NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:

"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities

"B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions or capabilities

"C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments

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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

COMMENT: In the Soviet effort to delay conclusion of the treaty, the USSR very likely counted upon US-Anglo differences as one of the most propitious means of obstruction. However, present indications are that the principal differences, i.e., those regarding Chinese Communist participation in the signing of the treaty and the limitation of Japanese shipping, are being eliminated and will not hinder Western accord on the treaty.

SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

Soviet Air Capabilities Increasing in Europe. CINCSAFE summarizes recent developments in Soviet Air Force units in occupied Europe: (1) higher performance jet light bombers have recently appeared for the first time at Soviet fields in Eastern Europe; (2) other evidence indicates
possible acceleration of the reequipment of Soviet fighter units with jet aircraft - including the appearance of jet trainers near Berlin; (3) there is also evidence of continued airfield construction and improvement. A review of available information has led CINCUSAF to the conclusion that Warsaw is making an effort: (1) to increase the capabilities of Soviet Air Force personnel; (2) to increase the tempo of the Soviet reequipping program; and (3) to extend defensive capabilities to include a significant increase in offensive capabilities. 25X1A 17 May 51.

"B" EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Food Situation Deteriorating. Information emanating from members of the Albanian resistance in Rome indicates that the food situation in Albania has become desperate as a result of the drought and the government's requisitioning of grain. Throughout the country the populace appears emaciated and spiritless. Even though the people are angered by their lack of food and clothing, they are powerless to act against the severe security measures which the government has taken to maintain itself in power. 25X1A 25X1C COMMENT: Although the conditions described in the above report may be exaggerated, 25X1A states that the Communist collective farm system in Albania has proved a boomerang to the Russians who must ship cereals to feed the population so as to compensate for the decline in food production. It has been reported previously that a great shortage of food exists in normally productive areas in Albania, and that little sustenance is provided for political internees. The tight food supply probably compelled the decision on 13 March 1951 of the Albanian Government to reduce the compulsory delivery quotas of agricultural products by 25%.

"B" CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Transit Agreement Signed with Poland. The Czechoslovak news service has announced that a Polish-Czechoslovak agreement was signed in Warsaw on 16 May, granting the latter country preferential freight rates and transit arrangements across Poland, and leasing it space in Stettin harbor. The US Ambassador in Prague comments that the agreement is consistent with the Soviet orbit's attempts to lessen its economic dependence on the West and provides Czechoslovakia with a measure of protection against possible future action by the Western occupation powers to deny it transit privileges across Germany. (FBIS, 16 May 51; C Pravda 720, 16 May 51). 25X1A COMMENT: The new agreement will probably result in the development of the Czechoslovak entrepot in Stettin harbor, an island which has lain dormant for the last two years. It may also result in a return of Czechoslovak maritime traffic to Polish ports, from which it shifted to West European ones last October when revaluation of the zloty raised Polish transit fees.

"B" POLAND. Peace Propaganda Aggressively Anti-US. According to the US Embassy Warsaw, the propaganda promotion of the nationwide Polish peace plebiscite has assumed a more aggressive anti-US tone. The Embassy reports that it has been informed from private Polish sources that the theme
of "punishment for American criminals guilty of aggression in Korea" is predominant in the prepared speeches of Communist Party agitators. This theme first appeared in the Warsaw press on 12 May and was repeated on 16 May. The Embassy believes that unless this theme is developed on a major scale by the Polish radio and press it is intended to excite flagging popular interest in the peace plebiscite rather than inaugurate a campaign for effective punitive action. (C Warsaw 896, 16 May 51).

**YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia Votes for UN Embargo Resolution.** The Yugoslav delegation to the UN on 18 May voted for the UN General Assembly resolution supporting a strategic embargo on areas under the control of Communist China and North Korea. The day previously in the UN Political Committee, the Yugoslav delegate abstained from voting on the preamble to the resolution on the grounds that it was based on the 1 February resolution on which Yugoslavia abstained. (The 1 February resolution condemned Communist China for supporting aggression). The Yugoslav delegate, in voting for the operative provisions of the strategic embargo resolution, explained that his Government recognized that Communist China had clearly persisted in support of aggression and had been singularly unresponsive to negotiation efforts. (U NYTimes, 19 May 51; S Belgrade 173, 17 May 51; U New York 1547, 18 May 51).

COMMENT: This is the first major resolution regarding Korea which the Yugoslav Government has supported. The Yugoslav vote reflects the gradual change in Yugoslav thinking concerning the Korean war and its possible consequences on Western solidarity in the face of Soviet-sponsored aggression. On earlier important issues the Yugoslavs have usually abstained, holding to the hope that a peaceful solution could be obtained if a cautious approach was maintained.
TOP SECRET

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

**E** ISRAEL/SYRIA. Israeli Bitter Concerning UN Security Council Resolution. According to US Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv, Israel's top officials have clearly stated that Israel is "extremely upset" over the 16 May UN Security Council Resolution which includes a request for a suspension by Israel of the Hule drainage project. In general, the Israelis feel that the resolution puts a premium on aggression. In particular, the Israelis are opposed to: (1) the suspension of the Hule drainage project, and (2) permitting the return to the demilitarized zone of those Palestinian Arabs removed by the Israelis several weeks ago. Davis fears that a wave of Israeli cynicism may develop against the UN and that Israel may even try to prevent implementation of the UN resolution. Meanwhile, US Minister Cannon in Damascus disputes the two major Israeli objections to the UN resolution. Cannon feels that the issue concerning (1) the Hule drainage scheme is not the project itself but rather the right of Israel to take unilateral action adversely affecting the interests of local Palestinian Arabs in an area whose sovereignty is still in dispute. Concerning (2) the Israeli allegation that the Arabs who were removed are "happy" and do not desire to return to their homes, Cannon points out that the Arabs bitterly fought to stay on their land and that UN observers were not allowed to see the displaced Arabs because they were "quarantined". (C Tel Aviv 765, 17 May 51; 5 Tel Aviv 771, 18 May 51; 3 Damascus 561, 18 May 51). COMMENT: The bitterness of the Israeli-Syrian border dispute made it certain that if the Security Council took any strong action at all, there would be strong opposition to the resolution from one or both of the parties concerned. The Israelis clearly oppose the Security Council measure, which was passed by a 10-0 vote, because the Israelis fear that any temporary suspension of the Hule drainage scheme may result in a longer stoppage. The Arab reaction will probably be a favorable one, since even a temporary suspension of the Hule drainage scheme will show that the UN opposes unilateral action in the area.

**C** SOUTH ASIA. Three Abstentions in UN General Assembly Vote on Chinese Embargo. On 18 May, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan abstained in the UN General Assembly vote recommending an embargo on the export of war materials to Communist China. In spite of its abstention, India pledged that it would not permit exports of items covered by the embargo. Afghanistan and Pakistan did not commit themselves. (U NY Times, 19 May 51). COMMENT: These abstentions reflect general South Asian fears of provoking World War III, dislike of taking sides in the East-West conflict, and uncertainty over future trade relations with China.

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Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000200210001-7
"C" INDIA. Violent Protest Greets Parliament Bill Curbing Rights of Free Speech. A nation-wide storm of protest has greeted the bill introduced by Prime Minister Nehru in Parliament on 12 May, in which it was recommended that the Indian Constitution be amended to curb the right of freedom of speech and expression "in the interests of the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign countries, public order, decency, and morality." The explanation that the "citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression has been held by some courts to be so comprehensive as not to render a person culpable even if he advocated murder and other crimes of violence" has not been accepted by the opposition. The fear has been expressed that the amendment would be used by the Congress Party to muzzle its opponents in the forthcoming national elections. (U NY Times, 13, 15, 18, 19 May 51). COMMENT: The apparent strength of Indian feeling about the right of free speech is noteworthy. Certain fears regarding Congress Party use of the proposed amendment may well be justified, but it is believed that much of the opposition has overlooked the probable real purpose of the bill. This is almost certainly to facilitate re-imposition of controls on the Communist Party of India and other subversive groups, two State bans on which have recently been lifted following high court decisions that they were unconstitutional. This sign of the Government's desire to maintain freedom of action in discouraging subversive activities is of interest in substantiating other recent indications that the Government is becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of international Communism.

