1. Comment on Malik's cease-fire proposal:

Although the manner in which Malik's cease-fire proposal was made suggests that it may have been designed for propaganda purposes, it possibly indicates a Soviet desire to settle the Korean War. If the latter is so, the USSR may have preferred to assume the role of "mediator" because of its official position of non-involvement in the Korean War. Even though Malik does not indicate what "belligerents" should participate in the discussions on whether North Korea would be accessible to UN inspection teams, his proposal is the first clear suggestion from the Soviet Government that a cease-fire might precede the withdrawal of the "foreign interventionists" or a discussion of a general Korean settlement.

Unofficial Chinese sources have stated that the Chinese Communist Government endorses Malik's proposal for a cease-fire in Korea. It is not yet clear, however, whether the Chinese Communists will continue to press their demands concerning UN membership and Taiwan as conditions for a Korean settlement. These demands were not included in Malik's proposal, and they have been omitted from Moscow propaganda and from informed statements by Soviet spokesmen since early April.

FAR EAST

2. Intensified enemy jet fighter operations noted in Korea:

The intensification of enemy jet fighter operations during the past week as a firm indication that the Communists will continue to provide vigorous air defense of the Yalu River border area. MIG-15's engaged UN aircraft on each day last week except on the 21st, when bad flying weather may have caused the lack of activity. An improvement in enemy fighter operations is indicated in addition, by the fact that in each of three aerial engagements during the week an F-86 was lost to enemy action. This sharp increase
in combat proficiency may be due to commitment of a new, highly trained jet fighter unit to the Korean air war, an hypothesis supported by the observation of new markings on an enemy jet fighter group. The total number of jet fighters available to enemy forces in Manchuria has not been increased, as there is insufficient evidence to estimate accurately whether this unit is new or one previously active over Korea and recommitted following further training.