OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

Date: MAR 17 1951

NOTE:

1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current traffic in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. Comment represents the preliminary views of the responsible analysts and not necessarily the final view of the Office of Current Intelligence.

3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:

   "A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities

   "B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions or capabilities

   "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

"A" USSR. Soviet Threats of Withdrawal from the UN. Clarification has been received of an unusual statement made by Soviet propagandist Oleshchuk which was incorrectly reported as threatening Soviet withdrawal from the UN if the UN did not respond to the representations of the delegation of the World Council of Peace. (See OGI Daily Digests 7 & 12 Mar 51). Oleshchuk is now reported to have stated, in commenting on the formation of the World Peace Movement as a reaction to Western activities in the UN, that the recent World Peace Council appeal constitutes a second warning to the UN to carry out her chief function — preserving peace. If the warning has no results and UN countries continue to serve the cause of US aggression, then the peace loving countries would have to leave it, since they could not uphold its authority by participation. Emb Moscow notes that the Krem- lin remains free to judge whether the UN is heeding the warning rather than being bound by the reception accorded a specific WPC delegation. The Emb continues to believe that the WPC is being developed as a potential rival to the UN, to be used only when and if the USSR deems desirable. (S Moscow 1660, 14 Mar 51). COMMENT: A member of the Yugoslav delegation at the UN has indicated his belief that the USSR was not yet ready to withdraw from the UN but that withdrawal was almost inevitable unless there was a drastic change in the whole world political climate. The Yugoslav delegation believes that the USSR is probably making a radical reappraisal of the advantages of UN membership since Soviet UN propaganda has become less valuable and its Security Council veto power has been curtailed by transferal of power to the General Assembly. UN Secretary General Ume has received a letter from Joliot-Curie, President of the WPC, listing a delegation to be sent to the UN and requesting a date for consultation. He has replied that he hoped to meet the delegation in the course of a projected trip to Europe in the near future.

"C" Chilean Audience Frequently Walks out During Soviet Harangues. Emb Santiago reports that the Soviet performance in the Economic and Social Council to date has had the effect of pointing up Moscow's chronic efforts to hamstring the UN. The local consensus is that the USSR forfeited a propaganda opportunity by its obstructive tactics. Public interest in the sessions is now confined to key topics like forced labor. (C Santiago 480, 15 Mar 51).

"B" EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Former Cabinet Members Active in Political Work. Both former Minister of Industry, Rita Marko, and former Deputy Premier, Spiro Fano, who were released from their positions "to carry on more important duties" at the meeting of the Presidium of the Albanian People's Assembly on 5 March, have recently made public statements. Marko extended the greetings of the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party.
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(Communist) at the March 8th celebration of International Women's Day, and Pano wrote an article in Zerj I Popullit criticizing local Communist officials for prohibiting criticism of old members in local Party cadres by the newer members, (U FBIS, 12 Mar 51; U FBIS, 9 Mar 51). COMMENT: The public statements made recently by both men suggest that they have not been purged. Their release from Cabinet posts probably has no connection with the dismissal of Minister of Justice, Dr. Manol Konomu.

"C"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. No Public Trial for Archbishop Beran. According to press reports from Praha, Archbishop Beran, Catholic Primate of Czechoslovakia who was banished from his see on 10 March, will not be tried for his so-called "negative attitude to the Peoples' Democratic Republic." An article in the newspaper, Lidove Noviny, denied foreign radio broadcasts to the effect that Beran was under arrest and awaiting trial. (U NYT, 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: These statements indicate that Beran will not be given a public trial. It is likely, however, that Beran has already been tried in secret, which has resulted in his fine and banishment. The reaction of the press to foreign comment on the Archbishop's case indicates the sensitivity of the Communist regime towards reactions of Czechoslovakia's three-fourths Catholic population. It also provides indirect evidence of the effectiveness of VOA, BBC, and other western radio broadcasts in reaching and influencing the Czechoslovak public.

