Correction to

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
(issue of 5 April 1951)

The first sentence of the Comment in article 4, page 5, should read:

No B-45's were reported to be in the area at the time of the sighting.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
4. Possible Soviet jet bomber sighted over northeast Korea:

On 29 March a twin-jet bomber, silver in color, was observed traveling at 400 miles per hour over northeastern Korea west of Songjin. According to field comment, the plane resembled a US B-45 jet bomber and may have been a "Soviet type 27 aircraft."

Comment: 16 B-45's were reported to be in the area at the time of the sighting. This is the first reported sighting of an enemy jet bomber in Korea. The Soviet "type 27" aircraft is believed to be the first jet bomber produced in numbers in the USSR. Although it appears to have been designed as a light bomber, it could be used for close support of ground troops.

5. Views of former UK Charge in Peking:

In a conversation with the US Consul General in Hong Kong, the former UK Charge in Peking, who is now en route to England, reportedly stated that (a) fear of US intentions toward China was an important factor in Chinese intervention in

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Korea, (b) the USSR will come to Peiping's aid if Chinese territory is attacked, and (c) Peiping will not reduce its terms for a Korean settlement -- although heavy Chinese losses may lead to an undeclared cease-fire restoring the situation prevailing before June-1950. With respect to Sino-Soviet relations, the UK Charge noted that Soviet personnel "are not much in evidence" in Peiping, and maintained that Peiping is unlikely to submit to Russian dictation but that Western pressure is forcing the Peiping regime into increasing dependence on the USSR.

Comment: The former Charge's views are largely in accord with the UK's China policy, which has been explicitly based on the premise that Western hostility to Peiping would force the regime into an unnatural dependence on the USSR. In recent months, as British belief in the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance has grown, the primary consideration of British policy in the Far East has been the desire to avoid an all-out war with China.