"B" KOREA. Enemy Activities in Northeastern Korea. The 41st UK Marine Commando in its 6 April raid on the east coast rail line near Songjin learned that the Communists were anticipating a UN amphibious landing and that two North Korean divisions with artillery were deployed in the Songjin area to repel any such attempt.

It is stated that a Communist main supply route from Manchuria to Korea was from Hyesanjin (on the border due north of Hungnam) to Tanchon using secondary roads and that the Songjin to Tanchon coastal road had not been in use for a month. All young men in the area had been inducted into the North Korean Peoples Army and all civilians are mobilized for nightly repair work on roads and railroads.

The reported abandonment of the Songjin to Tanchon coastal road as a main supply route, if true, bespeaks the effectiveness of UN naval bombardment.

"A" Preparation for Air Activities Continues on the North Korean West Coast. 800 troops (possibly two battalions of the NK 5th Division) replaced civilian laborers on 12 March in construction activities at Ongjong-ni airfield, west of Chinnampo and that supplies were received by rail two or three times a week from Chinnampo.

North Korean air-ground recognition panels, established for use from November through February, are still in use.

COMMENT: These and similar reports from other sources, continue to indicate North Korean preparations for increased air activities by Communist air units. The utilization of air-ground recognition panels for as long a period as reported, however, would seem to indicate that active Communist air intervention was still not anticipated at the time of this report.

"A" Reports on "International Volunteer Army" for Korea. states that a new Communist offensive will be launched in Korea in the latter part of April or early May. The offensive will be supported by air, some armor, and possibly submarines. Mongolian "Volunteers" will be sent due to their physical similarity with the Chinese and Koreans.

COMMENT: This is the second intimation of Soviet plans for sending

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troops have been the most frequently mentioned as designated for "Volunteer" roles; 

estimates that the Soviet Mongol reinforcements potential is about 100-150,000 and that only 5 well-trained divisions could be formed. In view of the vast remaining manpower resources of China, such a manpower contribution would have no particularly advantageous effect on the Communist effort in Korea.