"B"

Foreign Trade Minister Reports on New Trade Agreement with the USSR. Antonin Gregor, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, announced on his return from Moscow that a commercial agreement affecting the exchange of goods between his country and the USSR for 1951 had been signed in the Soviet capital on 13 March 1951. In return for raw materials, machinery, grain, fodder, and food products, Czechoslovakia has agreed to export to the USSR heavy machinery, metal-industry products, textiles, chemical goods, and a long list of other items. Gregor assured the Czechoslovak people that over and above the 600,000 tons of wheat the Soviet Union had promised to deliver during 1951, Czechoslovakia would receive a supplementary shipment of 155,000 tons before the end of May. He warned, however, that the increased shipments would cause transportation difficulties and that, therefore, the rationing of bread and grain would have to continue. The Communist Foreign Trade Minister boasted that the USSR would deliver goods to Czechoslovakia at prices far below the world level and would, in return, purchase Czechoslovak exports at prices much higher than the capitalist world would have been willing to offer. (R FBIS, 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: Gregor's remarks contain the expected eulogies of the Soviet Union and are sufficiently apochromatic to raise serious doubts regarding their accuracy. The decision to increase Soviet economic demands on Czechoslovakia subsequent to the conclusion of the 1951 agreement in November 1950 and the current widespread purge of suspected nationalists from the Party and the Government are undoubtedly related phenomena. The significantly elevated Five-Year Plan targets promulgated by State Planning Chairman Dolansky probably have been designed in an attempt to satiate the voracious Soviet maw.
POLAND. Annual Trade Fair at Poznan Canceled for 1951. Ludwig Grosfeld, President of the Polish Chamber of Commerce confirmed in a recent conversation that the annual international trade fair in Poznan would not be held this year. In recent years the fair has become more a propaganda effort and less an actual trade fair. Grosfeld attributed the Government's decision to the small foreign participation last year. The US Emb suggests that the decision to abandon the fair may be taken as another indication of the movement of Polish commerce and industry away from traditional trade relationships. This does not mean the Emb feels that Poland has abandoned its desire to trade with the West. Rather, Poland's intentions seem definitely to be to continue trade, serving Poland's interests, with the West. (R Warsaw Des 497, 27 Feb 51).

CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES. Radio Belgrade in Bulgarian 15 March: "Refugees arriving from Bulgaria tell about the building of new highways leading toward the frontier, the bringing up of military units..." On the same date, 15 Mar, Radio Moscow in Serbo-Croat stated: "They (the Yugoslavs) feverishly build strategic roads along the Bulgarian frontier and concentrate their troops on the same border." (R FBIE, 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: Before they call I will answer.
"A" INDIA. Third Shipment of Chinese Rice to Arrive in India. According to the Ceylon radio, a ship carrying 9,200 tons of Chinese rice was to arrive in Madras, India, on 16 March. Two earlier shiploads of Chinese rice totalling 13,100 tons had arrived in Calcutta on 19 and 27 February. China has contracted to deliver 50,000 tons of rice to India in return for 16,500 bales of jute bags. (R FBIS, Far East, 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: Arrival of the first shipload of Chinese rice was celebrated with appropriate ceremonies. Meanwhile, plans to ship 2,000,000 tons of US wheat to India are bogged down awaiting Congressional action.

"B" SYRIA. Al-Azm Asked to Form the Government. According to the Damascus radio, President Atassi has asked former Premier Khalid Bey al-Azm to head the government in view of the insistence of Prime Minister Qudsi and his colleagues that their resignations be accepted. (See OGI Daily Digest, 12 Mar 51). In another report, several hours previous to the Damascus broadcast, US Ambassador Cannon stated that a communiqué issued by Qudsi's Populist Party indicated that the Populists would refrain from forming or participating in any new cabinet but would give their support to any cabinet consisting of parliamentary deputies. This statement seemingly rules out Populist support for al-Azm, who is not a deputy. (R FBIS, Western Europe and Near East, 16 Mar 51; C Damascus 463, 15 Mar 51). COMMENT: Rumors have been circulating for the past week concerning the possibility that al-Azm would be asked to head the government if Qudsi insists on resigning. The equivocal communiqué of the Populist Party and the interference of the army in governmental matters raise some doubt as to whether al-Azm, a fairly strong independent, either would desire or be able to form a cabinet of more than short duration. However, in a similar difficult crisis (December 1949), al-Azm achieved success where Qudsi failed. Al-Azm's strong ambition and practical realism in regard to the army's current power in Syria might again favor him. While al-Azm would be acceptable as Premier from a Western viewpoint, his success in forming a cabinet would not alter the essential instability of a government upon which the army exercises an undue amount of influence.

