1. Across-the-table talks hold only hope for peace--Prime Minister Nehru has taken the position, in discussing the Korean crisis with US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi, that the only hope of preventing the outrush of war lies in across-the-table talks among the powers most immediately concerned, such as the US, UK, USSR, and Communist China. Nehru acknowledged that collective opposition to aggression seemed in the long run the most effective deterrent to war but urged that when the house is on fire, efforts for the moment must be concentrated on extinguishing the fire rather than on applying fire prevention methods. He expressed the fear that perhaps it is already too late for talks among the great powers, that war is perhaps inevitable, and that all that is left to do is for each power to get into the war, or to keep out of war as gracefully as possible. He also expressed concern lest the Chinese Communists had already decided that war was inevitable and therefore could not be deflected from their course.

2. Yugoslav estimate of Chinese intentions--Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj, in assuring US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade that the Yugoslav delegation at the UN has been instructed to seek passage by the General Assembly of the Security Council resolution on Chinese intervention in Korea, expressed the hope that an honorable solution to the Korean situation could be found which would prevent the extension of hostilities. Kardelj said he had received no intimation, however, that the Chinese Communists had become "reasonable" and attributed Chinese intervention in Korea primarily to the

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expansionist tendency of the Peiping regime and its
desire to detract Chinese attention from internal dif-
ficulties. Kardelj believes that the intervention, although
supported by the USSR, was primarily undertaken at
Peiping's initiative; he suspects that the Chinese may
have gone into Korea in larger force than Moscow wanted.

3. Information concerning Chinese Communist intentions--
US Consul Bombay has forwarded a 19 November press
dispatch (reportedly suppressed by the Indian Government
and a British news agency) from an Indian journalist, re-
cently returned from China, who is considered by the Con-
sul to be an "unusually good observer." According to this
dispatch, Chinese Communist leaders had decided by 19 No-
ember to intervene deliberately in Korea, had completed plans
to throw half a million of their finest troops into Korea, were
fully prepared to face any consequences, and had received a
pledge of Soviet assistance in the event their campaign to
drive UN troops down the length of the Korean peninsula
should meet with reverses or defeat. The dispatch cites
"authoritative information" from Peiping indicating that
the Chinese Communists had signed a secret agreement with
the USSR in October to end the threat of "imperialist aggres-
sion" and had accepted the Soviet views that the US intends to
destroy the Communist regime in China and therefore the best
defense was a well-timed and well-prepared offensive action
in Korea. The Indian journalist reportedly believes that Indian
Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping now recognizes the true in-
tentions of the Chinese Communists but is still "sugar-coating"
reports to New Delhi for fear he might lose prestige and the
confidence of Nehru.
EUROPE

4. FRANCE: Analysis of French reaction to Korean crisis--

US Embassy Paris reports that the feeling is being increas-
ingly encountered among the French that it is incumbent upon
France, together with the UK, to exercise a moderating in-
fluence on the US in order to avoid a major war in the Far
East. The Embassy says that what the French fear at this
time is a spontaneous reaction of US public opinion to a
challenge and a quick, decisive response by the US Govern-
ment. The Embassy analyzes this fear as springing from
such latent feelings as: (a) geographic and political factors
might lead the US to decide more lightly than Western Europe
about war and peace; (b) the US might be impelled to make
military commitments not in its own interests and therefore
not in Europe’s interests; (c) the US has not in the past listened
sufficiently to counsels of moderation from its allies; and
(d) France and Britain must now play the role of moderators
and detached advisers to their mighty and much-needed friend.
Underlying these feelings, the Embassy emphasizes, is to be
found the French belief that they are naked in the face of
possible Soviet aggression in Europe and the paramount French
fear of a Soviet military occupation, even of short duration.

The Embassy believes that despite these feelings,
the US can take at face value the recent statements by
Premier Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman concerning
French unity with the West and firm adherence to the UN
and the principle of collective security. In the Embassy’s
view, France can be counted on to make its contribution to
the building up of strength and unity in Europe and the defense
of Indochina. Concerning the Far East, however, the Embassy
warns that France’s war is in Indochina, not Korea, and that
therefore the French would find comparatively palatable a
compromise solution which would involve a return to the 38th
Parallel and admission of Communist China to the UN.
5. IRAN: Korean crisis causing loss of faith in US--US Embassy Tehran reports that the reaction in Iran to the current Korean situation is an increasing loss of faith in the power of the US to resist Soviet aggression because the US cannot resist "satellite Communist forces." According to the Embassy, there is also a stronger feeling that Iran should remain entirely neutral, continuing endeavors to restore the balance of great powers in Iran, according to former Iranian policy.

6. PAKISTAN: Anti-Western sentiment growing--US Ambassador Warren reports rapidly growing restiveness in Pakistan over the lack of progress in resolving differences with India, particularly the Kashmir dispute. Warren points out that as this frustration grows it will impair the domestic political position of Prime Minister Liaquat, who has already been under sporadic attack for fruitless "collaboration with the Anglo-American bloc," which is accused of taking Pakistan for granted and bending all its efforts to conciliate India. Warren anticipates that Liaquat, even though he may see no imminent threat to his leadership, may quite possibly find it expedient to manifest greater independence of the Western Powers or even take up a "third position."