2. Korea - North China - Japan

As of 25 October, only 20,000 North Korean troops (elements of seven divisions and four security brigades) were believed opposing advancing UN forces. An additional 15,000 are north of the 38th parallel, but cut off behind UN lines. An estimated 10,000 remaining in South Korea, apparently not centrally organized or coordinated, have continued guerrilla-type operations.

Disappearance of the bulk of North Korean radio communications, despite the continued existence of limited air force, ground force, and police radio nets, attests to the disruption of the chain of command. Present location of Supreme Headquarters is unknown. A North Korean message of 16 October indicates that Musan (40 miles northwest of Chongjin), as well as Simjiju, present North Korean capital, may be an exit point for military and government remnants. Communications intelligence has as yet provided no indication of the location of any North Korean radio station in Manchuria.

Soviet and Chinese public statements indicate a long period of guerrilla warfare. On 19 October North Korean Supreme Headquarters directed that personnel not withdrawn from a subordinate headquarters "go into concealment and go about their own business."

There has been no definitive evidence in communications intelligence of Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.
Chinese Communist messages sent during the period
10 September to 15 October refer to the military use of all
freight cars at Shanghai. Since the messages concern the
inability to make commercial shipments between Shanghai and
North China and Manchuria, they may indicate a considerable
northward military movement. A message of 21 October
reports observation of twenty northbound troop trains between
Shanghai and Tientsin during one week. Additional troops and
supplies for Fourth Field Army units in Manchuria might be
involved.

Soviet messages of late September to Harbin and
Peiping, concerning the delayed pick-up of petroleum products
both in tank cars and containers at transshipment points on
the Soviet-Manchurian border, may indicate clogging of Chinese
coil transport facilities. During the spring large quantities
of aviation gasoline entered Manchuria from the USSR. Since
this gasoline is not known to have been transported south,
nor to have been used during the summer, it is believed still
available for use in Manchuria.

Large Chinese Communist purchases of drugs and
medicines abroad during past months could represent an attempt
to satisfy huge normal requirements, but a sharp increase in
the rate of acquisition since the start of the Korean war may
indicate military stockpiling.

The annual major-scale maneuver of the Soviet 5th
Fleet, conducted in the Vladivostok area between 6 and 13
September, appeared to differ from those of previous years
in that tactics of an offensive rather than defensive nature
were stressed.