"A" INDOCHINA. De Lattre's Demand for Reinforcements May Not Be Met. French Defense Minister Moch is reported to have told General De Lattre, who is now in Paris, that De Lattre's request for 12,000 "specialized soldiers" for his forces in Indochina would prevent France from fulfilling its European commitments. De Lattre is said to have expressed the view that his demands are "modest" and that for the first time since 1946 it was possible to foresee victory in Indochina. (U NYTimes, 17 Mar 51). COMMENT: General De Lattre has previously informed US officials in Indochina that he will resign his post if his request for reinforcements is not fulfilled by the French Government.
BURMA. Chinese Communist Intervention.

New Seng, the Kachin rebel leader, and 300 followers have completed their training under Communist direction in Yunnan and, having been fully equipped, are now awaiting orders to infiltrate north Burma. In addition, 600 Burmese who are also undergoing training in Yunnan are expected to be ready for operations in Burma by mid-April. Chu Chia-pi, the successful Communist guerrilla leader in Yunnan, has been appointed Chief of Staff of the 14th Army and assigned the responsibility of directing Communist guerrilla activities in north Burma. Two Chinese Communist Divisions recently arrived in Paoshan (not far from the Burma border on the Burma Road) but that Chinese moves in Burma beyond their present program of training and supplying material will depend upon developments in Indochina - direct Chinese intervention in that country. The Embassy comments that Chu is ideally suited for his reported assignment, that it appears that the Chinese are now ready to actively support the Burmese Communist insurrection, and that the method of intervention will be most difficult for the Burmese Government to resist. (S Rangoon 632, 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: New Seng enjoys considerable influence in north Burma and if provided with proper equipment and a safe haven in China, he could create widespread havoc as well as gain new recruits.

Burmes forces are fully occupied with insurgents in lower Burma and cannot spare adequate troops to prevent widespread incursions into Burma from China. Furthermore, Chinese aid to the Burmese Communists will instill new spirit into the latter's badly lagging insurrection and develop it as a serious threat to the Burmese Government.

AUSTRALIA. Parliament to Be Dissolved. The Governor-General has agreed to Prime Minister Menzies' request that both houses of Parliament be dissolved and will issue a proclamation to that effect on 19 March. The general election will be held on 28 April. (U FBIS Wire, Melbourne, 17 Mar 51).

COMMENT: An opposition-controlled Senate has consistently stalemated Government legislation since the election of the Liberal-Country coalition in December 1949. Since the entire Senate membership retired upon a Parliamentary dissolution (ordinarily Senate elections are staggered), the Government hopes to obtain a clear majority in both houses as a result of the new elections. Although the popular vote will be extremely close, it is currently believed that the Government can eke out a victory.

Conscription Bill Passed. The Senate on 15 March passed the National Service Bill providing limited conscription for military service. (U FBIS 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: The National Service Act establishes a five-year military service plan. It provides for compulsory registration of 18 year-olds for approximately six months training during the first year of service and for shorter periods during the following four years.
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25X1C.

"A" CHINA. Policy Toward Indochina. The following indications of a possible change in Peiping's policy toward Indochina: (1) orders from Peiping to Canton that the "volunteer" corps for Indochina not be assembled for training; (2) dispatch to North China of five battalions previously scheduled for "volunteer" service in Indochina; (3) statement of a Chinese Communist official that all such "volunteers" forces might be sent north; and (4) diversion to Hankou of large ammunition stocks originally consigned to Indochina. 25X1A

COMMENT: The above report represents the negation of a rumor by new rumors. The existence of a "volunteer" program has been reported but has never been reliably confirmed. It is possible, however, that such a program was contemplated and that, in view of the course of the Korean conflict, it has been suspended.

"B" Sino-Indian "Non-Aggression" Pact Feathers Are Rumored. 25X1C

In early February the Peiping regime received an official communication from Nehru pledging India's friendship and expressing a desire for talks on Sino-Indian border demarcation and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Peiping replied with demands that India demonstrate its sincerity, assure non-cooperation with the US, and submit details of its border claims.

COMMENT: In early February, a New Delhi spokesman denied the rumor that a Sino-Indian non-aggression pact was under consideration, and in late February Peiping assured the GGI that Communist China subscribes to the Indian demarcation of the boundaries. Nehru's neutral position in the East-West conflict is well established, and he is believed to be unlikely to conclude a non-aggression pact with a major nation of the Soviet bloc.