"E" AFGHANISTAN. US Embassy Fears Regarding Afghan-Pakistani Situation. The US Embassy in Kabul, while recognizing that recent Afghan allegations regarding Pakistani military activity along the border are merely part of Afghanistan's long-standing propaganda campaign for Pushtoonistan, nevertheless feels that Afghan-Pakistani relations have deteriorated sufficiently to make UN observation of the situation advisable. (C Kabul 357, 16 May 51). COMMENT: In the past, Afghan-Pakistani tension has frequently mounted in direct proportion to the growth of Indo-Pakistani difficulties. At present, Pakistan is protesting the move made by the Government of Indian-held Kashmir to convene a Constituent Assembly against the expressed desires of the UN Security Council, and it may be that recent Afghan propaganda is designed to take Pakistani minds off the Kashmir question. It is believed that the current situation will not deteriorate to a dangerous point since previous situations of similar nature have proved innocuous.
"B" MALAYA: Singapore Chinese Said To Be Veering To Anti-FRC Position. The following information from a source evaluated F-3 has been released by the US Consulate General: An estimated 150,000 Singapore Chinese who in the past may have been susceptible to overtures from the Chinese Communist regime are now tending to become hostile to that regime, a position which many may take publicly during the next six months. This attitude is attributed to a reaction to Chinese Communist land reforms, rather than to the Korean War. (S Singapore 1104, 18 May 51). COMMENT: Singapore has one of the wealthiest Chinese communities in Asia. The Singapore Chinese have, like other Chinese communities in South Asia, tended toward a policy of "accommodation" toward the PRC. This was partly a case of following the UK's lead in recognizing the PRC. It has previously been reported that local Chinese would be more likely to take an anti-Communist stand if the UK would "clarify" its own position toward the Nao regime. More stringent British measures toward trade with Communist China should encourage anti-Communist feeling among the local Chinese.

"C" THAILAND. Vietnam Minister in Bangkok Wants Joint Action for Quashing Viet Minh Agent. US Minister Heath in Saigon strongly endorses the suggestion of the Vietnam Minister to Thailand that the US, UK and French Embassies jointly urge the Thai Government to expel Nguyen Duc Quy, the chief Viet Minh agent and propagandist in Thailand. This endorsement is made on the grounds that Quy has become so notorious and such a symbol of Thai hospitality to the Viet Minh that its expulsion would be "important and timely." If the Thai Government is adamant on Quy's right to asylum, Heath suggests that the minimum position to take vis-a-vis the Thai is to ask that Quy be obliged to drop all political and propaganda activity on pain of immediate expulsion. (S Saigon 1111, 17 May 51). COMMENT: Quy's expulsion from Thailand would not seriously hinder Viet Minh activities in Thailand.

"B" INDOCHINA. Indian Official Rebuffs Cambodia. The Cambodian Minister-designate to the US described two recent incidents indicating India's attitude toward Cambodia: 1) The Indian Consul General in Saigon stated in a discourteous reply to the Cambodian Government that India found it "hardly necessary" to accept Cambodia's offer of six tons of rice for famine relief since India was in the market for considerably greater quantities; 2) the Indian Congen refused to accept innocuous Cambodian Government tourist literature on the ground that this might imply Indian approval of the Cambodian regime. (C Saigon 1217, 18 May 51). COMMENT: India's feeling that continuing French control precludes recognition of Vietnam
TOP SECRET

applies with still greater force in the case of Cambodia, and
is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

