SPECIAL ESTIMATE

027590

PROBABLE IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE FAR EAST FOLLOWING A FAILURE IN
THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS IN KOREA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ARMY review(s) completed.

USAF review(s) completed.

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Number 9

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 3 August.
ANNEX A

The following tables show a break-down of aggregate air strength available to the Chinese Communists by aircraft types, subordination and disposition:

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Type</th>
<th>CCAF</th>
<th>NKAF</th>
<th>Undetermined Subordination</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Fighters</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Attack</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bombers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>Transports</td>
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Table 2

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<th>Piston Fighters</th>
<th>Ground Attack</th>
<th>Light Bombers</th>
<th>Transports</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX B

CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES

1. The Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces have very limited capabilities at the present time. Weaknesses in leadership, organization and logistical support curtail their defensive capabilities and seriously limit their offensive capabilities.

2. Present training, strength, and equipment are probably sufficient to permit a successful defense of Taiwan against a limited attack, but shortages of modern aircraft, POL, spare parts, ammunition, transport, artillery, and supplies of all classes, and lack of replacement personnel, make it impossible for the Chinese Nationalist forces alone to defend successfully against a prolonged and determined all-out assault by Chinese Communist forces equipped for amphibious warfare.

3. The completion of present organization plans and the receipt of American aid should greatly increase the combat effectiveness and defensive capabilities of the Nationalists. It is estimated that the Nationalist forces could possibly become combat effective in a minimum of 6 to 8 months after full implementation of the United States aid program. However, the Nationalists could not even then mount a successful invasion of the mainland and exploit a possible initial beachhead without continued United States air, naval, and logistical support. The Nationalists do not have the necessary additional manpower to exploit successfully a breakthrough from the beachhead, but it might be obtained from guerrillas and potential defectors from the Chinese Communist Forces.
PROBABLE IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FAR EAST
FOLLOWING A FAILURE IN THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS
IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To assess present Communist capabilities in the Far East and
probable immediate Communist courses of action in this area in the
event of a breakdown of cease-fire negotiations in Korea.

ESTIMATE

PROBABLE COMMUNIST MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION IN THE
FAR EAST

1. If cease-fire negotiations should break down, we believe that Com-
munist forces in Korea will continue large-scale military operations
in the area and may undertake offensive actions against UN troops at
an early date. The Chinese Communists have improved their over-all
capabilities since the termination of the April-May offensive. The
Communists probably would be able to employ at least as many troops
as they employed in that offensive. These troops would have the ad-
vantage of a considerable logistic build-up and, according to recent
indications, they are likely to have more artillery and tank support
than they had for recent offensives. Communist combat air capabili-
ties have been significantly increased during the past month, and now
constitute an increasingly serious threat to UN forces in Korea.*

* It is the view of DI/USAF, that the following consideration is ap-
licable at this point:
"However, it does not necessarily follow that the build-up of forces
in North Korea is for the purpose of launching an offensive in the
event that the cease-fire negotiations fail. The build-up could be
for the purpose of strengthening Communist bargaining power during
cease-fire negotiations or even to conduct a limited objective off-
fensive during the negotiations so as to move the battle line south
of the 38th Parallel and settle in fact one of the issues of the
negotiations."
Although Communist ground offensive operations against UN forces, at least in the early stages of renewed hostilities, are likely to be of substantially the same scale and nature as they were last spring, defensive air operations could be materially expanded and offensive operations on a sizeable scale could be initiated.

