of the cease-fire talks or of the Korean war in general. There are indirect hints at abandonment of the drive for unity, and Moscow relays evidences of what appears to be China's willingness to concede; but there is no discussion of the talks that would amount to an investment in any particular course of action.

There are, however, indications of a campaign to continue Korean tensions, and in the few days since the talks were resumed there has been a revival of atrocity propaganda. These charges are not so elaborate as were the earlier ones, nor do they receive an appreciable volume of attention.

Vishinsky's Reply to Kirk: Andrei Vishinsky's lengthy and conventional reply to Ambassador Kirk was widely broadcast in the first week; it has been supplemented by only one commentary, broadcast to North American audiences, which rehashes Vishinsky's remarks. The extensive publicity brings the attention to the war in the first week to a point paralleling that reached in the week between Delegate Malik's 23 June statement and the agreement to reach negotiations. However, Malik's statement was not broadcast so widely as Vishinsky's, and the supplementary propaganda gave marked attention to American responsibility for the war and to atrocity charges. Neither element is so prominent between 16 and 22 October; in fact, Vishinsky's actual statement makes up half of the total attention to Korea, and the Stalin-Kim Il Sung messages, (on the anniversary of Soviet-Korean diplomatic relations) makes up another fourth. Thus, Moscow appears to modify its attack on the United States, presumably in the hope of seeing the talks resumed.

Moscow Relays Chinese Statements: Although it continues its established pattern of avoiding outright discussion of the Korean situation, Moscow gives marked attention to Mao Tse-tung's call for a "reasonable" stand on the part of the Americans and also relays other Chinese statements, including Peng Chen's address to the CPCC and Chinese messages to Korea on the occasion of the anniversary of China's entry into the war. (Otherwise, this anniversary is ignored.) Mao avoids any sort of explicit statement on Korea, and his statement is broadcast 49 times; Peng Chen's more forceful address is broadcast only eight times. This difference could reflect the difference in rank of the individuals, but it may also be an indication of willingness to concede in the negotiations. The Chinese anniversary messages—and Stalin's message to Kim Il Sung—are evasive as to the stand to be taken at the negotiations and also suggest concessions. (For a fuller discussion of the Chinese stand, see FBIS, SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS, 25 October 1951)

Broadcasts for Koreans: Andrei Vishinsky's statement was broadcast six times to Korean audiences (Malik's 23 June statement was not broadcast in Korean at all), and this could mean that Moscow is now concerned to prepare the Koreans for possible concessions in the negotiations. It was broadcast
24 times to North America, 26 times to U.S. forces in Asia, and 12 times to Germany, thus serving to disunite the West; the disproportion in the Korean-language broadcasts seems to be further evidence of a desire to limit the propaganda commitment.

Broadcasts for Koreans continue to stress the heroism of Korean patriots and the over-all strength of the forces resisting imperialism. This pattern of emphasis serves several propaganda objectives: it avoids arousing Korean fears concerning abandonment of their cause; it is a precautionary measure that ensures continued Korean resistance, should some unforeseen development obstruct the negotiations; and it prepares for continued resistance of a small-scale and partisan type in the event that peace is restored.