"B" Cambodia Protests French Ouster of Indonesian Newsmen. French
Surete officials in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh have appre-
headed two Indonesian journalists who had just arrived by plane
and returned them to Bangkok by road. The journalists had been
originally recommended by the French military attache in Djakarta
and visas has been issued them in Bangkok by the Cambodian
Chargé and the Vietnamese Minister there. French Surete officials
in Phnom Penh, however, have told the US Chargé there that they
have definite information that the journalists were making reports
for the Ho Chi Minh regime. The Cambodian Government has pro-
tested the action of the French Surete to the French Commissioner
in Cambodia. (C Saigon Unnumbered, 18 May 51). COMMENT: As
with numerous other cases of friction between the French
authorities and the regimes which they have sponsored in Indo-
china, this incident has little significance in itself. Neverthe-
less, the accumulation of such infringements of native "sovereignty;
primarily the result of French tactlessness, produces an atmosphere
prejudicial to effective cooperation between France and its
Indo-Chinese allies. Moreover, such incidents tend to vitiate
the efforts of the Western Powers to persuade Asian governments,
especially India and Indonesia, of the independence of the
Indo-Chinese states.

"C" CHINA. Communists Reportedly Commandeering Motorboats in Canton.
The intelligence chief for the economic director of Macao,
P.J. Lobo, reported to the US Consul General, Hong Kong, that
Chinese Communist authorities in Canton have been "detaining"
motor-driven river boats in that city since April. More than
200 were reportedly collected by 1 May. The US Consul General
evaluates this source and report "C-6" (S State Hong Kong 3425,
18 May 51). COMMENT: There is probably some truth to this
report. Commandeering of small vessels in the Canton area in
April was reported by another source; this activity could be
related to enforcement of the new customs law, which emphasizes
the problem of smuggling. If the Communists confiscated in the
Canton area all vessels suspected of smuggling or of belonging to
"reactionaries", they would amass a large number which could
be used for military purposes and customs patrol.

"B" British Strictly Enforce Embargo on Rubber Exports to
Communist China. The British destroyer COSSACK was reported to
have intercepted the British freighter NANCY MOLLER on the
high seas 18 May and to have started escorting her back to
Singapore with her 3700-ton cargo of rubber destined for Communist
China (U Ticker London Reuters, 18 May 51). COMMENT: The strict
enforcement of this embargo by the British is indicated both by
this interception and measures taken to prevent the Panamanian-
flag NORBAY from clearing Malaya with 740-750 tons of rubber for
Communist China. Recent reports indicate that the Chinese are
expected to attempt to shift their rubber importing activity from
Malaya to Indonesia soon. It is not yet known whether the UK
intends to prevent British shipping from participating in that
trade, should it develop.

"Korea: Economic Conditions in the ROK. Ambassador Muccio,
commenting on economic conditions within the ROK since June 1950
observes that price levels in South Korea have risen by an
average of four times in prosperous southwest Korea and by
six times in the crowded Pusan-Taegu area. Meanwhile, daily
wages paid by contractors have risen an average of five times
for skilled labor and four times for unskilled labor. The
Ambassador further reports that recent Bank of Korea financial
statements tend to indicate that the ROK Government is making
some progress in curbing its deficit spending. (S Pusan 964,
18 May 51). COMMENT: The pacing of the rising cost of living
within the ROK by almost comparable wage increases will do
much to quiet any unrest at the inflationary spiral among the
Korean population. The basic fact remains, however, that the
Korean economy cannot be expected to provide any major measure
of productivity or materials for the UN war effort without a
large increase in the flow of imports for civilian consumption.
"C" FRANCE: Socialists Seek Electoral Alliances. The French Socialist Party's (SFIO) Congress which closed 15 May subordinated all controversial issues to the exigencies of the electoral campaign. Particularly noteworthy among the statements of party policy are a resolution reversing the SFIO's former opposition to the war in Indochina and a resolution which implies eventual acceptance of a German defense contribution. The Party favors the broadest possible electoral alliances, excluding only the Communists and the Gaullists. As a conciliatory gesture toward the Popular Republicans (MRP), SFIO spokesman made it plain that they would not make a campaign issue of Socialist opposition to church schools. (C Paris 7024, 17 May 51). COMMENT: Although the Socialists are expected to retain their present strength of 99 members in the National Assembly, SFIO leaders are undoubtedly jittery about the steady swing to the right, particularly since recent indications point to the Communists retaining more support than had seemed possible earlier. Since the newly created "fourth force" of non-Gaullist Rightists could limit SFIO electoral-alliance possibilities to the MRP, the group expected to suffer the most severe losses in the coming election, the Socialists' pre-election position seems now to be less favorable than when the new electoral reform was voted.