"C" Successor to JEN Pi-shih? 25X1X

Chen has been nominated as "successor" to JEN Pi-shih, Chinese Communist leader who died in October 1950. 25X1A

COMMENT: does not specify the manner in which P'ENG is to be regarded as JEN's successor. It is possible that P'ENG, an alternate member of the Secretariat of the CCP Politburo, will fill JEN's position on the Secretariat. Current members of the Secretariat are MAO Tse-tung, CHU Teh, CHOU En-lai and LIU Shao-ch'i. If this surmise is correct, P'ENG, who was recently "elected" Mayor of Peiping, will have been elevated to the Secretariat over two other alternates, KAO Kang and CH'IEN Yun.

"D" KOREA. Attitude of the ROK. The ROK Defense Minister is reported to have stated on 15 March that UN forces had the duty of driving north to the Yalu River. He warned that "victory at the 38th Parallel" would mean failure in that the Communists could again attack southward at any time. (APHS, 16 Mar 51). 25X1C

COMMENT: Although the predominant interest of the ROK in gaining control over North Korea is understandable, the ROK government is probably irritating its UN supporters by continually harping on the subject of unification.
"C" Seoul Recaptured. The recapture of Korea's capital city, Seoul, has done much to raise morale in the ROK. The ROK government, however, is aware of the extent of destruction in Seoul and has requested refugees from the city to remain where they are behind UN lines until notified to return to Seoul. Various governmental agencies have dispatched investiga
tive and relief groups to the Seoul area and some mention has been made of the imminent return of the government to the former capital. (RFbis, 16 Mar 51).

"C" JAPAN. Foreign Office Studying US Troop Arrangements. The Japanese Foreign Office is studying the problem of resolving the differences between US military regulations and Japanese civil law in anticipation of US troops being stationed in Japan after a peace treaty. The Japanese Government is anxious to devise an arrangement under which US troops in Japan will have the maximum effective freedom of movement in the interests of Japan's security while at the same time avoiding the precedent of granting extra-territorial rights to foreign troops. (RFbis, PANA, 15 Mar 51). COMMENT: The Japanese, after more than five years of Occupation, are particularly sensitive on this subject. Any infringement of Japan's sovereignty by post-treaty US troops could well lead to a recurrence of anti-foreign (especially anti-US) sentiment.

"B" Communist Party to Be Banned. Well-informed sources in Tokyo insist that the Japanese Government has reached a decision to outlaw the Japanese Communist Party, and will present legislation to that effect to the Diet in May. (U NYT, 17 Mar 51). COMMENT: Such action has been under consideration for the past two years. Although no official confirmation has been received, it is possible that recent leftist Korean activities in Japan and the discovery of Korean espionage rings may have provoked a definite decision.
GERMANY. East German Traffic Harassing Continues. A further demonstration of east Germans against US trains running between western Germany and Berlin took place on 12 March in Magdeburg. This incident, the fourth in the last two weeks, involved a group of approximately 75 east Germans who paraded on the platform singing "Ami Go Home" and pasted anti-American posters on the side of the train. One US Military Policeman was struck in the face with a small book as he was leaning out of the window of the train. Ten to fifteen Russian soldiers were present, but made no attempt to restrain the Germans. (R State, Berlin 1159, 15 Mar 51). COMMENT: Communist harassment of transportation in and out of Berlin appears to be on the increase. A renewal of east German measures against Berlin-bound truck traffic is indicated in press reports of 15 March that Soviet zone frontier guards, in their checking of vehicles, have slowed down traffic to about one truck per hour.

FRANCE. Tightening of Party Reins Reduces Gaullist Electoral Prospects. In a speech before the National Council of the Gaullist Rally of the French People (RPF) 11 March, General de Gaulle ruled against electoral affiliation of non-RPF candidates with his party, and thus seemingly abandoned his former appeal for support from all non-Communists. This ruling seems to be an attempt to bring into line those "political bigamists" who need Gaullist votes for election (C Paris 5331, 13 Mar 51). COMMENT: De Gaulle's realization that the electoral reform measures envisaged by the Government coalition are aimed at limiting the RPF's as well as the Communists' strength in the coming election is forcing him to work for rigid party organization at the expense of a wider field of influence. The RPF can still be expected, however, to obtain roughly 100 seats and become a major party in the next assembly.