2. We do not believe that operations of the scale and nature described above could destroy UN forces or drive them from Korea. Furthermore, we do not believe that if the Chinese Communists should employ their current maximum air capability in support of a ground offensive, they would be able to sustain these air operations long enough to gain air superiority over Korea and to enable Communist ground forces to destroy or expel UN troops. However, this air offensive would subject UN forces to greater personnel and materiel losses than heretofore inflicted in the Korean war.*

3. We believe, therefore, that in the event of a breakdown of cease-fire discussions and the continuance of large scale military operations in Korea, the Communists will have to choose between two possible major courses of action: (a) to accept the continuation of a conflict of substantially the scale and nature that preceded the cease-fire negotiations; or (b) to take more drastic measures to destroy or expel UN forces. There is a third less likely course of action in that the Communists could effect a defensive action with reduced strength. Whichever course of action is undertaken, the Communists will maintain military pressure in Korea, while probably trying to keep the door open for political negotiations at any time when the global interests of the USSR would make a diplomatic settlement of the Korean conflict advantageous.

4. If UN/US forces are to be defeated, the Communist forces in Korea must have strong air support and must be provided by the USSR with heavy ground equipment to overcome their current deficiencies.

* It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, that the last sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted.
There have been numerous reports that Communist forces in Manchuria have been supplied and trained with Soviet equipment. If these forces exist they could be utilized in Korea. In any event, personnel for the operation of Soviet equipment could be obtained by training Communist forces presently in Korea, by introducing "volunteers" from Soviet-Satellite sources, or by introducing organized Soviet units. Unless the USSR has, in fact, trained and equipped large Communist forces in Manchuria, we do not believe that the Chinese Communists can defeat the UN/US forces in Korea in the immediate future merely with the additional support of advisory, logistical and technical assistance and rear area participation from the USSR. If Soviet ground and air personnel were to be employed in sufficient strength to add decisively to Chinese Communist capabilities, such personnel would almost certainly come in direct contact with US forces, thereby creating a state of de facto war between the US and the USSR in Korea. We do not believe the Soviet Union is willing to accept the risk of such a de facto war, which might expand into general war, merely to insure an early defeat or expulsion of UN/US forces.

5. It is more likely that the Kremlin will attempt to prevent an extension of the area of conflict and, in recognition of internal strains in Communist China, will endeavor to provide enough logistical and technical assistance to insure maintenance of Chinese Communist will and ability to continue military operations in Korea. The Kremlin may estimate that thereby it could oblige the UN/US to maintain very substantial forces in Korea indefinitely, at great cost and with continuing strain on the political and military relations of the participating UN nations.*

* The DI/USAF would add the following consideration at this point: "However, it is possible that the Chinese Communists would reject such a plan and demand decisive help from the USSR or decline to maintain more than a holding force in Korea. Such a course of action would give them a greater freedom for operations elsewhere."
6. If, however, the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto local war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist.

7. If UN/US forces took the initiative in expanding the area of the conflict, Communist reaction would depend on the scale and nature of UN/US military operations:

(a) "Hot Pursuit"
If UN/US aircraft in "hot pursuit" of Communist aircraft crossed the Manchurian border, we believe that the Communist reaction -- aside from the local opposition by enemy interceptor aircraft and AA -- would be restricted to diplomatic protests and to intensified propaganda in the UN and elsewhere claiming that the US was engaging in action designed to expand the war.

(b) Bombing Attacks on Military Installations in Manchuria
If UN/US forces engaged in air operations against military installations and lines of communication in Manchuria, other than in furtherance of the "hot pursuit" principle, we believe that the USSR would commit air force and antiaircraft units in the defense of Manchuria despite the realization that such commitment would increase the risk of general war. The Kremlin probably would attempt to cloak these units as Chinese and/or "volunteer" forces.

(c) Naval Blockade
If the UN/US imposed a naval blockade on Communist China to enforce a UN imposed economic blockade, the USSR probably would attempt to step up the overland flow of supplies and attempt to reduce the effects of the blockade by water shipment through Port Arthur and Dairen. We do not believe that the USSR would openly attempt to break the blockade by force,
but would probably escort its own ships to Dairen and Port Arthur, and might well resort to covert use of submarines and mines against blockading ships.

