FAR EAST

1. **Enemy continues to augment forces in Korea:**

   The enemy is continuing to reinforce and provide replacements for both North Korean and Chinese Communist forces in Korea. Front line Korean corps have been strengthened by replacements drawn from units in the Pyongyang and Wonsan areas. The strength of these units, in turn, has been maintained by the consolidation of units assigned to rear area security missions, the reactivation of units dissipated in the defeats of last autumn, and the continuance of recruitment and training at a relatively high level. The activation in Manchuria of new North Korean divisions and their movement into Korea.

   Numerous sources have referred to the arrival in Korea of additional Chinese Communist units to replace those recently withdrawn as a consequence of combat losses. Prisoners of war have confirmed the presence in Korea of the 140th Army. Other prisoners have reported that other units of the Fourth Field Army are in Korea in a relief role. The movement of sizeable Chinese Communist forces along the main enemy supply route to the rear of the northwest front.

   **Comment:** There is ample evidence of a long range program to build up the North Korean armed forces, which might be significant if all foreign troops were withdrawn. The extent to which the Chinese Communists have instituted a rotation of forces to replace units withdrawn remains uncertain. The influence of the cease-fire negotiations on such long term manpower commitments have not as yet been reflected in available information.
2. Communist cease-fire terms dictated by prestige considerations:

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the choice of Kaesong as the site of negotiations and the delay preceding negotiations are for reasons of prestige and propaganda.

if the delay were designed to allow Communist forces to improve their military situation, the launching of an offensive would be likely to boomerang against their alleged peaceful intentions. Further questions whether the Communists could not expect to improve their military position materially before cease-fire negotiations, except in the unlikely event that they are determined to conclude the Korean war with a large-scale air offensive against UN rear bases and naval vessels.

Comment: In addition to possible prestige and propaganda advantages, the Communists probably consider a delay necessary in order to prepare for a conference that has developed quite rapidly. With regard to military considerations, there is evidence that Communist forces in Korea will be capable by mid-July of resuming the offensive if they so desire.