CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS

Malik and the UN. Soviet tactics in the Security Council during September will in general conform to the pattern developed during August; any variations will be largely the result of having lost those opportunities for procedural obstructionism deriving from Malik's position as president of the SC. Nevertheless, in continuing his campaign to use the Chinese Communist charges of US aggression on Taiwan and US violations of Manchuria to pin the label of aggressor on the US, Malik will still have considerable opportunity to obstruct, delay and confuse the deliberations of the Security Council. This campaign, however, designed primarily for Asian consumption, may begin to backfire during September as reliance on the veto rather than purely procedural maneuvers will dramatize Soviet intransigence. Soviet propaganda efforts will be further deflated by US willingness both to permit UN investigations of the Taiwan and Manchurian issues and to abide by majority UN decisions regarding their disposition.

North Korean Reserves: The numerous reports of a readily available strategic manpower reserve in Manchuria composed of Korean veterans (who had served with Chinese Communist forces in the Manchurian campaign of 1946-48) tend to be discounted by the non-appearance of such troops in the combat area. It is logical to assume that if such a reserve had been in existence on 25 June, it would have been committed shortly after UN forces had been committed and when its use might have proved decisive. Moreover, since mid-July the North Korean Army has been using recruits with as little as two weeks' training. In addition, even if not immediately available in concentration areas on 27 June, there has been ample time since that date to organize and equip any Korean veterans in Manchuria who would have been far more
useful in combat than the inexperienced reinforcements being used. Thus, it is likely that the North Koreans will have to depend for further replacements on: (1) non-veteran Koreans recruited in Manchuria and that part of Korea now in Communist hands; (2) untrained Chinese Communist or Soviet manpower resources; or (3) Chinese Communist or Soviet military units, if it is decided to commit such forces in order either to defend the 38th parallel or to drive UN forces out of Korea.