(d) Use of Nationalist Forces
Effective Chinese Nationalist forces are not currently available in significant numbers for employment outside present Nationalist-held territory, and it is estimated that it will be from six months to one year before such forces could be available. While Chinese Nationalist raiding forces could attack the Chinese mainland, the Chinese Communists can contain such attacks with the military forces presently deployed in east China. Since the Chinese Nationalists could not threaten the stability of the Chinese Communist regime (See Annex B), there would be no need for the USSR to intervene.

(e) Bombing Communist China
If the UN/US were to launch a systematic strategic air and naval bombardment of Communist China, Peiping would call on the USSR for increased assistance. So long as this bombardment did not jeopardize Communist control over Manchuria and North China, the Kremlin would probably restrict its assistance to the provision of air defense units.

8. If UN/US courses of action described above should endanger Communist control over North China and Manchuria, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto local war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist.

9. Unless the Kremlin decided to precipitate general hostilities, an intensification of military operations in Korea subsequent to a breakdown of cease-fire negotiations probably would reduce the prospect of any additional large-scale Communist military operations in the Far East.
INDICATIONS OF CURRENT COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

10. There have been many indications of Communist preparations for a new offensive, including troop movements, logistic build-up and reinforcements. Efforts to build and maintain airfields in North Korea continue, and the gradual southward extension of enemy air activities indicates an enemy intention to extend air defense progressively over all Communist-controlled Korea. There are no reliable indications, however, of enemy intent to commit the entire air force available to the Chinese Communists. Soviet assistance in the form of technical advisors, antiaircraft crews, and logistic support to Communist forces in Korea and Manchuria probably is increasing, but there is no reliable evidence that this assistance will be on such a scale as to increase substantially Communist capabilities in Korea in the near future. However, there are indications that tanks and artillery are moving into Korea. Furthermore, reports of Soviet assistance in the organization of a modern Chinese Communist army in Manchuria continue. These reports may be authentic, and, in fact, considerable progress may have been made in the development of such forces. There have also been unconfirmed reports of Soviet troop concentrations in Manchuria, including locations along the Korean border, but there are no reliable indications of Soviet preparation to move troops into Korea in the near future. Despite many reports concerning an "International Volunteer Army," there is no firm evidence that such a force actually exists.

11. There are no reliable indications of early Chinese Communist military action in other areas of the Far East beyond the scope of present efforts, although numerous reports state variously that invasions of Japan, Taiwan, and Indochina are planned within the next few months. There has been unusual agreement among otherwise unconfirmed reports from Indochina, Southeast China, Peiping, Japan, and Korea in alleging that Communist units, facilities, or personnel in these areas have been ordered to be in a state of readiness by late summer. The content and emphasis of Communist propaganda during the cease-fire talks indicate an intention to maintain and reinforce the psychological preparation of the Chinese and North Korean peoples for a possible resumption of hostilities. This theme, plus frequent reference to the remaining necessity of liberating Taiwan and of preventing the
"remilitarization" of Japan through a "separate" peace treaty, might indicate an intention to prepare these peoples for expanded military operations either in the Korean area or elsewhere in the Far East. Communist propaganda gives no indication of the formation or commitment of an "International Volunteer Army" in Korea, nor does Communist propaganda indicate any Soviet intention to participate in the Korean fighting on a large scale or in military operations elsewhere in the Far East.

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN KOREA

12. Chinese Communist and North Korean Strength. The Communists have recouped their military capabilities in Korea since the costly abortive offensive in late May. They have brought up troop replacements, additional supplies, and equipment including tanks and artillery, and they are now capable of launching a limited ground offensive at any time with little or no advance warning. Such a ground operation might be supported by offensive air attacks against UN air, ground, and naval forces if the Communists committed the air units presently available in the Manchuria-Korea area.