"B" ITALY: De Gasperi Adjourns Parliament As Election Maneuver. Premié De Gasperi has adjourned Parliament until 12 June, despite the angry protests of the Communists (PCI). The latter demanded a debate on the participation of Catholic churchmen in the campaign for the forthcoming local elections. (R FEIS, 18 May 51; U NY Times, 19 May 51). COMMENT: By recessing Parliament until after the local elections on 27 May and 10 June, the Government may hope to forestall a discussion at this time of controversial legislation scheduled for immediate debate, including the civil defense bill and the bill for regulating labor unions. Several aspects of both bills, particularly the provision of the latter prohibiting strikes by state employees, have aroused strong opposition among the anti-Communist labor organizations. Pressure by the Government for parliamentary approval of these measures prior to the elections would afford the PCI an opportunity to exploit this opposition and to divert from the anti-Communist electoral coalition a considerable percentage of the popular vote. In attacking Church participation in the election campaign the Communists expect to take advantage of the rising tide of anticlericalism in the country.
"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Foreign Office Concerned with Rise of German Neo-Nazi Party. A high UK official has expressed to US Embassy London the Foreign Office's serious concern over the emergence of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SSP) in Germany, particularly because of the adverse effect it may have on British opinion on German rearmament. He observed that British opinion had "pretty well come around" before the Lower Saxony elections in which the SSP secured 11 percent of the vote. Foreign Secretary Morrison will include the SSP in forthcoming discussions with Adenauer. (S London 6011, 18 May 51). COMMENT: Before the appearance of this new argument that will be used against German rearmament, there was a fairly important British sentiment against any such move (See COI Daily Digest, 12 Mar 51). The UK Government, anxious to meet this sentiment, has already felt it necessary to make great efforts to convene a Foreign Ministers' conference as evidence of its desire to promote East-West understanding, before German rearmament will be generally accepted by the British public.

"B" Government Reported Likely to Deliver Two Tankers to Poland. According to an export control official at the US Embassy London it is quite likely that the British Government will decide not to interfere with the delivery of two British-built tankers to Poland. According to the British, it was recently discovered that the two vessels are already the property of a Polish State Corporation. As a result, the British fear that the Poles would retaliate against their shipping if the British Admiralty requisitioned the tankers as had been previously requested in April by the Foreign Office. The US Embassy in London believes it highly desirable that a note be delivered by the US to the British expressing a strong desire that the British Government find means to prevent delivery of the vessels. (S London 6016, 18 May 51). COMMENT: In light of the UK's reluctance to curtail trade with Eastern Europe, and the absence of any question of ownership, the British would normally deliver the ships. The two vessels in question were ordered in 1948 by Poland, and are similar in size to those currently in use by the USSR to carry petroleum products to the Far East. Current Polish petroleum requirements are such that these vessels would not necessarily be required for regular shipments between the USSR and Poland.