AUSTRIA. Communist Demonstrations Reported for Easter Holidays.
the Austrian Communist Party has made plans for a
25X1C march on Vienna and a demonstration during the Easter holidays. The
party anticipates the participation of 50,000 Communist youths. The
25X1A demonstration will be the culmination of a
25X1A propaganda campaign demanding a 15% increase in salaries and that
political circles in Vienna believe the Communists will attempt to
25X1A provoke the fall of the Government as a result of the march.

COMMENT: Except for reference to the
dowfall of the Government, this report is virtually identical with
those concerning a Communist demonstration planned for Whitsun tide
(in May). There have been no other reports indicating that a youth
march was planned for Easter, but it is possible that the Communists,
during the next week, may attempt to provoke large-scale strikes in
conjunction with such a march. In this manner, a larger demonstration
could probably be effected, accompanied by sporadic violence. There
is little likelihood, however, that the Communists, either at Easter
or Whitsun tide, could provoke the downfall of the Government.

"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Government will Try to Step Up Colonial Recruiting.
The House of Commons has passed a Conservative MP's private motion
calling on the Government to tap the manpower resources of the colonies
by raising more colonial and native troops. The Government reportedly
accepted this in good part and promised further efforts in this
direction, but stated that there are various practical difficulties.
(U New York Times, 17 Mar 51). COMMENT: The Government has been
becoming increasingly concerned about the problem of raising more
troops (See OCI Daily Digest, 13 Mar 51), and doubtless welcomes wide
parliamentary support in the effort to utilize colonial manpower.
The main source of such manpower is the African colonies and the
practical difficulties center largely on the low level of education
among the natives and the shortage of British junior and noncommissioned
officers possessing the type of training and experience necessary.
There will also be difficulty in getting the colonial territories to
shoulder some of the added financial burden. Any rapid expansion of
colonial forces is therefore not to be expected.

"C" UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. Opposition to Restrictions on Colored Voters
Focuses on Constitutional Issues. The Malan Government on 5 March
introduced into the House of Assembly its key controversial bill to
remove the "Cape Colored" (i.e., mixed breed) voters from the common
electoral roll, allowing them to vote only for their own separate
representatives. The Opposition immediately raised the constitutional
point that this right is protected in one of the "entrenched clauses"
of the South Africa Act (passed by the British Parliament in 1910 as
the basic law of the Union) and hence could be altered only by a two-
thirds majority of both House and Senate sitting jointly. The Govern-
ment, in its reply, argued that the "coloreds" voting rights will still
be preserved and that in any case the Statute of Westminster in 1931 made the Union fully sovereign with the right to decide all matters of procedure. The Speaker is expected to give his ruling on this point after the House's Easter recess. (U London Times, 8, 9, and 12 Mar 51). COMMENT: The Speaker will probably rule in favor of the Government which, though unable to muster a two-thirds majority of both houses, can easily pass the bill by a simple majority. The Opposition will then be weakened in future elections by the loss of "colored" votes in a number of critical constituencies, and the way will be paved immediately for other racially restrictive measures on the Government's legislative program. The constitutional issue also aroused some alarm among English-speaking white South Africans because their right to equal political and cultural status with the more numerous Afrikaans-speaking population is similarly guaranteed by "entrenched clause", and the Malan Government contains elements who openly profess a desire to make the Union an Afrikaner republic.

"B" UNITED KINGDOM. Oil Company Makes Counter Offer to Iran. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) has formally offered to discuss with Iran the creation of a separate oil company in Iran with 50% of the profits accruing to Iran, and further offered to pay for the current year the higher royalty rates provided under a still unratified agreement supplementing its present contract. Both offers are contingent on assurances that the company's concession will be continued. The British note, in which these offers are made, stresses the legal right of AIOC to operate in Iran until 1993, points out that any disputes over the terms of the concession should properly be referred to arbitration, and suggests that Iran should draw a distinction between nationalization and expropriation. (S London 4/24, 14 Mar 51; U New York Times, 17 Mar 51). COMMENT: This note, sent to the Iranian Government on 14 March in an effort to prevent passage of the nationalization recommendations, failed in its immediate purpose. However, its implication that if Iran would agree not to expropriate the company's holdings some agreement might be worked out, could form a basis for further discussion. The 50-50 profit sharing offer, although known to the late Prime Minister Razmara, has become public knowledge for the first time. In addition, there has been no definition of what the Iranians mean by "nationalization". Although the high pitch of national feeling must be kept in mind, it is conceivable that extensive bargaining might end with AIOC being permitted to continue its operations under some formula more agreeable to Iran than the present arrangements.
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLE TRAFFIC