13. The current estimate of Communist troop strength in Korea, 492,000, represents only a slight increase over the estimate of late June, but reports suggest that a maximum of 300,000 additional Chinese Communist troops may be en route to or are now in North Korea. If these additional troops have entered or were to enter the Korean area, total Communist strength in the area would be somewhat greater than the previous peak strength at the beginning of the Communist April offensive. On the other hand, reports indicate that Chinese Communist combat effectiveness has been reduced by the practice of bringing battle-torn units up to strength by individual replacements rather than by introducing fresh experienced regular units. The North Korean Army has made a significant recovery in strength, fire power, and battle efficiency since last March, but it still is hampered by food and equipment shortages, disease, and the declining quality of the remaining North Korean manpower pool. The generally lower quality of Communist troops in Korea may be more than offset, however, by the reported movement in recent weeks of considerable numbers of tanks and artillery pieces towards the front.
14. Although the estimate of Chinese Communist air strength has not changed since 1 June 1951, intensified training, combat experience in both day and night operations, airfield development, and improved aircraft performance have contributed to a general increase in Communist air capabilities. The Chinese Communists have available approximately 1,000 aircraft, including about 100 aircraft of the North Korean Air Force (NKAF) and approximately 500 aircraft (400 of which are jet fighters) of undetermined subordination. (See Annex A.) These jet aircraft constitute the most significant element of Communist air power, and they are appearing in increased numbers near the battle area. They are principally of the MIG-15 type. The MIG-15 has performance characteristics at least comparable to the F-86, the best jet fighter available to the UN forces. Some of these MIG-15's have recently appeared in Korea with large-size wing tanks which increases their estimated radius of action to approximately 400 nautical miles, sufficient to permit these aircraft to reach from Manchurian bases over a large part of Korea and adjacent waters.

15. Limited airfield development has continued in North Korea despite intense and sustained UN aerial bombardment. The majority of North Korean airfields are suitable only for piston-engined planes, but some of them could possibly be used for limited jet operations. Logistic support of North Korean airfields is seriously hampered by the UN air interdiction of enemy lines of communications, and as long as UN air superiority is maintained, enemy offensive and defensive operations from these fields will be severely restricted. However, there are sufficient airfields in Manchuria from which the Communists could attempt to launch air attacks on UN forces.

16. The Chinese Communists are estimated to have the following air capabilities:

(a) Continuance of attempted air defense of the Yalu River line.

(b) Expansion of defensive air operations to cover all of Communist-controlled Korea. Exercise of this capability
would divert increasing numbers of UN aircraft from missions of close support and interdiction to the mission of maintaining air superiority.

(c) Initiation of offensive air operations against UN air, ground, and naval forces on the Korean peninsula and adjacent waters. Exploitation of this capability might:

(i) Disrupt UN air operations and logistic support of UN ground forces by airborne attacks on UN air bases, lines of communications, and supply bases.

(ii) Divert UN air effort from direct support of ground action and interdiction of lines of communications.

(iii) Hamper the freedom of movement of UN ground forces.

(iv) Hinder UN airlift operations.

(v) Harass UN naval operations and the present freedom of UN sea communications.

17. Soviet Assistance. Soviet assistance to Communist forces in Korea to date has consisted of advisory, technical, and logistical support and limited participation of antiaircraft personnel and possibly other specialized Soviet combat troops. Virtually all heavy combat equipment for the North Korean Army has been furnished by the USSR. In addition, most of the electronic and antiaircraft equipment for both North Koreans and Chinese Communists, POL supplies, and some vehicles and ammunition, have been supplied by the USSR. The USSR has the capability to increase considerably the level of its present type of assistance to the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces. UN attacks on lines of communications will continue to hamper the delivery of supplies to the front, however, and Chinese Communist forces thus far engaged in Korea appear to have lacked the skilled personnel required to operate modern heavy arms and equipment. The Soviets have supplied all the jet aircraft and most of the piston-engined aircraft in the Chinese Communist and North Korean air forces. They have also
provided logistic support for these air forces. In addition, they are providing technical assistance and advisory personnel and are reported to be training large numbers of Chinese pilots in the USSR and Manchuria.