"B" Government Suspends Prague-London Air Service. The British Foreign Office has notified the Czech Embassy in London that British European Airways (BEA) has been forced to discontinue air service to Prague as a result of Czechoslovak actions and consequently the Czechoslovak airline (CSA) will no longer be permitted to operate a scheduled service between Czechoslovakia and the UK. Discrimination against BEA in the allocation of air freight was cited as the
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The principal reason for the decision, The British pointed out that since the proportion of freight made available for BEA has now become negligible, its continued operation into Praha is uneconomical. Furthermore, according to the British Foreign Office, Czechoslovak authorities have constantly obstructed the work of the BEA office in Praha through the intimidation, arrest and interrogation of staff members. (S London 6006, 18 May 51). COMMENT: Continuing loss of revenue by BEA has finally compelled the British to follow US policy laid down by a NSC directive in January 1950 which deals with the containment of Eastern European airline activity within the orbit.

"C" UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. South Africa Publicly Committed to Assist Defense of the Middle East. Stressing the grave dangers of Communism to the Union with its vast non-European majority, Prime Minister Malan stated in Parliament on 17 May that South Africa would share in the responsibility of defending the Middle East against Communist aggression, and would undertake the protection of neighboring territories to the north, as far as could be agreed. (U FEIS London, 18 May 51). COMMENT: This is the first public commitment of South Africa to participate in the defense of the Middle East against Communist attack, although in mid-1950 the Cabinet secretly promised the UK one armored division (but without equipment) for such use in the event of war. Defense Minister Erasmus had also stated early in February of this year that an attack on Africa would be considered an attack on the Union. The Government has apparently given up, for the time being, its earlier efforts to make its military commitments contingent on the formation of an African Defense Pact, in which the Union hoped to play a leading part. As regards implementing this new pledge, however, South Africa's ground forces are in such a state of neglect that the Director-General of the Lapur Forces has reported that he would be unable to send as much as a company to join the Commonwealth Division in Korea, and the Union is actually contributing only five officers to this division. Moreover, South Africa has taken no steps to obtain the equipment needed for the armored division secretly promised for the defense of the Middle East, although the US indicated some weeks ago its readiness to assist the Union in procuring this equipment.

"C" BOLIVIA. MNR Attempts at Violence Quelled. Thus far, Embassy La Paz reports that the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario's (MNR) planned outbreaks at various points in La Paz on 18 May failed to materialize. In only one district, where MNRists tried to seize a police station, was there some violence, and this was quelled by police. MNRists say that their ranks have been well-infiltrated by police agents who thus far have been able to stalemate MNR plans.

25X1C

MNR labor leader

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Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T011464000200210001-7
Juan Lechin has left La Paz for southern Bolivia, where he will conduct strikes among the miners, who are being armed for revolution. The Bolivian airforce in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz is expected to join the MNR at the height of the revolt. 25X1A

COMMENT: Thus far the police and armed forces have remained loyal to the junta government, although some pro-MNR sentiment among minor army officers has been reported. The airforce is of prime importance in the rapid transportation of troops to suppress possible disturbances in remote parts of Bolivia.
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18 May 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

"B" JAPAN. Vice Foreign Minister Desires Inclusion Chinese Nationalists in Peace Treaty. The US Political Adviser, Tokyo, cables that Vice Foreign Minister IGUCHI called on him on 19 May. In a discussion of the problem of a Chinese signature on the peace treaty, IGUCHI said the Japanese Government under no circumstances desires the signature of the Chinese Communist regime. He added that, basically, his Government wishes to make peace with the Chinese Nationalist Government which it considers deserving of Japan’s support. IGUCHI expressed the thought that failure to give the Nationalist regime an opportunity to become a party to the treaty might unduly delay ratification of the treaty by the US Senate. Because of the fervent (Japanese) desire for an early “majority” peace, IGUCHI said, the Japanese Government would be much disappointed if the signing of the treaty were delayed by reason of a procedural question. (S Tokyo 2001, 19 May 51).

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