17 March 1951

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

BELGIUM. Attitude toward Proposed Schuman Plan Organization

Upsetting. US Embassy officials in France are disturbed by Belgian
Foreign Minister Van Zeeland's dissatisfaction over the proposed
Schuman Plan organization. (See CIC Daily Digest, S/S Supplement,
15 Mar 51 for comments by Van Zeeland). It is felt that the risks
resulting from Van Zeeland's attitude are that: (1) the Belgians
may try to initial the draft treaty with reservations—an eventual-
ity which probably would not be acceptable to the other participat-
ing parties; and (2) when the Foreign Ministers meet shortly to sign
the coal-steel pool treaty, Van Zeeland may try to open new questions
on the grounds that the conference delegates could not commit their
Governments. (S S/S Paris 5139, 15 Mar 51). COMMENT: Although the
Belgians never accepted the Schuman Plan principle enthusiastically,
it is unlikely that, at this late date, they will impede efforts to
initial the agreement. Furthermore, Belgian ratification of the
Schuman Plan Treaty probably will be forthcoming without too much
domestic opposition.

FRANCE. Exclusion from Malta Conference Irks French. Foreign Office
officials have emphatically protested US and UK failure to invite
France to participate in the talks regarding the defense of the
eastern Mediterranean which opened at Malta on 12 Mar. The French
stand is based partly on fears of the repercussions which absence
from the Malta talks will have on North Africa. (S S/S Paris 5136,
15 Mar 51). COMMENT: The French position is that any defense prob-
lem in any sector of the Mediterranean should be discussed by all
three powers, and the Foreign Office considers participation by the
three powers in the declaration on the Near East of May 1950 a
precedent. Because of the strong reaction in Moslem states to
recent developments in French Morocco, France fears that its exclu-
sion from such high-level discussions will produce an unfavorable
impression on the Arab governments.

Foreign Office Warns US of President Auriol's Volatility. In discuss-
ing the proposed topics for President Auriol's conversations with US
officials during his visit in the US, the Foreign Office has pointedly
reminded Embassy Paris that under the French constitution the President may act only with the approval of a minister and that his personal views do not commit the Government. As Auriol is a volatile conversationalist and holds strong personal views on various international subjects, he may express himself extensively in private conversations, and these opinions should not be taken as official unless they coincide with the Government line. (S S/S Paris 5k35, 15 Mar 51).

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UNITED KINGDOM. Public Criticism of US Continues. US Embassy London estimates that British public attitudes toward the US remain "tindery", despite some decline in the intensity of adverse criticism of the US. The Embassy further points out that although there is no doubt concerning fundamental Anglo-US agreement on basic international issues and the Government deprecates this criticism's effect on Anglo-US relations, these public attitudes have been sufficiently strong to affect the shading and emphasis on some government policies. Particular issues likely to arouse public opinion are noted as Taiwan, crossing the 38th parallel in Korea, sanctions against China, German rearmament, Spain, and further command appointments under NATO. The Embassy also finds a growing public interest in international questions and attributes this partly to the recent intensification of domestic partisan political warfare which tends to magnify minor disputes. (S S/S London 4928, 14 Mar 51). COMMENT: British public opinion has been unusually sensitive to US policies and views during the whole postwar period, as the US has assumed leadership of the Western world and the UK has lost its former pre-eminence in international affairs. Above all, the British fear US inexperience and impulsiveness in the handling of foreign affairs and an alleged tendency to substitute aggressive bullying tactics for subtle negotiations. The current international arms race and the threat of a new world war being precipitated by events in the Far East have magnified this fear recently, while emphasizing Britain's strategic vulnerability and relative weakness. These currents of opinion are not strong enough to disrupt the close Anglo-US partnership but they can reduce its effectiveness considerably if disregarded.
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