(a) "International Volunteer Forces"
While unconfirmed reports continue to be received concerning the existence of formation of "International Volunteer Forces," the existence of such forces, though possible, is not accepted.

(b) Communist Forces in Manchuria
Large numbers of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops are stationed in Manchuria. While persistent reports have been received that the Soviets were equipping these forces with Soviet equipment and training them in Soviet techniques, there is no reliable basis for estimating the size or status of such forces.

(c) Soviet Ground Forces.
The strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East is estimated to be 35 divisions. Of this total, a force of 13 to 15 divisions probably could be made available and committed to combat in Korea within 30 to 60 days after a decision had been made to employ it. The commitment of such a force with presently available air support would give the combined Communist forces the capability of forcing a UN withdrawal from Korea.

(d) Soviet Air Forces
(i) Strength. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces have an estimated Table of Organization and Equipment strength of 5,000 combat aircraft, primarily of World War II types. The actual strength is estimated to be about 85 percent of the TO and E strength but it is believed that these units could be brought up to full strength immediately after M-Day. Over and above those jet fighters estimated to be available to Communist China, there is but little evidence of additional jet fighters in the Far East. However, jets may have been introduced without detection by intelligence. In any event, the
Soviets have the capability of deploying jet units to the Far East in a relatively short time.

(ii) **Airfields.** There are 131 airfields in the Sino-Soviet Far East within 500 miles of the 38th Parallel in Korea or the Japanese Islands of Honshu and Kyushu. The Soviets could probably deploy their entire Far Eastern air strength on these 131 fields.

(iii) **Logistic Support.** The Soviets probably have been stockpiling POL products, including jet fuel, in substantial quantities in the Far East. Providing no effective UN action were taken to disrupt Communist supply lines outside Korea, it is believed that Communist China and the USSR could support logistically a major air effort in the Korean theater. If the Soviet Far Eastern air forces were deployed to bases adjacent to Korea, night bombing attacks could be carried out anywhere in Korea or against Japan, and saturation-type day bomber operations could be launched throughout most of Korea. If Soviet medium bombers (TU-4's) were employed, they would considerably increase enemy air capabilities and expose UN military installations in South Korea and Japan to the danger of atomic attack. No TU-4's are currently known to be based in the Far East.

(e) **Soviet Naval Forces.** Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces consist of the Fifth Fleet with headquarters at Vladivostok and the Seventh Fleet with headquarters at Sovetskaya Gavan. The surface forces of these fleets consist of two heavy cruisers, nineteen destroyers, fifteen coastal destroyers, and 345 miscellaneous vessels including mine sweepers, subchasers, mine layers, landing craft, and motor torpedo boats. The submarine fleet has a strength of 85 submarines including 18 ocean patrol types, 39 medium-range types and 28 coastal types.
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST ELSEWHERE THAN IN KOREA

18. The Chinese Communists have the capability of undertaking military operations in the Far East elsewhere than in Korea and could initiate such operations as an alternative or, in some areas, as an addition to a renewed offensive in Korea.

(a) Taiwan. The Communists have been building up their capabilities for an assault on Taiwan. Thus far, however, the heavy Communist military commitment in Korea, together with the assignment of the US Seventh Fleet to assist in maintaining the security of Taiwan, probably have been decisive factors in the Chinese Communist decision to postpone any attempt to invade the island.

(b) Hong Kong. Regardless of the outcome of the cease-fire negotiations, the Chinese Communists will continue to have the capability of launching an attack on Hong Kong without further preparations and little, if any, advance warning.

(c) Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists probably could make available approximately 50,000 men for extended operations in Burma[25X1]. In Indochina, the Chinese Communists probably could support approximately 100,000 men[25X1] for a series of limited offensives of short duration. However, so long as they are committed in Korea, the Chinese Communists probably would not be able to support logistically both such operations concurrently.

(d) Japan. Direct and large-scale Soviet participation would be necessary for Communist attacks against Japan.